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2A B S T R A C T
THE FEDERAL LARD DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY: 
NATIONAL PLANNING AND NATIONAL UNITY IN 
PENINSULAR MALAYSIA
National socio-economic development planning in Peninsular 
Malaysia is guided by the New Development strategy which resulted 
from the race-riots of May 1969 “ events which were themselves 
clear indication that Peninsular Malaysia lacked national unity.
The New Development Strategy has two components, Rukun Negara 
(the National Ideology) and the New Economic Policy.
The New Economic Policy aims to eradicate poverty and to 
restructure the socio-economic system in order to remove the 
inter-communal imbalances which were identified as the root 
causes of disharmony in the country. In this way it is hoped to 
create national unity in Peninsular Malaysia.
A major weapon in the government's bid to implement the 
New Economic Policy is the Federal Land Development Authority 
(FELDA).- Since its establishment in 1956, FELDA has become 
not merely Peninsular Malaysia's foremost land developer, but has 
been raised by the Malaysian government to premier status among 
agencies implementing national socio-economic development policy.
The present study assesses the ability of the Federal Land 
Development Authority to comply with the Malaysian government's 
requirement that through land development FELDA be a major 
contributor to the attainment of national unity in Peninsular 
Malaysia. The assessment is undertaken by first analysing the 
reasons why planning failed to create national unity before 1969* 
and - in the light of the knowledge gained from this analysis - by 
then assessing FELDA's qualifications for meeting the responsi­
bilities placed upon it by the post-1969 Plans designed to 
rectify the situation of socio-economic imbalance. The study 
considers the nature of inter-communal imbalance in Peninsular 
Malaysia, and indicates the political and other constraints which 
govern planning approaches. The study concludes by presenting the 
main findings regarding the Federal Land Development Authority's 
ability to contribute to the attainment of national unity in 
Peninsular Malaysia, with particular attention paid to FELDA's 
ability to contribute to the implementation of the government's 
New Economic Policy in the Malay-dominated rural areas.
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GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS, ABBREVIATIONS 
AND BAHASA MALAYSIA WORDS
The National language of the Federation of Malaysia - the 
Bahasa Malaysia - is in fact Malay, the language of the 
Federation's principal community. The selection of Malay as the 
National language has come about partly because of the Malays 
status as the largest indigenous community, and partly because 
of the political requirement that Malay culture and institutions 
must form the basis of national unity within the Federation.
The Glossary lists the acronyms, abbreviations and Malay 
words contained in the thesis. The spelling of Malay words 
Is now standardised, but occasional alternative spelling may 
still be encountered. The Glossary reflects this situation 
where appropriate.
Alliance the coalition between the United 
Malays National Organization (U.M.N.O.), 
the Malayan Chinese Association (M.C.A.) 
and the Malayan Indian Congress (M.I.C.) 
Formed in 1952 to lead Peninsular 
Malaysia to independence, the Alliance 
collapsed after the crisis of May, 1969*
bahasa language, hence Bahasa Malaysia or 
Malaysian language, Bahasa Malaysia is 
also termed Bahasa Kebangsaan, the 
National language.
bahru, baru 
Barisan Nasional
new.
National Front.
The Barisan Nasional replaced the Alliance 
as the main political coalition in 
Malaysia, and currently dominates politics 
In the Federation. The Barisan Nasional 
is essentially the.Alliance writ large, 
U.M.N.O., M.C.A. and M.I.C. having been 
joined in coalition by most of the 
Federation's remaining political parties.
batik light cotton cloth, the pattern created by 
using wax or starch to protect selected 
portions from the effects of the dyes.
besar - big or large; powerful or important.
bin
bukit
bumiputera, bumiputra
D. A. P.
D. A* R. A.
Datuk, Dato1
Dewan Rakyat
dusun
P. A. M. A.
F E. L. D. A.
E. I. D. A.
Gerakan
gunong, gunung
gula
haji
jalan
J. K. K. R.
kampung, kampong
I?
son of; used to indicate family 
relationship, as in Ahmad bin Alias,
Ahmad son of Alias.
hill,
native or indigenous people; usually used 
as a synonym for the Malays, and translated 
as princes or sons of the soil.
Democratic Action Party.'
Pahang Tenggara Regional Authority.
literally grandfather, here used as a 
respectful title for a man of high rank or 
status.
House of Representatives. The Federal 
Parliament comprises the Yang di-Pertuan 
Agong (King or Supreme Sovereign), the 
Dewan Negara (Senate), and the Dewan 
Rakyat. The Dewan Rakyat is an elective 
assembly corresponding to the Dritish House 
of Commons: a dewan is a hall or meeting
place.
orchard.
Federal Agricultural Marketing Authority.
Federal Land Development Authority.
Federal Industrial Development Authority.
Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia, or Malaysian People's 
Movement; sometimes abbreviated to G. R. M.
mountain, peak.
sugar.
used to denote a man who has made the 
pilgrimage to Mecca.
road, street.
Jawatan Kuasa Kemajuan Rancangan, or FELDA 
Scheme Development Committee.
village, especially a Malay village; may be 
used also to denote a suburb of largely Malay 
character, as in the Kampong Bahru area of 
Kuala Lumpur,
kebangsaan - national; Bahasa Kebangsaan, National language.
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kedai
K. E * I • 0« R. a .
K. E. TENGAH 
kilang 
kopi 
kuala
laut 
L. P. M.
lumpur 
M . A • D. A.
M. A. R. A.
M. A. R. D. E. C. 
M. C. A.
menteri, mentri
merdeka 
M. I. C.
M. I. P. P.
N. A. P. R. A.
negara 
Orang Asli
padang
- shop; kedai kopi, coffee shop.
- Johore Tenggara Regional Authority,
- Trengganu Tengah Regional Authority.
- mill or factory.
- coffee.
- estuary; also a confluence between two 
rivers.
- sea.
- Labour Party Malaysia.
- mud, or muddy.
- Muda Agricultural Development Authority, 
the organization in charge of the Muda 
Irrigation Project in Kedah-Perlis.
- Majlis Amanah Rakyat or Council for the 
Development of the Indigenous People, 
charged with assisting bumiputra participa­
tion in commerce and industry.
- Malaysian Rubber Development Corporation.
- Malayan Chinese Association, a founder- 
member of the Alliance.
- minister, person at head of a department of 
State and usually a member of the Cabinet; 
Mentri Besar, Chief Minister of a state.
- independent, self-governing; used also in 
the sense of a noun, as in Merdekai , Freedom
- Malayan Indian Congress, a founder-member of 
the Alliance.
- Malaysian Industrial Development Finance Ltd
- National Padi and Rice Authority.
- country, nation state.
- the forest-dwelling, aboriginal peoples of 
Peninsular Malaysia; literally original 
(asli) people (orang).
- field or plain; often used to denote an 
open space, playing field or green at the 
centre of a town or village.
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padi
P. A. P.
P. A. S.
pembangunan 
P E R. N A S.
pertanian 
P.- M. I, P.
P. P. P.
P . R,
putera, putra 
P. V. D.
rakyat
R. I. 3. D. A.
Rukunegara
S. E. D. C.
sendirian berhad
S. P.
sungai, sungei
syarikat
tanah
- rice growing in the field, or unhusked 
rice grain,
- People's Action Party, later the Democratic 
Action Party.
- Parti Islam Sa-Tanah Melayu, the Malay 
form of Pan-Malayan Islamic Party.
- development.
“ Perbadanan Nasional Berhad or National 
Corporation, a government financed holding 
company established to speed the creation 
of a Malay commercial and industrial 
community.
- agricultural,
- Pan-Malayan Islamic Party.
- People's Progressive Party.
- Parti Rakyat, the People's Party.
- prince.
- Public Works Department; in Malay Jabatan 
Kerja Raya, J. K. R.
- citizens or subjects of a country, the 
people; sometimes spelt ra'ayat.
- Rubber Industry Smallholders Development 
Authority.
- National Ideology, the principles and rules 
intended to guide national unity in the 
Federation; made up from rukun (principle) 
and negara (country), and spelt alternatively 
as Rukun Negara.
- State Economic Development Corporation.
- the equivalent of company limited, often 
abbreviated to Sdn. Bhd. (Co. Ltd.).
- Socialist Front,
- river.
- company, firm.
- land, soil; Tanah Melayu, the Malay Land, a 
Malay expression for Peninsular Malaysia.
20
Tuanku
Tun
Tunku 
U. D. A.
U. D. P.
ulu
U. M. G. 0.
U. M. N. 0.
- honorific title given to a ruler and to 
members of a royal family, equivalent to 
Highness.
- title given to holder of Seri Maharaja 
Mangku Negara (S. M. N.) or of Seri Setia 
Mahkota (S. S. M.), respectively the highest 
and second highest Orders of Chivalry 
conferred by the King.
- an honorific applied to important persons.
- Urban Development Authority.
- United Democratic Party.
- upstream, the upper part of a river; 
sometimes spelt hulu.
- United Malayan Chinese Organization.
- United Malays National Organization, a 
founder member of the Alliance and most
important political party in the Federation.
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language is rudimentary at best), and to Mr. G. E. Graham for his 
comments and advice on the first draft of the thesis. Thanks are 
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CHAPTER 1
National Socio-Economic Development Planning,
National Unity, and Land Development in Peninsular 
Malaysia - An Assessment of the Ability of the Federal 
Land Development Authority to Contribute to Attaining 
the Objectives of the New Development Strategy.
1,1 INTRODUCTION
1.1a Southeast Asia
Southeast Asia is that region located east of the Indian
sub-continent, south of China, and north of Australia, and is
reckoned usually to comprise Burma, Thailand, Laos, Vietnam,
Cambodia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, Indonesia and the 
(1)Philippines. ' The first five countries are appended to the 
Asian mainland, whereas the latter states occupy the peninsulas 
and archipelagos separating the Indian Ocean from the Pacific.
Thus Southeast Asia may be sub-divided into Continental Southeast 
Asia (Burma, Thailand, Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia), and Maritime 
Southeast Asia (Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, Indonesia, the 
Philippines)
The geographical boundaries delimiting Southeast Asia as a 
region are both physical and human. The physical boundaries - 
mountains and seas - are identified relatively easily. The human
a?
boundaries - those of ethnicity, religion, language and culture - 
are discovered less readily, for the complex diversity of Southeast 
Asia's human geography renders problematical the identification of 
a human regional identity,
In the north of the region, Continental Southeast Asia is 
separated from its regional neighbours - India and China - by the 
mountain ranges which stream southwards from the southeastern
O')corner of the Tibetan Plateau and the Himalayas. To the west, 
the Naga Hills and the Arakam Yoma divide Burma from India. Further 
east, Burma, Laos and Cambodia are separated from the Yunnan pro­
vince of China by an inhospitable, mountainous frontier.
In the south of the region, Maritime Southeast Asia is bounded 
by two oceans - the Indian and the Pacific - which are much deeper 
than the shallow seas overlying the continental shelf which bears 
the peninsulas and archipelagos. To the west and south of Indonesia 
the waters of the Indian Ocean descend 5»000 metres or more, and to 
the east of the Philippines the Pacific Ocean plunges suddenly to 
over 8,000 metres. To the southeast, Australia spreads its contin­
ental bulk - largely arid and empty - in contrast to the humid, 
populous islands of Maritime Southeast Asia.
As noted above, Southeast Asia exhibits a diverse human 
geography, the ramifications of which make difficult the identifi­
cation of a Southeast Asian region based on human geographical 
criteria. Southeast Asia encompasses many ethnic groups, some 
indigenous - for example Burmans, Thais and Malays - some exogenous 
- primarily Chinese, Indians and Europeans, This plethora of 
peoples enjoys great variety In religions, languages and cultures,
and recognition of a regional identity based on one human criterion 
is impossible. Yet Southeast Asia's very heterogeneity in human 
geography is perhaps the region's best identification, for 
Southeast Asia contrasts in this respect with the homogeneity of
(S')human geography in India, China and Australia. '
Southeast Asia contains ten independent states which have many 
features in common, and which share historical, social and economic 
experiences. Nearly all of Southeast Asia is recently Independent 
from European authority, and all of its countries may be classed 
as developing or 'Third World'. Southeast Asia's countries 
share the numerous problems which attend socio-economic development 
in new states. This study concerns itself with certain aspects of 
the geography and socio-economic development of just one Southeast 
Asian country, the Federation of Malaysia.
(7)1.1b The Federation of Malaysiav
The Federation of Malaysia is one of the states of Maritime 
Southeast Asia, and consists of territories which once owed allegiance 
to the United Kingdom. The former British territories in Southeast 
Asia have experienced several changes of political status, both
during the colonial era and after the cessation of direct rule, and
the major political events which touch upon the Federation are
detailed in Chapter 3 and Appendix I. The present Chapter will give
a brief description of the Federation's present status.
The Federation of Malaysia is an association of thirteen states, 
and may be subdivided into Peninsular Malaysia and East Malaysia.
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Peninsular Malaysia comprises eleven states grouped at the end of 
the Malay Peninsula, sandwiched between the Republic of Thailand 
and the island Republic of Singapore, The eleven states are Perils, 
Kedah, Penang and Province Wellesley, Perak, Selangor, Negri 
Sembilan, Malacca, Johore, Pahang, Kelantan and Trengganu. East 
Malaysia is separated from Peninsular Malaysia by some 330 miles of 
the South China Sea, and comprises the Bornean States of Sabah and 
Sarawak,
The Federation of Malaysia was created on September 16th, 19&3* 
Prior to federation, Peninsular Malaysia and East Malaysia had been 
administered separately by the British, The present association 
between the peninsular states and the Bornean States is a recent 
innovation.
Traditional political detachment, and several present geo­
graphical differences, allow the Federation's two components to be 
considered separately. The physical gulf dividing Peninsular 
Malaysia from East Malaysia is apparent from Figure 1.1. Otherwise 
the two components reveal similarity in their physical geography. 
However, Peninsular Malaysia and East Malaysia exhibit basic 
differences in their human geography - demographic differences 
especially - which distinguish them from each other.
The physical gap between Peninsular Malaysia and East Malaysia, 
historical political separateness, and basic differences in their 
human geography, make legitimate a study of only one of the 
Federation's two components. Consequently, the present study will 
limit itself to Peninsular Malaysia.
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1,1c Peninsular Malaysia '
Peninsular Malaysia is that political unit occupying the tip 
of the Malay Peninsula, itself the southeastern mainland extremity 
of Asia. The country lies approximately between Latitudes 1° 20* 
and 6° 40' north of the Equator, and between Longitudes 99° 35' and 
10^° 20' east of Greenwich.
The climate of Peninsular Malaysia may be described as hot and 
humid the year round. The country has an equatorial climate, modified 
by insularity and e:Kposure to the Asian monsoon. Temperatures are 
always high, there is no cold season, and seasons are distinguished 
by variations in rainfall rather than in temperature. Mean annual 
temperature in the lowlands lies between 78° and 80.5° Fahrenheit 
(25.6° - 26.9° Centigrade) and mean annual rainfall ranges from a 
minimum of 65 inches or i,651mm (in Jelebu District of Negri Sembilan, 
in a rain-shadow cast by mountains) to a maximum of 201 inches or 
5,105 (at Maxwell's Hill, Perak).
Peninsular Malaysia’s relief and drainage comprise a mountainous 
core edged by a coastal plain, the whole drained by "a dense network 
of rivers and streams" (Ooi Jin Bee, 1976, p.2^). Relief is dominated 
by the Main Range, which trends southwards from the Thai border for 
approximately 30C miles until it reaches the coastal plain of 
Malacca. The Main Range has peaks over 7,000 feet high and lies west 
of the geographical centre-line of the country. Drainage is not
dominated by any one river, the largest river - the Pahang - being 
only slightly in excess of 270 miles.
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The complex human geography of Peninsular Malaysia mirrors the 
very great diversity and heterogeneity characteristic of Southeast 
Asian countries. Peninsular Malaysia's population may he split 
into those peoples considered indigenous - various aborigines, and 
the Malays - and those peoples of immigrant origin - primarily 
Chinese, Indians and Europeans.
The indigenous people proper consist of small groups of nomadic 
aborigines who inhabit the more inaccessible mountains, forests, and 
swamps. These aborigines are variously hunters and gatherers or
(ll)shifting cultivators, and their collective Malay name is Qrang Asli. J 
At the 19?0 Census the Qrang Asli numbered only 52,^99 and were con­
centrated in the more remote regions of Pahang, Perak and Kelantan.
The Malays are not indigenous in sensu stricto, for the Qrang 
Asli were resident in the peninsula at the time of Malay immigration. 
However, the Malays may be considered indigenous, for they had made 
themselves de facto rulers of the peninsula by the time Europeans 
penetrated Southeast Asia in force. It was the Malays with whom the 
British treated, and it is from the Malays that the names of the 
peninsula and of the Federation are derived. The Malay claim to 
being indigenous is attested by their length of residence and their 
numerical superiority over the Qrang Asli, and for all practical 
purposes today the indigenous nature of the Malays is unquestioned.
The status of the immigrant peoples is less controversial: 
their arrival in the peninsula is a matter of recent historical 
record. European expansion into the Malay Peninsula, especially by 
the British, stimulated an influx of Chinese and Indian immigrants.
The consequences of these mass-immigrations upon the socio-economic 
framework of Peninsular Malaysia form the burden of this study. At 
this juncture it suffices to note that the immigrants were attracted 
to the west coast, which became consequently more developed and 
urbanised than the remainder of the country.
The British presided over the development of this hot, humid 
peninsula and its increasingly polyglot population. The East India 
Company's servant - Francis Light - occupied Penang in 1786, and 
from then up to the Second World War the British created in the Malay 
Peninsula a territory of great economic power. Prior to independence, 
the rationale of planning was the "maintenance of a productive system 
in West Malaysia for the greater welfare of the United Kingdom" (Lim, 
D., 1975, p.3). British Malaya was one of the most valuable jewels 
in the British Empire's crown.
The Japanese invasion of Southeast Asia tolled the knell of 
European supremacy in the region. The Japanese military machine 
trounced the European powers in the short term, and the speedy re­
acquisition of their territories could not compensate the Europeans 
for their loss of face in the eyes of Southeast Asian peoples. The 
Japanese had exploded the colonial myth of European superiority over
the Asian, and post-Second World War Southeast Asia echoed to the
( 12")clamour for freedom from European hegemony. 7
In British Malaya the yearning for Merdeka (freedom) bore fruit 
on 31st August, 1957, when the Federation of Malaya became an inde­
pendent country within the Commonwealth, The attainment of inde­
pendence was attended by reservations about welding the heterogenous
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Malayan peoples into one nation, but the mood was generally one of
optimism. The Federation of Malaya had inherited from the British
a wealth-generating economy the envy of the new country’s peers,
and of the new States which emerged about that time the Federation
(is)of Malaya was marked down as one of those most likely to succeed, J
The Federation's experiences in the years after independence 
boosted this self-confidence. The economy continued to grow apace 
during the 1960s, and any inter-ethnic confrontations that did occur
(140were considered infrequent and transient aberrations.v 7 Yet on 
May 13th, 196 9, Peninsular Malaysia - on the surface prosperous and 
peaceful - was shattered by race riots. This "day of national 
tragedy" (National Operations Council, 19&9, p.iii) revealed that 
economic success in the post-independence era had not united the 
diverse population of the country. The "glossy veneer of an average 
6% growth" (Richards, 1973, P«2l) could not hide the cracks which 
split indigene from immigrant, Malay from Chinese and Indian. Goh 
Cheng Teik stated at that time, "the most pertinent question to ask 
is why, after fourteen years of unbroken Alliance administration, 
Malayan society was more, and not less divided" (Goh Cheng Teik, 1971,
p .44).
This study does not purport to answer the question posed by 
Goh Cheng Teik. The fundamental reasons for the lack of national 
unity in 19^9 have been explained satisfactorily in the years since 
the May 13th race-riots. The factor causing disunity was identified 
as the failure of the wealth and advantages generated by economic 
growth to be transmitted equally to all parts of Peninsular Malaysia's
socio-economic system. The poorer elements of Peninsular Malaysia's 
socio-economic system felt that they had not tasted fully of the 
fruits of Merdeka. In particular, the indigenous Malay population 
felt that socio-economic development had by-passed them in favour 
of the immigrant Chinese and Indian populations.
The government of Peninsular Malaysia reacted quickly in the 
wake of the May, 19&9 race-riots. The government promulgated a New 
Development Strategy intended to correct the socio-economic problems 
of the country, so as to create an environment favourable to the 
development of national unity. The chief element of this new strategy 
of socio-economic development was the New Economic Policy, designed 
to establish the conditions for national unity in Peninsular Malaysia,
The May 13th race-riots occurred nearly twelve years ago, and 
their cause has long been known. Goh Cheng Teik's question has been 
answered. Observers seem to agree that the government of Peninsular 
Malaysia has identified the problems correctly, and that the New 
Economic Policy is in theory aimed squarely at the roots of the 
problem: the racial and regional socio-economic imbalances in 
Peninsular Malaysia. However, the practical achievement of national 
policy is only as good as the individual socio-economic development 
programmes implemented to achieve such policy objectives. Therefore 
a second question is most pertinent today: viz, are individual pro­
grammes implemented in Peninsular Malaysia themselves aimed squarely 
at national policy objectives? If they are not, then national 
policy objectives cannot be achieved.
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This study concentrates on land development in Peninsular 
Malaysia, paying particular attention to the role of one agency 
- the Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA) - in attaining 
the objectives of the New Development Strategy. It is impossible to 
overstate the importance of the Federal Land Development Authority 
on the present socio-economic development front in Peninsular 
Malaysia, for "the Government has accepted FELDA to be the foremost 
instrument for its development strategy" (Bahrin and Perera, 1977t 
p.48), Thus an assessment of the role of the Federal Land Development 
Authority in attaining national policy objectives at about the half­
way stage of the New Economic Policy is not just timely: it is
imperative if the Authority is to contribute fully to the creation of 
national unity in Peninsular Malaysia.
1.2 NATIONAL SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PLANNING, NATIONAL
UNITY AND LAND DEVELOPMENT IN PENINSULAR MALAYSIA
This study concentrates upon three aspects of socio-economic 
development in Peninsular Malaysia, These three aspects are national 
socio-economic development planning, national unity, -and land 
development. The study examines the interrelationships between 
these three major components of the development process in Peninsular 
Malaysia, taking as its rationale the assumption that individual 
programmes must be directed squarely at national objectives if these 
latter are to be obtained.
In Peninsular Malaysia, the creation of national unity is the 
priority theme of present national planning, and "the dominance of 
the rural sector in Malaysia has necessarily made land development
and settlement the key to economic development, social progress and 
political stability" (Bahrin and Perera, 1977, p.l). Also, the 
Federal Land Development Authority is "by far the largest" (Tan 
Bock Thiam, 1975* p.206) of Peninsular Malaysia's land development 
agencies. Consequently, this study focusses upon the ability of 
the Federal Land Development Authority to contribute to the 
attainment of the national unity objective at the heart of 
development planning in Peninsular Malaysia today.
1,2a National Socio-Economic Development Planning in 
Peninsular Malaysia
Bernstein has stated that development "became an issue of
urgent priority following the end of the Second World War" (Bernstein,
1971> p.142), and this was certainly the case in British Malaya, The
immediate post-Second World War years were occupied by reconstruction
of the economy, which had suffered much damage in the war with Japan.
However, post-War restoration was rapid, and by about 1948/1949 the
British could think in terms of planned future growth rather than of 
(15)rehabilitation,v This desxre for a planned economic future 
resulted in the Draft Development Plan of the Federation of Malaya 
(1950 ~ 1955), which heralded a series of five-year national 
development plans after independence.
The Draft Development Plan was followed by the First Malaya 
Plan (1956 - i960) and the Second Malaya Plan (1961 - 19&5)» themselves 
precursors of the 'Malaysia' Plans which followed the creation of the 
Federation of Malaysia: the First Malaysia Plan (I966 - 1970), the
Second Malaysia Plan (1971 - 1975), and the Third Malaysia Plan
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(1976 - 1980). These Elans may he subdivided into the three which 
preceded the May, 1969 race-riots (the First Malaya Plan, the Second 
Malaya Plan and the First Malaysia Plan), and the two which were 
published subsequent to 19&9 (the Second Malaysia Plan and the 
Third Malaysia Plan).
The relationship between the several Plans implemented in 
Peninsular Malaysia since 1950 forms an important content of this 
study. The Draft Development Plan, the First Malaya Plan, the Second 
Malaya Plan, and the First Malaysia Plan form the burden of Chapter 
4. The Second and Third Malaysia Plans are considered in Ghapter 6 . 
Chapter 8 summarises the main findings in respect of the Plans1 
relationships,
Apthorpe has cast doubt upon the efficacy of national socio­
economic development Plans in developing countries. He states that 
"nationally and internationally development planning for and in the 
third world unfortunately has become an end in itself" (Apthorpe,
1970, p.10). This suggests that the governments of developing 
countries look upon possession of a Plan document as their sole aim, 
without any real consideration dfthe feasibility, objectives and 
sense of their Plans. In 1964, Ness - anticipating the present 
study - posed the question, "what is the relation between goals of 
development organisations and the changes experienced by the total 
social system?" (Ness, 1964, p.416).
The foregoing suggests that national socio-economic development 
Plans - particularly the evaluation of such Plans - offer a fruitful 
field of research to the human geographer. Evaluation may be defined
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as a "systematic attempt to provide data as the hasis for programme 
planning and to assess, hy organised procedures, progress towards 
previously established objectives" (United Nations, 1971j p.15^0*
This study attempts in part an evaluation of the national socio­
economic development Flans of Peninsular Malaysia.
The several national socio-economic development Plans of 
Peninsular Malaysia enshrine the policy objectives deemed important 
by Peninsular Malaysia's planners over the years. The JO-yeax 
period 1950 “ 1980 was marked by several major political events in 
Peninsular Malaysia, each having implications for the course and 
nature of national socio-economic development planning. The most 
important political events for their impact upon the national Plans 
were the elections and the Kuala Lumpur race-riots of May, 1969* In 
the aftermath of which the government stated its present overall 
objective of national unity in Peninsular Malaysia. Consequently, 
an evaluation of Peninsular Malaysia's national Plans - past and 
present - is vital to an assessment of FELDA1s ability to 
contribute to attaining the government's goal of national unity,
1.2b National Unity in Peninsular Malaysia^ ^
It was noted above (p.32) that independence in 1957 was attended 
by optimism with regard to Peninsular Malaysia's future, but that in 
May, I969 this optimism was shattered by severe race-rioting in 
Kuala Lumpur, National socio-economic development planning between 
1957 and 1989 had failed to create a Peninsular Malaysian nation.
The factors underlying the lack of national unity in Peninsular 
Malaysia in I969 will be discussed below,
ifO
One feature of the European rush for territory in Africa and 
Asia during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was that it 
occurred on a piecemeal basis. Also, tenitory was desired for the 
economic wealth - actual or potential - which it represented. These 
two factors - the mainly piecemeal seizure of territory, and the 
desirability of land per se - meant that little consideration was 
accorded to the human populations of the territories which were 
expropriated. Thus, African and Asian peoples with little in common 
- indeed, who may have been traditional enemies - were often lumped 
arbitrarily into exogenous, European-dominated political units. In 
addition, under European aegis there was often the migration into 
these new territories of other, even more disparate peoples.
In the days of Imperial rule, this aggregation of diverse 
peoples into one political unit may have been attended by some 
friction, but usually the European powers were able to impose suffi­
cient control to keep potential antagonists apart. Europeans played
the role of master and mediator, ruling the lives of their subject
(17)populations and acting as liaison and buffer between them,' '
In the post-Second World War era, many of the Europeans' 
territories in Africa and Asia voiced a determination for freedom 
from overseas domination, and in the majority of cases independence 
was achieved ultimately. Therefore, there are in Africa and Asia 
today many new countries which bear the hallmarks of colonialism, and 
these countries have had to come to terms with their particular 
heritage.
The main legacy willed to these new states was imbalance in
it I
(18")their socio-economic systems. ' This imbalance was sometimes
regional, in that economic development was not spread evenly over
(19)the whole country. y At other times the imbalance was racial, the 
different peoples of a new territory inheriting unequally from the 
Europeans social, economic or political power. In many cases, 
imbalance had both a regional and a racial component.
In Southeast Asia, the colonial experience had led to mass- 
migrations of Chinese and Indian peoples into the Europeans' South­
east Asian territories. Several factors tended to prevent the 
integration of immigrant with indigene, and many Southeast Asian 
countries acquired a "cellular society" (McGee, I960, p.^7)f each 
group concentrating in
"self-contained cultural enclaves - Chinatowns,
Indian estate labour lines, Chinese tin mines,
Burman, Thai and Malay villages. Each group 
lived in its own watertight compartment; there 
was little economic competition and much social 
aloofness" (vn')
(McGee, i960, p.^7) ^ U;
Today, such a society - divided into roughly equal disparate groups,
coexisting yet unintegrated - may be termed a 'plural' society,
(21)Peninsular Malaysia exhibits a plural society par excellence.v '
In 1957 Peninsular Malaysia inherited from British Malaya a 
socio-economic system laden with imbalance, Moreover, the colonial 
experience in Peninsular Malaysia had led to regional socio-economic 
imbalance being attended by extreme compartmentalisation of indigenous 
and immigrant races within the socio-economic system. It is this 
socio-economic compartmentalisation by race - rather than regional 
imbalance per se - which is the stumbling block to national unity in 
Peninsular Malaysia today:
l\.£
"the thorniest of all problems in Malaysia at 
the moment stems from the economic disparities 
along racial lines in terms of employment, 
income distribution, and ownership and control 
of wealth" (oo\
(Arlff, 1973, p.377)
Ethnic socio-economic pluralism of a kind exists throughout the 
Federation, but the problem is acute within Peninsular Malaysia.
Table 1.1 shows the population of the Federation at the end of 1976, 
and reveals that the bulk of Malaysia1s population (some 83.7%) is 
resident in Peninsular Malaysia. Table 1.2 gives a breakdown by 
community of the population of Peninsular Malaysia. Table 1,3 presents 
similar data for East Malaysia. Study of these latter Tables is 
rewarding.
Table 1.2 shows that the indigenous people - the Malays - are 
numerically just the majority in Peninsular Malaysia (53.7% of the 
total). Non-Malays run the Malays close, having 46,3% of the popu­
lation, the Chinese alone forming some 35<>1% of Peninsular Malaysia's 
population. Table 1„3 contrasts with Table 1.2 in three main ways. 
First, it reveals that no one community claims numerical superiority 
in East Malaysia0 The largest single community - the Chinese - 
muster only a quarter (25.8%) of the total population. Second, in 
East Malaysia the indigenes are much more numerous than the immigrant 
Chinese, the indigenous population making up 66.4% of the total.
Third, the Malays are just one of several indigenous communities, and 
are inferior numerically to the Sea Dayaks (the former have 13.1%j the 
latter 16.5%» of the total population). Thus, East Malaysian society 
is inter-racial, not plural in the sense used above.
TABLE 1.1
Federation of Malaysia 
ESTIMATED POPULAT ION, 1 9 7 6 ^
Political Unit Population %
Peninsular Malaysia 
East Malaysia
Federation of Malaysia
10.376,739
2 ,025,600
83-7 
16.3
12,402,339 100.0 ;
(a) estimated 31 December 1976
Source: Federation of Malaysia, 1979a, p.23*
TABLE 1.2
Peninsular Malaysia 
ESTIMATED POPULATION BY COMMUNITY, 1 9 7 6 ^
Community Population %
Malay'1 D)
Non-Malay 
(Chinese)
(Indian and Pakistani) 
(Others)
Total
5,571,649
4,805,090
(3,644,044)
(1,082,909)
(78,137)
53.7 
1*6.3 
(35.1) 
(10 A) 
( 0.8)
10,376,739 100.0
(a) estimated 31 December 1976
(b) “Malay* appears to include other indigenous people, namely the 
Qrang Asli, who were very few in number (52,4-99 in 1970).
Source: adapted from Federation of Malaysia, 1979a* P«23.
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Tables 1,1, 1.2 and 1,3 together emphasise that ethnic 
pluralism in the Federation of Malaysia is concentrated very much in 
Peninsular Malaysia, Peninsular Malaysia has 83*7$ of the Federation's 
population, and it is in Peninsular Malaysia that the ’plural* balance 
between races having differing - yet approximately equal - shares of 
social, economic and political power is most sharply defined. The 
difference in the demography of Peninsular Malaysia vis-a-vis that of 
East Malaysia is a main reason for concentrating upon Peninsular 
Malaysia in this study.
Within Peninsular Malaysia, the pluralism of the socio-economic
system - especially the compartmentalisation of the races into certain
(2socio-economic niches - is the fundamental barrier to national unity.
As Mahathir Mohamad has noted, "equality has to be established first
for race loyalties to disappear and integration to take place"
(Mahathir Mohamad, 1970, p.178), for
"in a plural society, economic issues take on 
political overtones, not only because economic 
functions tend to be racially defined, as in 
the Malaysian case, but also because inter­
ethnic comparisons of relative wellbeing and 
perceptions of relative deprivation tend to be 
group based"
(Ghee, 1975, P.3)
The extremeness of ethnic socio-economic pluralism in Peninsular 
Malaysia means that "today almost every issue in Malaya, however 
apparently innocuous, is apt to give rise to unexpected communal 
overtones" (Fisher, 1966, p.6^).
In modern Peninsular Malaysia, the lack of oneness between the 
communities - Malay and non-Malay - thrown together by the fickle 
tid^s of colonial experience, is considered the greatest threat to
if 6
the nation's integrity: "our status as a politically independent
nation is tenable only if there is national unity” (Sambanthan, 1974* 
p,5). The severity of the danger to Peninsular Malaysia's peace 
and harmony cannot be overstated (Ariff, 1973» P«378)» Thus, in 
the aftermath of the May 13th race riots, the government of 
Peninsular Malaysia made the decision to direct national socio-economic 
development planning at the correction of socio-economic imbalance 
and towards the creation of national unity,
Enloe has defined nation-building as "a complex mobilisation 
and inter-weaving of policy, resources, and groups for the sake of 
unity and modernisation” (Enloe, 1970, p#2). This study examines some 
aspects of Peninsular Malaysia's attempts to undertake nation-building, 
that "momentous and difficult process” (Federation of Malaysia,
1 9 6 4 , p.5 1 ).
1,2c hand Development in Peninsular Malaysia - The Federal Land 
Development Authority
The present study examines the role of one socio-economic 
development programme in Peninsular Malaysia - land development - in 
attaining that country's objective of national unity. More specif­
ically, the study will assess the contribution of the Federal Land 
Development Authority to nation-building in Peninsular Malaysia.
Such an assessment is vital for two reasons.
First, there is no doubt that FELDA is pre-eminent among 
socio-economic development programmes in Peninsular Malaysia today. 
Second, it is certain that the Authority was raised to this premier
k?
position by the Malaysian government in the wake of the 19&9 ^ace- 
riots, and consequently that much of the burden for achieving the 
New Economic Policy - poverty eradication and restructuring of 
society, and hence national unity - has been placed squarely onto 
FELDA's shoulders by the Malaysian powers that be*
The following paragraphs will underline the pre-eminence of 
FELDA among socio-economic development programmes in modem Penin­
sular Malaysia. The agricultural/rural sector within the socio­
economic system that is Peninsular Malaysia has always been so 
important to planners that all Peninsular Malaysia's recent devel­
opment Plans have accorded priority to that sector. Within agri­
culture, "land development will be the major vehicle for achieving 
the objective of eradicating poverty, increasing rural incomes 
and expanding job opportunities" ( Asia Research Bulletin, 1976,
f O C \
p . 236 ). This emphasis on land development is dictated to
some extent by the common-sense of playing to Peninsular Malaysia's 
strengths:
"With Malaysia's abundance of both under-utilised 
labour and undeveloped land suitable for agri­
culture, along with extensive knowledge of 
perennial crop technology, there seems to be a 
prima-facie case for promoting new land develop­
ment as a desirable and viable strategy for 
accelerating economic growth. They establish 
both a necessary and perhaps the sufficient 
condition for such a strategy. This has led 
planners to adopt a vast land development and 
settlement programme as a key element in the 
strategy for promoting economic growth".
(Syed Hussain Wafa, 1975* p *16o )
^8
Table 1 .4 reveals the allocation to land development as a 
proportion of Agriculture and Rural Development allocations since 
land development started in Peninsular Malaysia with the creation 
of FELDA in 1956* Table 1.4 shows that for the last twenty years 
(i.e. since 1961) land development programmes of several kinds have 
received at least one-third of Plan allocations to Agriculture and 
Rural Development. Indeed, under the Second Malaysia Plan land 
development was entrusted with almost exactly half (50.6%) of the 
funds allocated to this sector.
Within the land development programmes, the premier status 
of the Federal Land Development Authority is unquestioned. Since 
its establishment in 1956, the Authority "has evolved to be the 
major land development and resettlement agency in Malaysia" (Bahrin 
and Perera, 1977, P*152), arid in the period 1961 - 1975 FELDA was 
responsible for 41% of all land developed and for 48*8% of all persons 
resettled in Peninsular Malaysia (MacAndrews and Yamamoto, 1975a» p.4). 
FELDA was assigned 35% of all land to be developed during the Third 
Malaysia Plan period (1976 - 1980) (Bahrin and Perera, 1977? p.48).
The first position of the Authority among land development programmes 
is borne out by the data presented in Table 1.5* Table 1.5 gives the 
allocation to FELDA as a proportion of the total land development 
allocation between 1961 and 1980. The Authority was apportioned 
precisely 70.0% of the monies allocated to land development during 
the period 1961 - 1980, ranging from a high of 9 1*6% during the 
Second Malaya Plan period (1961 - 19^5)* *to a °£ 61.4% allocated 
under the Third Malaysia Plan (1976 - 1980).
k9
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TABLE 1.4 
Sources: (b)
(c)
(a)
(e)
(f)
Federation of Malaya, 1961, Table II, Gross 
Public Investment, 1956 - I960*
Federation of Malaya, 1961, Table V, Allocation 
of Public Investment During the First and 
Second Five-Year Plans.
Federation of Malaysia, 1965» Table 4-1, Malaysia: 
Sectoral Allocation of Public Development 
Expenditure in 1966 - 70 as Compared with 
1961 - T 6 7
Federation of Malaysia, 1971, Table 9-4, Public 
Development Expenditure for Agricultural 
Development, I966 - 75*
Federation of Malaysia, 1976, Table 16-3,
Malaysia: Public Development Expenditure for
Agricultural Programmes, 1971 - 8 0.
TABLE 1.5
Sources: (b)
(e)
(a)
(e)
(f)
(s)
Federation of Malaya, 1961, Table V, Allocation 
of Public Investment during the First and 
Second Five-Year Plans.
Federation of Malaya, 1961, p. 30, paragraph 91.
Federation of Malaysia, 1965, Table 4-1, Malaysia: 
Sectoral Allocation of Public Development 
Expenditure”in 1966 - 70 as Compared with
1961 - 657"
Federation of Malaysia, 1965, p.117, paragraph 33^*
Federation of Malaysia, 1971, Table 9-4, Public 
Development Expenditure for Agricultural 
Development, 1966 - 75*
Federation of Malaysia, 1976, Table 16-3, Malaysia: 
Public Development Expenditure for Agri cultural 
Programmes, 1971 - 80.
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In 1972, Wikkramatileke described the Pederal Land Development
Authority as "the leading spender within the Malaysian G-overrmient1 s
programme of economic development" (Wikkramatileke, 1972a, p*77)» The
Authority still maintains this position, the Second Malaysia Plan and
the Third Malaysia Plan Doth showing that FELDA is allocated more
(26^funds than any other development agency.' The Authority was
established "to spear-head the government’s programme to eradicate 
rural poverty through land development" (Lim, E., 1975» P*4)> and has 
become "one of the most effective mechanisms in Malaysia's overall 
rural development policy" (MacAndrews, 1977j P-36l). Today PELDA has 
10 - 11% of Peninsular Malaysia's cultivated acreage (Alias, 1978* p*3)» 
a figure magnified greatly in its importance by the Authority's concen­
tration upon wealth-generating export crops.
However, the foregoing paragraphs and Tables conceal a second, 
and considerably more important, feature of PELDA's pre-eminence, 
namely that a marked change in emphasis occurred in the years 
following the crisis of 1969* Although land development had been 
important before 1969* after that date the government of Peninsular 
Malaysia deliberately shifted its policy towards agriculture and 
rural development by placing particular emphasis upon land develop­
ment. by PELDA as the main component of its socio-economic develop­
ment strategy in the Malay-dominated rural areas. This shift is 
revealed clearly in Table 1.6, Table 1.7» and Table 1.8.
53
Table 1.6 shows the importance of land development within 
public development programmes for the First Malaysia Plan ( 1966 - 
1970 ) - that is, pre-1969 - and for the Second Malaysia Plan 
( 197"I - “1975 ) “ that is, post-1969* Table 1.6 reveals the import­
ance of all land development programmes as a proportion ( % ) of all 
public development programmes, and of economic and social programmes 
only ( see note (c) to Table 1.6 ). For example, it is revealed in 
Table 1.6 that monies allocated to land development were 9*0% of 
total planned public development expenditure for the First Malaysia 
Plan ( 1966 - 1970 ), whereas the equivalent figure with regard to 
economic and social programmes only was 11.1%.
Table 1.6 reveals also that the planned and actual pro­
portional expenditures on land development in the Second Malaysia 
Plan ( 1971 - 1975 ) were consistently much greater than their 
counterparts for the First Malaysia Plan ( 1966 - 1970 ), For 
example, whereas the money allocated to land development in the 
First Malaysia Plan ( 1966 - 1970 ) was 11.1% of the allocation 
to economic and social programmes only, the equivalent statistic 
for the Second Malaysia Plan ( 1971 - 1975 ) was 16.8%, Indeed, if 
the actual amounts allocated and expended are also considered ( in 
addition to their proportions relative to the whole ), then Table 
1.6 reveals a clear swing to land development in the early years 
post-1969 compared with the years immediately before that date 
( viz., 1966 - 1970 ).
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Table 1.6
Sources and Notes:
(a) The figures for Planned Expenditure given in Table 1*6 
are the unrevised allocations presented in the original 
Plans.
(b) Estimated.
(c) All Public Development Programmes (la) includes expend­
iture on General Government and Security; Economic and 
Social Programmes (lb) is total public development 
expenditure minus expenditure on General Government 
and Security.
(d) The source of these figures is Table below.
(e) The source of these figures is Table 6.1 below*
(f) All Land Development Programmes in Peninsular Malaysia, 
notably FELDA, but including also FSLCPA, State land 
development programmes, etc.
(g) The source of these figures is Table 1.5 above.
(h) Source: Federation of Malaysia, I9?I, Table 5-1* Public
Development Expenditure. 1966-1975*
(i) Source: Federation of Malaysia, 1976* Table 12-3,
Malaysia: Public Development Expenditure. I971-I98Q.
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The switch to land development - especially by the Federal 
Land Development Authority - indicated in Table 1.6, is pointed up 
more dramatically if the Agriculture and Rural Development sector 
is considered alone. Table 1.7 shows the importance of land dev­
elopment within Agriculture and Rural Development under the First 
Malaysia Plan ( 1966 - 1970 ) and the Second Malaysia Plan ( 1971 “ 
1975 ) ~ again, pre-1969 and post-1969 - and Table 1.8 reveals the 
position of the Federal Land Development Authority within the same 
sector. The salient features of Table 1.7 arid Table 1.8 are 
discussed below.
Table 1.7 presents first the actual expenditures on Agriculture 
and Rural Development of the First Malaysia Plan ( 1966 - 1970 ). It 
may be seen from the Table that Land Development attracted M$309*7 
millions, or 34«0% of the total M$9H*2 millions expended on Agri­
culture and Rural Development. The Drainage and Irrigation cate- 
egory attracted slightly more spending ( 36.1% of the total ),
Thus - on the basis of the expenditures of the First Malaysia Plan 
( 1966 - 1970 ) - in the immediate pre-1969 years Land Development 
was accorded second priority to Drainage and Irrigation, and each of 
these categories attracted slightly more than one-third of total 
public expenditure on Agriculture and Rural Development.
Table 1.7 next reveals the contrasting position of these two 
categories under the Second Malaysia Plan ( 1971 ~ 1975 ) • in the 
years immediately following 1969» Land Development was unequivocally 
raised to pre-eminence among rural sector programmes. Table I.7 
shows that Land Development was accorded 50.6% of the Agriculture 
and Rural Development allocation, with Drainage and Irrigation not
57
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Table 1.7
Sources and Notes:
(a),(b) Estimated.
(c) All land development programmes in Peninsular Malaysia, 
notably FELDA, but including also FELCRA, State land 
development programmes, etc.
(d) Includes expenditure on crop protection services, crop 
production services, soil and agricultural services, 
agricultural extension, agricultural education, coconut 
replanting and rehabilitation, pineapple replanting, farm 
crop subsidies, and construction of agricultural buildings.
(e) Includes expenditure on Bank Pertanian ( Agricultural 
Bank, ), Federal Agricultural Marketing Authority ( FAMA ), 
Cooperatives, Padi Board, and Rural Credit.
(f) Includes Malaysian Agricultural Research and Development 
Institute ( MARDI ) and Division of Food Technology.
Sources: First Malaysia Plan (1966-1970) expenditures
and Second Malaysia Plan (1971-1975) original 
allocations are derived from Federation of 
Malaysia, 19?I9 Table 9-^ f* Public Development 
Expenditure for Agricultural Development.
(1966-1975): Second Malaysia Plan (1971-1975)
actual expenditures are derived from Federation 
of Malaysia, 1976, Table 12-3, Malaysia: Public 
Development Expenditure. 1971-1980.
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only being relegated to second place, but slumping to a mere 14-5% 
of the total allocation of M$I,570.86 millions. The switch to Land 
Development is revealed more emphatically if actual expenditures 
under the Second Malaysia Plan ( 1971 - 1975 ) ar© considered : Land
Development received over half ( 56.8% ), with Drainage and Irrigation 
a well-beaten runner-up with only 13*7%* Indeed, if actual expendi­
tures are compared, actual expenditure on Land Development under the 
Second Malaysia Plan ( 1971 - 1975 ) was 320.4% of the first Malaysia 
Plan ( 1966 - 1970 ) figure ( M$992.31 millions, confer M$309-7 
millions ), whereas the equivalent statistic for Drainage and Irriga­
tion was 73*1% ( M£>240.07 millions, as compared with M$32S.5 millions ).
Table 1.8 shows the importance of the federal Land Development 
Authority within Agriculture and Rural Development under the first 
Malaysia Plan ( 1966 - 1970 ) and under the Second Malaysia Plan 
( 1971 - 1975 )• ^Me increased emphasis placed upon the Authority 
after 1969 may be observed readily. Under the first Malaysia Plan 
( 1966 - 1970 ) PELDA was allocated 27*3% of the total expenditure on 
Agriculture and Rural Development, M$248.4 millions from a total of 
M$911«2 millions. Under the Second Malaysia Plan ( 1971 - 1975 )j 
the original allocation to PELDA was raised to 37*1% of the total allo­
cation to Agriculture and Rural Development ( M$1,570-86 millions ), and 
actual expenditure was 36*9% of the total actual expenditure (M$1,747*02 
millions ).
Table 1.8 reveals also that land development by agencies other 
than PELDA was also given much greater emphasis after 1969* Actual 
expenditure on Other Land Development under the Second Malaysia Plan 
( 1971 - 1975 ) was 566.3% of the equivalent expenditure under the
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Table 1.8
Sources and Notes:
(a),(b) Estimated.
(c) Federal Land Rehabilitation and Consolidation Authority 
( FSLCRA ), State land development programmes, etc.
(d) Includes expenditure on crop protection services, crop 
production services, soil and agricultural services, 
agricultural extension, agricultural education, coconut 
replanting and rehabilitation, pineapple replanting, 
farm crop subsidies, and construction of agricultural 
buildings.
(e) Includes expenditure on Bank Pertanian ( Agricultural 
Bank ), Federal Agricultural Marketing Authority ( FAMA ), 
Cooperatives, Padi Board, and Rural Credit.
(f) Includes Malaysian Agricultural Research and Development 
Institute ( MARDI ) and Division of Food Technology.
Sources: First Malaysia Plan (1966-1970) expenditures
and Second Malaysia Plan (1971-1975) original 
allocations are derived from Federation of 
Malaysia, 1971, Table 9-4, Public Development 
Expenditure for Agricultural Development. 
(1966-1975): Second Malaysia Plan (1971-1975)
actual expenditures are derived from Federation 
of Malaysia, 1976, Table 12-3, Malaysia: Public 
Development Expenditure. 1971-1980. with the 
exception of the figure for the Federal Land 
Development Authority ( marked* ), which was 
obtained from Federation of Malaysia, 1976,
Table 16-3, Malaysia: Public Development 
Expenditure for Agricultural Programmes. 1971-1980.
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First Malaysia Plan ( ’]$66 - 1970 ) ( M$347*17 millions, compared 
with M$61.3 millions ). Even so, Second Malaysia Plan ( 1971 - 
1975 ) actual expenditure on Other Land Development (M$347«17 
millions ) was only 55*0% of the total actual expenditure on Land 
Development (M$992«31 millions, see Table 1*7) > with FELDA alone 
accounting for 65*0% ( M$645«14 millions, out of M^992*31 millions ).
To summarise, Table 1,6 shows that in the Second Malaysia Plan 
( 1971 ~ 1975 ) period Land Development attracted something between 
one-seventh ( 14*4% ) and one-sixth ( 16.8% ) of public expenditure 
on economic and social development, compared with something between 
one-tenth ( 10.8% ) and one-ninth ( 11*1% ) of equivalent expendi­
ture during the First Malaysia Plan ( 1966 - 1970 )• More signifi­
cantly, Table 1.7 and Table 1.8 reveal that in the Agriculture and 
Rural Development sector - the sector which would have greatest 
impact and impression upon the lives and minds of the Malay popula­
tion - land development by the Federal Land Development Authority 
was raised dramatically to premier status. Table 1.7 shows that 
Land Development as an approach became highly favoured compared with 
other approaches to development in rural areas ( for example, 
compared with Drainage and Irrigation and with Rubber Replanting ), 
and Table 1.8 shows that - within the priority accorded to Land 
Development - FELDA was vested by the government with by far the 
greatest responsibility.
Whatever criterion is chosen, the Federal Land Development 
Authority stands out as the most important single development agency
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in Peninsular Malaysia today* Moreover, it is evident that the 
government of Peninsular Malaysia has made FELDA by far the most 
vital element of its approach to development in the Malay-dominated 
rural areas. Thus, the Authority has been burdened with a responsi­
bility greater than that borne by any other agency for achieving 
Peninsular Malaysia’s national socio-economic objectives, partic­
ularly for implementing the two prongs of the New Economic Policy- 
redressal of poverty and restructuring of society - in the Malay- 
dominated rural areas where success is a prerequisite for the 
creation of national unity. The great importance of FELDA in 
Peninsular Malaysia's national socio-economic development Plans - 
especially the onus placed upon FELDA for the success of the New 
Economic Policy in the rural areas - require that the Federal Land 
Development Authority’s ability to contribute to the New Development 
Strategy be assessed.
1.3 AN ASSESSMENT OF THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL LAND DEVELOPMENT 
AUTHORITY IN ATTAINING THE OBJECTIVES OF THE NEW 
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY
The foregoing has underlined the importance of the Federal 
Land Development Authority within the framework of national socio­
economic planning in Peninsular Malaysia. The remainder of this 
Chapter will indicate how the assessment will be undertaken. However, 
first the urgency for this assessment will be emphasised.
In a developing country, it is imperative that any organization or
agency charged with much responsibility for attaining national
( 2 7 )objectives be evaluated regularly. This evaluation should not be
restricted merely to the agency’s efficacy in carrying out its 
allotted programme, but should scrutinise also the role of that
6h
agency in achieving national goals. This is so particularly in a 
country such as Peninsular Malaysia, where national goals have been 
stated very explicitly, but where doubt has been cast on the ability 
of national socio-economic development programmes to attain national 
objectives.
In the particular case of land development in Peninsular 
Malaysia, Bahrin has pointed out that there have been few evaluation 
studies relative to feasibility studies. Bahrin has opined that 
"the time has probably come when researchers could focus their 
attention on the subject of land settlements more seriously than ever 
before" (Bahrin, 1972, p.24). Peninsular Malaysia's Fringe Alienation 
Programme of the 1960s was "generally unsuccessful" (Economic 
Planning Unit, 1969j P«19)» suLd Bahrin cites the failure of this pro­
gramme as a "classic example" of lack of research into the effective­
ness and impact of a programme (Bahrin, 1973)
With reference to the Federal Land Development Authority, 
Wikkramatileke has noted that cynics might well consider FELDA to be 
"another aberration of a group of planners formulating plans to end 
all plans" (Wikkramatileke, 1972a, p.77)» and the present Director- 
General of FELDA has pointed out that it is just as necessary to 
appreciate the Authority's limitations as it is to appreciate its 
achievements (Alias, 1978, p.21).
Consequently, there is little doubt that an assessment of the 
role of Peninsular Malaysia's most important single socio-economic 
development agency is overdue. Such an evaluation may not be welcomed 
by all, but it is imperative nonetheless^ \  p
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1•3a Aims of Thesis and Methodology
This study assesses the ability of the Federal Land Devel-
■jr
opment Authority to face up to the government's requirement that 
land development by the Authority be a major plank of the New 
Development Strategy. The New Development Strategy was first 
stated explicitly in the Second Malaysia Plan, which "represents 
a new strategy in which national priorities are re-ordered and 
efforts intensified to deal with the economic and social problems 
confronting the country" ( Federation of Malaysia, 1971» P*2 ).
The New Development Strategy was reiterated and emphasised-in the
Third Malaysia Plan. These two Plans together embody a new
approach to national socio-economic development planning in
Peninsular Malaysia, which since about 1970 has been guided by the
New Development Strategy aimed at the creation of national unity,
"the over-riding objective of the country" ( Federation of 
Malaysia, 1971 j P*1 )•
The New Development Strategy comprises two components, the 
Rukun Negara and the New Economic Policy. Rukun Negara, the National 
Ideology, aims to establish a set of long-term national values, 
beliefs and traditions peculiarly Malaysian. The object is to 
change perceptions among Malays, Chinese and Indians, so that their 
main loyalty will be to country, not community. The New Economic 
Policy is a more prosaic social and economic policy designed to bring 
about short-term objectives. The main short-term objectives are the 
eradication of poverty and the restructuring of the socio-economic 
system, so as to correct the major imbalances which prevent the 
growth of national unity between Peninsular Malaysia's communities.
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The aim of the thesis may be stated thus : to assess the
ability of the Federal Land Development Authority to meet the 
responsibility placed upon it by the Malaysian government in the 
aftermath of the 1969 crisis, that is to assess the extent to which 
land development by FELDA is a satisfactory method for eradicating 
poverty and for restructuring society ( the two prongs of the New 
Economic Policy ) in the Malay-dominated rural areas.
The May, 19^9 race-riots in Kuala Lumpur were a watershed in 
the history of national socio-economic development planning in 
Peninsular Malaysia. They marked the time when Peninsular Malaysia’s 
national Plans became directed unequivocally at the forging of national 
unity. In 1970* neither development Plans nor the quest for national 
unity were novel in Peninsular Malaysia : national socio-economic
development planning for independent Peninsular Malaysia had started 
in 1956 with the First Malaya Plan, and the desire for national unity 
had been expressed at independence in 1957* However, the events of 
May 1969 pointed up the failure of pre-1969 national socio-economic 
development Plans to create a united nation in Peninsular Malaysia.
The failure of the First Malaya Plan, the Second Malaya Plan, 
and the First Malaysia Plan to forge national unity hold the key to 
the methodology of this study. Scrutiny of the course and nature of 
these Plans should allow identification of their main features, and 
of the reasons why they failed to create national unity prior to 1969* 
Armed with this knowledge, it should be possible to evaluate fully 
the Second Malaysia Plan and the Third Malaysia Plan, and to assess
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the suitability of land development by FELDA as a means of 
fulfilling the New Economic Policy embodied within them, 
for as Ness has pointed out:
" public or stated goals are often different from
actual or operative goals. The former can be
identified in public policy statements, the latter 
in allocations of personnel and financial resources"
(Ness, 1967a, p.88)
In Peninsular Malaysia today the "public or stated goals" are 
those of nation-building. The present "actual or operative goals" 
will be identified by the allocations of personnel and financial 
resources in the Second Malaysia Plan and the Third Malaysia Plan. 
Clearly, if the "public or stated goals" and the "actual or operative 
goals" of today show congruity, then national planning under the New 
Development Strategy should achieve the objective of national unity. 
However, if congruity is absent, then the opposite will occur. Given 
the importance of FELDA, it is imperative to assess whether land 
development by the Authority accords well with the "public or 
stated goals" of the post-1 9 6 9 period, namely those of poverty 
eradication, restructuring of society,, and national unity.
The methodology of this study will be as follows: Chapter 2
will describe land development in Peninsular Malaysia, focussing on 
the history and present status of the Federal Land Development 
Authority. The main purpose of Chapter 2 is to familiarise the 
reader with the nature and activities of FELDA.
Chapter 3 will describe the social and economic development of 
British Malaya, showing how the making of British Malaya was attended 
by the creation of gross socio-economic imbalances between Malay and 
non-Malay, The description of British Malaya will detail the socio-
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economic imbalances present on the eve of independence. Background 
information concerning the colonial period is imperative if the 
problems of modern Peninsular Malaysia are to be appreciated fully, 
for the fundamental imbalance inherent in Peninsular Malaysia*s 
socio-economic system derives from this period of its history□
Chapter ^ will describe the national Plans implemented in 
Peninsular Malaysia prior to May, I969. It was noted above that 
planning pre-1969 failed to create national unity. Chapter 4 will 
discover the main features of the pre-1969 Plans, and will suggest 
the reasons why these Plans did not forge the looked-for national 
unity of independent Peninsular Malaysia.
Chapter 5 will describe the events of May, 1969* The 1969 race- 
riots were the major turning-point in Peninsular Malaysia*s national 
development planning, for they gave rise to the New Development 
Strategy. Also, Chapter 5 will underline the peculiar relationship 
between politics and national development planning in Peninsular 
Malaysia. An appreciation of the fine political/socio-economic 
imbalance in Peninsular Malaysia is vital to an assessment of the 
role of FELDA,
Chapter 6 will deal with the consequences which the May, I969 
race-riots had upon national development planning post-1969. Chapter 
6 will detail the New Development Strategy, Rukun Negara, and the 
New Economic Policy, and will reveal the main features of the Second 
Malaysia Han and the Third Malaysia Plan so that they might be 
compared with the pre-1969 Plans.
Chapter 7 will assess FELDA*s contribution to attaining the
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objectives of the New Economic Policy. The immediate short-term 
objectives of the New EconomicPblicy are very much the core of the 
New Development Strategy - in practical terms the two are synonymous 
- and concentration upon the New Economic Policy is justified for 
that reason.
Chapter 8 is the concluding Chapter. National socio-economic 
development planning in Peninsular Malaysia is an exceedingly complex 
web, and Chapter 8 will attempt to bring together the main threads 
contained inthe body of the thesis. Chapter 8 will present the 
main findings in respect of the Federal Land Development Authority's 
ability to contribute to the attainment of national unity in 
Peninsular Malaysia.
The approach which this study adopts is qualitative. The 
qualitative approach in Geography may be defined as "relating to an 
object or feature in terms which cannot be expressed quantitatively, 
but has to be described in subjective terms" (Monkhouse, 1970, p.283). 
The subject matter of this thesis - national socio-economic develop­
ment planning, national unity and land development - does not lend 
itself to quantification and statistical tests, and statistical data 
presented are employed solely to support the subjective opinions 
expressed in the text.
1,3b Limits and Terminology of Thesis
The limits within which this study is confined are spatial and 
temporal. The spatial limits refer to the physical area being con­
sidered, the temporal limits to the time-frame which encompasses the 
events under consideration.
?0
The study limits itself spatially to Peninsular Malaysia. It 
was suggested above that the physical divide between Peninsular 
Malaysia and East Malaysia, coupled with historical separateness and 
present differences in human geography, make legitimate a concen­
tration upon the peninsular component of the Federation. A more 
fundamental reason for concentrating upon Peninsular Malaysia is that 
the activities of the Federal Land Development Authority are limited 
to that territory: land development in East Malaysia is undertaken
by local land development agencies. Thus, the only territory con-
(31)sidered here is Peninsular Malaysia. '
The time-frame of the study is dictated by the fact that 
planned socio-economic development and land development are post- 
Second World War phenomena in Peninsular Malaysia. The lower 
temporal limit is 1950t in which year the Draft Development Plan 
heralded the start of planned socio-economic development in 
Peninsular Malaysia. The upper temporal limit is 1990, the year by 
which it is intended the objectives of the New Economic Policy are to 
be achieved. Within these overall temporal limits the study will 
focus upon the period 1956/1957 to 1980. Concentration upon this 
period is justified by the nature of the study, which concerns the 
role of the Federal Land Development Authority in creating national 
unity in independent Peninsular Malaysia. FELDA was created in 1956, 
and Peninsular Malaysia achieved independence in 1957* The Third 
Malaysia Plan period terminated at the end of 1980. The theoretical 
events of the period 1981 - 1990 cannot be scrutinised yet, although 
suggestions will be made as to the possible role of the Federal Land 
Development Authority during this period.
?1
The complicated political events which have affected the former 
British territories of Southeast Asia since the Second World War have 
made for a confusing multiplicity of terms. Peninsular Malaysia has 
heen known "by different names during its history, and the terminology 
used in this thesis requires clarification. The study will employ 
the terms British Malaya, Federation of Malaya, and West Malaysia 
as synonyms for Peninsular Malaysia. The term British Malaya will 
refer to Peninsular Malaysia prior to independence (thus it refers to 
the Federation of Malaya between its formation in 19^8 and Merdeka in 
1957)• The term Federation of Malaya will be used to describe 
Peninsular Malaysia in the six years between independence and the 
creation of the larger Federation of Malaysia in 1983* The term 
Peninsular Malaysia is preferred for the post-1963 period, although 
the term West Malaysia - where used - will be employed synonymously 
with Peninsular Malaysia.
The adjectives derived from these expressions require clarifi­
cation also. However, confusion arises only after the creation of 
the Federation of Malaysia. The adjective 'Malayan1 will suffice to 
describe Peninsular Malaysian affairs prior to 1963» and will be used 
equally for events in pre-independence British Malaya and in the 
post-independence Federation of Malaya prior to 1963- In order to 
prevent confusion arising from the use of the expression 'Malaysian5, 
the term 'Peninsular Malaysian' will be used when referring to the
post-1963 period. In this study, the term 'Malaysian' will be used
(32)to refer to the complete Federation of Malaysia. '
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER i
See Frontispiece for the location of these states.
The suh-division of the countries of Southeast Asia used here 
is the same as that indicated by Fisher (see Fisher, C. A,, 
South-east Asia, pp.22i - 339 in East, W . G ., Spate, 0. H . K ., 
and Fisher, C. A., eds., 1971» 5th edn., The Changing Map of 
Asia, (Methuen, London)). However, sub-division of the 
countries of Southeast Asia is fraught with difficulty, and 
varies according to which physical (e.g. geological, climatic) 
or human (e.g. ethnic, economic, political) criteria are chosen 
as the basis for sub-division. Thus Fryer states that "examin­
ation of most economic criteria strongly suggests a division of 
Southeast Asia into two major economic units, Malaysia and 
Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines on the one hand, Burma, 
Indonesia and the Indochinese states on the other, This 
division is also basic in the socio-political field" (Fryer,
D. 1970# Emerging Southeast Asia - A Study in Growth and 
Stagnation, (George Philip, London, p.20). Fryer used this sub­
division as the basis for his book (Fryer, 1970* o£« cit.). For 
further discussion of the nature and characteristics of 
Southeast Asia, see Fryer, 1970, PP*20 - 30» Myint, H.,
1967. The Inward and Outward Looking Countries of Southeast Asia, 
pp.l - 13 in Malayan Economic Review, Volume XII, Number 1.
The expression 'Southeast Asia' is in common usage today, yet in 
the past there was no consensus as to the region's designation 
and boundaries. Fisher notes that the Chinese, Japanese and 
Indians recognised the region as distinct (Fisher, _et al, 1971, 
op. cit,), but - although the term 'Southeast Asia' was first 
used in English in 1900 - other expressions were used also, e.g. 
'Further India* (Clifford, H,, 1905> Further India - The Story 
of Exploration from the Earliest Times in Burma, .Malaya, Siam 
and Indo-China, (Alston Rivers, London)77 Fryer notes that the 
term 'Southeast Asia* was first used in its modem sense by the 
Indian historian K. M. Pannikar in 19^3 (Fryer, 1970, p.2), and 
that by the end of the Second World War the name was well 
established. See Fisher, et al, 1971, o£. cit., and Fryer, 1970 
Chapter 1, especially pp.l - 2.
'India' is used here to refer to the Indian sub-continent rather 
than to the Republic of India, 'China' is used as synonymous 
with the area occupied by the People's Republic of China.
It cannot be denied that both India and China also exhibit great 
human diversity, especially with regard to factors such as 
language, dress and custom, Even so, India and China are 
relatively homogenous in respect of human geography when con­
trasted with the great diversities found within Southeast Asia.
(Continued)
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5. (Continued)
The contrasts between the human geography of Southeast Asia and 
that of Australia are obvious to even the casual observer.
6. Only Thailand has never experienced direct European political
control. Fryer states that "Thailand is unique in Southeast 
Asia in never having experienced colonial rule" (Fryer, 1970,
p.22), although even in Thailand European - especially British - 
influence was important. Other influences have been British 
(Burma, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei), French (Laos, Vietnam, 
Cambodia), Dutch (Indonesia), and American (the 
Philippines), although Spanish influence is evident in the 
Philippines, and Portugese influence lingered in the island of 
Timor until the end of 1975» when Indonesian forces seized the 
Portugese half of the island. For a brief account of the 
Indonesian seizure of Portugese Timor see Fryer, D. W„, and 
Jackson, J. C., 1977» Indonesia, (Ernest Benn, London), pp.25^ - - 255*
7. The reader is referred to Figure 1.1 during this Section.
8. Ooi Jin Bee's Peninsular Malaysia (1976) is an accurate and
readable account of the physical and human geography of the
study area ‘(see Bibliography). Peninsular Malaysia used to be
known as West Malaysia.
9. Peninsular Malaysia is a small country, with an area of 50*600 
square miles, The reader might find it useful to compare the 
areal extent of Peninsular Malaysia with that of England (50,33^ 
square miles) and of New York State (49>576 square miles).
10. The highest peak in Peninsular Malaysia is Gunong Tahan (Mount 
Tahan), which reaches 7»186 feet above sea level,
11. Literally the Original People. The reader is referred to the 
Glossary, which contains all the acronyms, abbreviations and 
Malay words contained in the thesis.
12. The Japanese invaded Peninsular Malaysia during the night of ?th/
8th December, 19^1, with a landing at Kota Bharu (Kelantan), and 
associated landings at Singora and Patani (in southern Thailand).
The subsequent capture of the peninsula - culminating in the 
loss of Singapore - is detailedin Kirby, S. W., 1957. The War 
Against Japan - Volume It The Loss of Singapore, (HMSO, London), 
especially Chapters XI, XII, XIV, XVII, XIX, XX, XXII, XXIII, 
and XXIV.
13. Rudner notes that at independence "the prevailing attitude was
one of promise for the future and confidence in existing 
institutions" (Rudner, 1975&, p.l^). This mood of optimism was 
reflected in the words of the first Prime Minister - Tunku Abdul 
Rahman - when he gave his independence address: "With freedom
there Is much to do for us all. Freedom must bring with it 
opportunities for all - to the needy, new hope; to the sick and 
afflicted, relief; to those distressed and in want, help. We 
shall build our social, economic and educational structures so 
that the new nation will rear its head sturdy and proud and the
(Continued)
13. (Continued)
people happy and contented" (Federation of Malaysia, 19&7, The 
Challenging Decade, (Department of Information, Kuala Lumpur),
P . 2) .
14. So successful was Peninsular Malaysia in terms of rapid 
economic growth and apparent maintenance of inter-communal 
stability that observers were moved to cite that country as a 
model of successful development in a plural society. Thus Ness 
declared "a bias for Malaysia because it has achieved success 
in public investment and in its accommodation of ethnic 
interests" (Ness, 1967a, p.ix), and Fryer stated that "Malaysia 
demonstrates a high degree of harmony and even equality in the 
everyday relations of its many peoples" (Fryer, 1970, p.24).
(in fairness, Fryer noted also that "Malaysia's communal problems 
could threaten total disaster" (Fryer, 1970, p.30).
15. The speedy post-Second World War rehabilitation of Peninsular
Malaysia occurred despite the great disruption which the economy 
had suffered due to British 'scorched-earth* tactics and 
Japanese military mal-administration: "The subsequent rapid
restoration and recovery of the economy were a striking achieve­
ment and a tribute to the energy, efficiency and cooperative 
effort of private enterprise, labour and, initially, the British 
Military Administration, later, the reconstituted civil govern­
ments of the two territories.* By 1947 and 1948 the foundations 
of the economy had in large measure been restored" (international 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1955* P>19). Similarly, 
a government publication stated: "Now, at the end of four years,
Malaya can boast a truly remarkable economic recovery. The 
volume of international trade has been restored to the level of 
the busiest pre-War years, rubber and rice production in 1948 
broke all previous records and tin production is steadily rising 
to its pre-War level" (Reference Division, 1950, An Economic 
Review of Malaya, 1945 - 1949* (Central Office of Information, 
London), p.5).
^(Author's note: Peninsular Malaysia (then British Malaya), and
Singapore).
16. The International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences says that 
“nation' is "either synonymous with a state or its inhabitants, 
or else it denotes a human group bound together by common solid­
arity - a group whose members place loyalty to the group as a 
whole over any conflicting loyalties" (Sills, D. L., ed., 1968, 
International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, Volume II, 
(MacMillan and The Free PressJ, p.7T°
This author believes that the latter definition is much the more 
pertinent in the context of Peninsular Malaysia, The main prob-. 
lem facing the government is that the diverse peoples who occupy 
the country are not yet truly integrated, and in order to build 
national unity in Peninsular Malaysia the government must forge 
a common - that is, Peninsular Malaysian - group solidarity 
which invests the several communities with the loyalty vital to 
the creation of national unity.
?5
1?, As a consequence there was often lack of overt friction between 
the races occupying a country. However, the European presence 
prevented not only friction but also the integration which 
might have led to genuine national unity. Enloe has noted 
the popular mis-conception that Peninsular Malaysia prior to 
the Japanese invasion was "remarkably serene" (Enloe, 1970, 
p.42), and has also indicated the myth that apparent serenity 
of this kind presages true nationhood: "The very reason for
that pre-War serenity was the un-integrated character of 
Malaysian society. Total absence of conflict in such a 
distinctively heterogeneous society is, therefore, usually a 
sign of separateness and low integration, not of unity and 
mutual trust" (Enloe, 1970, p.42).
18. Ariff uses the term "lopsided economic development" to describe 
the "haphazard nature of the development process under the 
colonial rule" (Ariff, 1973» P*3?2).
19. With regard to the study region, McGee has observed that 
"economically undeveloped Southeast Asia has great regional 
contrasts within countries in terms of economic development, 
and these present difficulties to integration at the economic 
and political levels" (McGee, i960, p.52).
20. McGee is here quoting two other authors. The expression 
"cellular society" was used by E. H. G. Dobby (Dobby, E. H. G., 
1950» Southeast Asia, (University of London Press, London)), and 
the quotation is from F. G. Camell (Carnell, F. G., 1958,
Ethnic and Cultural Pluralism in Burma, Thailand and Malaya, in 
Ethnic and Cultural Pluralism in Intertropical Communities 
(Report of the 30th Meeting, International Institute of Differing 
Civilizations held in Lisbon, 1957)» Brussels).
21. Collins1 Dictionary of the English Language defines "pluralism"
as a sociological "theory of society as several autonomous but 
interdependent groups having equal power" (Hanks, P., ed., 1979t 
Dictionary of the English Language, (Collins, London)), and as 
Enloe has noted, "political integration in a multi-ethnic 
society is particularly difficult for the very reason that 
ethnic divisions usually overlap with and compound the more 
common lines of political and social separation" (Enloe, 1970, 
p.l).
22. Ness considers "racial antagonism" to be the "most divisive of
all forces in modern Malaya" (Ness, 1967a, p.99)> and the danger 
inherent in Peninsular Malaysia'g peculiar mix of socio-economic 
and racial imbalances has been summarized neatly by Hoerr: "The 
coincidence of economic imbalances by location and by race does
not simply complicate the regional problems which Malaysia
shares with virtually every nation in the world: it adds a
whole new dimension" (Hoerr, 0. D., 1973* Education, Income and 
Equity in Malaysia, pp.247 - 273 in Economic Development and 
Cultural Change, Volume 21, Number 2),
Wang Gungwu states that "the fundamental source of frustration 
and potential conflict still lies today in the economic gap 
between the Chinese and the indigenous peoples" (Wang Gungwu,
1974, Chinese Minorities in Southeast Asia, pp.13 - 24 in Negara, 
Volume I, Number 1. The quotation is from p.2l).
"The lesson of the recent disturbances is clear. This Nation 
cannot afford to perpetuate a system that permits anybody to 
say or do things which would set one race againstanother. If 
the events of May 13 are not to occur again, if this Nation 
is to survive, we must make sure that subjects which are likely 
to engender racial tensions are not exploited by irresponsible 
opportunists. We can only guarantee this by placing such 
subjects beyond the reach of race demagogues, the Communists 
and other subversives. We need, therefore, to construct a 
political framework which is realistic and takes full account 
of the social and economic conditions of our people and which 
is based on an unshakable and sound foundation" (National 
Operations Council, 1969» p.v.).
The importance of land development is underlined by Lim Sow 
Ching in his study of the relative merits of different land 
development approaches in Peninsular Malaysia: "land development 
by the public sector is one of the major means of raising 
rural standards of living and of narrowing the economic 
imbalance between the races in Malaysia" (Lim Sow Ching, 1976, 
p.vii) .
As revealed in Table 1.5» the allocations to FELDA were 
M$582.42 millions under the Second Malaysia Plan (1971 - 1975) 
and M$985*02 millions under the Third Malaysia Plan (1976 - 1980). 
The Second Malaysia Plan reveals that the next highest sums 
allocated to specific, named agencies during 1971 - 1975 were 
sums of M^IOO.OO million allocated to the National Corporation 
(PERNAS), the Urban Development Authority (UDA), and the 
Malaysian Industrial Development Finance corporation (MIDF) 
(Federation of Malaysia, 1971, Table 5-1)* The Third Malaysia 
Plan reveals that during 1976 - 1980 the next highest alloca­
tions to specific, named agencies were sums of M$515*00 
million to Majlis Amanah Rakyat (MARA) for commerce, industry, 
education and training, M$200.00 to the Urban Development 
Authority (UBA), and a contribution of M$200.00 to the Bumiputra 
Investment Fund (Federation of Malaysia, 1976, Table 12-3).
Of course, such evaluation should be imperative in any country, 
regardless of the state of development. However, the need for 
evaluation is particularly acute in developing countries, for 
- with comparatively few resources with which to solve their 
many problems - there is much less room for wasteful expenditure.
For example, the Far Eastern Economic Review - a respected and 
authoritative source of information on Southeast Asian affairs - 
observed recently that "there are signs that details of the New 
Economic Policy (NEP) - the cornerstone of contemporary Malaysian 
policy - may be in need of adjustment" (Far Eastern Economic 
Review, 1978, Volume 99> Number 2, January 13, p.42).
29. Bahrin defines a fringe alienation scheme as "a land develop­
ment scheme located close to an area of established agricultural 
settlement intended to supplement the land resources of existing 
farmers" (Bahrin, 19^9» P-75)*
30. With regard to evaluations of socio-economic development, Dunham 
points out that "completely objective appraisals would in
some cases, no doubt, tell 'too much truth1 and would jar 
political nerves or tread on delicate national toes" (Dunham, A., 
1970, Community Development - Whither Bound?, pp.85 - 93 
Community Development Journal, Volume 5» Number 1. The quotation 
is from p.87).
31. Singapore has had a very close association with Peninsular 
Malaysia for many decades. This association has been both 
economic and political, and the preclusion of Singapore from 
this discussion warrants further explanation. There are several 
reasons for excluding Singapore from this study. First, previous 
economic and political association notwithstanding, Peninsular 
Malaysia and Singapore are discrete political units today. The 
separation of Singapore from the Federation of Malaysia in 1965 
wasnnot amicable, and since that date the two countries have 
gone their separate ways. Furthermore, a return of Singapore
to the Federation's fold is unlikely as long'as the reason 
underlying Singapore's explusion - the large Singapore Chinese 
population - persists. Second, land development by the Federal 
Land Development Authority is not undertaken in Singapore.
Third, even when the two states were linked, data were collected 
for each discrete unit. Thus it is possible to find data 
referring to Peninsular Malaysia only, and the study is not 
hampered by the necessity to 'clean' data so as to remove the 
figures for Singapore. For these and other reasons it has been 
felt both practicable and legitimate to preclude Singapore from 
the discussion, except for certain historical references in 
Chapter 3 .
32. These remarks refer only to the terminology employed by the 
present author. Other authors have not necessarily been as 
discriminating, especially in their usage of 'Malaysia' and 
'Malaysian'. Frequently these terms are used as synonyms for 
'Peninsular Malaysia' and 'Peninsular Malaysian', and are not 
necessarily to be taken as referring to the complete Federation 
of Malaysia (that is, Peninsular Malaysia and East Malaysia 
together). However, where 'Malaysia' and 'Malaysian' are 
employed in quotations contained in this thesis, they may be 
taken as referring to Peninsular Malaysia only (unless other­
wise indicated).
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CHAPTER 2
Land Development in Peninsular Malaysia - 
The Federal Land Development Authority
2.1 INTRODUCTION
In 1956, the government of Peninsular Malaysia started to 
implement land development as part of its national planning policy, 
and from comparatively humble beginnings land development has risen 
to a position- of priority in Peninsular Malaysians development planning. 
Today, the principal exponent of the land development approach is the 
Federal Land Development Authority, known familiarly by the acronym
felda/3^)
It is the aim of Chapter 2 to give an account of land develop­
ment in Peninsular Malaysia, concentrating upon the growth and 
development of the Federal Land Development Authority. Chapter 2 will 
describe first the land development scene in Peninsular Malaysia 
today; the growth, development and present nature of the Federal Land 
Development Authority will then be detailed.
2.2 LAND DEVELOPMENT IN PENINSULAR MALAYSIA
2.2a Definition of Land Development
Any attempt to alienate land or to modify land use might be 
termed 'land development®. The construction of drainage and irri­
gation schemes, the implementation of double-cropping techniques,
the introduction of new crops or of new strains of traditional crops, 
agricultural mechanisation, farm consolidation, and the extension of 
agricultural marketing and credit institutions would all fall within 
such a general definition. However, in the case of Peninsular 
Malaysia such a general interpretation of 'land development' is far 
too broad.-
In Peninsular Malaysia 'land development" has a specific 
connotation. In the Peninsular Malaysian context, 'land development' 
is the opening-up of undeveloped land to the cultivation of commer­
cial crops, with or without concomitant relocation of population on
planned settlement schemes integrated with the agricultural develop- 
(35)ment. ' This definition is wide enough to include all types of 
land development practised In Peninsular Malaysia, yet narrow enough 
to exclude activities such as those noted in the previous paragraph. 
The definition itself requires modification when applied to particular 
land development programmes.
2.2b Land Development Strategies in Peninsular Malaysia
In Peninsular Malaysia, land development - as opposed to
irrigation and drainage schemes - is a post-independence phenomenon
(Bahrin, 1971 $ P*23)« Peninsular Malaysian land development stems
from The Report of the Special Working Party set up to assess the
(36)
feasibility of land development in the Federation of Malaya.
The most important recommendation of the Working Party was the
establishment of the Federal Land Development Authority. However,
The Report paved the way also for the proliferation of land develop-
(37)ment strategies and agencies revealed in Figure 2.1. 7
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The land development strategies depicted in Figure 2.1 fall 
within the definition of land development given in Section 2.2a above. 
All these strategies involve the utilisation of undeveloped land. 
However, in Peninsular Malaysia the term 'undeveloped land* can 
have several nuances of meaning, ranging from abandoned padi- and 
rubber-smallholdings in need of rehabilitation to large tracts of 
virgin forest which have never been utilised, ' Different strate­
gies are employed for dealing with different classes of undeveloped 
land, and each agency has its particular terms of reference. Thus, 
the Federal Land Rehabilitation and Consolidation Authority (FELCRA) 
is concerned with refurbishing abandoned agricultural land. The 
Federal Land Development Authority is the agency entrusted with the 
opening up of forested areas for new cultivation.
Figure 2.1 indicates the reality that public sector land 
development - either by Federal or by State agencies - is dominant, 
although the fact that the private sector undertakes some land 
development is revealed as well. Figure 2.1 shows also that land 
development does not necessarily involve land settlement. For example, 
Fringe Alienation schemes are worked by farmers who travel to them 
from their homes in nearby, pre-existing villages. However, other 
strategies do require the translocation of farming populations into 
new settlements. FELDA falls into this second category.
Figure 2.1 does not indicate the relative importance of different
land development strategies. One indicator of relative importance is
(39)
the acreage of crop-land developed by each agency. Four land
development programmes accounted for approximately 92# (791*^00 acres) 
of the crop-land developed by the end of 1970 (Lim Sow Ching, 1976, 
V.9).m
8a
On the basis of acreage of crop-land developed, these major land 
development programmes in Peninsular Malaysia are:
( i) The Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA);
( ii) Fringe Alienation schemes. These are projects
- financed partly by State government, partly by 
Federal government - set up by State governments 
close to existing villages so that the villagers 
might supplement inadequate farm incomes;
(iii) State schemes, often similar to FELDA schemes, but 
less sophisticated with respect to infrastructure 
and management. State schemes are set up with 
either partial or full State assistance;
( iv) Unsubsidised schemes, in which the State government
has supplied only the land alienation fee. These 
schemes are funded by the settlers,
(Lim Sow Ching, 1976, p.9)
Table 2.1 shows land development implemented in Peninsular 
Malaysia up to December, 1970. Table 2,2 details land development 
under the Second Malaysia Plan and gives target acreages for the Third 
Malaysia Plan. The Tables underline the premier status of the 
Federal Land Development Authority. Table 2.1 shows that FELDA 
accounted for 39% of oil land developed by the end of 1970. The 
Authority dominated the oil-palm sector especially, being responsible 
for 91-5% of the oil-palm acreage planted up to that date. Table 2.2 
reveals that the Authority strengthened its position relative to other 
agencies after 1970: FELDA was responsible for some 51*6% of the
acreage of land developed during the Second Malaysia Plan, and was
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TABLE 2.1
Peninsular Malaysia
ACREAGE OF LAND DEVELOPED BY TYPE OF 
LAMP DEVELOPMENT SCHEME, DECEMBER 1970
Type of Scheme Number 
of Schemes
MAIN CROP AREA
RUISBER 0IL-PALM BOTH
'000
acres %
*000
acres %
'000
acres %
FELDA 90 147.8 24.0 160.6 91.5 308.4 39.0
Fringe Alienation 398 135.3 22.0 - - 135.3 17.1
State 70 37.0 [ 6 .0 - - 37.0 4.7
Other Subsidised 141 66.7 10.8 14.4 8 .2 81.1 10.2
Unsubsidised 391 229 .0 37.2 0 .6 0.3 229.6 29 .0
Total 1,090 615.8 100.00 175.6 100.00 791 .4 100.00
Source: adapted from Lim Sow Ching, 1976, Table 1.1, Details of Peninsular
Malaysia Land Development Schemes (December 1970).
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TABLE 2.2 
Peninsular Malaysia
LAND DEVELOPMENT PROGRESS,. 19-71 - 75
AND TARGET ACREAGE, 1976 - 80
Agency/Programme TARGET 
1971 ~ 75
ACHIEVEMENT 
1971 - 75
TARGET 
1976 - 80
acres % acres % acres %
FELDA 403,000 41.8 412,375 51.6 350,000 5 0 .0
FELCRA^ 100,000 10.4 58,255 7.3 50,000 7.1
RXSDA1^ 150,000 1 5 .6 47,251 5-9 100,000 14.3
State Programmes 87,500 9.1 151,108 18.9 100,000 14.3
Joint Venture// \ 
Private Sector^ ' 222,500 23.1 130,644 16,3 100,000 14.3
Total 963,000 100.0 799,633 100.0 700,000 100.0
(a) Federal Land Consolidation and Rehabilitation Authority,
(b) Rubber Industries Small-holders Development Authority,
(c) target acreage 1971 - 75 includes data for East Malaysia. Other
acreages are Peninsular Malaysia only.
Source: adapted from Federation of Malaysia, 1976, Table 16-2,
Malaysia: Progress in Land Development, 1971 - 75 and
Target Acreage, 1976 - 80,
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allocated exactly 50% of the land to he developed under the Third 
Malaysia Plan.
2.3 THE FEDERAL LAND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY 
2.3a The FELDA Model
The premier status of FELDA among the land development strategies 
practised in Peninsular Malaysia means that in that country land develop­
ment is popularly considered synonymous with the activities of the 
Federal Land Development Authority. In Peninsular Malaysia, the term 
fland development* conjures up the vision of tracts of forest land in 
rural areas being brought into cultivation by FELDA estates and settle­
ments. The Federal Land Development Authority is the senior practitioner 
of land development, and since its inception FELDA has built up a vast 
store of knowledge and experience. The Authority has spread its 
influence widely both in terms of the distribution of its schemes and 
in respect of its contribution to the economy. Thus, FELDA*s impact 
upon Peninsular Malaysia's socio-economic system has been great in very 
many respects.
Figure 2.1 shows that FELDA belongs to the Federally controlled 
public sector, and that the Authority implements several types of 
scheme. FELDA Youth Schemes and FELDA Fringe Schemes form only a small 
proportion of the schemes implemented by the Authority. A typical 
FELDA operation is a large-scale development of either rubber or oil- 
palm smallholdings, according closely with the provisions of National 
Land Council Paper No. 4/1958* This Paper called for "the adoption of 
planned land development -
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(a) by establishing holdings of economic size, and if 
possible or desirable, creating complementary estates;
(b) based on the proper use of soils and conforming to 
the topography;
(c) with kampungs and villages properly furnished with 
social and other services as the centres;
(d) with no scattered habitation; and
(e) with processing and marketing facilities as part of
the development,"
(Bahrin and Perera, 1977, p.ll)
The FELDA scheme model consists of several thousand acres of 
cropland - rubber or oil-palm - around a nucleated village located 
near the centre of the agricultural area. The actual vital statistics
of a scheme - crop acreage, type of main crop, number of settlers,
location of village within the crop-land, provision of physical and 
social infrastructure - vary according to factors such as the age of 
the scheme and the physical constraints influencing its development.
The earlier FELDA schemes were established in the developed 
West Coast States, where infrastructure was already largely available, 
but where suitable land was restricted in its extent. Later schemes 
were established in the less developed States of the East Coast, where 
land is plentiful but infrastructure has often to be developed from 
scratch. Schemes located in the West Coast States are usually smaller 
than those established more recently in the land-rich States of the 
East Coast, which States continue to occupy most of the Authority9s 
attention.
8?
Today, FELDA prefers a minimum scheme size of approximately 
4,500 acres settled hy some 400 families, giving a total scheme 
population of approximately 2,000 settlers and their dependants. This 
'ideal' size is preferred because it provides a suitable management 
unit; qualifies under the Red Book system for the provision of various 
services (for example, mid-wife's clinic and primary school); justifies 
the provision of roads and piped water; and furnishes a population large 
enough to support a small commercial centre (Bahrin and Perera, 1977i
p.27).
A typical FELDA scheme satisfies basic requirements for
facilities and services. Apart from the settlers* houses, an established
village has roads, piped water, shops, a primary school, a mid-wife's
clinic, and a mosque. There will be also a FELDA scheme management
office. Some schemes - by virtue of age, size or location - may have
a police station, a secondary school, and a Community Centre. A scheme
(4l)will have usually the central padang typical of a Malay kampung. J
The Federal Land Development Authority furnishes by no means all 
the physical and social infrastructure on its schemes. FELDA is 
responsible only for developing the crop-land, providing the village 
housing, and managing the settlers. Other infrastructure is the purview 
of the Public Works Department (roads and water supply), the Ministry 
of Education (schools)^ "the Department of Town and Country Planning 
(planning of village development), and the Ministry of Health (Mid­
wives and clinics).
2.3b History and Development of the Federal Land
Development Authority
FELDA has passed through several distinct phases of growth,
each marked by changes in the Authority's powers and terms of
reference. FELDA's history and development may be subdivided into
(42)three main stages coinciding with these changes:
( i) The Advisory Stage (1956 - I960)
The first real attempt at development planning for Peninsular 
Malaysia as a whole was the Draft Development Plan. In the Draft 
Development Plan it was recognised that the opening-up of new land 
for development and settlement would probably become important in the 
future, although it was emphasised that such land development would 
require a heavy investment of capital (Federation of Malaya, 1950, 
p.44). A further five years were to elapse before the land develop­
ment approach received close scrutiny.
The suggestion that land development merited serious consid­
eration as a means of developing rural areas was made in 1955 by Tun 
Doctor Ismail bin Datuk Abdul Rahman (Bahrin and Perera, 1977, P»l). 
Accordingly, in August 1955 a special Working Party was commissioned 
to study the potential of land development in Peninsular Malaysia 
(Syed Hussain Wafa, 1975, p.166). The Working Party's brief was
"( i) To assess the needs in the various States and 
settlements for assistance from the Federal 
Government in the development of new areas for 
land settlement, and In the light of this 
assessment,
(ii) To make recommendations with special reference to 
financial and administrative aspects of the most
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suitable organisation for providing such 
assistance"
(Bahrin and Perera, 19??, P.l).
The Working Party found that there was a need for planned land
development in Peninsular Malaysia. A major consideration was the
great back-log of land applications still to be processed as a result
(As)of disruptions caused by the Second World War and the Emergency. 1 
It was realised that a Federal land development authority could assist 
greatly in rectifying the situation. Moreover, the Working Party 
discovered that the States were willing to accept Federal assistance in 
developing their land.
Accordingly, the Working Party recommended the establishment 
of a Federal land development authority, whose task would be to channel 
Federal funds to the State governments. The State governments would in 
their turn set up Local Development Boards to prosecute the development 
of new land (Syed Hussain Wafa, 1975, p.l66). The recommendations of 
the Working Party were accepted in March, 1956 (FELDA, 1956, p.l), and 
the Federal Land Development Authority was established by the Land 
Development Ordinance (No. 20 of 1956). The Land Development Ordinance 
provided for
"the establishment of a Federal development authority 
and local development boards to promote and carry 
out projects for land development and settlement, 
for making funds available therefor, and for purposes 
connected therewith"
(Federation of Malaya, 1956, p.l). 
and came into effect on July 1st, 1956. Mr. D, E. M. Fiennes was 
seconded from the Commonwealth Development Corporation to be the new 
Authority's first Chairman. J
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The provisions of the Land Development Ordinance were put into 
operation without delay, and by November 1956 eleven Land Development 
Boards and Corporations had been established in 8 States. At this 
stage the Federal Land Development Authority was not expected itself 
to initiate land development. The Working Party had been aware of the 
States0 jealousy in respect of rights over State land, and the govern­
ment created FELDA with the limited function of providing advice and 
making Federal finance available to State land development agencies 
(Bahrin, 1972, p. 1 2 ) . ^
The operations of-the Authority did not meet with great success
during the Advisory Stage. There were several reasons for this lack
of success. First, there was an absence of cooperation at State 
06)level. Second, changes of staff at State level hampered coordination
between FELDA and the State authorities. Third, FELDA itself suffered 
from a shortage of staff. Fourth, there were numerous departments 
with some responsibility for land development, and consultation between
O?)these interested parties wasted much time. Fifth, FELDA was
hampered by a dearth of survey data regarding the country’s soils, 
mineralisation, topography and land alienation. Lack of such inform­
ation rendered doubly difficult the complex task of land development.
As a consequence of these problems, during the Advisory Stage 
the rate of alienation of new land was very slow. FELDA's first 
scheme was established at Ayer Lanas in Kelantan, under the control of 
the Kelantan Land Development Board. The Ayer Lanas scheme comprised 
some ^,000 acres and was financed by FELDA to the tune of M$800,000. 
Ayer Lanas was started in 1957» tut subsequent progress was tardy.
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Between 1957 and I960 the Authority brought 14 schemes into operation 
(New Straits Times, 1977» p.19)*^^
This slow progress was exacerbated by problems encountered in
the field implementation of land development. First, neither FELDA
nor the State Land Development Boards had much experience of this type
of operation. Second, the Authority was hampered by the quality of
the first settlers. There had been no great rush of farmers wishing
to avail themselves of FELDA's bounty. It appeared that many potential
settlers were unwilling to commit themselves to the new Authority
until it had proved itself (Alias, 1975> P»6). Also, the FELDA life
was hardly a 'soft option'. Prior to 1958 the new settlers were
thought of as true pioneers. They were expected to perform all the
tasks of scheme development, including arduous labour such as tree-
felling and field preparation. Many settlers had neither the stamina
(49)for forest clearance nor the skills required for farming. 7
As a result of the slow progress, in 1958 FELDA decided to 
employ contractors to speed the task of site-clearing, although 
settlers were still expected to perform jobs such as terracing, planting 
and house-building. At the end of I960 these tasks also were turned 
over to contractors.
The Alliance government's failure to fulfil the development 
objectives of the First Malaya Plan (1956 - i960) resulted in many 
rural Malays switching allegiance to the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party 
(P.-M. I. P.) at the 1959 General Election. Defeat at the polls forced 
the Alliance government to reappraise its development strategies, and 
in the light of this reappraisal FELDA's slow rate of progress was seen
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as unsatisfactory. Acceleration of the land development programme 
became a development imperative.
In December i960 the Ministry of Rural Development appointed 
a Special Committee to consider the role of the Federal Land Development 
Authority. The Special Committee recommended that FELDA take on the 
greatest responsibility for land development. Amendments to National 
Land Council Resolutions Number 12 and Number 13 made, the Authority 
responsible for all major land development schemes, including those 
Group Settlement Schemes being developed by State governments. Finally, 
the Federal Parliament passed the Land (Group Settlement Areas) Act of 
i960 in order to standardize regulations and procedures.
As a consequence of these measures FELDA ceased to be a mere 
loans and advisory body. The Authority became responsible for all 
operations involved in land development. FELDA was restricted no longer 
to acting in support of State agencies, and was empowered to undertake 
the field implementation of schemes. This change heralded the second 
stage of development, during which the Federal Land Development Authority 
made a major impact upon the landscape of Peninsular Malaysia.
( ii) The Development Stage (1961 - 1970)
The Development Stage was nearly coterminous with the decade of 
the 1960s, and was the period of change during which FELDA became more 
complex as its activities grew increasingly diverse. The Special 
Committee set up to review FELDA had recommended that the State Land 
Development Boards be wound up, and this recommendation was implemented 
in mid-196l. FELDA took control of 17 schemes, The Special
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Committee had advised also that the Authority he brought within the
scope of the Ministry of National and Rural Development, and the
fulfilment of this recommendation caused FELDA to lose much of its
autonomy. However, in 1961 the Ministry did appoint a Technical
Investigation Committee and a Technical Planning Committee, which
committees solved the problems of slow progress which had beset FELDA
(51)at the close of the Advisory Stage. J
The Alliance's intention to use land development as part of its 
response to electoral dissatisfaction was apparent in the allocations 
of the Second Malaya Plan (I96I - I965). The Second Malaya Plan gave 
M$5^5*3 million to Agriculture and Rural Development (Federation of 
Malaya, 1961, Table V ) . ^ ^  The importance of FELDA within the pro­
gramme of Agriculture and Rural Development was emphasised by the Plan's 
allocations. The Second Malaya Plan allotted M$175 million direct to 
the Authority, and M$30 million to those agencies whose job it was to 
provide facilities and services on the Authority’s schemes (Federation 
of Malaya, 1961, p.3l)*
The First Malaysia Plan (1966 - 1970) ushered in a further era 
of growth for FELDA. Under the First Malaysia Plan the estimated 
actual expenditure on land development by all agencies was M$363,6  
million (Federation of Malaysia, 1971» Table 2-k), with the major pro­
portion of land development being undertaken by FELDA (Federation of 
Malaysia, 1971. p.11).
During the Development Stage, a number of changes were effected 
in FELDA's modus operand!. The first change was a switch from rubber 
to oil-palm as the main crop. FELDA had been attracted to rubber
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originally by the settlers' comparative familiarity with it, and
because rubber held out the prospect of high incomes for the
(  5 3 )settlers (Harcharan Singh Khera, 1975> P*194). Rubber was the
main crop on 52 of the 57 schemes in operation in 1963 - only five 
schemes were devoted to oil-palm (Wikkramatileke, 1972a).
The switch to oil-palm as a settler crop was prompted by the 
government's desire to maintain settler incomes at high levels within 
a growing and increasingly diversified economy,, Rubber prices had 
fallen steadily since the 'boom' occasioned by the Korean War, and the 
government wished to reduce Peninsular Malaysia's dependence on this 
crop. The First Malaysia Plan reiterated the intention of diversifi­
cation (Federation of Malaysia, 1965» Pt7)i and the remarkable turn­
around in the importance of the two crops on FELDA schemes had its 
roots in the government's decision to diversify. Also the ability 
of oil-palm cultivation to enhance settler incomes was particularly 
attractive in the aftermath of the 1959 General Election result.
The Authority had first planted oil-palm in 1961, 4 of* the 
first 5 FELDA oil-palm schemes being established at the Taib Andak 
complex in Johore. In the second half of the 1960s oil-palm was adopted 
increasingly as a settler crop, with 32 of the 42 new schemes set up 
between 1964 and 1970 being planted with oil-palm (Wikkramatileke,
1972a). By the end of the decade the acreage of oil-palm had out­
stripped that of rubber. Table 2.3 shows the acreage planted by the 
Federal Land Development Authority by State and by type of crop at the 
end of 1970. Table 2.3 reveals that rubber comprised 147,825 acres 
(47*4%) and oil-palm 164,003 acres (5 2.6%) of the total 3H>828 acres 
(100.0%) planted. Table 2.3 reveals also that total land developed
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TABLE 2.3
Federal Land Development Authority
ACREAGE. PLANTED BY STATE AND BY 
_________CROP TYPE, 1970_________
STATE RUBBER OIL-PALM BOTH
acres % acres % acres %
Penang - - - - - -
Perak 16,082 10.9 7,596 4.6 23,678 7.6
Selangor 7,761 5.3 14,094 8 .6 21,855 7.0
CENTRAL WEST COAST 23,843 16 .2 21,690 1 3 .2 45,533 14.6
Negri Sembilan 28,079 19 .0 - - 28,079 9.0
Malacca 6,571 4.4 - - 6,571 2 .1
Johore 34,300 23 .2 40,008 24.4 74,308 23 .8
SOUTH-WEST COAST 68,950 46.6 40,008 24.4 108,958 34.9
Kedah 11,086 7.5 - - 11,086 3.6
Perils - - - - - -
NORTH-WEST COAST 11,086 7.5 - 11,086 3.6
WEST COAST 103,879 70.3 61,698 37.6 165,577 53.1
Pahang 34,155 2 3.I 89,531 54.6 123,686 39.7
Kelantan 2,400 - - - 7 -
Trengganu 9,791 6.6 12,774 7.8 22,565 7.2
EAST COAST 43,946 29.7 102,305 62.4 146,251 46.9
Peninsular
Malaysia (a) 147,825 100.0 
f- ■ ■
164,003 100.0 I 311,828> 100.0
(a) total and sub-total figures do not include data for Kelantan, since 
no statistics are available after FELDA ceased operation in that 
state.
Sources adapted from Wikkramatileka, 1972a, Table II, FELDA Projects;
A Statistical Summary, 1970»
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was divided fairly equally "between the West Coast States and the 
East Coast States. The former had i65,577 acres (53^1%) nnd the latter 
146,251 acres (46.9%) of the total developed area of 3H»828 acres. 
However, this over-all picture masks important differences in the 
distribution of rubber and oil-palm: almost three-quarters (70.3%)
of the rubber acreage was in the West Coast States, whereas nearly 
two-thirds (62.4?&) of the oil-palm acreage was in the East Coast.
The distribution of oil-palm noted above reflected the second 
change within FELDA, which was that the Authority turned its attention 
to the East Coast States. Again, this was a manifestation of Alliance 
desire to use land development as a means of regaining the support of 
the rural Malays. The move was a response also to the growing 
unavailability of large tracts of suitable land in the West Coast 
States. The reality that oil-palm benefitted from large-scale develop­
ment lent economic credibility to the political considerations. 
Consequently, in the second half of the 1960s FELDA started to concen­
trate its efforts on central Pahang and Trengganu and southeast
(55)interior Johore, areas rich in under-utilised and virgin-forest land. '
This switch in emphasis is demonstrated in Table 2.4, which 
shows the distribution by State of schemes implemented in two time- 
periods, 1957 - 19&3 an<^  1964 - 1970* In the former period, 42 (73*7%) 
of FELDA's 57 schemes were established in States of the West Coast 
with Johore alone having more schemes than the total number located in 
the three East Coast States (17 as opposed to 15). In the latter period, 
the position was reversed. Between 1964 and 1970, the East Coast 
States acquired almost two-thirds (62.0%) of new schemes, Pahang alone 
accounting for some 24 (57.1%) of the 42 schemes implemented during 
this period.
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TABLE 2.4
Federal Land Development Authority
DISTRIBUTION _ BY STATE .OF . SCHEMES. IMPLEMENTED.
IN TWO TIME PERIODS, 195? - 63 AND 1964 - 70
STATE SCHEMES IMPLEMENTED 
1957 - 63
SCHEMES IMPLEMENTED 
1964 - 70
RUBBER OIL-PALM BOTH RUBBER OIL-PALM BOTH
' No ' No No % No No No %
Penang - - - - - - - -
Perak 5 - 5 8 .8 - 2 2 4.8
Selangor 2 1 3 5.3 - 1 1 2.4
CENTRAL WEST COAST 7 1 8 14.1 - 3 3 7.2
Negri Sembilan 7 - 7 12.3 3 - 3 7.1
Malacca 4 - 4 7.0 1 - 1 2.4
Johore 15 2 17 29 .8 - 8 8 19.0
SOUTH-WEST COAST 26 2 28 49.1 4 8 12 28.5
Kedah 6 - 6 10.5 1 - 1 2.4
Perils - - - - - - - -
NORTH-WEST COAST 6 - 6 10.5 1 - 1 2.4
WEST COAST 39 3 42 73-7 5 11 16 38.1
Pahang 8 1 9 15.8 4 20 24 57.1
Kelantan 1 - 1 1.8 - - - -
Trengganu 4 1 5 8.8 1 1 2 4.8
EAST COAST 13 2 15 26 A 5 21 26 62 .0
J Peninsular Malaysia 52 5 57 100.0 10 32 42 100.0
Source: adapted from Nikkramatilekef 1972a,. Tahle I., Distrihution of
FELDA Projects Implemented and Scheduled, 1957 - 70.
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The third change made by FELDA was in respect of its operations 
at scheme level. To combat the slow rate of development, after 1962 
FELDA did not require settlers to work on the construction of roads, 
drainage channels and similar infrastructure within the schemes.
Later it was decided that settlers would not have to even build their 
houses. Thus FELDA arrived at the situation pertaining today, where 
all the tasks of scheme establishment - forest clearance, terracing, 
planting, crop maintenance in the early stages, house-building, and 
the construction of scheme infrastructure - are completed before the 
arrival of the settlers. The settlers simply move into the houses 
and take over from the contractors the task of crop maintenance.
The fourth change was with reference to the size of main crop 
holding. During the Advisory Stage, the settler had been allocated 
some six to eight acres of rubber as a main crop holding. Each settler 
had received also an additional two acres of orchard land, or dusun.
It had been discovered that the main crop holding was too small to 
provide the settler with adequate income and employment, whereas often 
the dusun was neglected (Alias, 1975)• Towards the end of the 
Development Stage these problems were solved partially by fixing the 
main crop holding at 10 acres for both rubber and oil-palm, at the 
same time doing away with the separate dusun area.
The fifth change was in the way in which the main crop holdings 
were allocated to the settlers for development. Originally, settlers 
on FELDA rubber schemes had been expected to assist in developing the 
whole of the scheme crop acreage. This had proved to be unsatisfactory, 
as settlers were unable to associate their efforts with rewards 
accruing to them personally. In 1962, FELDA introduced a 'block'
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method of farming in which groups of settlers cooperated in tending 
smaller, more easily defined acreages. The settlers found more 
motivation in the fact that they could now identify the trees which 
would one day he theirs, and scheme development improved. Today, each 
settler is allocated ultimately a portion (i.e. 10 acres) of the 
larger area which he has helped to maintain, and he continues to work 
alone on this plot. The final act is the granting of land title to 
the settler on .completing the repayment to FELDA of the cost of 
developing the holding.
The allocation of holdings on FELDA oil-palm schemes was 
complicated hy the fact that oil-palm fresh fruit hunches (FFB) 
require rapid processing if most value is to he obtained from the crop. 
Also, the maintenance and harvesting of oil-palm acreage is a more 
demanding task physically than that of ruhher cultivation. Consequently, 
oil-palm is hest worked on a group basis rather than hy one man alone. 
Thus* in 1970 FELDA introduced to oil-palm schemes a modified 1block' 
system which would allow oil-palm cultivators to continue to assist 
each other after the crop had reached production.
Unlike the practice on ruhher schemes - where settlers ulti­
mately farm their holdings independently - in the oil-palm 'block' 
system the cropland is divided into units of some 200 acres. Each 
200-acre block is farmed hy 20 settlers on a cooperative basis. The 
settlers help each other in performing the necessary tasks, and share 
equally the proceeds from the block. This system links the economic 
advantage of efficiency with respect to crop production with the 
political attractiveness of land ownership: "FELDA's endeavour in
oil palm growing is more or less an estate-based venture with a
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cooperative land ownership" (Bahrin and Perera, 1977, P-^3)*
The sixth change was that at the end of the Development Stage 
FELDA began to expand the nature and scope of its operations. The 
Authority experimented with new crops to supplement the traditional 
rubber and oil-palm. For example, the potential of sugar-cane began 
to be investigated in 1967* Also, FELDA established more autonomy 
with respect to the processing and marketing of its products. The 
Authority had processed its own rubber during the first years of the 
1960s, but in 1964 switched to private sector processing in order to 
save on capital costs. This course soon proved expensive, and in 
1966 - with the commissioning of its first two rubber-mills at Ulu 
Jempol and Jerangau - the Authority returned to its original concept„ 
Prior to 1967 FELDA had not carried out any oil-palm processing, but 
in 1967 the Authority commissioned two oil-palm mills at Jerantut and 
Ulu Jempol in Pahang. Later, two more oil-palm mills were built at 
Bukit Besar and Sungei Dusun,^^
A final change was that FELDA began to acknowledge some respon­
sibility for the settlers1 future by instituting social measures aimed 
at improvement of life on the schemes. One consequence of this 
acknowledgement was the creation in 1969 of a Settler Development 
Division within FELDA. The Settler Development Division was set up in
order to assist settlers in adjusting to their new environment and to
( 57)their changed socio-economic status. ' At scheme level, there was the 
creation in 1967 of Scheme Development Committees (Jawatan Kuasa 
Kemajuan Rancangan, or JKKR). These Committees were established in 
order to give settlers a greater say in scheme development.
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Thus by the end of the Development Stage FELDA had evolved the 
main features of the "completely integrated concept of agricultural 
development" (Alias, 1975, P*l6) which characterize it at present.
(iii) The Modem Stage (1971 onwards)
By the beginning of the Modern Stage FELDA had. become the 
"complex and wide-ranging organisation" (MacAndrews, 1977, P«109) which 
it is today. The Modern Stage continues the three main developments 
which characterized the end of the Development Stage. These were:
(i) the recognition by FELDA of its role as a socialising and 
modernising agent; (ii) the growth of processing and marketing 
functions; and (iii) the concentration on large-scale regional develop­
ment projects.
First, the Authority is aware that the government puts great 
reliance on land development as a means of modernising rural areas, 
of changing traditional attitudes, and of effecting the New Development 
Strategy. It is clear also that the government sees FELDA as the most 
important part of the land development approach. The Authority's 
estimated expenditure during the Second Malaysia Plan was M^6^5»l^- 
million out of a total Plan expenditure on land development of 
M$l, 139.18 million (Federation of Malaysia, 1976, Table 16-3).^^ The 
allocation of funds to FELDA in the Third Malaysia H a n  was M$l,603.69 
million (Federation of Malaysia, 1976, Table 16-3).
During the Modern Stage FELDA has continued to seek an optimum 
size for its rubber and oil-palm holdings. The government's ambitions 
make it imperative that FELDA settle as many people as possible at 
adequate income and employment levels. Therefore, size of holdings 
must be kept to the minimum consistent with satisfactory levels of
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employment and earnings. Falling prices of rubier and oil-palm meant
that in 1973 "the size of holdings was increased so as to maintain 
(59)settler incomes. However, it was decided later that this action
would reduce too greatly the numbers of settlers who could be placed 
on FELDA schemes, and today the size for both rubber and oil-palm 
holdings has been standardised at 10 acres.
Second, during the Modem Stage there has been a proliferation 
of departments within FELDA, and of concerns in which the Authority 
has interests. By 1976 FELDA had eleven Departments, 10 Regional 
Administrations, and - at 'grass roots' level - 209 scheme offices.
The Authority controlled also 6 subsidiary Corporations and 3 
subsidiary Companies, which are detailed in Table 2,5.
The third and most significant development during the Modern 
Stage has been the emphasis on FELDA as the cornerstone of regional 
development planning in the more remote East Coast States, The 
regional planning strategy originated in the early 1960s. In 1962, 
government desire to increase the pace of rural development prompted 
Tunku Abdul Razak to concentrate development on a regional planning 
basis. The Tunku selected the Jengka Triangle area of Pahang as the 
country's first planned development region. The World Bank sent
a feasibility mission to Peninsular Malaysia in mid-1963* and the 
project was started in 1966 (FELDA, 1977a). The Jengka Triangle 
development was expected to take twelve years (Tippetts and Co,, et 
al, 1967), and settlers entered the first FELDA scheme in 1970 (FELDA) 
1977a) S 61^
The promulgation of the New Development Strategy - the New 
Economic Policy at its core emphasising correction of ethnic and
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TABLE 2.5 
Federal Land Development Authority 
DETAILS OF SUBSIDIARIES
SUBSIDIARY DATE OF 
ESTABLISHMENT
FUNCTION
Syarikat Kilang Gula 
FELDA Perlis 
Sendirian Berhad
1971 Milling and refining of 
sugar-cane
FELDA Stores 
Corporation
October, 1972 Provision of retail services 
in FELDA schemes
FELDA Marketing 
Corporation (FELMA)
January, 197^ Marketing of rubber and palm 
products from; FELDA schemes
Syarikat FELDA-Johore 
Bulkers Sendirian 
Berhad
September, 197^ Bulking and storage of palm 
oil
Latex Handling 
Corporation (LHC)
September, 197^ Export of latex concentrate 
(Joint venture with Malaysian 
Agricultural Research and 
Development Corporation (MARDEC))
FELDA Transport 
Corporation
January, 1975 Transport of palm oil and 
latex concentrate
FELDA Mills 
Corporation
July, 1975 Control of all processing and 
bulking installations
Syarikat FELDA Oil 
Products Sendirian^ 
Berhad
October, 1975 Refining and fractionating 
of palm oil
FELDA Security 
Services Corporation June, 1976
Provision of security for 
FELDA and its. subsidiaries
Sources compiled from data presented in FELDA, 1975* PP*9 - 11, 
and FELDA, 1977b, pp.8 - 9.
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regional socio-economic imbalance - stimulated a great upsurge of 
interest in regional planning. Between 1970 and 1975 the government 
commissioned 19 Regional Plans, among them the Johore Tenggara Scheme 
and the Pahang Tenggara Scheme. The Johore Tenggara Scheme is a 
scheduled 20-year project covering 750,000 acres in southeast Johore 
(Malaysian Business, 1977). The Plan recommends that 49% of the
249,000 acres suitable for agriculture be developed by FELDA. The 
Pahang Tenggara scheme involves the development of some 2,500,000 
acres in southern Pahang.
Peninsular Malaysia's regional plans show a number of common 
features. Typically they involve extensive areas of the less- 
developed States of the East Coast, which areas offer large tracts 
of under-used land or virgin forest suitable for development by FELDA 
and other agencies. Table 2.6 shows the extent to which suitable 
unalienated land was still available in these States in 1975* It may 
be seen from Table 2.6 that in 1975 some 58.6$ of unalienated land 
suitable for agriculture lay in the East Coast States, especially in 
Pahang (41,1%). If the figure for Johore (20.7%) is added to that 
for the East Coast, then 79*3% of unalienated land suitable for agri­
culture was to be found in the interior part of Peninsular Malaysia 
(see note (a) to Table 2.6).
Table 2.7 shows by State the amount of land projected for 
development by all land development agencies during the term of the 
New Economic Policy (1971 - 1990 )• The emphasis upon the East Coast 
States and upon Johore reflects the situation with respect to the 
availability of unalienated land suitable for agriculture revealed 
in Table 2.6, Table 2.7 shows that in the period 1971 - 1990, the 
East Coast States and Johore are projected to have 75*0% (56.7% + 18.3%)
105
TABLE 2.6
Peninsular Malaysia
AVAILABILITY OE UNAT.IENTAIED LAND 
SUITABLE FOR AGRICULTURE BY STATE, 1975
STATE LAND AREA UNALIENATED LAND SUITABLE 
FOR AGRICULTURE
acres %
Penang 253,000 3 ,000 0 .1
Perak 5,154,000 519,000 8.4
Selangor 1 ,980,000 149,000 2.4
CENTRAL WEST COAST 7,387,000 671,000 10.9
Negri Sembilan 1,642,000 338,000 5.5
Malacca 418,000 22,000 0.4
Johore 4-, 693,000 1,282,000 20.7
SOUTH-WEST COAST 6,753,000 1,642,000 2 6.6
Kedah ) 
Perils)'
2,541,000 250,000 4.0
NORTH-WEST COAST 2,541,000 250,000 4.0
WEST COAST 16,681,000 2,563,000 41.5
Pahang 8,870,000 2,545,000 41.1
Kelantan 3 ,720,000 217,000 3.5
Trengganu 3 ,196,000 866,000 14.0
EAST COAST 1 5,786,000 3,628,000 58.6
Peninsular Malaysia 32,467,000 6,191,000 100.0
(a) Although Johore is a 'West Coast* State - having a shore on the 
Straits of Malacca - the eastern part of the State has e:xperienced 
the inaccessibility and lack of development traditionally charac­
teristic of Pahang, Kelantan and Trengganu. Thus, the bulk of 
unalienated land suitable for agriculture in Johore is distant 
from the developed regions which lie close to the Straits of 
Malacca and to Singapore.
(b) The vast majority of unalienated land suitable for agriculture 
lies in the State of Kedah.
Source: adapted from Federation of Malaysia, 1976, Table 10-7, Malaysia 
" Availability of Suitable Land for Agriculture, 1975*
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TABLE 2.7 
Peninsular Malaysia 
PROJECTED LAND DEVELOPMENT BY STATE, 1971 - 90
STATE OIL-PALM RUBBER OTHER CROPS TOTAL
*000
acres %
•000
acres %
*000
acres %
*000 . 
3,cres %
Penang
Perak
Selangor
CENTRAL WEST COAST
Negri Sembilan
Malacca
Johore
SOUTH-WEST COAST
Kedah )
Perlis)
NORTH-WEST COAST 
WEST COAST
5-5
44.7
40.5
0.3
2.7
2.5
98.6
37-9
10.6  
. 4*1
77.1
10.5
12.7
1.7
5.5
220.4
88.9
0 .2
6.9
2 .8
90.7 5.5 136.5 14.7 87 .6 14.4 314.8 .9.9
123.9
3-5
320 .2
7.5
0.2
19.4
164.9
18.6
164.8
17.8
2.0
17.8
17.7 
99.^
2.9
16.3
306.5
22.1
584.4
9.6
0.7
18.3
447.6 27.1 348.3 37.6 117.1 19 .2 913.0 28.6
- - 105.2 11.4 45.9 7.5 151.1 4.7
- - 105.2 11.4 45.9 7.5 151.1 4.7
538.3 3 2 .6 590.0 63.7 250.6 41.1 1,3£.9 4 3 .2
Pahang
Kelantan
Trengganu
EAST COAST 
Peninsular Malaysia
827.0
32.3
255.4
50.0
2.0
15.5
134.0
116.5
85.5
14.5
12.6 
9-2
222.8
39.6
96 .0
3 6 .6
6.5
15.8
1,183.8
188.4
436 .9
37.1
5.9
13.7
1,114.7 67.5 336.0 36.3 358.4 58.9 1,809.1 56.7
1 ,653.0 |l00 .0 926.0 100.0 609.0 100.0)3188.0 100.0
Source: adapted from Federation of Malaysia, 1976, Table 10-8, Malaysia:
Projected Land Development by State, 1971 - 90»
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of the new land developed for agriculture, and it is particularly 
noticeable that the vast majority of the projected oil-palm acreage 
- 86.9$ (67.5$ + 19.*$) “ was scheduled for the East Coast and eastern 
Johore (the reader is referred again to note (a), Table 2.6). Although 
the Federal Land Development Authority's share of land development 
is not indicated specifically in Table 2.?, the Authority will be 
expected to undertake the lion's share of new land development between 
1971 and 1990.
FELDA's great success in opening-up such tracts of under- or 
unutilised land to profitable cultivation with tree-crops and to 
colonisation by settlers has been a major factor in making such 
regional planning possible. Thus, FELDA is the foundation of 
Peninsular Malaysia's regional planning approach. The Authority pro­
vides the foundation-stone in several ways. First, land clearance 
gives the opportunity for the growth of forestry and associated timber- 
processing industries, which can continue to exploit and manage any 
forest land deemed unsuitable for agricultural development. Second, 
the FELDA schemes produce raw materials which might form the basis 
of agro-industries such as rubber-milling, motor-tyre manufacture, 
and soap production. Third, the Authority's settlers and their 
dependants form a nucleus of population which might provide the initial 
labour force and market for the region's nascent industries. Fourth, 
FELDA brings to remote rural areas some of the facilities and services 
found normally only in towns.
2 A  CONCLUSION
The basic rationale underpinning the Federal Land Development 
Authority is summarised in the following quotation from the Official 
History:
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"FELDA's main operation is to carry out land 
development and settlement in new areas with 
the sole objective of creating at the end of 
the development period prosperous farming 
communities with economically viable agri­
cultural holdings"
(Bahrin and Perera, 1977, p.26).
To the attainment of this end FELDA had by 1970/71 evolved into 
a multi-functional agency concerned with the many and diverse operations 
necessary for successful land development and settlement.
The essperience gained by the Federal Land Development Authority 
in the Advisory Stage (1956 - I960) - during which FELDA had an 
advisory capacity only - was put to good use during the Development 
Stage (1961 - 1970), when the Authority became responsible for the 
actual implementation of land development. The 1960s saw FELDA 
learning the land development 'business1 by trial and error, gaining 
expertise and profiting from its mistakes, until by the end of the 
decade it had forged itself into a sound implement for the opening-up 
and settlement of new land. The advent of the Modem Stage (since 
1971) was marked by refinement of the techniques acquired during the 
Development Stage, and by consolidation of the Authority's position as 
Peninsular Malaysia's most able land development agency, rather than 
by the introduction of further change.
The Federal Land Development Authority's very success up to 1970/ 
1971 as a development agency in the Malay-dominated rural areas - 
especially with the growing emphasis on large-scale regional planning 
- prompted the Peninsular Malaysian government to invest FELDA with 
heavy responsibility for achieving the objectives of the New Development 
Strategy, especially those of the New Economic Policy. The remainder of 
this thesis will assess the role of the Federal Land Development
/
Authority in attaining the objectives of the New Development Strategy.
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 2
33• The hest single account of the history and activities of the 
Federal Land Development Authority is the official history 
of FELDA: Bahrin and Perera, 197?, FELDA - 21 Years of Land
Development, (Federal Land Development Authority, Kuala Lumpur),
3^. The acronym FELDA is the abbreviation preferred today, but in
the past the Federal Land Development Authority was known by 
its initials, FLDA, Thus earlier references to the Authority 
do not employ the abbreviation FELDA,
35* Thus irrigation schemes such as that operated by the Muda
Agricultural Development Authority (MADA) on the Kedah/Perlis 
border - designed to ameliorate the socio-economic conditions 
of padi-farmers resident in the area - are not considered 'land 
development’ in the sense used in Peninsular Malaysia.
3 6. Federation of Malaya, 1956, Report of the Working Party set up 
to consider the Development of New Areas for Land Settlement 
in the Federation of Malaya,"(Government Press, Kuala Lumpur),
37. Bahrin has calculated that there are "at least 15 different 
agencies involved in land development" in Peninsular Malaysia 
(Bahrin, 1973, p.83)«
3 8. The word 'virgin' as used here is not limited solely to 'primary' 
forests untouched by man, but includes those 'secondary' forests 
which have been modified by shifting cultivators and exploited
to a limited extent by sedentary cultivators (e.g. the Malays) 
as a source of firewood, thatch and other traditional forest 
products. Thus any forest which has not been cleared for 
permanent agriculture nor exploited by commercial forest 
industry might be considered 'virgin'„
3 9- No single criterion can be taken as perfect, and 'acreage
developed' is limited as an indicator of the relative importance 
of land development agencies. Other criteria which might be 
used are the number of schemes operated by each agency, the 
number of persons aided by each agency, or the amount of 
Federal money allotted to each agency, However, these criteria 
are themselves limited, and 'acreage developed' appears to be 
the indicator used most frequently.
IK). Rubber (Hevea brasiliensis) and oil-palm (Elaeis guineensis) are
of overwhelming importance as main crops on FELDA schemes, and 
in 197? only these crops were in production on established schemes 
with settlers (Blair and Noor, 1978, p.59)* In addition, there 
is a sugar-cane project in Perlis - developed as a joint venture 
with private enterprise - and there are experimental plantings 
of crops such as coffee and cocoa, which crops are undergoing 
field trials to assess their suitability for FELDA's purpose.
FELDA wishes to develop crops such as these so as to diversify 
away from rubber and oil-palm.
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41. The padang of a Malaya village (kampung). equates with the English 
village green, in that it is an open space within the village 
used for meetings, recreational activities and sports.
42. Most authorities agree that the history of FELDA may be sub­
divided into distinct phases, although some authorities prefer
a sub-division different from that used here (1956 - 1960} 1961 - 
1970} 1971 onwards). For example, 'MacAndrews identifies three 
stages: the initial years (1956 - 1961)} a second stage of
large scale, directly administered development (I96I - I967)» 
and a third stage of diversification and social development 
(1967 - 1975) (MacAndrews, 1977).
43. It is not certain how many applications still awaited processing, 
Syed Hussain Wafa notes that the Working Party established to 
review land development in Peninsular Malaysia estimated that
200.000 applications were outstanding (Syed Hussain Wafa, 1975» 
p.164). Bahrin and Perera state that "there were already
116.000 land applications awaiting action in the various land 
offices", although they consider that some of these were dupli­
cates and others speculative (Bahrin and Perera, 1977$ P*3)« 
Whatever the precise figure, there were a considerable number 
of outstanding applications. The Emergency is explained below, 
footnote 55*
44. Mr, Fiennes was appointed Chairman in August 1956, and had 
previously been a member of the Working Party (MacAndrews,
1977, p.9*0 .
45. Bahrin and Perera note that FELDA was established with a working 
capital of M$10 million (Bahrin and Perera, 1977> P«4).
46. At first sight this is surprising, when one remembers that the 
Working Party found that the States would welcome Federal 
assistance towards land development. However, as noted by Ho,' 
Peninsular Malaysia's land codes confirmed that land rights
were vested in the States (Ho, 1965» P«5)i which were apprehensive 
of extending to the Federal government any opportunity of 
reducing State powers.
47. There were 12 departments and agencies responsible to 8 mini­
sters both at State and Federal levels, each with some interest 
i‘n land development (Bahrin and Perera, 19771 P*9)»
48. The fact that land development could generate political capital
was an important consideration in the location of schemes. 
Wikkramatileke has observed that a notable feature of the first
years' development was that all the States - except Penang and
Perlis - had at least one representative scheme (Wikkramatileke, 
1972a, p.63).
Ill
^9. That the settlers’ inadequacy in the performance of tasks such
as forest clearance was a major factor contributing to poor 
scheme development in the period 1957 - 19&0 has been acknow­
ledged by FELDA (Alias, 1975> P*6). On occasion settlers 
actually deserted schemes rather than undertake these arduous 
tasks.
50. As Ho has observed, not without opposition from the State
governments concerned (Ho, 1965» P*6)«
51. These two committees no longer exist (Bahrin and Perea, 197?»
P.9) ■
52. This figure was the original allocation. It is not uncommon
for original Plan allocations to be revised - and often 
increased subsequently - as part of a mid-term review of pro­
gress, In order to achieve consistency, throughout this thesis 
the original Plan allocations have been used.
53■ Natural rubber (Hevea brasiliensis) had been introduced into
European plantations at the end of the nineteenth century, and 
It was soon adopted by Malay farmers as a valuable small­
holding crop well suited to their traditional village economy 
and capable of furnishing them with good financial returns.
5^. Oil-palm (Elaeis guineensis) benefits much more than rubber from
economies of scale, the great cost of palm-oil processing 
facilities vis-a-vis those for processing rubber making desirable 
extensive plantings of oil-palm, Thus, despite the fact that 
only 36 of FELDA’s 92 schemes in mid-1970 were planted with oil- 
palm - the remainder being devoted to rubber - at that date the 
planted acreage of the former (16^,000 acres) exceeded that of 
the latter (1^7t000 acres) (Wikkramatileke, I9?2b, p.^79).
55* In addition to the political requirement of being seen to aid
the rural Malays, and to the economic advantage of large-scale 
oil-palm plantings, the expropriation of extensive areas of 
forest in the East Coast States for purposes of land development 
assisted the government in its drive against Communism in the 
immediate post-Emergency years. The Emergency (19^ +8 - i960) was 
an attempted Communist insurrection, and Communist guerillas 
still lingered in the more remote parts of the country. Land 
development not only helped to convince the rural population that 
support for the government would reap rich harvests,but also 
reduced the Communists' forest refuges, making it increasingly 
difficult for them to hide and travel undetected by the security 
forces.
56. At the beginning of 1977 PELDA had in operation 17 oil-palm mills, 
3 rubber factories and 1 sugar mill, with a further 13 oil-palm 
mills, 1 rubber factory and 1 cocoa processing factory either 
under construction or at the planning stage (FELDA, 19771>f P-2).
57. "The basic task of PELDA's Social Development Programme is the 
creation of a cohesive social group of people from diverse 
backgrounds" (Bahrin and Perera, 1977> P«85).
As revealed in Table 1.5 above, FELDA was originally allocated 
M£>582,42 million out of a total Second Malaysia Plan allocation 
to land development of ,Mjii>795.l4 million, that is 73*2^ of the 
original total allocation to land development.
Holdings were increased from 10 to 12 acres in the case of 
rubber, and from 10 to 14 acres in the case of oil-palm.
Tunku Abdul Razak was Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for 
Rural Development. The 'Jengka Triangle' is the name given to a 
forest reserve of western Pahang, the apexes of the 'triangle* 
being formed by the towns of Jerantut (in-the north), Temerloh/ 
Mentakab (in the southwest) and Maran (in the southeast) . The 
triangle is bordered by the Pahang River on the west and by the 
Jerantut-Maran road on the east, the base of the triangle being 
formed by the Temerloh/Mentakab - Maran road (National Route 2). 
The total area of the Jengka Triangle is approximately 300*000 
acres, of which some 100,000 acres is being developed as FELDA 
schemes.
Regional development plans of the Jengka model are expected to 
stimulate the economic development of resource-rich but poorly 
developed and sparsely populated areas which have great potential 
for future ■ growth ,• The government has recognised-that-lack of 
physical and institutional infrastructure in these areas has 
tended to deter private capital from exploiting the resources. 
Consequently, the government hopes that by furnishing the appro­
priate foundations - roads, new towns, even population - the way 
will be paved for rapid economic development. As noted in the 
Mid-Term Review of the Third Malaysia Plan, 1976 - 1980* "the 
regional development strategy under the New Economic Policy (NEP) 
has two basic objectives: first, to develop more fully the
resources of the regions in the country, and second, to bring 
about a more equitable distribution, among the regions, of the 
benefits from economic growth" (Federation of Malaysia, 1979^* 
P*77). Note that FELDA is only one of many vehicles - both public 
and private - intended to contribute to successful regional 
development: mining, forestry, agro-industries and private enter­
prises of many kinds are expected to play their part also.
However, FELDA is regarded as the key to successful regional 
planning, especially in the early, difficult years.
The Mid-Term Review of the Third Malaysia Plan, 1976 - 1980 states 
that "during 1976 - 78, approximately 51*000 acres in Johor 
Tenggara, 96,000 acres in Pahang Tenggara and 47,000 acres in 
Trengganu Tengah were developed mainly by FELDA, bringing the 
total area opened up in these three regions to 522,000 acres" 
(Federation of Malaysia, 1979b, p.86). At the end of 1978, the 
total acreages of land developed in each region were 247,000 
acres in Pahang Tenggara, 145,800 acres in Johor Tenggara, , and 
128,400 acres in Trengganu Tengah (Federation of Malaysia, 1979b, 
Table 5-7).
Appendix 2 presents data and statistics concerning the present 
status of the Federal Land Development Authority, and the Endpaper 
depicts the distribution of FELDA schemes in Peninsular Malaysia.
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CHAPTER 3 
The Structure of Peninsular Malaysiafs 
Socio-Economic System, 1957
3.1 INTRODUCTION
As implied, in Chapter 1, the development of Peninsular 
Malaysia led to the creation of socio-economic imbalance. This 
imbalance resulted from development proceeding largely in the West 
Coast States, the States of the East Coast remaining a back-water cut 
off from the main-stream of modernisation. British colonial policy 
was motivated by a desire to derive wealth from Malaya, partly by the 
extraction of minerals, and partly by the cultivation of tropical 
crops. Ghinese and Indians migrated to the peninsula in response to 
the peaceful conditions brought by thb extension of British power, and 
were attracted to those regions of greatest development. Thus the 
socio-economic patterns became set early on and were accentuated as 
the West Coast States and the immigrant communities built upon their 
initial and derived advantages.
Chapter 3 will present the main features of the Malay Peninsula's 
transformation into the political unit known as British Malaya, and 
will summarize the structure of Peninsular Malaysia's society and 
economy on the eve of independence in 1957• The Conclusion will give 
a synopsis of the main characteristics of Peninsular Malaysia's socio­
economic system at that time.
Ilk
3 .2  THE CREATION OF BRITISH MALAYA (1786 - 1957) (65)
3 ,2a British Contact prior to 187^
The first part of the Malay Peninsula to feel the direct 
effect of European colonial expansion was the Sultanate of Malacca. 
Malacca was annexed by the Portugese in 1511j and in 16^1 passed by 
right of conquest to the Dutch. Finally, the Sultanate was expro­
priated from the Dutch by the British in exchange for Benkulen (part 
of modern Indonesia) under a provision of the Treaty of London, 182^. 
Malacca was the fourth Malayan territory to be seized by the British, 
its acquisition having been preceded by that of Penang (1786), 
Singapore (1819) , and The Dindings,/^^
At this early stage of contact with the peninsula, the British 
had an official policy of non-interference in the mainland Malay 
States. The value of the Malay Peninsula lay in its contribution to 
the defence of British India. Control of the Straits of Malacca - the 
shortest sea-route between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea 
- was vital to British India’s security. However, the British were 
soon to find themselves involved with events within the peninsula 
itself.
3.2b Consolidation of British Power (187^ - 1957)
In 1829 the British possessions in Malaya had been incorporated 
as the Colony of the Straits Settlements, and for some time British 
interest was confined to these territories and to the governance of 
the Straits of Malacca, However, Chinese prospectors from the Straits 
Settlements had begun to exploit the rich tin-fields discovered in 
the Malay States of Perak, Selangor and Negri Sembilan. This activity
had been accompanied by disputes between rival mining factions, and 
between the Ghinese prospectors and the Malay inhabitants. By about 
1870 the turmoil in the Malay States threatened the peace of the 
Straits Settlements.
British desire to control the disturbances in the Malay States 
prompted them to extend their influence over the nearer parts of the 
peninsula, and 1874 saw the start of consolidation of British power 
in Malaya. In that year Perak, Selangor and Sungei Ujong (the main 
part of Negri Sembilan) became protectorates, with the remainder of 
Negri Sembilan acquired in subsequent years. A protectorate was 
established over Pahang in 1888.
The growth of the tin. mining industry in the Malay States was 
accompanied by a steady influx of Ghinese settlers and the genesis 
of a road and rail network based on Kuala Lumpur, Consequently, the 
development of these newly-acquired States was rapid, and in*'order 
that their growth might be supervised more readily a more comprehensive 
form of government was required. Thus, between 1895 and I896 the 
States of Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Pahang were brought 
together as the Federated Malay States.
Near the end of the nineteenth century tin began to be replaced 
by rubber as the mainstay of the Federated Malay States* economy. This 
change-over was in response to the increased world demand for rubber 
occasioned by the rapid growth of the electrical and motor-car 
industries. The development of the rubber industry was accompanied by 
the ingress of South Asian (Indian) immigrants, particularly of Tamils 
from the south of the Indian sub-continent.
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The consolidation of British power in the Malay Peninsula 
continued during the early part of the twentieth century. British 
control replaced Siam's suzerainty over the northern Malay States 
of Kedah, Perils, Kelantan and Trengganu, this transfer of authority 
"being effected by the Bangkok Treaty of 1909.^^ Finally, the 
British grip on Johore was assured by an agreement signed in 1914.
The States of Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, Trengganu and Johore were 
linked loosely as the Unfederated Malay States.
Thus, by 1914 British expansion had reached a logical conclusion: 
control had been extended over all the Malay Peninsula and nearby 
islands. At this time British Malaya comprised three main political 
units: (i) the Colony of the Straits Settlements (Penang and
Province Wellesley, the Dindings, Malacca and Singapore); (ii) the 
Federated Malay States (Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Pahang); 
(iii) the Unfederated Malay States (Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, Trengganu 
and Johore). This political pattern persisted until the coming of 
the Second World War to the Malay Peninsula, and is summarized in 
Figure 3 *1■
In 1948 all the mainland territories were amalgamated as the 
Federation of Malaya, Singapore alone remaining a separate Crown 
Colony. The Federation of Malaya became an Independent country
within the British Commonwealth in 1957* The granting of independence 
marked the termination of official British control of events in the 
Malay Peninsula, and the .start of Peninsular Malaysia's quest for 
national unity.
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fig 3.1 PENINSULAR MALAYSIA. POLITICAL DIVISIONS 1832-1942
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3 .3  THE STRUCTURE OF PENINSULAR MALAYSIA'S
SOCIETY AND ECONOMY, 195?
3 ,3a Peninsular Malaysia - A Socio-Economic System
The social and economic development of any country is a dynamic 
process involving the interactions of physical and human forces 
within a spatial unit over a period of time. The interplay through 
time of factors such as physical geography, human motivation, level 
of technology and chance creates horizontal and vertical patterns of 
social and economic geography within a country. In this way a socio­
economic system evolves.
The patterns contained within a socio-economic system may 
appear static at one point in space and time, hut in reality they 
continue to evolve in response to changes in the factors which govern 
them. Thus the structure of Peninsular Malaysia's society and 
economy at independence was the culmination of all the many physical 
and human forces which had influenced development up to that time.
The patterns reflected particularly the cumulative effect of the 
socio-economic forces unleashed after 187^ 4- hy the establishment of 
the Pax Britannica.
The structure of Peninsular Malaysia's socio-economic system in 
1957 resulted entirely from the manner in which development occurred 
under British colonial auspices„ In the first days of British involve­
ment, the West Coast States were favoured hy their location with 
respect to the Straits of Malacca. Later, the West Goast States' 
advantage was augmented hy their virtual monopoly of tin deposits.
The growth of the ruhher industry occurred also in these West Coast 
States, where advantage could he taken of their accessihility and of
*19
the infrastructure and population associated with the tin industry.
The resulting economic prosperity of the West Coast States meant that 
it was they which tore the brunt of immigration by wealth-seeking 
Chinese and Indian pioneers.
The fundamental structure of the social and economic system 
apparent in Peninsular Malaysia in 195? had been created by about 
191^• The years between 191^ and 195? were characterised by growth 
of this socio-economic system, and by reinforcement of the social and 
economic patterns which had arisen. Two outstanding features of the 
development process which created the socio-economic system of 195? 
were that it was undertaken largely from one direction - the west - 
and that it involved the immigration of large numbers of aliens 
(especially of Chinese and Indians, but also of Europeans). The 
remainder of Chapter 3 will detail the consequences which these and 
other forces had for the spatial and communal patterns of the social 
and economic geography of Peninsular Malaysia in 1957*
3 .3b Spatial Structure of Peninsular Malaysia1s
Socio-Economic System, 1957
The spatial distribution of social and economic development 
within a developing country is a phenomenon demanding study, for it is 
a large measure of the population's share of that country's wealth, 
and of the population's access to the 'advantages and fruits' of 
development. In the case of Peninsular Malaysia In 195?» the 
country's wealth was derived mainly from commercial agriculture and 
mining, plus some manufacturing activity. The 'advantages and fruits' 
of development brought by this wealth were employment, income, items 
of physical infrastructure (for example roads, railways, public
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utilities), and the services and social infrastructure associated with 
urban areas (for example education, medical services, banks, shopping 
facilities and cinemas).
In a developing country the particular distribution of social 
and economic development correlates highly with the spatial distri­
bution of wealth-generating activity and the "advantages and fruits' 
of development. Accordingly, the spatial distribution of social
and economic development in Peninsular Malaysia In 1957 may "be measured 
by the regional distribution at that time of (i) tin-mining, commercial 
agriculture - especially estate rubber - and manufacturing (the 
wealth-generating activities); and (ii) employment, income, physical 
infrastructure, and the services and social infrastructure associated 
with urban areas (the 'advantages and fruits* of development).
The general distribution of social and economic development 
about 195? Is summarized in Figure 3*2 (from Ward, 1968). According 
to Ward, "fairly well-developed" parts equated with the presence of 
plantations, mines, urban areas, and relatively well developed 
communications; "subsistence development" comprised areas of irrigated 
rice production, lower urbanisation, and poorer communications; and 
"little developed" consisted mostly of forest land, with a low popu­
lation density and very poorly developed communications.
Figure 3*2 demonstrates clearly the greater social and economic 
development of the western littoral at independence. In 195?» almost 
all the "fairly well-developed" land was located within some thirty 
miles of the Straits of Malacca. The main areas of "subsistence 
development" were the major 'rice bowls' of Kedah and Perlis (in the 
north-west), and of Kelantan and Trengganu (in the north-east). The
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central and eastern two-thirds of the peninsula contained vast 
tracts which were '“little developed”. Indeed, the heart of the 
peninsula was a sea of poorly-developed forest, dotted with occasional 
islands of relative prosperity, along the "better lowlands, the main 
navigable rivers, the roads and the coast.
The peninsula penetrated by the British after 187^ was a 
mountainous land clothed in almost impenetrable tropical forest. The 
resident Malay population was confined largely to the lowland riverine, 
deltaic and estuarine areas, which locations provided the Malays with 
the bases of their traditional subsistence economy founded on wet- 
padi—cultivation supplemented by fishing. The rivers and coastal 
water-ways provided lines of communication.
This low-value subsistence economy was of little interest to 
the commercially-minded British. They were concerned with the extrac­
tion of wealth in the form of the tin and rubber which could be sent 
to feed the burgeoning industries of the metropolitan country. Thus, 
the seeds of Peninsular Malaysia*s dependence on the export of primary 
commodities - tin and rubber especially - as a source of wealth were 
sown. This dependence has persisted to the present day.
Table 3*1 shows that in 1957 the tin and rubber industries 
together provided 79*9% of the total value of Peninsular Malaysia*s 
exports. Consequently, the regional distributions of the exogenous, 
export-oriented tin and rubber industries in particular - and of 
manufacturing to a lesser extent - provide a firm measure of the spatial 
distribution of wealth at independence. The tin, rubber and manu­
facturing industries provide the first measurable component of the 
spatial distribution of social and economic development in 1957*
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TABLE 3.1 
Peninsular Malaysia 
VALUE OF EXPORT COMMODITIES, 1957
COMMODITY VALUE
/■
%MJB Millions
Rubber (all types) 1,304.2 59.8
Tin (in concentrates, blocks, ingots, etc.) 439.5 20.1
(sub-total) (1,743.7) (79.9)
Iron Ore 65.6 3.0
Food, Beverages and Tobacco 96.6 4.4
Copra and Coconut Oil 57.1 2 .6
Palm Oil and Kernels 51.3 2.4
Wood, Timber and Cork 32.2 1.5
(a)Other Commodities } 135.7 6 .2
TOTAL 2 ,182.2 100.0
(a) includes ships and aircraft stores.
Source: adapted from Federation of Malaya, 1958, p.120, Table B,
Federation of Malaya - Exports by Commodity for the Years 
1956 and 1957.
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Since the first major 'tin rush* following the discovery of the 
rich Larut field in 1848, tin has dominated the mining economy of 
Peninsular Malaysia. Tin is widespread in the peninsula, although 
there is uneven distribution of the richest deposits. Figure 3*3 
shows the distribution of tin deposits in Peninsular Malaysia about 
1957* Two main stanniferous zones may be identified, a western tin- 
belt and an eastern tin-belt.
The larger and richer western tin-belt has two main zones of 
mineralization. In the State of Perak there are the famous Kinta 
Valley fields, and further south an extensive area of primary and 
secondary tin deposits is shared by Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and 
parts of south-western Pahang. The less rich eastern tin-belt 
stretches discontinuously from eastern Kelantan in the north, through 
eastern Trengganu and eastern Pahang ( which contains the richest 
portion) to eastern Johore in the south.
Table 3*2 gives details of Peninsular Malaysia1s tin production 
by State in three selected years. Examination of Table 3*2 shows 
that at about independence (that is, in 1958) the West Goast States 
were responsible for 95*8% of Peninsular Malaysia*s tin production. 
Indeed, the two States of Perak and Selangor alone were responsible 
for nearly all (91.1$) of the country's output of tin. The data for 
1929 and 1939 reveal that the dominance enjoyed by the West Goast in 
general and by Perak and Selangor in particular had a firm historical 
basis. Comparison of the data presented in Table 3.2 and the distri­
bution depicted in Figure 3*3 shows that Perak and Selangor held 
their premier position by virtue of their advantage with regard to 
the location of stanniferrous ores.
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Fig 3.3 PENINSULAR MALAYSIA. DISTRIBUTION OF TIN FIELDS, about 1957
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Table 3.2 -
Peninsular Malaysia
PERCENTAGE TIN PRODUCTION BY 
STATE, 1929, 1939, and 1958
STATE OR SETTLEMENT PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL PRODUCTION
1929 1939 1958
Penang^ - - -
Perak 61.7 56.6 56 .2
Selangor 28.1 32.7 3 4 .9
CENTRAL WEST COAST 89.8 89.3 91.1
Negri Sembilan 2.7 2.8 2.0
Malacca 0.4 0.4 0.2
Johore 0.9 1.8 1.0
SOUTH-WEST COAST 4.0 5.0 3.2
Kedah 0.4 - 0.7
Perlis 0.6 1.4 0.8
NORTH-WEST COAST 1.0 1.4 1.5
WEST COAST 94.8 95.7 95.8
Pahang 4.2 3.7 3.8
Kelantan^ - - -
Trengganu 1.4 1 .0 0.2
EAST COAST 5.6 4.7 4.0
(c)Peninsular Malaysia^ x 100.0 100.0 100.0
1
(a), (b) Penang and Kelantan were not tin-producing States.
(c) In tons the total production figures were: 1929 72,355
1939 46,745 
1958 38,459
Source: adapted from Lim Chong Yah, 1967, Table 2.16, Tin
Production by State 1929, 1939 and 1958.
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Rubber (Hevea Brasiliensis) was first cultivated successfully 
in the region in 1877, the first commercial estate in Malaya being 
planted in Malacca in 1898. The growth of the rubber industry 
accelerated swiftly due to the surge of demand for rubber caused by 
the rapid expansion of the world's motor-vehicle and electrical 
industries, coupled with the decline of other Malayan estate crops
- such as coffee, sugar-cane, pepper and other spices - as a result 
of disease, pests, and overseas competition.
As it expanded, the rubber industry gravitated to those States 
in which the tin industry had become established. In this way 
advantage could be taken of the population and the infrastructure
- especially the transport facilities - already present in these 
States due to the prior development of the tin industry.
Figure 3,4 shows the distribution of rubber estates in 
Peninsular Malaysia about 1957. Table 3 .3 gives details of 
Peninsular Malaysia's rubber acreage in 1953. Examination of Table 
3.3 in conjunction with Figure 3.4 shows clearly that the rubber 
industry was confined largely to the States of the western littoral. 
Figure 3*4 depicts graphically the concentration of rubber in States 
such as Kedah, Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Johore. Table 3 .3  
shows that in 1953 the West Goast States had between them 8 8.7% of 
Peninsular Malaysia's rubber acreage. Indeed, almost all (92.1%) of 
the estate rubber acreage was in the West Goast, with some 81.0$ 
(34,0% + 47.0^) contained in the western coastal strip between Penang 
and Johore inclusive.
Tin and rubber together formed the backbone of Peninsular 
Malaysia's economy in 1957* Both these industries were labour-
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Fig 3.4. PENINSULAR MALAYSIA. DISTRIBUTION OF RUBBER ESTATES, about 1957
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TABLE 3 .3  
Peninsular Malaysia
ESTATE AND SMALL-HOLDING RUBBER ACREAGE BY STATE, 1953
STATE P L A N T E D  A R E A
ESTATES SMALL-HOLDING^ TOTAL
'000
acres
% '000
acres
% '000
acres
%
Penang
Perak
Selangor
CENTRAL WEST COAST
Negri Semhilan
Malacca
Johore
SOUTH-WEST COAST
Kedah
Perils
NORTH-WEST COAST
WEST COAST
Pahang
Kelantan
Trengganu
EAST COAST 
Peninsular Malaysia
3 8 .6
296.5
354.9
1.9
14.6
17.5
29.6
3U.5
186.2
1.7 
18.3  
11 .0
68 .2
608.0
541.1
1 .8
16.3
14.5
690.0 34.0 527.3 31 .0 1,217.3 32.6
286.5
129.9
538.0
14.1
6 .4
26.5
131.1
89.0
540.5
7.7
5.2
3 1 .8
417.6 
218.9  
1,078.5
11.2
5.9
28.9
954.4 47.0 760.6 44.7 1,715.0 46.0
223.4
1.9
11.0
0.1
146.1
4.9
8 .6
0.3
369.5
6 .8
9.9
0 .2
225.3 11.1 151.0 8.9 376.3 10.1
1,869.7 92.1 1,438.9 84,6 3,308.6 88.7
105.5
37.9
16.5
5.2
1.9
0 /8**
126.0
83.5
7.4
4.9
^•:2A9^
231.5 
121.4 
65.8
6 .2
3.3
; :
159.9 7.9 258.8 15.2 ‘ /;4i8.7 11.3
2 ,029.6 100.0 1,697.7 100.0 3,727.3 100.0
(a) defined as units of less than 100 acres.
Source: adapted from Lim Chong Yah, 1967, Appendix 4.4, Malayan
Rutter Planted Areas, State Distribution and Growth, 
1922 - 62, Selected Years.
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intensive, and could therefore provide the relatively small Malayan 
population with employment opportunities. Neither rubber nor tin 
lent itself easily to a programme of heavy industrialisation, the 
paucity of coal being an additional disadvantage in this respect. 
Consequently, manufacturing and industrial activity at the time of 
independence were restricted mainly to the support of the tin and 
rubber industries and of the populations associated with them.
Thus, the reliance of manufacturing and industry upon the 
export industries and the populations associated with them had 
restricted industrial development by about 1957 largely to those 
States with well developed tin and rubber sectors. This is indicated 
clearly in Table which shows that in 1959 the bulk of manufacturing
activity (measured by the distribution of factories) was located in 
the West Coast States, with a concentration in Penang, Perak and 
Selangor. Table 3*^ shows that these Central West Coast States 
contained 58-2% of factories in 1959» with most of the remainder 
(31.7% of the total) in the other West Coast States. Thus the West 
Coast States between them contained 4,500 (8 9.9$) of Peninsular 
Malaysia's 5»004 factories in 1959* The three East Coast States 
could muster only 504 factories (10,1$ of the total).
The wealth-generating activities (tin-mining, rubber and manu­
facturing) brought to Peninsular Malaysia certain 'advantages and 
fruits' of development. These have been defined above as employment, 
income, physical infrastructure, and the services and social infra­
structure associated with urban areas. Just as the regional 
distribution of the wealth-generating activities provided the first 
measurable component of the spatial distribution of social and economic
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TABLE 3.4 
Peninsular Malaysia
DISTRIBUTION OF FACTORIES BY STATE. 1959
STATE OR SETTLEMENT FACTORIES ^
Number %
Penang 724 14.5
Perak 1,113 22.2
Selangor 1,077 21.5
CENTRAL WEST COAST 2,914 58.2
Negri Sembilan 237 4.7
Malacca 178 3.6
Johore 610 12.2
SOUTH-WEST COAST 1,025 20.5
Kedah 517 10.3
Perils 44 0.9
NORTH-WEST COAST 561 11.2
WEST COAST 4,500 89.9
Pahang 259 5.2
Kelantan 194 3.9
Trengganu 51 1.0
EAST COAST 504 10.1
Peninsular Malaysia-*
croo 100.0
(a) establishments devoted exclusively to manufacturing activities.
(b) including Province Wellesley.
Source: adapted from Ooi Jin Bee, 1963* Table 54, Distribution of
Factories by State, 1959.
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development in 1957f so the regional distribution of the ’advantages 
and fruits' of development serves as the second measurable component 
of the spatial distribution of socio-economic development at that 
time»
Data for the regional distribution of employment and income in 
1957 are not readily available, and the spatial distribution of 
favourable employment levels and of high incomes is difficult to 
determine. However, in 1957 employment and income levels differed 
markedly from one industrial sector to another, and between types of 
economic activity within a particular sector. Thus, the regional 
distribution of employment and income may be inferred from an analysis 
of the regional distribution of different sectors and activities, 
coupled with knowledge of the levels of employment and income which 
might be expected in each sector.
In 1957 comparatively high levels of employment and income were 
associated with the wealth-generating part of the primary sector (tin- 
mining and commercial agriculture) and with the more productive parts 
of the secondary and tertiary sectors (manufacturing, commerce and 
higher-level government employment). Comparatively low levels of 
employment and income were to be expected in the remainder of the 
primary sector, especially in low-productivity activities such as 
subsistence agriculture (padi-farming and the traditional fishing 
industry), and in low-productivity secondary and tertiary activities 
(petty trading, hawking, traditional craft activities and domestic 
service).
Table 3*5 shows the percentage of economically active persons 
by main industrial sector and by State in 1957* Table 3*5 reveals
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each State1s share of all those persons economically active in each 
main industrial sector in 1957* A measure of the spatial distribution 
of employment and income in 1957 may be inferred by study of these 
two Tables.
Table 3*5 reveals that primary sector employment was dominant 
in Peninsular Malaysia in 1957* In that year 1,291>231 (62.9%) of 
Peninsular Malaysia's 2,052,811 economically active persons were in 
primary sector activities, with 200,9^7 (9-8%) and 560,633 (27.3%) in 
secondary and tertiary sector activities. However, there were 
several important contrasts between the States, The West Goast 
States averaged 60.0% of workers in the primary sector, whereas the 
equivalent figure for the East Goast States was 74.7%. Indeed, one 
West Goast State - Penang - had less than one-third (31.8%) of its 
workers employed in the primary sector, and the State with the highest 
number of economically active persons - Selangor - had just less than 
half (48.7%) of its workers in primary sector activities. Table 3 ,5  
reveals also the corollary that secondary and tertiary sector 
activities - especially the latter - were enjoyed by West Goast States 
rather than by East Goast States, The 'core* States of the Central 
West Goast had an average of 35.1% of economically active persons in 
the tertiary sector, Penang having just over half (51.8%) of its econo­
mically active persons in this sector. The West Goast as a whole 
averaged nearly one-third (29-7%) of Its workers in the tertiary 
sector, whereas the East Goast States averaged less than one-fifth 
(17.5%) of their economically active persons in tertiary sector 
activities.
Table 3 .6 reflects the distribution patterns indicated in Table
134
*0
ON
m
PQ<sE-h
sE-i 
CO
l -s o  o  o O O  O  O o o  o O O o  o  o O O* » ■ • * 9 • m •  * ■ ■ •  ■ •
Eh o  o  o O o  o  o o o  o O o o  o  o o o
o o  o  o o o  o  o o o  o o o o  o  o o O
Eh
j------------
t H  t H t H t H vH t H  tH tH tH  vH ■tH ■H t —t t —t tH iH t —1
© v o  c n tH n o , m ,  o n O IN- H CN N - o o  4  n o N N CNm m m • •  * ■ • •  • • ■ •  ■ ■
O t H  IN- M3 NO NO\ r n ,  NO, tN- I N - 4 IN- ON O  I A N IN- IN-
fH
r r!
' A N  CO 0r N CM ON CM CM ■tH v H ■H CM CM t H  t H tH CM
§
H ON O n  O n £N- l> -  O  l> - - 4 CM 4 NO c - - t H  £ N -0 0 NO CN  i
fc! Pi NO ON ON NO NO, ON ON N N  t H NO CM CN  - H  NN o CNP S 0 4  IN- C N NO ON O  O n CN C N  n n 0 0 ON ON t H  NO IN- NOEP r0 *n *i «S *s
EH £ o  c o  o - NO CN  IN- NN NO CM 4 NO ON 4  ON NO O o
PS o o  o  t h o CN  CM IN- CN 4 4 0 0 CM CM t H IN- NO
O
r  t
i s ; ■H tH o n tH 4 NN
t~ *
o
• S '  ‘A ' H CO 0 0  n o , NN NO O 4 ON NO IN- t H 0 0 0 0
EP S N •  ■ ■ • m m m ■ W m •  n *
NO ON CM IN- C N  N - 0 0 NN  4 NN O NO NO t H IN- O n
c o
r*H
*H  t H t H T—1 •tH t —I
PS
<
Ph CM CM £>- O  ON 0 0 IN- O  N - IN- •tH N N  4  CN- NO IN­
fen Pi N -  O  CN O O  n n  £N- CN 4  IN- t H NO 4  N N  CO 0 0 CH­
<S o
o
0
x j
4 4 ^ 0 0 N - CM 0 0  O ■H C N  CM NO 4 OO t H  4 4 ON
H m e ' A  C ^ C c T tH o '  O  CM CN c N 4 ON IN- ON O tH O
CO cm c N 4 t H t H  t H  CM • 4 *vH H NO t H  tH CN OPS p s tH H CM
EH
c o
!=> CO O N I N t —1 I N  t H  NO NN 0 0  O n 4 O NO NO ON £N- ON■ •  ■ ■ •  ■ * * « • ■ ■ •  •  ■
« -■---' t - t  CM 0 0 CM NO C N N O - 4 NO t —l IN- o CM IN- tH 4 CM
4 ;
o3 C N M 0 4 NN NO n n n o NO IN- 0 0 IN- NO IN- IN- IN- !N- NO
>H
H PS
<ti I N - 4  NO £N~ 4  *-H £ N CM ON CN CM H CO 0 0  CM O t H
Pi 4  0 0  CM NT\ CM 0 0  O vH NO ON O £N- tH  CM CM NO CNI—1 0 0 N N N  NN 4 H  OO I N IN- CO t H O tH ON NO Nn, O CM
QS 4 »* n  «  ^ *s *k •>« p, **
P h 0 ON £>- (N- 4 IN- CM n n NN C N N O O o NO NO IN- tH tH
£ 4  4  NN NO 0 0 4  O n CM 0 0  CM T—1 ON 0 0  4  NO O ONPS CM tH tH CN CM ON ■H CN CM
tH
>H
hS
hS OO NO fN- tH r l  O  CM CN ■tH 4 NN ON NO ON IN- CM tH
<S S  B2
CO CO NO, ON IN- ON 0 0 - 4 NO CM OO NN 0 0  ON NO NN t HO P=- is ; CM N -  IN- 0 0 NO IN- IN- CM NN  ON 4 NN NO 0 0  NO CM 0 0
H M  O
£ 3 N N  CN  CN CM O  O  CN NN O n t H tH ON ON 0 0  4 CN CMo O  PS NN ON  CM IN- C N  0 0  ON O C N  C N IN- 4 t H  OO O n O NN
is ;o -=S EP P h H  n c o 0 0
t H  CM NN CM CM NO tH  tH 4 O
o
EP
tH c l
ctf
,Eh •aE— ■H“Sfe. C •• "W
-=S E h EH !>io CO CO n3
H O SS < ! ■<! I—(
Eh ec3 O O
<S Eh H O O sEh CO •H
CO EP £ EH Eh EH IN Pie CO CO Pi CO ra
Pi 0 p£} <S 5S SS <S Ho h-] CO Cij J S | 3 O aJ ctl o
hO . ttf) O  0 1 tn 1 O tiO - P  hO O 0
§  s Ph •H  O  P | PS ,H PScti co cti F-l U  n j O cd H Eh Eh g g W Eh •H
S  P  H fe O0 rH rCj }n ^  PH PS CO r£S H  0 CO SS0  0  0 H 0) Hi o o 0  0 O flj 0  Pt <s 0
P h P h CO O S  S  b CO W  P h P h M  H EP P h
135
Table 3.5:
(a) Primary industries included agriculture, forestry, hunting
and fishing; the production of agricultural products requiring 
substantial processing (mainly rubber, coconuts and copra); 
and mining and quarrying (especially production of tin).
(b) Secondary industries were mainly manufacturing industries 
(especially food and fodder processing, wood products, 
production of footwear, clothing and textiles, and general 
engineering); and building and construction activities.
(c) Tertiary industries were utilities (electricity, gas and
water); commerce (both retail and wholesale); transport, storage 
and communications; and services (government, community and 
personal).
Source: adapted from Ma and You Poh Seng, I960, Table VIII,
Federation of Malaya, 195? - Per Gent Analysis of the 
Economically Active in the Primary Industries Sector by 
Industries, for Each Major Ethnic Group in Each State; 
Table IX, Federation of Malaya, 1957 - Per Gent Analysis 
of the Economically Active in the Secondary Industries 
Sector by Industries, for Each Major Ethnic Group in Each 
State; and
Table X, Federation of Malaya, 1957 - Per Cent Analysis 
of the Economically Active in the Tertiary Industries 
Sector by Industries, for Each Major Ethnic Group in Each
State.
3-5* Primary sector activities are again revealed as paramount in 
Peninsular Malaysia, and the discrepancies in the distributions of 
primary, secondary and tertiary activities between the ¥est Goast and 
the East Goast are repeated. Table 3*6 shows that over three- 
quarters (7 6 ,5%) of persons economically active in the primary sector 
were in West Goast States, with the remainder (23.3%) in States of 
the East Goast. Even more noticeable is the concentration of secondary 
and tertiary sector workers in the West Goast. The West Goast States 
contained 8^.3% of secondary and 8 7.^% of tertiary sector workers. 
Indeed, over half of Peninsular Malaysia's secondary sector (55*6%) 
and tertiary sector (5^*?%) workers were located in the 'core' States 
of the Central West Goast in 1957*
It may be deduced from these sources that in 1957 the Central 
West Goast States of Penang, Perak and Selangor contained most of the 
employment in the wealth-generating parts of the primary sector and 
in the comparatively productive secondary and tertiary sectors, 
whereas the economies of the peripheral States - notably Pahang,
Kelantan and Trengganu - depended largely on the least productive 
primary, secondary and tertiary activities (for example, padi-farming, 
traditional fishing, batik manufacture, handicrafts, and petty trading). 
The inference to be drawn is that greater employment opportunities 
and higher income levels were more likely to be attainable in the 
States of the Central West Goast 'core' - Penang, Perak and Selangor 
- than elsewhere in 1957* The East Goast States occupied the lowest 
positions.
The items of physical infrastructure of importance in Peninsular 
Malaysia at independence were those • items which facilitated social and 
economic development. The most important in this respect were trans­
port and communications, and power supplies,,
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TABLE 3.6
Peninsular Malaysia
PERCENTAGE SHARES BY STATE OF ALL PERSONS ECONOMICALLY 
ACTIVE IN EACH MAIN INDUSTRIAL SECTOR, 1957
STATE I N D U S T R I A L  S E C T O R
PRIMARY(a) SECONDARY(*>) tertiary(°)
Number % Number % Number %
Penang
Perak
Selangor
CENTRAL WEST COAST
Negri Sembilan
Malacca
Johore
SOUTH-WEST COAST
Kedah
Perlis
NORTH-WEST COAST
WEST COAST
Pahang
Kelantan
Trengganu
EAST COAST 
Peninsular Malaysia
49,347
247,584
157,526
3.8
19.2
12.1
25,472
37,403
48,832
12.7
18.6
24.3
80,469
108,799
117,399
14.4
19.4
20.9
454,457 35.2 111,707 55-6 306,667 54.7
87,124
42,881
195,707
6.7
3.3
15.2
10,200
10,859
22,078
5.1
5.4
11.0
33,347
27,050
75,997
5.9
4.8'
13.6
325,712 25.2 43,137 21.5 136,394 24.3
183,869
26,133
14.2
2.0
13,340
1,277
6.6
0.6
42,352
4,514
7.6
0.8
210,002 16.2 14,617 7.2 46,866 8.4
990,171 76.6 169,461 84.3 489,927 87.4
86,910
146,628
67,522
6.7
11.4
5.2
7,845
13,154
10,487
3.9
6.5
5.2
24,931
29,117
16,658
4.4
5.2
3.0
301,060 23.3 31,486 15.6 70,706 12.6
1,291,231 100.0 200,947
,
100.0 560,633 100.0
(a) Primary industries included agriculture, forestry, hunting and 
fishing; the production of agricultural products requiring 
substantial processing (mainly rubber, coconuts and copra); and 
mining and quarrying (especially production of tin).
(b) Secondary industries were mainly manufacturing industries 
(especially food and fodder processing, wood products, production
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of footwear clothing and textiles, and general engineering); 
and building and construction activities.
(c) Tertiary industries were utilities (electricity, gas and 
water); commerce (both retail and wholesale); transport, 
storage and communications; and services (government, 
community and personal),
Source: Adapted from Ma and You Poh Seng, I960, Table VIII,
Federation of Malaya, 1957 - Per Cent Analysis of the 
Economically Active in the Primary Industries Sector by 
Industries, for Each Major Ethnic Group in Each State; 
Table IX, Federation of Malaya, 1957 - Per Gent Analysis 
of the Economically Active in the Secondary Industries 
Sector by Industries, for Each Major Ethnic Group in Each 
State; and
Table X, Federation of Malaya, 1957 - Per Gent Analysis 
of the Economically Active in the Tertiary Industries 
Sector by Industries, for Each Major Ethnic Group in Each 
State.
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The basic transport and communications pattern of Peninsular 
Malaysia at independence had evolved as a result of the prior develop­
ment of the ports of Penang and Singapore. Prior to 1885 the sea 
and navigable rivers had been the primary means of transport and 
communication, Land transport had been developed in response to the 
British need for access to the main tin- and rubber-producing areas 
of the West Coast States.
The rail-way network started as a number of short lines built 
between the main tin-mining areas and the West Coast to facilitate 
the export of the mines' products. The main stages in the development 
of the rail-way network prior to the Second World War are summarized 
in Figure 3*5.
Road construction began in earnest only after the introduction 
of the motor-car to Malaya in 1902. Early development followed the 
same lines as that of the rail-way. However, the greater flexibility 
of road transport made it more suitable than the rail-way for linking 
more distant parts of the peninsula to the West Goast. Consequently, 
by the Second World War the road network had developed to the stage 
summarized by Figure 3*6.
The overall transport network of Peninsular Malaysia in 1957 is 
summarized in Figure 3.7. Figure 3 .7 shows clearly that the West 
Coast States were served much better with transport than were the East 
Coast States.
In 1957, the provision of power supplies in the form of electri­
city reflected the distribution of the transport and communications 
network. The early growth of electricity generation was based on the 
European tin-mining industry. The pattern set by the tin-mining
IZfO
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Fig. 3.5 PENINSULAR MALAYSIA. DEVELOPMENT OF RAILWAY NETWORK UP 
TO 1939
Source- A dapted from  Ooi Jin Bee, (1 976), p .3 8 8 . Figure 15.1, The Evolution o f the Rail N e tw o rk
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(a) Although the third diagram depicts the 
railway network in 1931, the picture was 
the same in 1939. The Japanese 
Occupation saw some reduction of the 
network, but most was rehabilitated 
after the Second World War ( SCO Ooi 
Jin Bee, (1976). p.389 )
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Figure 3.7 PENINSULAR MALAYSIA. PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE MAIN 
TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK AND MAJOR 
SOURCES OF POWER. 1957
NOTE: locations of power stations are 
approximate.
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V Diesel projected
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•  Coal mine in production 
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  Main road
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Source: Ooi Jin Bee, 1963, p.356, F ig 1 5 3  Rail N etw ork 1957 
p-359. Fig. 15.4 Road N etw ork 1957 
p.327, Fig. 14.1 Minerals 
Federation of Malaya, 1958, p. 3 4 8
windustry was reinforced after the Second World War, although the 
importance of mining as a consumer of electricity diminished during 
the 1950s.
In 1957, hy far the greatest demand for electricity was in the 
western littoral, and this is reflected by the regional distribution 
of electricity generating capacity. Table 3*7 details the major 
suppliers of electricity in 1957» and the main uses to which elec­
tricity was diverted. Figure 3*7 depicts the major operating and 
projected power-stations in Peninsular Malaysia in 1957*
The regional distribution in Peninsular Malaysia of urban areas 
and their associated infrastructure and services was another indicator 
of the spatial distribution of social and economic development in 
1957. First, 'advantages and fruits' of development such as piped 
water, mains sewerage, street lighting, 'bus services, postal services, 
and telephones, banks and shopping facilities were the virtual prero­
gative of urban areas. Second, the distribution of educational and 
medical infrastructure in 1957 correlated highly with that of urban 
areas.
The data in Table 3*8 reveal the distribution by State of towns 
m  two size classes in Peninsular Malaysia in 1957. Table 3.8
shows that 83*3% of all towns over 1,000 population in 1957 were to 
be found in West Goast States, with a marked concentration (^ -8,9$) in 
the 'core' area encompassing Penang, Perak and Selangor. Table 3,8 
shows also -that the East Goast States contained only i7.1$ of all 
Peninsular Malaysia's towns with a population of 1,000 persons or 
greater. Also, 59 (86.8$) of the 68 towns in the East Goast were in 
the lower size category, 1,000 to 10,000 persons.
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TABLE 3.8 
Peninsular Malaysia 
DISTRIBUTION OF TOWNS IN TWO SIZE CLASSES BY STATE, 1957
STATE OR SETTLEMENT TOWNS WITH 1,000 
TO 10,000 PERSONS
TOWNS WITH 10,000 
OR MORE PERSONS
TOTAL
Number % Number % Number %
Penang 17 4.7 4 10.5 21 5.3
Perak 100 27.6 9 23.7 109 27.3
Selangor 60 16.6 5 13.2 65 16,3
CENTRAL NEST COAST 177 48.9 18 4 7 .4 195 48.9
Negri Sembilan 24 6.6 2 5.3 26 6.5
Malacca 7 1.9 1 2.6 8 2.0
Johore 60 16.6 5 13.2 65 I6 .3
SOUTH-WEST COAST 91 25.1 8 21.1 99 24.8
Kedah ■32 8.8 3 7.9 35 8.8
Perlis 3 0.8 0 0.0 3 0.8
NORTH-WEST COAST 35 9.6 3 7.9 38 9.6
WEST COAST 303 8 3.6 29 76.4 332 83.3
Pahang 23 6.4 4 10.5 27 6,8
Kelantan 21 5.8 2 5.3 23 5.8
Trengganu 15 4.1 3 7.9 18 4.5
EAST COAST 59 I6 .3 9 23.7 68 17.1
Peninsular Malaysia 362 100.0 38 100.0 400 100.0
Source: adapted from Keraial Singh Sandhu, 1961, Table 5t Distribution
of Towns in Malaya, 1947 to 1957»
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Table 3-9 presents the distribution of urban centres and of 
urban population in Peninsular Malaysia in 1957 if an ‘urban1 
criterion of 5 j000 population or greater is adopted. If this second 
criterion is used, then 69 (82.2$) of Peninsular Malaysia's 84 urban 
places were in West Goast States, 47 (55• 9$) in the Central West 
Coast States alone. Thus Table 3*9 shows a pattern akin to that 
revealed in Table 3*8 with respect to the distribution of urban centres 
by State. More significant were the urbanisation levels of the popu­
lations of the States. Table 3*9 shows clearly that the inhabitants 
of the Central West Goast States - Penang (58.7$)j Perak (33*4$), and 
Selangor (49.9$) - were more urbanised than those of other States.
The East Coast States - with 20.1$ of their population urban - occupied 
essentially a position between those of the South-West Coast (25.5$ 
urban) and the North-West Coast (13«2$ urban). It may be concluded 
from these data that in 1957 the populations of the Central West 
Coast States had much greater access than those of the peripheral 
States to the 'advantages and fruits' of development as defined above. 
Figure 3*8 illustrates the spatial distribution of urban areas 
revealed by the data in Table 3*9.
The regional distribution of educational and medical infra­
structure about 1957 mirrored the unbalanced spatial distribution of 
urban areas. Consequently, provision of both education and medical 
care was not uniform throughout the peninsula. The spatial distri­
bution of educational and medical infrastructure within Peninsular 
Malaysia about 1957 may be inferred from the data presented in Tables 
3.10, 3*11 and 3*12, and from Figure 3-9-^^
Table 3*10 implies that educational infrastructure was not 
distributed evenly throughout Peninsular Malaysia in 1953* Primary
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TABLE 3.9
Peninsular Malaysia
DISTRIBUTION OF URBAN AREAS AND OF URBAN 
_______POPULATION BY STATE, 1957(a)_______
STATE OR SETTLEMENT TOTAL
POPULATION
DISTRIBUTION OF 
URBAN AREAS BY 
STATE 1957
LEVEL OF URBAN­
IZATION OF STATE 
POPULATION 1957
Number Number^
Penang 572,132 6 7.1 336,026 58.7
Perak 1,221,390 25 29.8 407,552 33.4
S elangor 1,012,891 16 19.0 505,038 49.9
CENTRAL WEST COAST 2,806,413 47 55-9 1,248,616 44.5
Negri Sembilan 36^,331 3 3.6 69,443 19.1
Malacca 291,24-6 1 1 .2 69,851 24.0
Johore 927,565 13 15.5 263,899 28.5
SOUTH-WEST COAST 1,583,142 17 20.3 403,193 25.5
Kedah 701,643 4 4.8 98,654 14.1
Perlis 90,866 1 1 .2 6,065 6.7
NORTH-WEST COAST 792,509 5 6 .0 104,719 13.2
WEST COAST 5,182,064 69 82 .2 1,756,528 33.9
Pahang 312,949 6 7.1 84,883 27.1
Kelan tan 505,585 6 7.1 82,935 16.4
Trengganu 278,165 3 3.6 52,834 19.0
EAST COAST 1,096,699 15 17.8 220,652 20.1
Peninsular Malaysia 6 ,278,763 84 100.0 1,977,180 31.5
(a) ’urban' defined as population 5,000 or greater.
(b) State’s share of urban centres as a percentage of urban centres
in Peninsular Malaysia,
(c) Total urban population.
(d) percentage of urban to total population.
Source: adapted from Ooi Jin Bee, I963, Table 17, Distribution of
the Urban Population. Malaya, 1957.
X£f 8
Fig 3.8 PENINSULAR MALAYSIA. TOWNS
WITH POPULATION OF 5000 or over. 
[ 1957Perl is THAILAND
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International boundary Source Ooi Jin Bee (1 9 6 3 ). p .139. Fig. 2 9  
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school enrolments as a proportion of estimated primary school age 
population were greater in the 'core' States of the Central West 
Coast than in the peripheral States. The proportions of primary 
school enrolments ranged from a high of 66.8$ in Selangor to a low of 
49.2$ in Kelantan. The average figure for all the West Coast States 
was 62.3$, although the more peripheral States of the West Coast were 
somewhat below this average. In particular, Kedah - with only 50.5$ 
of those eligible commencing primary level education - exhibited a 
figure rather worse than the average for the three East Coast States 
(56.5$). The data reveal that more children in the West Coast States 
(62.3$) than in the East Coast States (56.5$) were enrolled into 
primary education, although the differential is not an exaggerated one.
The differential about 1957 with regard to secondary education 
was much more marked than was the case with primary education. Table 
3*10 shows that secondary school enrolments as a proportion of 
secondary 'educative population' ranged from a high of 71.9$ in Penang 
to a low of only 5*3% in Trengganu. Just over half (51.9$) of the 
secondary 'educative population' of the Central West Coast States 
proceeded to secondary education, and the figure for the West Coast 
as a whole was 38.2$. This statistic was achieved despite the fact that 
the two States of the North-West Coast - Kedah and Perlis - each 
reveal figures below the average noted for the East Coast States 
(10.7$)* The East Coast's average is raised by the relatively good 
score for Pahang, a former Federated Malay State.
The regional distribution of medical infrastructure about 1957 
painted a picture similar to that for the distribution of educational 
infrastructure. Table 3*11 gives the distribution of physicians by 
State in Peninsular Malaysia in 1954. Table 3.12 presents the
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TABLE 3.10
Peninsular Malaysia
PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOL ENROLMENTS BY STATE, 1953
STATE OR SETTLEMENT P R I M A R Y S E C O N D A R Y
ESTIMATED ENROLMENTS SECONDARY ENROLMENTS
PRIMARY / \ 
POPULATION^
TOTAL 
No.
■*(!>) 'EDUCATIVE /\ 
POPULATION1^
TOTAL
No.
P*(d)
Penang 103,000 68,113 66.1 15,500 11,144 71.9
Perak 223,000 145,179 65.1 33,500 13,980 41.7
Selangor 169,000 112,818 66.8 25,500 13,569 53.2
CENTRAL WEST COAST 495,000 326,110 65.9 74,500 38,693 51.9
Negri Sembilan 64,000 42,262 66.0 9,500 3,760 39.6
Malacca 5?,ooo 36,253 6 3 .6 8,500 3,304 38.9
Johore 175,000 104,172 59.5 26,000 5,968 23.0
SOUTH-WEST COAST 296,000 182,687 61.7 44,000 13,032 29.6
Kedah 129,000 65,682 50.9 19,500 1,769 9.1
Perlis 16,000 8,873 55.5 2,500 136 5.4
NORTH-WEST COAST 145,ooo 74,555 51.4 22,000 1,905 8.7
WEST COAST 936,000 583,352 62.3 140,500 53,630 38.2
Pahang 56,000 36,414 6 5 .O 8,500 2,023 23.8
Kelantan 99,000 48,751 49.2 15,000 884 5.9
Trengganu 50,000 30,747 61.5 7,500 399 5.3
EAST COAST 205,000 115,912 56.5 31,000 3,306 10.7
Federal
Institutions - 150 - - 656 -
Peninsular Malaysia 1,141,000 
1-------------------------------
699,414 61.3 171,500 57,592 33.6
(a) children between ages of 6+ and 12+j
(b) total number of enrolments as a % of estimated primary school age
population,1
(c) 20% of population between 13+ and 18+ years of age;
(d) total number of enrolments as a % of'secondary 'educative population'.
Source: adapted from International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
1955. p.464, Table 2, Primary School Enrolments, September 1953. 
Federation; and p.465, Table 3. Secondary School Enrolments, 
September 1953. Federation.
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distribution by State of hospitals and hospital beds about the same 
year. Scrutiny of Table 3*11 and Table 3*12 together shows that there 
was a marked concentration of medical infrastructure in the West Coast 
States, especially in the 'core* area of Penang, Perak and Selangor. 
For example, Table 3*11 shows that persons per physician ranged from 
4,900 in Penang to 38,000 in Kelantan, the average for Peninsular 
Malaysia being 9,200 persons per physician, The average figure for 
the West Coast States (8,200 persons per physician) contrasts markedly 
with that for the East Coast States (22,300 persons per physician). 
Table 3*12 shows that 201 (90.5$) of Peninsular Malaysia's 222 
hospitals in 1957 were in West Coast States, with 182 (105 + 77) or 
82.0$ in the western littoral between Penang and Johore inclusive.
The East Coast States had only 21 (9*5$) of Peninsular Malaysia's 
hospitals. In terms of hospital beds per thousand population the 
position was similar, the West Goast States exhibiting a much more 
favourable coverage than that exhibited by the East Goast States,
Table 3*12 shows that the West Coast States as a whole could muster 
3.6 hospital beds per thousand population, whereas the East Coast 
States could find just less than half that number (1.6 beds per thou­
sand population). The contrast between the West Coast State of Negri 
Sembilan (6.8 beds per thousand population) and the East Coast State 
of Kelantan (0.9 beds per thousand population) is noteworthy. It must 
be noted also that the two most peripheral West Coast States - Johore 
and Perlis - exhibited figures (2.7 and 1.5 beds per thousand popula­
tion respectively) which were lower than that for Pahang (3.2 beds 
per thousand population), itself the East Coast State linked most 
closely with the developed West Coast 'core'.
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TABLE 3.11
Peninsular Malaysia
DISTRIBUTION OF PHYSICIANS BY STATE, 1954
STATE OR SETTLEMENT POPUL­
ATION / \
('ooop
PHYSICIANS(b) PERSONS PER PHYSICIAN(c)
Pri­
vate
Govern­
ment
Private Govern­
ment
Both
Penang 512 71 33 7,200 15,500 4,900
Perak 1,11? 74 49 15,100 22,800 9,100
Selangor 847 89 47 9,500 18,000 6,200
CENTRAL WEST COAST 2,476 234 129 10,600 19,200 6,800
Negri Sembilan 321 17 24 18,900 13,400 7,800
Malacca 283 19 16 14,900 17,700 8,100
Johore 875 40 46 21,900 19,000 10,200
SOUTH-WEST COAST 1,479 76 86 19,500 17,200 9,100
Kedah 646 16 26 40,400 24,800 15,400
Perlis 81 1 3 81,000 27,000 20,300
NORTH-WEST COAST 727 17 29 42,800 25,000 15,800
WEST COAST 4,682 327 244 14,300 19,200 8,200
Pahang 281 8 16 35,100 17,600 11,700
Kelantan 494 6 7 82,300 70,600 3.8,000
Trengganu 249 2 7 124,500 35,600 27,700
EAST COAST 1,024 16 30 64,000 34,100 22,300
Peninsular Malaysia 5,706 343 274 16,600 20,800 9,200
(a) mid-year, 1953;
(b) March, 1954. 'Private' includes only registered physicians by 
place of registration, 'Government' includes only those engaged 
part- or full-time in general or specialized clinical service; 
it excludes administrative officers and those in leprosaria, 
mental hospitals, research, etc.
(c) figures are rounded to the nearest hundred and ratios are slightly 
understated because calculated against estimated populations of 
mid-year, 1953-
Source: adapted from International Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
1955, P.554, Table 4, Physicians in the States a,nd Settlements, 
March 1954, Federation.
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Table 3.12
(a) as at December 31» 1952;
(b) as at April, 195^;
(c) All Chinese maternity hospitals or homes except one
hospital in Selangor and two in Penang;
(d) Ratios slightly overstated because calculated against 
estimated populations of mid-year 1953-
Source: adapted from International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development, 1955» P*555» Table 5> Hospitals in 
the States and Settlements, Federation.
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fig 3.9. PENINSULAR MALAYSIA. PROVISION OF MEDICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND OF 
SECONDARY EDUCATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE. (1954)
Source: Com piled from  data presented in Table 3 .11 , PENINSULAR M A LA Y S IA . PR M A R Y  A N D  SECO NDARY  
SCHOOL ENROLM ENTS BY STATE, 1953; Table 3 .1 2 , PENINSULAR M A LA Y S IA . D ISTR IB U TIO N  OF P H Y S IC IA N S  BY  
STATE 1954; and Table 3 .1 3 , PEN IN SU LA R  M A L A Y S IA . D ISTR IB U TIO N  OF HO SPITALS A N D  H O SPITA L BEDS BY
STATE, 1 9 54
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3*3c Communal Structure of Peninsular Malaysia*s
Socio-Economic System, 1957
A synopsis of the spatial distribution of social and economic 
development in Peninsular Malaysia in 1957 has been given in Section 
3*3h above. Section 3»3h has indicated the spatial distribution of 
socio-economic development by summarizing the regional spread of the 
principal wealth-generating activities (tin-mining, commercial agri­
culture, and manufacturing) and of the main 'advantages and fruits' 
of development (employment, income, physical infrastructure, urban 
areas and associated services and social infrastructure). The concen­
tration of wealth-generating activities and of the 'advantages and 
fruits' of development in the West Goast States - especially in the 
'core' States of Penang, Perak and Selangor - has been emphasised.
The present section will complete the description of Peninsular 
Malaysia's society and economy in 1957 hy describing the communal 
structure of the socio-economic system at that time.
Table 3*13 shows the density distribution of Peninsular 
Malaysia's population by State at the Census of 1957. The data for 
1957 show that those States which were the first parts of the 
peninsula to be touched by British influence - Penang and Malacca - 
had the greatest population densities, 1 ,^ 30 .3 and ^60 ,0 persons per 
square mile respectively. Table 3 .13 shows that the States of the 
developed Central West Coast 'core* - Penang, Perak and Selangor - had 
a density (2^5.0 persons per square mile on average) much higher than 
any other part of Peninsular Malaysia. Next highest was the North- 
West Coast, consisting of the densely-peopled 'rice-bowls' of Kedah 
and Perlis (average 199.7 persons per square mile). The population 
density of the South-West Coast (150.7 persons per square mile) was
15?
TABLE 3,13
Peninsular Malaysia
DENSITY DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL POPULATION BY STATE, 1957
STATE Area 
in square 
miles
1957 (.a) 
population
195? (b)
population
density
Penang TOO 572,100 1,430.3
Perak 7,890 1,221, 446 154.8
Selangor 3,166 1,012,929 319.9
CENTRAL WEST COAST 11,456 2,806,475 245.0
Negri Sembilan 2,550 364,524 143.0
Malacca 633 291,211 460.0
Johore 7,321 926,850 126.6
SOUTH-WEST COAST 10,504 1,582,585 150.7
Kedah 3,660 701,964 191.8
Perlis 310 90,885 293.2
NORTH-WEST COAST 3,970 792,849 199.7
WEST COAST 25,930 5,181,909 199.8
Pahang 13,873 313,058 22.6
Kelantan 5,746 505,522 88.0
Trengganu 5,050 278,269 55.1
EAST COAST 24,669 1 ,096,849 44.5
Peninsular Malaysia 50,599 6,278,758 124.1
1 - ■
(a) Total population of Malays, Chinese, Indians and Others 
enumerated at the 195? Census,
(b) Density in persons per square mile, calculated simply by 
dividing the population of each unit by the area of that 
unit,
Source: adapted from Chander, 1972, Table 1, Total Population
of States by Main Community Groups compared -with Previous
Census,
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Persons per square 
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Fig 3.10 PENINSULAR MALAYSIA. DENSITY OF POPULATION BY 
DISTRICT, 1957
Source: Adapted from Ooi Jin Bee (1976), p.135. Fig 6.2, Density of Population 1957
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relatively low due to the inclusion of thinly-populated eastern 
Johore. Even so, the average population density of the West Coast 
(199*8 persons per square mile) was much superior to that for the
East Coast States (44.5 persons per square mile). The population
density of Pahang (22.6 persons per square mile) was low even by
the standards of the East Coast States.
Figure 3*10 depicts the population density by district in 195?*
Figure 3*10 shows that population was concentrated in the western 
littoral, with a subsidiary population on the north-east coast. The 
central two-thirds of the country was thinly-peopled. Comparison of 
Table 3*13 and Figure 3*10 with the Tables and Figures presented in 
Section 3*3h above shows clearly that in 1957 Peninsular Malaysia's 
population was to be found largely in those States in which the 
wealth-generating activities and 'advantages and fruits* of develop­
ment were concentrated.
The yinference^yto be drawn from the data presented so far in 
Section 3*3° Is that the spatial distribution of population in 1957 
correlated closely with the spatial distribution of social and economic 
development. However, the data for the total population mask signi­
ficant differences in the spatial distributions of the three main 
communities.
Table 3*14 shows the community composition by State at the 
Census of 1957* The Table reveals that at that date the Malays were 
just the majority in Peninsular Malaysia, having 50.5% of the population 
in comparison to the Chinese (37*7%) and the Indian (11.9%) communities^'^ 
However, the Table reveals also important differences between the 
several parts of Peninsular Malaysia in terms of communal distributions.
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Table 3.1^
(a) Note that Table 3*15 does not include data for 'Others' 
enumerated at the 1957 Census, restricting its presentation 
to the Malay, Chinese and Indian communities. The 1957 
Census enumerated a total of 8 ,^<^ 90 'Others' distributed 
throughout the States of Peninsular Malaysia, and the 
discrepancies between population totals presented in 
Table 3>15 and those listed in Table 3*1^ m&y attributed 
to the omission of 'Others' from Table 3*15*
(b) Due to the omission of the 'Others' category noted above, 
percentages presented in Table 3*15 differ slightly from 
those which may be found elsewhere (e.g. in Ghander, 1972, 
Table XIV).
Source: adapted from Chander, 1972, Table 1, Total Population
of States by Main Community Groups compared with 
Previous Census.
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Table 3*1^ shows that in the West Coast States as a whole the Malays 
were only slightly more numerous than the Chinese (43.6$ as against 
42.7$), and. were inferior in number to the combined non-Malay popu­
lations in all the States of the Central and North-West Coast. Indeed, 
in the 'core' States of Penang, Perak and Selangor the Malays were 
fewer than the Chinese community alone (averaging 3^«0$ as against 
an average of 4$.9$ for the Chinese in the Central West Goast States). 
It was in the peripheral States that the Malays achieved their 
numerical superiority. In the North-West Coast States the Malays 
were 70.4$ of the total population, being especially dominant in 
Perlis (80,4$ of the total). In the East Coast States Malay numerical 
superiority was even more marked, averaging 82.7$ of the East Coast 
population, with almost total dominance of Kelantan (92.9$) and 
Trengganu (92.3$)<
Figure 3»11, Figure 3*12 and Figure 3*13 depict the 1957 
distributions of the three main communities by district. Like 
Figure 3*10> the Figures reveal that all the communities showed a 
preference for coastal locations in 1957* Population densities in the 
interior were very low for all the communities. However, Figures 
3.11» 3*12 and 3«13 mirror the imbalanced distributions of the three 
main .communities which was revealed in Table 3.14.
In 1957i the Malay community was concentrated in the north-west 
and north-east of the peninsula - particularly in the 'rice-bowls* of 
Kedah/Perlis and the Kelantan delta - and in Penang and Malacca, and 
in coastal locations in the remaining States (see Figure 3.11). The 
Chinese population was concentrated almost entirely in the West Coast, 
especially in Penang, in and around Kuala Lumpur, and in the Kinta
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districts
Persons per square mile
0 - 2 5  
2 5 - 5 0  
5 0 -1 0 0  
100-200 
200-300  
300-400  
Over 400
Fig 3.11 PENINSULAR MALAYSIA. DISTRIBUTION OF MALAY 
POPULATION BY DISTRICT, 1957
Source: Adapted from Ooi Jin Bee (1963) p. 147, Figure. 31, Density of the Malay population, 1957
14A
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districts
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2 0 0 - 300 
300 -  400  
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—  \
Fig 3.12 PENINSULAR 
MALAYSIA. DISTRIBUTION OF 
CHINESE POPULATION BY DISTRICT. 
1957
100 m iles 
_ |
Source: Adapted from Ooi Jin Bee (1963), p. 153, Figure 33, Density of the Chinese
population, 1957
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Over 80
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Fig 3.13 PENINSULAR MALAYSIA. DISTRIBUTION OF INDIAN 
POPULATION BY DISTRICT 1957
Source: Adapted from Oot Jin Bee, (1963), p.156, Figure 34, Density of the Indian population, 1957
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Valley of Perak (see Figure 3.12). The Indian population showed a 
distribution similar to that of the Chinese, with particular concen­
trations in Province Wellesley and in central Selangor (see Figure
3 .13).
Figure 3*1^ compares the density distributions of the communities 
in 195? in terms of Malays and non-Malays, with particular attention
( 'paid to the relationship between the Malay and the Chinese populations; 
The Figure shows that Chinese comprised in their own right the majority 
population in the Central West Coast States of Penang, Perak and 
Selangor. If Indians are reckoned with the Chinese, then in 1957 non- 
Malays formed the majority in the South-West Coast States of Negri 
Sembilan, Malacca and Johore. Malays made up the majority only in the 
North-West and East Coast periphery States of Perlis, Kedah, Pahang, 
Kelantan and Trengganu.
It is in the light of the data presented in Table 3*14 and- 
Figures 3,11, 3*12 and 3*13 - summarized in Figure 3.14 - that the 
distribution of socio-economic development in 1957 must be viewed.
The data just presented show that in 1957 the non-Malay populations 
were concentrated in the best developed States - especially in the 
’core' States of Penang, Perak and Selangor - whereas the Malays were 
concentrated in the least developed States, forming almost the entire 
populations of Kelantan and Trengganu.
The position was similar with respect to the urban/rural status 
of the communities. Data presented in Section 3 .3b above showed that 
the West Coast States - especially Penang, Perak and Selangor - con­
tained the majority of urban areas, and had the most highly urbanised
16?
Fig 3.14 PENINSULAR MALAYSIA. COMMUNITY
DISTRIBUTION BY STATE AT CENSUS OF 1957
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populations (see above, Table 3-8, Table 3*9 and. Figure 3*8), and 
the inference that urban status correlated, highly with the distribution 
of socio-economic development was made.
Table 3*15 shows that the three main communities differed in 
their levels of urbanisation in 1957. The non-Malay populations were 
both highly urbanised, the Chinese having nearly half their population 
(^4.7^) living in urban areas. The Indian population (30.6% urban) 
was less urbanised than the Chinese, but was still greatly urbanised 
in comparison to the Malays, the great majority of whom (88,8^) lived 
in rural areas.
The conclusion to be drawn from the data presented so far is 
that in 1957 the non-Malay populations, especially the Chinese, were 
concentrated in the ’core’ States of the Central West Coast and in 
the urban areas, whereas the Malay population was to be found mainly 
in the peripheral States and in the rural areas. Given that the West 
Coast States and the urban areas enjoyed a virtual monopoly of wealth- 
generating activities and of the ’advantages and fruits' of develop­
ment in 1957» the data presented so far in Section 3*3c emphasise 
the non-Malays’ greater access vis-a-vis the Malays to socio­
economic development.
This imbalance was mirrored in the communal structure of 
Peninsular Malaysia’s socio-economic system in 1957* The unbalanced 
spatial distribution of social and economic development, coupled with 
the imbalances apparent between the three main communities in respect 
of spatial distribution and urban/rural status, meant that there was 
concentration of each community in particular social and economic 
strata within the socio-economic system. Between 187<T and 1957, a
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TABLE 3,15
Peninsular Malaysia
POPULATION BY COMMUNITY AND BY , > 
DEGREE OF URBANISATION AT CENSUS OF 1957 W
COMMUNITY URBAN
AREAS
%
RURAL 
AREAS 
% .
TOTAL
%
Malays 11.2 88.8 100.0
Chinese 44.7 55.3 100.0
Indians 30 .6 69.4 100,0
Peninsular Malaysia 26.5 73.5 100.0
(a) the definition of urban used here is "all gazetted admini­
strative areas with a population of ten thousand or over" 
(Chander, 1972, p.23).
Source: adapted from Chander, 1972, Table XVI, Population by
Community and Degree of Urbanization at Censuses of 
1970. 1957. and 1947 - West Malaysia.
1?0
number of factors combined, to ensure that each community gravitated 
towards some socio-economic niches rather than others. Thus, by the 
time of independence community, on the one hand, and industrial 
activity and social status, on the other hand, were correlated highly.
The close correlation between community and socio-economic 
status in 1957 is depicted clearly in Table 3*16 and Table 3-17.
Table 3-16 shows industry by community in 1957. Table 3*17 shows 
community by industry in the same year. It may be seen from Table 
3.16 and Table 3*17 that each community was concentrated in certain 
sectors of Peninsular Malaysia's socio-economic system in 1957. There 
were significant contrasts between the positions occupied by the 
Malays bn the one hand, and those occupied by the non-Malays on the 
other.
Table 3*16 shows that the Malays formed over half (60,7%) of 
those employed in Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing. The Malays 
were not the majority in any other sector, although they were the 
largest group in Services (44.7%). The non-Malays were dominant in 
all sectors of the economy other than Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fishing. The Chinese formed unaided the bulk of those engaged in 
the wealth-generating sectors Mining and Quarrying (70.0%), 
Manufacturing (72.7%), and Commerce (66.2%). The Chinese were 
strongly represented also in Building and Construction (48.8%), 
Transport, Storage and Communications (40,4%) and Services (3 8.5%),
The Indians did not dominate any category, but were well represented 
in Utilities (3 8.0%), Services (l6 .8%), Transport, Storage and 
Communications (22.3%), Commerce (17.1%), and Building and Construction
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Table 3,16
(a) Table 3.16 presents only data concerning those persons who 
were in employment at the time of the Census. In addition 
there were a number of persons who were not working but who 
were looking for work (see notes (d), (e) and (f)). Furthermore, 
the Table does not present data concerning the 'Others' who were 
economically active at the time of the Census (see note (g)).
(b) Agriculture here includes agricultural products requiring 
substantial processing, e.g. palm oil, and some workers will 
be employed in the processing - rather than in the growing - 
of such products.
(c) The 1957 Census used the classification’Malaysian1, and thus 
included Malay persons of recent immigration from places out­
side British Malaya, e.g. from Sumatra, However, these 
immigrant Malays are so similar to the indigenous Malays in 
matters of race, language, religion and custom that all the 
Malays. - whether indigenous or immigrant - may be legiti­
mately classified simply as ’Malay’ for purposes of comparison 
with the Chinese and Indian communities.
(d) In addition to this total there were 19»392 Malays who were
not working but who were looking for work.
(e) In addition to this total there were 12,917 Chinese who were
not working but who were looking for work.
(f) In addition to this total there were 5»728 Indians who were
not working but who were looking for work,
(g) In addition to this total there were those who were unemployed
at the time of the Census, and 56,213 'Others' (of whom 6^ -2
were not working but who were looking for work).
Source: adapted and compiled from data presented in Fell, H., i960,
1957 Population Census of the Federation of Malaya: Report 
No. 1^4- (Final Report - Summary Tables for the Federation, 
with General Comments on the Census), Kuala Lumpur, Dept, 
of Statistics;
Table 17A, Economically Active Malaysians by Sex, Industry 
and Occupation Division;
Table 17B> Economically Active Chinese by Sex, Industry 
and Occupation Division;
Table 17C, Economically Active Indians by Sex, Industry and 
Occupation Division;
Table 17P> Economically Active Others by Sex, Industry and 
Occupation Division.
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Table 3*17 shows that nearly three-quarters (7^.6$) of Malays 
were Involved in Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing in 1957- A 
further 12.7$ of Malay employment was in the Services sector, all 
other sectors of the economy claiming residual percentages only of 
Malay employment. The non-Malays shared the Malay preference for 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing, although the concentration of non- 
Malay employment in this sector was much less. The Chinese had less 
than half (^ -0.9$) of their employment concentrated in Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fishing, with other sectors such as Commerce (l6.7$)i 
Services (1^.5$)» and Manufacturing (12.8$) sharing highly in Chinese 
employment. The Indians had just over half (5 6.8$) of their employ­
ment in Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing, with smaller concentrations
in Services (15«7$)» Commerce (10.7$)» and Transport, Storage and
(78)Communications (5«2$).
Table 3»l6 and Table 3*17 show clearly that - in respect of 
industrial occupation - the Malays were concentrated heavily in the 
low productivity Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing sectors, In 
contrast, the non-Malays - especially the Chinese - revealed a marked 
preference for all the more productive sectors of the economy. These 
differences in the communities' levels of concentration in various 
sectors of the economy had a logical outcome in terms of the distri­
bution of income in 1957*
Table 3*18 shows the approximate distribution of total individual 
incomes by community in 1957* Table 3 .19 reveals the distribution of 
individual incomes under M/l2,000 per annum by community and by urban/ 
rural status in 1957» The following paragraphs will Indicate the 
salient features of Table 3 .18 and Table 3.19.
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Table 3.1?
(a) Table 3*1? presents only data concerning those persons who were 
in employment at the time of the Census. In addition there 
were a number of persons who were not working but who were 
looking for work (see notes (d) , (e) and (f)). Furthermore, 
the Table does not present data concerning the 'Others' who 
were economically active at the time of the Census (see
note (g)).
(b) The 1957 Census used the classification 'Malaysian', and thus 
included Malay persons of recent immigration from places out­
side British Malaya, e.g. from Sumatra, However, these 
immigrant Malays are so similar to the indigenous Malays in 
matters of race, language, religion and custom that all the 
Malaysians - whether indigenous or immigrant - may be legiti­
mately classified simply as 'Malay9 for purposes of comparison 
with the Chinese and Indian communities,
(c) Agriculture here includes agricultural products requiring 
substantial processing, e,g, palm oil, and some workers will 
be employed in the processing - rather than in the growing - 
of such products.
(d) In addition to this total there were 19»392 Malays who were
not working but who were looking for work,
(e) In addition to this total there were 12,917 Chinese who were
not working but who were looking for work,
(f) In addition to this total there were 5»728 Indians who were
not working but who were looking for work,
(g) In addition to this total there were those who were unemployed
at the time of the Census, and 56,213 'Others' (of whom 642
were not working but who were looking for work),
Source: adapted and compiled from data presented in Fell, H., I960,
1957 Population Census of the Federation of Malaya: Report
No. 14 (Final Report - Summary Tables for the Federation, 
with General Gomments on the Census), Kuala Lumpur, Dept, 
of Statistics:
Table 17A, Economically Active Malaysians by Sex, Industry 
and Occupation Division;
Table 17B, Economically Active Chinese by Sex, Industry 
and Occupation Division;
Table 17C, Economically Active Indians by Sex, Industry and 
Occupation Division; and
Table 17D, Economically Active Others by Sex, Industry and 
Occupation Division.
X?6
Table 3*18 shows clearly that in 195? the average incomes 
enjoyed hy non-Malays were far superior to those received by Malays. 
The figures for average annual income per head and for average annual 
incomes per adult male are noteworthy. Table 3*18 reveals that the 
average annual incomes per head in the non-Malay communities were far 
higher than that for the Malay community, ranging from M$83? for 
Chinese, through M$669 for Indians, to M$367 for Malays. Similarly, 
the average annual income per adult male varied from a high of 
M$3»223 (Chinese), through M$2,013 (Indian), to a low of M$l,^63 
(Malay).
The data in Table 3*19 augment those given in Table 3*18, The 
data presented in Table 3*19 support the conclusion that in 195? the 
average incomes enjoyed by non-Malays were superior to those received 
by Malays. For example, the average annual income per head was 
M$56l for urban Chinese, M$513 for urban Indians, and M$482 for urban 
Malays. Table 3*19 reveals also that there were differences in urban 
and rural incomes. All three communities displayed this character­
istic, but the differential between the urban Malay and the rural 
Malay was most marked. For example, the urban Malay average family 
income per month (M$229) was far greater than the -rural Malay 
equivalent (M$128).^^
3.^ CONCLUSION
Chapter 3 has presented a synopsis of the major factors 
influencing the evolution of Peninsular Malaysia's socio-economic 
system up to 195?, paying particular attention to the events of the 
British colonial period between 18?^ and the eve of independence. It 
was noted that the development of British Malaya proceeded mainly from
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TABLE 3.18
Peninsular Malaysia
APPROXIMATE DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL INDIVIDUAL INCOMES 
__________________ BY COMMUNITY. 1957__________________
MALAYS CHINESE INDIANS TOTAL
Annual incomes reported 
under M$12,000 (MjSmillion) 1,025 1,200 350 2,575*
Annual incomes assessed m  
over M$12,000 (M$million>^ 25 150 25 300
Unreported and unassessed 
income (M$millions)(c) 100 600 100 800*
Total individual income 
(M$millions) 1,150 1,950 ^75 3,675
Percentage of total 31 53 13 100
Populations (millions) 3.13 2.33 0.71 6 .2 8
Average annual income 
per head (M$) 367 837 669 585
Adult males, 15 - 59 
years (millions) 0.786 0.605 0.236 1.679
Average annual income 
per adult male (M$) 1,^63 3,223 2,013 2,189
(a) with the exception of figures marked *, all figures include 
data for Europeans and others.
(b) estimates for incomes over $12,000 were made from figures supplied 
by the Inland Revenue Department: "from the separate analyses
by race and income, and from the rate of tax paid by each race, 
and other evidence, we can infer that approximately $2 5m. accrued 
to Malays and $25m. to Indians, $150m. to Chinese and $100m, to 
Europeans, in the classes with individual incomes over $12,000." 
(Silcock, 1963g, p.278).
(c) Silcock estimated that some $800m, was unaccounted for due to 
under-reporting and under-assessment, partly of the income from 
scattered rubber small-holdings owned by Malays, but mainly of 
the income of businessmen, the majority of whom were Chinese: 
"Clearly, detailed information is unobtainable, but it seems 
reasonable to divide this in the proportions, Malays $100m., 
Chinese $600m., Indians $100m," (Silcock, 1963c, p.280).
Source: adapted from Silcock, 1 9 6 3c, Table A.5, Federation:
Approximate distribution of total individual incomes by
community, 1957.
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TABLE 3.19
Peninsular? Malaysia
DISTRIBUTION OP INDIVIDUAL INCOMES UNDER M$12,000 per 
annum BY COMMUNITY AND BY URBAN/RURAL STATUS, 1957
MALAYS CHINESE INDIANS TOTAL
Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural
Total popul­
ation (1000) 350 2,800 1,050 1,300 200 500 6,200
Average family 
income per month $229 $128 $285 $260 $216 $212
Average family 
size 5.7 5.0 6.1 6.6 5.1 5.1
Annual income 
per head $482 $307 $561 $473 $513 $499
Estimated total 
of individual 
incomes $l69m $860m $589m $6l5m $103m $249m $2,575^
(a) the estimated total of individual income ($2 ,5 7 5m) may he
divided approximately between the three communities. To the 
nearest $25m, the approximate totals of individual income 
were: Malays $l,025m; Chinese $1,200ms Indians $350m.
Source: adapted from Silcock, 1 9 6 3c, Table A,4, Federation:
Distribution of individual incomes under~$12,000 per annum, 
between urban and rural districts and between races, 1 9 5 7 »
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the west, and that it involved the immigration to Malaya of large 
numbers of non-Malays (primarily Chinese and Indians).
The main body of Chapter 3 (Section 3*3) analysed the structure 
of Peninsular Malaysia's society and economy about 1957* The analysis 
was undertaken with reference to two important themes.
The first theme of the analysis was a description of the 
spatial structure of Peninsular Malaysia's socio-economic system about 
1957 (Section 3*3^)* This involved consideration of the spatial 
distribution of socio-economic development as measured by the regional 
distribution of wealth-generating activities (tin-mining-, rubber, and 
manufacturing) and of the 'advantages and fruits' of development 
(employment, income, physical infrastructure, and the services and 
social infrastructure associated with urban areas).
The text, Tables and Figures in Section 3*3h have shown 
clearly that by 1957 the spatial distribution of socio-economic 
development in Peninsular Malaysia was highly unbalanced. The wealth- 
generating activities and the 'advantages and fruits' of development 
were concentrated markedly in the West Coast States, particularly in
the 'core' States of Penang, Perak and Selangor. The peripheral West
Coast States of the North-West (Kedah and Perlis) and the South-West 
(Negri Sembilan, Malacca, and Johore) were less well developed. The 
peripheral East Coast States (Pahang, Kelantan and Trengganu) 
exhibited a very low level of economic development.
The second theme of the analysis was a description of the
communal structure of Peninsular Malaysia's socio-economic system in 
1957 (Section 3 -3c). This required consideration of each community's
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spatial distribution within Peninsular Malaysia, and of its access
to the wealth generated within the economy and to the 'advantages
and fruits' of development.
The text, Tables and Figures in Section 3*3c have shown clearly 
that by 1957 there was considerable imbalance between the Malays and 
the non-Malays in terms of access to the wealth and to the 'advantages 
and fruits' derived from the socio-economic development of Peninsular 
Malaysia. In 1957 the Malay community was concentrated in the rural 
periphery and in low-value economic activities, whereas the non- 
Malay communities - especially the Chinese - were entrenched in the 
urban 'core' and in the wealth-generating economic sectors. Thus, in 
1957 Peninsular Malaysia exhibited a socio-economic system marked by 
a high degree of social plurality compounded by severe economic dualism.
The expressions 'social plurality* and 'economic dualism' 
indicate that within a country's socio-economic system there are 
social and economic sub-categories which are not interrelated with each 
other in the manner which is inperative if that country is to be welded 
into a fully-integrated socio-economic system, A newly-independent 
country cannot aspire to genuine national unity while such a divided 
and potentially fissiparous socio-economic system persists.
In Peninsular Malaysia in 1957 the problem of social and 
economic division was exacerbated severely by the association of 
community with socio-economic status. On the eve of independence 
there were great imbalances in the spatial distribution of socio­
economic development between the 'core* States and the peripheral 
States, and between urban and rural areas. However, it was the gross 
imbalance between the Malays and the non-Malays in terms of the 
benefits which had accrued to them during the evolution of Peninsular
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Malaysia's socio-economic system under the British which provided 
the overriding concern of the planners charged with directing the 
new country's course.
If Peninsular Malaysia were to arrive at a position of genuine 
nationhood after independence, then means would have to he sought by 
the planners to eliminate potentially disruptive social and economic 
imbalances between the Malays and the non-Malays, The non-Malays had 
economic power, but the Malays had the political might to pursue a 
vigorous course of socio-economic redressal in the new environment of 
socio-economic equality engendered by Merdeka. Consequently, the key 
to national unity in Peninsular Malaysia after independence was to be 
true integration of the socio-economic system so as to correct the 
socio-economic and political imbalance between the three main 
communities•
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 3
64, In this respect the economic development of Peninsular Malaysia 
accords closely with the theory of 'cumulative causation' pro­
pounded by G. M. Myrdal towards the end of the 1950s* Myrdal's 
thesis was that free market forces would direct the economic 
development of a sparsely-populated, underdeveloped country in 
such a way that regional imbalances would be accentuated.
Myrdal considered that certain areas would have inherent advan­
tages for economic development (e.g. mineral deposits, a site 
for a port), that these areas would attract economic development 
to them as a consequence of these inherent advantages, and that 
as a result these areas would be rendered evai more attractive, 
to the detriment of less-favoured regions. Thus a 'vicious 
circle* would be established, whereby advantaged regions would 
prosper more and more, whereas backward regions would be rendered 
continually more unattractive by comparison. For an account of 
Myrdal's theory, see Myrdal, G. M., 1957» Economic Theory and 
Under-Developed Regions, (Duckworth, London). For a summary, see 
Keeble, D. E,, 1967 > Models of Economic Development, Chapter 8 
(pp.243 “ 302) in Chorley, R. J. and Haggett, P., 19&7» Models 
in Geography, (Methuen, London), especially pages 257 - 264 and 
pages 273 - 275*
65* The best account of the events described in Section 3*2 - on which 
the Section is based - remains that of Fisher, C. A., 1966, 
Chapter 17, Malaya; The Physical and Historical Setting, 
especially pp.592 - 603, which deal with The Establishment of 
British Malaya and Malaya Between the Wars.
66. "The Dindings, a rocky promontory and an associated group of 
small islands off the Perak coast, were obtained as a base from 
which to stamp out piracy in the Straits", although they were 
never in fact used for this purpose (Fisher, I966, p.593)*
6 7. Throughout this thesis the term 'Indian' will be used as a 
general expression for the natives of the Indian sub-continent.
Thus 'Indian' will cover all immigrants from the sub-continent 
to Peninsular Malaysia, and no distinction is made between 
nationals of the modern Republics of India, Pakistan, Bangla 
Desh, or Sri Lanka,
68. Thailand was known as 'Siam* to Europeans from the sixteenth 
century until comparatively recently, "However, in June 1939 
the Siamese government of Pibul Singgram decreed that the 
Western style of the State should henceforward be Thailand, and 
although this form was dropped when Pibul was ousted in 1945,
it was reintroduced as the official name shortly after his return 
to power in 1948" (Fisher, 1966, p.484).
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6 9. Between the Japanese surrender and the creation of the 
Federation of Malaya on 1st February, 19^8, Peninsular Malaysia 
was known as the Malayan Union (created 1st April, '19^ 6), The 
Malayan Union comprised Penang, Malacca, and the former 
Federated and Unfederated Malay States, Singapore remaining 
separate, but had proven very unpopular„ For an account of the 
Malayan Union, see Allen, J. de V., 19&7, The Malayan Union, 
Monograph Series Number 10, Southeast Asia Studies (Yale 
University, Yale).
70. This is especially true of developing countries. In developed 
countries there may be social and institutional mechanisms 
designed to redistribute wealth and advantages within the socio­
economic system, so that populations of deprived regions might 
be subsidised by those of more prosperous regions. Also, the 
populations of developed countries tend to be more mobile than 
those of developing countries, both in terms of movement from 
region to region, and in terms of occupational mobility. Thus, 
in the United Kingdom, for example, nationalised education, 
health and social security services are designed to ensure 
approximately equal coverage of basic services to the entire 
population, regardless of regional disparities in wealth. This 
is in marked contrast to most developing countries, which lack 
such mechanisms of redistribution. In developing countries 
there is often a great imbalance between socially and economi­
cally developed regions (which are wealthy, and which have roads, 
hospitals, schools and the like), and underdeveloped regions 
(which lack both wealth and the ‘advantages and fruits® of 
development),
71. The advantages of the West Coast vis-a-vis the East Coast for 
rubber production were numerous. Physically, the West Coast 
provided well-drained foot-hill sites near to the Straits of 
Malacca, obviating the necessity to either penetrate the Main 
Range or to travel round the peninsula to the East Coast. 
Socially and economically the West Coast had advantages such as 
ports, railways, public utilities, labour supply, and a ready 
market for rubber goods such as footwear (although most produc­
tion was destined for export in unprocessed form). In all 
these social and economic advantages the interior and east of 
of the peninsula was sadly lacking,
72. A feature of the Peninsular Malaysian rubber industry was that 
approximately half the production was derived from small­
holdings of less than 100 acres, not solely from foreign-owned 
estates. In the light of this knowledge, it might be thought 
that Figure 3*^ - which depicts the distribution of rubber 
estates only - is'misleading. However, the factors which have 
tied the estate rubber industry largely to the West Coast - e.g. 
accessibility - had influenced small-holding production also. 
Consequently, the distribution of small-holding rubber mirrored 
that of estate rubber about 1957» the small-holdings occupying 
small parcels of land sandwiched between the estates and other 
types of land-use. The concentration of small-hoidings as well 
as of estates in the West Coast is underlined by the acreages 
given in Table 3*3. Although neither Figure 3*^ nor Table 3*3 
present data for 1957> it may be assumed that these patterns 
would be virtually unchanged at independence itself.
18/.}.
73- It might well he considered that the two size classes considered 
here are inadequate as criteria by which to measure urban status, 
and in fact in Peninsular Malaysia today 10,000 persons is taken 
as the lower limit of population by which urban status is 
measured. This point - definition of urban status by reference 
to population size - is considered further in Section 7.3i>*
7^. Although data presented here regarding education and medical 
infrastructure are for 1953/195^i it may assumed that the 
pattern would be little changed by 1957.
75- This thesis is particularly concerned with the relationship
between the Malay, Chinese and Indian communities, and for this 
reason 'Others1 enumerated at the 1957 Census have been omitted 
from the discussion. This omission means that the position of 
the Malays and of the Chinese and Indians is slightly overstated 
in each case. The inclusion of ’Others' would affect only the 
Peninsular Malaysia total significantly, as the Malays would be 
rendered just the minority in Peninsular Malaysia, ^9*8$ as 
against 37*2% (Chinese), 11,7$ (Indian), and 1.3$ (Others).
Otherwise the patterns remain unchanged, See also note (a),
Table 3-15.
76„ For reasons which will become apparent as this thesis unfolds,
it is the relationship between these two communities - Malay and 
Chinese - which is of particular importance in the Peninsular 
Malaysian political and socio-economic environment.
77» The strong position of the Indians in these categories is very
remarkable when one considers their low population figure rela­
tive to those of the Malay and Chinese communities.
78. Broad categories of industrial classification - e.g. Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fishing - mask significant differences between the 
communities within the categories. Thus the majority of Malay 
agriculturalists in 1957 were found in poor agricultural activi­
ties such as padi-farming, whereas Chinese agriculturalists were 
concentrated in richer agriculture, e.g. market-gardening and 
plantations, This situation of inter-communal imbalance was 
repeated in other broad categories.
79. If must be acknowledged that data such as are presented here have 
limitations. For instance, comparison of urban and rural incomes 
using dollar-income as the measure ignore the subsistence aspects 
of the rural economy. A rural farmer may be able to supply many
of his needs - for food, fuel, building materials and the like - 
from his holding and its environs, whereas the urban dweller must 
needs pay out money to satisfy his wants, Viewed in this light, 
the urban dweller's dollar-income might not be as superior to 
that of the rural dweller as it appears to be at first sight, 
Similarly, generalizations such as are presented here hide the 
fact that there were very rich Malays and very poor non-Malays, 
no community having a complete monopoly of either wealth of 
poverty. However, the generalization that in 1957 the non- 
Malays - especially the Chinese - were rich, with the Malays 
their poor cousins, was essentially valid. What is more, it is 
the fact that such a division is believed true by the communities 
of Peninsular Malaysia which has been responsible for the problems 
at the heart of political and socio-economic development in that 
country.
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CHAPTER k
National Socio-Economic Development Planning 
in Peninsular Malaysia, 1950 ~ 1969
4.1
■ —  dependence, Peninsular Malaysia exhibited a
plure .ual economy. The fundamental structure of
Brit. -economic structure was characterised by
imba unities' and States' shares of wealth-generating
acti 'advantages and fruits' of development. The
crea y unbalanced socio-economic system in Peninsular
Mai tion about 19571 have been detailed in
Chi
independence was received on behalf of Peninsular 
Mala;$ oy the newly-formed Alliance. Freedom was
accei >f confidence in the new state's strength and resi­
lient: a that potential social and economic problems
migh-' oothly. Yet, within twelve short years Peninsular
Mala* -t a grave national trauma: the race-rioting of
May, .
ragedy was the culmination of a decade or so 
during Jinary Peninsular Malaysians became disillusioned
with r. nent, As the euphoria generated by independence
wore o jnunal tensions grew inexorably, yet almost
imperc » -veral years the increasing pressures could not
i m
discover suitable outlets, and remained largely unremarked as a 
consequence. The tragedy was that the ultimate release of inter- 
communal tension was manifested asthe violent eruption of May, 1969.
After little more than a decade, the country which had faced 
the brave, new world of independence so confidently in 1957 was 
shocked into sudden realisation that the Peninsular Malaysian body 
politic was gravely ill. Chapter k will show how and why national 
socio-economic development planning in the post-independence period 
failed to prevent this dramatic reversal in Peninsular Malaysia's 
fortunes.
k,Z NATIONAL SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PLANNING, 1950 - I969 
^.2a National Planning, 1950 - 1955
(i) Aim of National Planning, 1950 - 1955
The end of direct British control in Peninsular Malaysia was the
final act in a long period of economic and political association. The
post-war years were a winding-down period, during which the British
( 811concerned themselves with preparing Malaya for independence. ' A 
major part of this preparation was the securing of the extensive 
economic and political interests which the United Kingdom intended to 
maintain after her withdrawal.
Thus, there were two main factors influencing national planning 
policy in Malaya during the twilight of colonial rule. First, the 
British intended to maintain indirect guidance of the Malayan economy 
for as long as possible after the cessation of official control.
Second, the United Kingdom wished to fashion from Malaya an independent 
country favourably disposed towards the former metropolitan power as
insurance against the time when even indirect control should prove 
impracticable. The motive was to safeguard for as long as possible 
the stability of the established colonial relationship between the 
countries, a relationship whereby Malaya served as a ready source of 
commodities for the United Kingdom, J It is in the light of this 
motive that national planning policy in the period 1950 - 1955 must 
be viewed.
The accumulated experience of several decades*- economic growth 
in Malaya played its part in directing the course of national 
planning as British, rule drew to its close. The development of 
British Malaya had been motivated by a desire to secure wealth for 
the United Kingdom and her Empire, At first this desire had taken 
the form of safeguarding the passage through the Straits of Malacca 
of merchantmen plying the trade-routes between India and China. Later, 
there was advantage to be gained from creaming-off a proportion of the 
wealth created by Chinese and Indian immigrants. Finally, the growth 
in demand for rubber and other commodities had persuaded the British 
to take an active interest in the development of plantations on the 
mainland. Subsequently, British Malaya came to be regarded as a 
virtually limitless source of wealth in the form of tin, rubber, and 
other tropical produce.
The inter-war years were the halcyon period of British rule.
For the British there was an eminently profitable social, economic,
and political status quo in Malaya, each Asian community appearing
settled in the role allotted.it by circumstance, inclination and 
( 83 ^British policy. } The British were able to concentrate on the task 
of tapping the great fount of wealth which Malaya represented.' The 
Second World War was a drastic interruption in the seemingly ordained
scheme of things, hut the hiatus of Japanese Occupation was very brief 
in comparison to the length of the United Kingdom's tenancy of the 
peninsula. Thus, on their return to Malaya the British saw no
necessity to change their attitudes regarding socio-economic 
development.
Consequently, after 19^5 the British reapplied to Malaya those 
socio-economic policies which had worked successfully prior to the 
Second World War, In the immediate post-War years, the United 
Kingdom's motive was the rehabilitation of the economy and the re­
establishment of Malaya's status as a source of riches for the Empire. 
In the last years of colonial rule the motive was modified to that of 
strengthening those links with Malaya which the United Kingdom 
intended to preserve after independence. The imminence of self-rule 
was the rationale behind this policy: Malaya would soon cease to be
the United Kingdom's responsibility, and assessment of the country's 
long-term needs could be passed over in the face of more immediate 
tasks.
The objectives of British planners between 1950 and 1955 were 
revealed by the nature of national planning in this period. It is 
possible to identify three main objectives of planning policy, each 
one a hang-over from the profitable pre-Second World War era: first,
a necessity for balancing the budget; second, a desire to attract 
foreign capital for investment; third, a preference for economically 
profitable projects and programmes, These three objectives were 
interrelated.
The principal concern of planning in this period was that of 
balancing the budget year by year. "Economic policy was little more
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than conservative fiscal policy" (Ness, 1967b, p.2), and budget-
balancing had two attractions. First, it abetted the creation of
large financial reserves, regarded by colonial Finance Secretaries as
insurance against lean times (Ness, 1967a, P*95)* Justification for
this view was that Malaya's main exports were governed by market
mechanisms over which she had little control, and the maintenance of
reserves against possible reductions in revenue due to falling prices
(86)was considered prudent. ' Second, it was felt that budget- 
balancing and the maintenance of large reserves assisted fiscal policy
( 87)in creating a healthy investment climate in the country. J
The second concern of planning policy was the attraction of 
foreign investment to Malaya. The British considered that domestic 
capital should not be used for development purposes if foreign capital 
could be diverted to the task. The budget-balancing and the main­
tenance of large reserves noted above were seen as the necessary pre­
conditions whereby foreign investors would be lured to Malaya.
The third concern of planning policy was that socio-economic 
development diould restrict itself to 'economic' rather than 'social* 
projects. 'Economic' projects were those designed to be productive 
of revenue in the short-term. Concentration on 'economic* projects 
would ensure steady increments to the funds necessary for balancing 
the budget, topping up the reserves and maintaining a satisfactory 
investment climate.
(ii) The Draft Development Plan, 1950 - 1955
The British planning policies and objectives outlined above 
were made flesh in the Draft Development Plan. The Draft Development
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Plan was the only attempt ever made by the British in Malaya to lay 
down for the whole country a programme guiding several concurrent 
years' socio-economic development, The priority of the Draft Development 
Plan was the augmentation of Malaya's wealth by programmes directed 
at the concerns described above: budget-balancing, the creation of
large reserves, the attraction of overseas capital, and the implemen­
tation of 'economic* projects.
The economic biases of the Draft Development Plan were stated 
clearly. In 1950 the "aim of development" was:
"to make the country more prosperous, and the methods 
will be those of 'good husbandry', by which is meant 
the cultivation of its resources in such a way that, 
while the individual himself benefits, the wealth of 
the country is permanently increased"
(Federation of Malaya, 1950, p.12^).
This economic emphasis was reiterated in the Progress Report on 
the Draft Development Plan, which described the Draft Development Plan 
as
"an attempt to define the objectives of social and 
economic policy for the period 1950 - 1955s to 
balance them in relation to each other, and to 
plan them within range of the resources available 
to finance them"
(Federation of Malaya, 1953> P*2).
The foregoing underlines that at that time the creation and 
maintenance of wealth took first priority in socio-economic planning 
policy. The Draft Development Plan spoke of the "vital necessity of 
rebuilding the financial reserves of the country" (Federation of 
Malaya, 1950, p.2^ -), Indeed, the first two short-term criteria of 
the Draft Development Plan were
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"(a) that Malaya should aim to make the maximum 
contribution that its resources permit to 
the early attainment of a balance in the
external payments of the sterling area ...
(b) that those projects which yield an early 
return are to be preferred"
(Federation of Malaya, 1950, p.23).
Every effort was to be made to recreate the economic strength
of Malaya, and to re-estahLish the traditional economic relationship
between Malaya and the United Kingdom. The intention was that
Malaya's recreated wealth would be used to facilitate the recovery of
the United Kingdom's war-shattered economy. This economic motivation 
was clear from the"allocations of the Draft Development Plan, in which 
monies were diverted to economically productive programmes such as the 
building of roads and bridges, the planting of commercially valuable 
crops, and the construction of drainage and irrigation systems.
Table 4.1 summarizes the allocations of the Draft Development 
Plan. The Draft Development Plan contained detailed proposals 
relating to public sector development only, and public sector develop­
ment monies were allocated under two broad headings: Development of
Social Services and Development of National Resources and Utilities.
Table 4.1 shows that approximately 72,9% of money was allocated to
'economic* development, with only 27,2% allotted to 'social* develop-
(91)ment. ' One 'economic* development category - Transport, Communications 
and Public Utilities - was allocated nearly half (^9>5%) of the total 
M$2l4.643 millions set aside for public sector development, and it is 
noteworthy that the"allocation to this particular category was very 
nearly double the allocation to the entire 'social' development sector 
(M$58.247 millions).
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TABLE 4.1
Peninsular Malaysia
DRAFT DEVELOPMENT PLAN (1950 - 1955)
__________- TARGET EXPENDITURE (a)
SECTOR DRAFT DEVELOPMENT PLAN, 
1950 - 1955
PLANNED EXPENDITURE (b)
M$ Millions %
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Agriculture and Rural
Development (c) 46.475 21.7
Transport, Communications 
and Public Utilities (d) 106.324 49-5
Commerce and Industry (e) - -
Other (f) 3.597 1.7
Sub-total 156.396 72.9
SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT
Education and Training (g) 35.015 16.3
Health and Family 
Planning (h) I6.896 7.9
Housing (i) 3.000 1.4
Social and Community Ser­
vices other than 
housing (j) 3.336 1 .6
Sub-total 58.247 2 7 .2
GENERAL GOVERNMENT (e) - -
SECURITY (e) - -
TOTAL 214.643 100 .0
(a) The figures presented in Table 4.1 include both Federal, State 
and Settlement expenditure, and refer to public sector develop­
ment expenditure on works of a capital nature only. Federal 
commitments for expenditure on works of a capital nature were 
M$186.325 millions, or 8 6.8^ of the total M$214.643 millions 
planned expenditure on capital works under the Draft 
Development Plan, 1950* — 1955* Apart from expenditure on capital 
works, it was expected that under the Draft Development Plan 
Federal sources would have to meet additional recurrent expendi­
ture rising to M$22.536 millions in 1955 (see Federation of 
Malaya, 1953 > PP.2 - 3).
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Notes to Table 4.1 (Continued):
(b) As noted above, figures in Table 4.1 refer to expenditure on 
capital works only: data for recurrent expenditure are not 
included. The figures given are the unrevised allocations 
presented originally in the Draft Development Han.
(c) Table 4.1 has been constructed by adapting the information pre­
sented in the sources listed below, This adaptation took the 
form of amalgamating different sectors in the sources so as to 
be compatible with the sectors used in Table 4.1. Thus, the 
allocation to Agriculture and Rural Development in Table 4.1 is 
the sum of the Draft Development Han's allocations to 
Agriculture; Fisheries; Forestry; Veterinary Services; Drainage 
and Irrigation; Land Settlement,
(d) The sum of the Draft Development Plan's allocations to Broadcasting; 
Civil Aviation; Marine; Posts; Road Transport; Telecommunications; 
Public Works, The Draft Development Plan contained no specific 
allocation to Electricity supply or Railways,
(e) The Draft Development Plan contained no specific allocations to 
these sectors.
(f) The. sum of the Draft Development Plan's allocation to Geological 
Survey; Mines; Co-operative Services; Information Services; Film 
Unit; Meteorology,
(g) The Draft Development Plan's allocation to Education Services.
(h) The Draft Development Han's allocation to Medical Services„
(i) In the Draft Development Plan, the allocation to Housing is 
listed under the heading Development of Resources and Utilities, 
which equates with the heading Economic Development in Table 4.1. 
However, in all later Plans provision of Housing is listed as a 
social service. Consequently, in Table 4.1 the Draft Development 
Plan's allocation to Housing has been included under Social 
Development, not under Economic Development. This will facili­
tate comparison of the Draft Development Han with later Plans.
(j) The sum of the Draft Development Plan's allocations to Labour and 
Social Welfare.
Source: adapted and compiled from data presented in Federation of
Malaya, 1950, Appendix A - Education Programme, 1950 - 1955;
Appendix B - Labour Programme, 1950 - 1955; Appendix C - 
Medical Programme, 1950 - 1955; Appendix D - Social Welfare 
Programme, 1950 - 1955; Appendix Y - Resources and Utilities, 
1950 - 1955.
mNational socio-economic development planning policy in the 
period 1950 “ 1955 has been summarized neatly by Thillainathan:
"Before the attainment of ’political independence1, 
the economic job of the government was seen as 
providing a stable monetary and fiscal framework 
within which firms and persons could pursue their 
business and secondly as providing for the 
essential infrastructure of roads, port facilities, 
et cetera, to enable development to take place"
(Thillainathan, 19?5> P*309)» 
ty.2b National Planning, 1956 - I960
(i) Aim of National Planning, 1956 ~ I960
The years 1956 - I960 encompassed the transition period during 
which the British custodians of Malaya handed over power to the new 
rulers. On the one hand the new rulers had to shoulder an increasing 
burden of responsibility for Malaya's government and socio-economic 
development, on the other hand the British were to maintain a consid­
erable say in Malayan affairs. Indeed, on many issues the British 
were to reserve to themselves the final word.
Between 1956 and I960, the problem was to find a planning 
approach which would satisfy the several interested parties. The 
three Malayan communities had their own aspirations as to what Merdeka 
would bring to them. The British also had expectations in respect of 
Malayan independence. Each community had representation in the new 
government, and the British maintained a presence in key positions of 
power. The manner in which Malayan leaders made concessions over the 
aspirations of their respective communities, coupled with the extent 
to which the British exercised their ’casting vote’, directed Malayan 
socio-economic planning at the time. In the period 1956 to I960,
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national planning "became a synthesis of the various aspirations of 
the new Malayan rulers tempered "by continued British influence.
The leaders of the three Malayan communities "believed firmly
that the only acceptable course of action was one of consensus, It
was especially important that agreement be reached between the Malays
and the Chinese. Here the potential conflict of interest was great
(92)and the balance cf power very fine.
Tunku Abdul Rahman was concerned to improve the economic status 
of the Malays. The Alliance had used the promise of rural develop­
ment to curry favour among the Malays in the run-up to the 1955 
General Election (Ness, 1967a) and fulfilment of the manifesto 
promise was vital if the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) 
was to maintain the support of the rural Malay electorate. However, 
moderate leaders of the Malay community appreciated that the country*s 
non-Malay population - especially the Chinese - was a considerable 
economic asset. They had no wish to excite undue fears among the 
Chinese community, fears which might lead to the flight overseas of 
Chinese capital.
For their part, the non-Malays were apprehensive about the
future which independence for Malaya held in store for them, Non-
Malays wished to enhance their political status, but felt keenly
their impotence in the face of Malay political might. In particular
the Chinese were afraid that their loyalty had been called into
question, and feared that the politically powerful Malays would seise
on independence as an opportunity to act against the economic interests
( 92*)of the Chinese community.v
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The three communally-based parties of the Alliance - UMNO, the
Malayan Chinese Association (MCA), and the Malayan Indian Congress
(MIC) - each had strengths and weaknesses at the "bargaining table.
However, at independence the political strength of the Malays, allied
to non-Malay apprehension with respect to their future, tipped the
balance of power in favour of UMNO and the aspirations of the Malay
community. Whilst not having an entirely free hand, in*.the final
(914)
analysis it was UMNO which could call the tune. /
For this reason, the Chinese were prepared to allow some 
economic concessions to the Malays in the hope of proving their own 
loyalty to Malaya, In this way they hoped to lay the foundation of a 
secure political future. Thus, Malay economic progress became "the 
quid pro quo for Chinese political rights" (Rudner, 1975"b, p .8 o ) .
The problem in the period 1956 to i960 was to find a vehicle for Malay 
economic progress acceptable to both Malays and non-Malays.
(ii) The First Malaya Plan, 1956 - 1960^ ^
The solution adopted was to concentrate upon a massive pro­
gramme of infrastructure development in rural areas. "This compromise 
found general favour throughout the Alliance, each member of the 
Alliance having its own motive for wanting to keep the Malays contented. 
From the viewpoint of UMNO leaders, the provision of rural infra­
structure was tangible proof of their readiness to satisfy Malay 
demands for a measure of economic progress. Thus it was expected to 
retain for UMNO the support of the rural Malay electorate. Likewise, 
the MCA leadership could point to such rural infrastructure development 
as a manifestation of Chinese support for Malay economic advancement,
19?
and so foster goodwill among the Malay community.
Chinese politicians had a more personal and economic reason for 
favouring infrastructure development in rural areas. Such develop­
ment needed goods and materiel which could he supplied only by 
Chinese businesses. Thus, much of the financial gain from rural 
development accrued in the short-term to the Chinese community.
However, most important was the fact that rural development along 
these lines shielded Chinese economic interests by acting as a sop to 
Malay opinion, thus diverting Malay attention away from Chinese 
commercial activity and away from any thoughts of expropriating 
Chinese wealth. The Chinese community’s agreement that rural develop­
ment in Malay-dominated areas was in the interests of Chinese business 
was stated publicly:
"As a consequence of rural expansion on these lines, 
it will no longer be necessary to strive to adjust 
economic imbalance through controls in the free 
enterprise sector which can be allowed to continue 
unhindered by unnecessary constraints"
(Goh Keng Swee, 1958, p.7 ) ^
The First Malaya Plan reflected the Alliance consensus regarding 
development of infrastructure in rural areas. It has been estimated 
that probably over half the total investment in the period 1956 to 
I960 went on rural development (Chee, 197^), the emphasis being almost 
exclusively on physical infrastructure; roads, bridges, irrigation 
systems, health clinics, schools and land settlement schemes (Ness, 
1967b). In this respect, the First Malaya Plan continued the Draft 
Development Plan’s preference for 'economic' rather than 'social* 
development. The Economic Committee allocated 60$ of planned public 
investment during the period to ’economic' development, 30$ to 'social' 
development, and 10$ to the government sector (Rudner, 1975a).
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The final allocations and expenditures of the First Malaya Plan 
are shown in Table 4.2. The greater allocation of monies to Economic1 
rather than 'social' development is clear from the data. Table 4,2 
reveals that more than two-thirds (6 9.2%) of the total allocation of 
MjZ?l,l48.7 millions was reserved for 'economic® development, with 
Agriculture and Rural Development and Transport, Communications and 
Public Utilities - especially the latter category - receiving 67.8% 
(23.1% + 44.7%) of the total. By contrast, the allocation to 'social' 
development was a mere 18.6% of planned expenditure for the First 
Malaya Plan period.
The stress laid upon 'economic' development is emphasised 
further by the greater attainment of 'economic' development targets. 
Actual expenditure on 'economic1 development was 95*6% of planned 
expenditure overall, whereas actual expenditure on 'social* development 
averaged only 65.3% of the targets. Indeed, the greatest single 
'economic* category - Transport, Communications and Public Utilities - 
actually spent slightly more than had been planned, in marked contrast 
to the extreme shortfalls in spending on Health and Family Planning, 
and on Education and Training to a lesser degree (see Table 4.2). The 
very 'economic' emphasis of the First Malaya Plan cannot be doubted 
on the evidence presented in Table 4.2.
The main features of the First Malaya Plan have been summarised 
by Bhanoji Rao:
"In terms of actual expenditure, first priority went to 
infrastructure development (i.e. transport, communications 
utilities and industrial sites). Agriculture received 
a second priority. Social services and government sectors 
received the status of residual claimants"
(Bhanoji Rao, 1974, p.204).
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Notes to Tat)le 4.2
(a) The figures given In Table 4.2 are the unrevised allocations 
presented originally In the First Malaya Plan.
(b) Approximate.
(c) The sum of the First Malaya Plan's expenditures on Rubber 
Replanting; Drainage and Irrigation; Land Development; Survey; 
Fisheries; Forestry; Animal Husbandry; Research and Extension 
Work; Rural Industrial Development Authority (RIDA).
(d) Includes expenditure on Public Works Department Plant and 
Equipment,
(e) Site development and Mining Survey.
(f) Municipal Development; Government Buildings; Miscellaneous 
expenditure (including Police).
(g) In the First Malaya Plan, expenditure on Security did not 
include expenditure on Police (see note (f) above). Thus 
Security expenditure in the First Malaya Plan was allocated 
to Defence only.
Source: adapted and compiled from data presented in Federation of
Malaya, 1961, Table II, Gross Public Investment, 1956 - I960.
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4 ,2c National Planning, 1961 - 1965
(i) Aim of National Planning, 1961 - 1965
The first major test of the popularity of the economic develop­
ment compromise worked out by UMNO, MCA and MIG was the 1959 General 
Election. The shortfalls in the attainment of Agriculture and Rural 
Development and in 'social1 development allocated expenditure under 
the First Malaya Plan which were noted above precipitated a political 
crisis for the Alliance. Rural Malays - dissatisfied with the slow 
rate of progress - vented their spleen at the polls. At the elections, 
the governments of the States of Kelantan and Trengganu fell to the 
main Malay opposition, the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party (P-MIP). P-MIP 
was more extremist than UMNO in its championing of Malay communal 
aspirations, and had charged UMNO with failing to satisfy Malay 
economic desires and of selling-out the Malays to the non-Malays.
This manifestation of popular support for P-MIP in the Malay- 
dominated East Coast States was a double blow for the Alliance. First, 
the election result threatened to discredit UMNO's claim to be the 
elected representative in-the government of Malay sentiment and interest. 
Second, the result threatened to make untenable -the basic Alliance 
concept that the problems inherent in Peninsular Malaysia's socio­
economic system could be solved by compromise between three communally- 
based parties representing the three ethnic groups.
The partial defeat of UMNO at the hands of P-MIP did not under­
mine seriously the Alliance's overall strength in the Federal 
(97)Parliament. However, it did underscore the necessity for the 
Alliance to reaffirm its claim to be the best vehicle for social and
^0^
economic progress in Malaya. UMNO and the Alliance concept both
required that ground lost to P-MIP he recaptured swiftly.
Therefore, the aim of development planning between i960 and 1965 
was to woo the rural Malay electorate back to UMNO and the Alliance, 
This was to be achieved partly by reducing P-MIP popularity in 
Kelantan and Trengganu, but mainly by stepping up the pace of rural 
development so as to discredit opposition claims that UMNO was not 
advancing the economic status of the Malays. The Alliance's campaign 
to regain the support of the rural Malay electorate was encapsulated
in the Second Malaya Plan.
(ii) The Second Malaya Plan, 1961 - 1965^ ^
The Second Malaga Plan was the Alliance’s response to the chal­
lenge posed by the electorate's lack of faith in the Alliance develop­
ment policy. As such, the Second Malaya Plan was "cast in the mould 
of the 1959 General Election" (Rudner, 1975a, P*53)« The Alliance 
responded to the challenge by increasing greatly the pace of rural 
development. The i960 development budget assigned 25% of capital 
effort to rural areas, and the total non-security investment under the 
Second Malaya Plan increased by more than 100% (Chee, 1974)•
Tabel 4.3 lists the allocations and expenditures of the Second
Malaya Plan, of which the fundamental pattern of expenditure was like
( 9 9 )that of the First Malaya Plan.W 7 ' The Second Malaya Plan assigned 
nearly half of its expenditure to infrastructure (Bhanoji Rao, 1974), 
and there was emphasis on utilities, transport and communications 
(Rudner, 1975a). The basic similarity between the First Malaya Plan 
and the Second Malaya Plan is clear from Table 4.3, which shows that
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Notes to Table 4.3
(a) The figures given in Table 4.3 are the unrevised allocations 
presented originally in the Second Malaya Plan.
(b) Estimated.
(c) The sum of the Second Malaya Plan's expenditures on Rubber 
Replanting; Drainage and Irrigation; Land Development; Animal 
Husbandry; Forestry; Fishing; other associated activities.
(d) Includes expenditure on Public Works Department Plant and 
Equipment.
(e) Planned expenditure included Site Development and Rural Industry. 
Actual expenditure went to Malaysian Industrial Development 
Finance Ltd. (M$24,i millions); Industrial Estates (M$24.5 
millions); National Productivity Centre (M^0.03 millions);
Majlis Amanah Ra'ayat (MARA) (Mpl0.5 millions).
(f) Actual expenditure was to Mines Department and Geological 
Survey Department.
(g)(h)Expenditure on Municipal Development; Government Buildings; 
Miscellaneous.
(i) The Security expenditure of the Second Malaya Plan included 
Defence and Police. The break-down of the Security expendi­
ture was as follows:
PLANNED ACTUAL
EXPENDITURE EXPENDITURE 
M$ Millions M$ Millions
Defence 60.0 244,7
Police 3 3.O 62.6
TOTAL 93.0 307.3
Source: adapted and compiled from data presented In Federation of
Malaysia, 1965, Table 2-6 , Malaya: Public Development
Expenditure 1956 - 65; and Table 4-1,. Malaysia:. Sectoral 
Allac.ation _oi .Public. .Development Expenditure in 1966 - 70 
as compared with 19&1 - 6 5.
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the Second Malaya Plan allocated 68.8% of total planned expenditure to 
'economic' development, with 'social1 development receiving only 22.8% 
of the total (confer Table 4.2). However, as Table 4.3 reveals, the 
Second Malaya Plan differed from the First Malaya Plan in the amounts 
of money allocated: all categories excepting General Government
received a larger allocation of money. In some cases - notably 
Agriculture and Rural Development, Education and Training and Health 
and Family Planning - the increase was very substantial (see Table 4.3)•
Increased allocations apart, Table 4.3 shows that actual expen­
diture under the Second Malaya Plan was like that of the First Malaya 
Plan, in that the greater emphasis was on ’economic' development. 
Overall the 'economic* development categories were rather better 
achieved than the 'social' development categories, although the short­
fall in Agriculture and Rural Development (75*4% attained) was note­
worthy. However, the 'economic* emphasis of the Second Malaya Plan 
was not as emphatic as that of the First Malaya Plan. This is 
attested to by the slight overspending on 'social' development (106.0% 
of allocated expenditure), and the more substantial overspending on 
General Government (l40.3% of planned expenditure) and on Security 
(330-4% of the Plan allocation). The overall actual expenditure of 
the Second Malaya Plan showed a large increase over Plan targets, with 
planned expenditure 123.0% attained overall. This increase resulted 
mainly from the innovations discussed in the following paragraph.
A notable feature of the Second Malaya Plan was the re-organizing 
and streamlining of the development effort. New methods were employed 
to increase the rate of implementation of development. The innovations 
were quasi-military, and owed much to experience gained during the
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Emergencyi Decisions were taken quickly, and. bureaucratic ’red-tape1 
was cut to the minimum. Projects were listed in the so-called ’Red 
Books ■ Local Operations Rooms1 kept detailed records of development, 
and results were displayed so that the recipients of development might 
assess progress. The. emphasis was on visible results, the intention being 
to produce an obvious and overwhelming improvement in living condi­
tions among the peasants (Fisk, 1963a). As Ness has noted,
"the country came alive with heavy equipment and 
construction activities that extended even to the 
most remote rural areas. The physical impression 
was absolutely unique to the region"
(Ness, 1967b, p.4).
4.2d National Planning, I965 - I969
(i) Aim of National Planning, I965 - 1969
The 1964 General Election was a resounding success for the 
Alliance. The great increase in the rate of rural development brought 
about under the Second Malaya Plan had had the desired effect upon the 
rural Malay electorate, and the result was renewed support at the 
polls for the Alliance. The "massive victory" (Goh Cheng Teik, 1971, 
p.11) gained by the Alliance in 1964 appeared to vindicate Alliance 
planning policy.
The Alliance had sought a socio-economic development compromise 
acceptable to all communities, and an apparently successful method had 
been discovered. Rapid development of the rural areas seemed the key 
to intercommunal accommodation. The aim of planning between 1964 and 
1969 was to consolidate the gains of the 1964 General Election by con­
centrating upon the formulae proven by Alliance experiences in the 
first half of the decade. The First Malaysia Plan reflected the
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Alliance's conviction that rapid rural development was the compromise 
solution hest suited to Peninsular Malaysia's situation and require­
ments . Rapid rural development of this nature allowed the government 
to satisfy Malay demands for economic advancement, whilst not arousing 
non-Malay alarm concerning vested economic interests.
(ii) The First Malaysia Plan, 1966 - 1970^ ^ ^
The First Malaysia Plan restated the successful themes of the 
Second Malaya Plan. Modifications were that the allocation to infra­
structure and utilities dropped to about one-third of total expendi­
ture, and in the First Malaysia Plan more emphasis was placed on
"the priorities of agricultural education, extension 
services, research, modernisation of farming 
techniques, increased pace of land alienation and 
development, and the setting up of marketing and 
credit institutions"
(Ghee, 197^, p.ll).
Modifications notwithstanding, in its basics the First Malaysia 
Plan was a restatement of policies implemented under the Second 
Malaya Plan. The main priority continued to be the rapid implement­
ation of rural development. There was still emphasis on projects 
designed to increase productivity and investment in primary and 
secondary industries. Allocations to infrastructure and public 
utilities were 30 io 35% of total development spending after 1965 
(Thillainathan, 1975)» and there was still stress on revenue-generating 
projects (Federation of Malaysia, 1969» p.HO).
Table 4.^ shows the allocations and attainments of the First 
Malaysia Plan. The Table reveals two main features, First, the 
First Malaysia Plan was characterised by increased allocations to all
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Notes to Table 4.4
(a) The figures given in Table 4.4 are the unrevised allocations 
presented originally in the First Malaysia Plan,
(b) Estimated,
(c) The sum of the First Malaysia Plan's expenditure on Agriculture; 
Rubber Replanting; Animal Husbandry; Land Development; Drainage 
and Irrigation; Forestry; Fisheries; Rural Credit and Marketing; 
Agricultural Research; other associated activities.
(d) The First Malaysia Plan's expenditure on Public Works Depart­
ment Plant and Equipment was contained within the category 
Transport.
(e) Allocated expenditure was to Mines Department (M$0,5 millions) 
and Geological Survey Department (M$0,8 millions). Actual 
expenditure was only M$0,4 millions (Geological Survey 
Department), the First Malaysia Plan's allocation of M$0,5 
millions to the Mines Department (for mining equipment) being 
transferred to the Trust Fund.
(f) Expenditure on Major Sewerage Schemes; Fire Services; Culture, 
Youth and Sports; Community Services; Welfare; Aborigines 
(Orang Asli).
(g) Expenditure on General Administration.
(h) The Security expenditure of the First Malaysia Plan included 
Defence and Police. The break-down of the Security expendi­
ture was as follows:
Defence 
Pollce
PLANNED 
EXPENDITURE 
M$ Millions
502.0
97.6
ACTUAL 
EXPENDITURE 
M$ Millions
532.4 
113-3
TOTAL 599.6 645'. 7
Sources: adapted and compiled from data presented in Federation of
Malaysia r. 1965., Table 4-1, Malaysia. - Sectoral AH o cation. 
of Public Development Expenditure in 1966 - 70 as compared 
with, .1961 - .651 .and Federation of.Malaysia, 1971, Table 5-1, 
Public Development Expenditure, 1966 - 7 5.
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aspects of socio-economic development (with the minor exception of the 
allocation to General Government, which was 99*8% of the Second 
Malaya Plan allocation). All other categories received allocations in 
excess of those contained in the previous Plan, with Commerce and 
Industry (408*5%), Social and Community Services other than Housing 
(l,763.07S), and Security (644.770 "being particularly favoured. The 
overall expenditure allocated under the First Malaysia Plan (M$3>713*6 
millions) showed a great increase over that of the Second Malaya Plan, 
being 172.7$ cf Second Malaya Plan allocated expenditure (M$2,150.0 
millions).
The second feature of the First Malaysia Plan was the continuing 
emphasis on 'economic' rather than on 'social* development, although 
this was reduced somewhat in comparison to previous Plans. In the 
First Malaysia Plan, 'economic* development was allotted 60.1$ of 
planned public expenditure, the award to 'social* development being 
21.4$ of planned expenditure. This 'economic* emphasis is underlined 
by the rather better attainment of 'economic* targets under the First 
Malaysia Plan. *Economic* development spending was 99*2$ of target 
expenditure, whereas actual expenditure on 'social* development was 
only 80.9$ of the original First Malaysia Plan allocation.
4.3 CRITIQUE OF NATIONAL SOCIO-ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT PLANNING, 1950 - I969
As the 1964 General Election had been before it, so the General 
Election of 1969 was expected to be the thermometer of the electorate's 
opinion of the Alliance's socio-economic development strategies. The 
electorate's support for the Alliance's planning compromise, whereby
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the Malays received economic advancement in the shape of rural 
development acceptable to the Chinese, would he tested again. However, 
in 1969 the Alliance could look hack with confidence to their massive 
win at the 1964 elections. There was no reason to suspect that the 
1969 General Election could hring anything hut a repeat of the 
success of 1964.
The 1969 General Election dealt several crippling hlows to 
Alliance strength. At the election, significant parts of the elector­
ate voted in opposition to the Alliance cause. The Pan-Malayan 
Islamic Party regained some of the position which it had relinquished 
in 1964. More significantly, three new non-Malay opposition parties 
- the Democratic Action Party (DAP), Gerakan Ra*ayat Malaysia 
(Gerakan), and the People's Progressive Party (PPP) - achieved 
considerable success at the expense of the Alliance's non-Malay 
buttresses, MCA and MIG.
The 1969 General Election precipitated the series of events 
which led to the May, 1969 race-riots, and ultimately to the promul­
gation of the New Development Strategy, with the New Economic Policy 
(102)at its core. In the final analysis, national planning in
Peninsular Malaysia had failed to create national unity. In retrospect, 
it is possible to identify the main causes of failure. These several 
causes will be outlined below.
The Draft Development Plan was not a comprehensive Plan of 
national development. The official description of the Plan as "an 
attempt to define the objectives of social and economic policy for the 
period 1950 - 1955" (Federation of Malaya, 1953> P*2) was accurate in
ai a
only a limited sense: planners were not expected to operate within
a grand policy framework intended to achieve long-term, national 
socio-economic objectives. If this official description had been 
entirely accurate, then the lead would have come from the government, 
with Ministries and Departments being obliged to follow suit. In 
other words, lower echelons would have been expected to tailor their 
efforts to the achievement of national socio-economic objectives 
stated clearly from above.
In point of fact, the Draft Development Plan was quite specific
that the initiative for deciding objectives - and the programmes with
which to achieve them - was expected to come from below, from the
Departments concerned with implementing development (Federation of
Malaya, 1953)■ The Draft Development Plan consisted of
"lists of schemes which each Department of the 
Government expected to carry out during the six- 
year period 1950 - 1955> indicating a programme 
of works conforming to broadly defined long term 
objectives"
(Federation of Malaya, 1953> P*5)»
The Draft Development Plan was "essentially an exercise in
fiscal administration (Rudner, 1975a, p.3l)» in reality an aggradation
"of various departmental expansion programmes, 
amounting to little more than projections of 
. annual budgets. The development objectives and 
targets were not only ambiguous but also unambi­
tious and there was no evidence of adoption of any 
development strategy"
( A r i f f ,  1 9 7 3 ,  p . 3 7 2 ) .
The reasons for this were threefold. First, planners in Malaya 
were acting in accordance with standard colonial economic practice. 
Second, the rumour of independence lessened any obligation upon British
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planners to consider too deeply the long-term suitability of planning
approaches to the requirements of Malaya in the post-Merdeka period.
Third - and most important - the Draft Development Plan was a direct
response to the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 19^5 (Bhanoji
Rao, 197^)• This Act set aside monies for the development of the
United Kingdom's territories, which were expected to indent for a
(103)
share of available funds.
The Draft Development Plan was a logical result of the planning 
environment in which it was written. The aim of British planning 
between 1950 and 1955 was to restore Malaya to its pre-War strength 
and to its former status vis-a-vis the metropolitan power. British 
planners chose to reapply those policies - balancing the budget, 
building large reserves, attracting foreign investment for development, 
concentrating on 'economic' rather than 'social' projects - which had 
been accepted as correct procedure in the pre-Second World War era.
Thus, at independence, the British handed over to the new 
leaders a restricted socio-economic policy designed to meet a limited 
range of objectives. These objectives had their origin in the pre-War 
colonial period, and their rationale was the rehabilitation and contin­
uance of the colonial social and economic status quo. It remained to 
be seen how the new leaders would modify planning policies to meet 
the needs of independent Peninsular Malaysia,
It turned out that political independence was not attended by 
socio-economic emancipation. Merdeka Day brought little weaning from 
the socio-economic doctrines and policies propounded by the British.
The British grip on Peninsular Malaysia's socio-economic affairs after 
Merdeka was maintained in three principal ways.
Slij.
First, the British had established certain terms in exchange 
for giving independence to Malaya. The conditions on which self- 
government was granted were established at the London Round Table 
Conference of 1.956. The Conference provided for economic conditions 
intended to maintain Malaya as a source of wealth for the United 
Kingdom after the cessation of direct rule:
"After independence, the Conference agreed, Malaya 
would remain a member of‘the sterling area, and 
would maintain its sterling reserves 'at the right 
level'"
(Rudner, 1975a, p.13)*
Second, Malaya was prevailed upon to retain British officials
('lOl)
in advisory capacities after independence. 1 These officials 
continued to have great control over Alliance planning policy even 
after Merdeka, and in practice
"it was the economic doctrines prevailing in the 
Economic Secretariat more than the formal 'priorities' 
laid down by the Cabinet that determined actual 
investment allocations under the First FYP"
(Rudner, 1975a, p.36) . ^ ^
Third, the Alliance leaders had been raised themselves in a 
lifestyle conditioned by British influence. They had recieved a diet 
of British education - formal and informal - and had ingested British 
social, economic and political mores. In addition, independence had 
been attained without internecine struggle. Alliance leaders were 
favourably disposed towards their British mentors, and had no wish to 
compound the many problems attendant on self-government by implementing 
unprovoked policy changes.
Thus, despite the attainment of political Independence, economic 
ties remained largely intact. Most important, the planning ethos in
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Peninsular Malaysia remained virtually unchanged. Consequently, the 
First Malaya Plan implemented under Alliance aegis bore strong 
resemblance to the Draft Development Plan implemented under colonial 
auspices. The First Malaya Plan was just as concerned as the Draft 
Development Plan had been with budget-balancing, the creation of 
reserves, the attraction of foreign investment for development, and 
the implementation of 'economic* rather than ’social* programmes and 
projects. Balancing of the budget was a manifestation of Alliance 
desire for a continuation ofthe colonial style of financial stability. 
The new rulers repeated their concern that Malaya's development 
should still be financed from abroad:
"Foreign capital was to continue to enjoy its 
welcome, a point reiterated upon occasion by 
Alliance ministers in order to reassure anxious 
foreign investors" f-inA'i
(Rudner, 1975a, p.13) . }
That 'economic* rather than 'social' development remained the favourite
child of planning policy was apparent from the allocations and
attainments of the First Malaya Plan,
The fact that political independence brought little real break 
from British economic influence meant that in 1957 a- golden opportunity 
for reassessing planning policy was lost. The new leaders were given 
no real chance of analysing planning policy from a Malayan viewpoint, 
that is from the standpoint of a Peninsular Malaysia genuinely released 
from the colonial yoke. Moreover, events during the period 1957 - 19&J- 
were to conspire to reinforce Alliance faith in the planning policy 
to which they were heir.
The world-wide economic recession of 1957 had serious repercus­
sions for Malayan socio-economic planning. The retrenchments prompted
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"by the recession - allied with continuing British influence - meant 
that Alliance flirtation with changes in policy was all too briefi
"Despite official protestations favouring development, 
when the crunch came it was the Treasury's traditional 
concept of financial orthodoxy that governed Malayan 
economic policy"
(Rudner, 1975a, p.^0).
For the Alliance, the most serious consequence of the recession 
was that the First Malaya Plan was not implemented fully. The overall 
shortfall in attainment was approximately 15% of planned expenditure 
(Bhanoji Rao, 197^). Moreover, traditional economic conservatism 
meant that the attainment of Plan objectives was uneven! 'economic' 
development was implemented more successfully than 'social' develop­
ment. The effects of the economies upon implementation were particu­
larly noticeable in rural areas, and by the end of 1958 it was 
apparent that the First Malaya Plan had failed to prevent a deterior­
ation of Malay fortunes relative to those of the non-Malays (Rudner, 
1975t>). The rural Malay electorate's discontent at this state of 
affairs was revealed at the ’1959 General Election.
The Alliance responded to the Malay dissatisfaction manifested 
in 1959 "by plac.ing even greater emphasis on their socio-economic 
planning compromise of infrastructure development in rural areas. It 
was considered that this agreed formula was inherently sound, and that 
it had failed to satisfy the Malays only because of the tardy rate of 
implementation. By accepting uncritically the soundness of their 
planning method - rural Malay discontent notwithstanding - the Alliance 
leaders failed to take advantage of a second good opportunity for 
reassessing independent Peninsular Malaysia's planning policies.
21?
Thus, the Second Malaya Plan re-emphasised those planning 
policies which had been reiterated in the First Malaya Plan, and which 
had originated with the Draft Development Plan, Moreover, the Draft 
Development Plan itself had been based upon a socio-economic planning 
rationale founded in the pre-Second World War era. In this manner, 
socio-economic development policies typical of the colonial period 
were carried through intact to the early 1960s, and continued to 
permeate Peninsular Malaysian planning policy several years after 
Merdeka/ 10^
Alliance planning approaches under the Second Malaya Plan 
consolidated this now-traditional orthodoxy of socio-economic policy 
in Peninsular Malaysia. Attitudes towards development finance and 
fiscal priorities became even more deeply entrenched. Peninsular 
Malaysia's planners remained of the opinion that an investment climate 
attractive to foreign capital was imperative for development in the 
Malayan contexts
"Its (Malaya's) heavy dependence on exports would 
make it hard to check capital flight by exchange 
control measures. This makes it feel insecure. It 
has been persuaded that the maintenance and increase 
of its assets depends far more on the willingness of 
foreign capitalists to invest in Malaya than on 
almost any other aspect of economic policy"
(Silcock, 1963a, p.24)/108)
The Second Malaya Plan was characterised also by the "conventional 
wisdom of the Alliance leadership that only 'economic' projects 
generate income flows" (Rudner, 19?5a, p.54).
In other words, the Second Malaya Plan underlined the same sort 
of imperative for economic accountability which in the colonial era
BIS
had been revealed by - for example - balancing the budget. The means 
of achieving this accountability remained the same. Thus, the 
Second Malaya Plan showed a now-familiar emphasis on 'economic* rather 
than 'social' development.
Reference to Table k-,2 and Table ^.3 shows clearly that the 
important differences between the First Malaya Plan and the Second 
Malaya Plan lay in the amounts of money allocated to - and in the level 
of attainment of - the latter. Much more money was allocated to 
development, and was actually spent, under the Second Malaya Plan.
The Second Malaya Plan replaced the shortfall experienced under the 
First Malaya Plan with a noticeable over-attainment of planned public 
expenditure. The two Plans did not differ greatly in either their 
objectives or their programmes. They differed significantly only in 
amounts allocated, rates of implementation, and in levels of 
attainment.
The setbacks at the 1959 General Election had threatened the 
Alliance, which had responded to dissatisfaction among the rural 
Malay electorate by increasing greatly the implementation of its pro­
gramme of rural development. The 196^ General Election was a great 
success for the Alliance, and victory at the polls appeared to be 
confirmation of the efficacy of government socio-economic planning 
policy. The 1964- General Election success assuaged any lingering 
Alliance fears concerning the suitability of its socio-economic 
development compromise as a means of curing Peninsular Malaysia's 
intercommunal socio-economic problems. If anything, the resounding 
success of 1964 persuaded the Alliance that in rural development it had 
not a mere remedy, but a virtual panacea for Peninsular Malaysia's many 
intercommunal disagreements.
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Thus, "by the end of 1964 national socio-economic development 
planning policy in Peninsular Malaysia was firmly entrenched. Events 
had conspired in such a way that the socio-economic ethos which had 
originated in the colonial period (as embodied in the Draft Development 
Plan) had been applied to independent Peninsular Malaysia (under the 
First Malaya Plan, 1956 - I960), had been tested severely (at the 
1959 General Election), had been reapplied much more vigorously (as 
the Second Malaya Plan, 1961 - 1965)i and had been re-examined and 
pronounced sound (by the Alliance's victories at the 1964 General 
Election).
Thus, in the period 1957 - 1964 a number of factors had combined 
to vindicate Alliance trust in the socio-economic planning policy 
willed to it by the British. The First Malaysia Plan reiterated 
Alliance faith in massive development of infrastructure in rural areas 
as the compromise best suited to the development of Peninsular 
Malaysia's peculiar socio-economic system after independence. The 
extent to which this trust was unfounded was revealed at the 1969 
General Election. National socio-economic development planning in 
the period 1957 - 1969 had failed to create national unity in 
Peninsular Malaysia.
4.4 SUMMARY _ OF MAIN FEATURES OF NATIONAL SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT PLANNING, 1957 - 1969
It may be seen from the above that the colonial style of socio­
economic planning (as embodied in the Draft Development Plan) was 
carried through to the Plans implemented after independence. The only 
major break with the past was that the post-independence Plans
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intentionally placed greater emphasis on highly-visihle rural 
development (by means of infrastructure construction) as a way of 
mollifying Malay demands for economic advancement, without damaging 
Chinese vested economic interest. In particular, the post-1957 Hans 
were similar in their approach to national socio-economic development 
and the main features of national planning in independent Peninsular 
Malaysia are summarised briefly, below.
First, there was greater emphasis upon 'economic' rather than 
'social' development. This was revealed in the greater allocations
to - and attainments of - the former sector in all the post-independence
(109)
Plans. J The 'economic' approach to development was revealed also 
in the concentration upon revenue-generating projects which would be 
viable economically, and which would help to create a sound financial 
climate attractive to foreign investors.
Second, there was emphasis on rural rather than on urban develop­
ment as a means of regaining and keeping the support of the rural 
Malay electorate. Rural development stressed the rapid construction 
of physical infrastructure such as roads, bridges, and schools. Not 
only was this profitable economically: it had the advantage of being
a sound political compromise between the Malays and the Chinese.
Every effort was made to speed implementation by avoiding bureaucratic 
bottle-necks.
Thus, national planning in the post-independence period can be 
summarised as rapid economic development of the Malay-dominated rural 
areas. Such an approach - in situ economic development of the Malays - 
did not alter significantly the Malay/non-Malay and rural/urban imbal­
ances characteristic of Peninsular Malaysia's socio-economic system. It
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served to maintain the ethnic socio-economic compartmentalisation 
which had "been a feature of British-style planning, and consequently 
it failed to remove the ethnic socio-economic imbalance which stood 
in the way of national unity after independence. It was this failure 
to alter the deep-rooted socio-economic imbalances between the 
communities which prevented national development planning from forging 
national unity in independent Peninsular Malaysia prior to 19&9*
4.5 CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion has shown how the socio-economic 
planning ethos applied by the British was adopted by the Alliance as 
the method best suited to developing Peninsular Malaysia's socio­
economic system after independence. The only major modification 
introduced by the Alliance was to concentrate attention upon the 
economic development of Malay rural areas as a political compromise 
necessitated by the changed socio-economic and political climate after 
the attainment of Merdeka. The race-riots which resulted from the 
1969 General and State Elections brought home to Peninsular 
Malaysia's government and peoples the fact that national unity had 
not been created in the post-independence period, and forced a re­
appraisal of national socio-economic development planning policy.
This reassessment culminated in the promulgation of the New Development 
Strategy.
The remainder of this thesis will assess the role of the 
Federal Land Development Authority in attaining the objectives of the 
New Development Strategy. The New Development Strategy will be
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detailed in Chapter 6, Chapter 7 will deal with FELDA's contribution 
to achieving the objectives of the New Economic Policy, which policy 
is the core of the New Development Strategy. The main findings will 
be summarised and presented in Chapter 8. However, Chapter 5 will 
first describe briefly the events of May, 1969» events so dramatic 
that they have had a most persistent and pervasive influence upon 
the development of Peninsular Malaysia's socio-economic system.
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER
80. The Alliance was a coalition between the three main, conserva­
tive parties representing each of the three main communities, 
namely the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), the 
Malayan Chinese Association (MCA), and the Malayan Indian 
Congress (MIC). Brief details of the Alliance and Its consti­
tuent parties are contained in the Glossary. The President of 
UMNO - and hence leader of the Alliance - was Tunku Abdul Rahman 
Putra Al-Haj (Tunku Abdul Rahman), who was to be Prime Minister 
of the Federation of Malaysia from independence until his 
retirement in September, 1970.
81. The temporary removal of British authority during the three 
years of Japanese Occupation initiated a surge of political 
awareness in Peninsular Malaysia. Once the task of economic 
rehabilitation had been accomplished, agitation for political 
independence became stronger, and by the early years of the 1950s 
the British had come to recognise thet Merdeka would have to be 
granted ultimately.
82. Notably of rubber and tin, but also of products such as coconuts, 
copra, pineapples and tropical hardwoods.
8 3. There is dispute as to British policies regarding the compart- 
mentalization of the society and the economy into various 
categories associated with race. The dispute centres around 
whether the association of race with socio-economic status 
arose unplanned as a result of socio-economic forces, racial 
preferences and communal traditions, or whether there was a 
deliberate British policy - at least in part - to guide certain 
communities into particular sectors of the socio-economic system. 
It has been suggested that there was a "colonial myth which 
identified race with special natural abilities* Chinese as good 
businessmen, Malays as good farmers and junior civil admini­
strators and Indians as most suited for plantation labour and 
petty trading" (Far Eastern Economic Review, 1979, Vol. 105,
No. 35, August 31, p.57).
8^. The British reoccupied Peninsular Malaysia during September 19^5, 
commencing with the reoccupation of Penang on the 2nd of that 
month. The formal surrender of all Japanese forces in Southeast 
Asia was signed in Singapore on 12 September, 19^5. The 
Japanese occupation of Peninsular Malaysia lasted 3-J years.
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85* The rapid post-Second World War rehabilitation of the economy of 
Peninsular Malaysia has already been noted. By 1950 "Malaya 
was able to turn from its preoccupation with reconstruction to 
the problems of further economic expansion" (international Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development, 1955» P-19).
8 6. Both tin and rubber - especially the latter - were subject to 
fluctuations in world market price,
8 7. Another reason was that British colonial policy everywhere was 
geared to making overseas territories financially self-supporting. 
Cblonial officials strove to keep accounts 'in the black', and 
were concerned that their financial activities bear up under 
even the most careful scrutiny by metropolitan officialdom. As 
Ness has noted, a balanced budget represented economic stability 
and administrative competence (Ness, 1967a). I am grateful to 
Mr. G. E. Graham for advice on these points,
8 8. In 195^1 Mr. J. G, Mathison - an unofficial member of the 
Legislative Gouncil - argued that foreign capital was vital for 
development, and stated that the only way to attract such 
capital was to balance the budget, maintain financial stability, 
and refrain from threats of increased taxes (Ness, 1967a).
89. On the other hand were 'social' projects such as education, 
medicine, and other social services. These were not favoured, 
on the grounds that they were unproductive of revenue. Even 
though it could be argued that education and medical services 
produced an ’economic' return (by helping to create workers who 
were more able, and thus more productive), such long-term gains 
were unattractive to planners whose objectives were essentially 
short-term.
90. Federation of Malaya, 1950* Draft Development Plan of the 
Federation of Malaya, (Government Press, Kuala Lumpur). The 
Draft Development Plan was also known as the 'Yellow Book', from 
the colour of its cover.
91. These figures do not total exactly 100.0% due to rounding. See 
the note to the List of Tables.
92. There evolved in Peninsular Malaysia a particular style of poli­
tical activity which stressed "rationality, pragmatism, ambiguity, 
and gradualism" (Enloe, 1970, p.7l)< The modus operand! was to 
weigh carefully any policy moves and changes against the possible 
effects upon inter-communal socio-economic relations, and to 
proceed with any modifications only very cautiously. In practice, 
it was often easier to 'let sleeping dogs 1i^', so as not to 
upset the delicate intercommunal status quo. This style of 
politics has been referred to as the "politics of accommodation" 
(Ness, 1967b, p.2), or the "politics of ambiguity" (Enloe, 1970* 
P*7l)* and it "relies for its effectiveness on the capacity to 
side-step decisions and to shun detailed description of long- 
range goals, both of which are seen as likely to foster ethnic 
antagonisms and forces of national disintegration" (Enloe, 1970*
p . n ) .
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93* In addition to inter-communal divisions "based on race, religion, 
language and associated factors, a series of historical events 
had widened the gulf between the Malays and the Chinese. First, 
during the nineteenth century there had been territorial disputes 
between Chinese tin-prospectors and resident Malays. Second, the 
bulk of the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPA-JA) - which 
had conducted guerilla warfare against the Japanese during the 
war - had been Chinese, and they had seized the opportunity 
presented by the interregnum between Japanese and British control 
at the end of the war to set up ’kangaroo courts', at which many 
Malays had been tried and summarily executed for alleged collab­
oration with the occupiers. Later, the Emergency took on racial 
overtones, for the Communist guerillas were mainly Chinese, 
whereas the bulk of the Police and other indigenous government 
forces were drawn largely from the Malay community. As a result, 
many Chinese loyal to Malaya feared that independence would 
herald a Malay back-lash directed against Chinese interests.
94. As Enloe has observed, UMNO were "the first among equals" (Enloe,
1970, p.116).
95• Federation of Malaya, 1956, First Malaya Plan, 1956 - i960, 
(Government Press, Kuala Lumpur),
9 6. Goh Keng Swee did not mention the Chinese specifically in his
article, but that 'the free enterprise sector* was synonymous
with Chinese business is abundantly clear. The article stated 
that Malay economic enterprise and business should remain rural 
- "it is in the field of rural development that Malay economic 
enterprise and managerial skills may best be developed and has 
the greatest chances of success" (Goh Keng Swee, 1958* P*6) - 
and argued that this would maintain harmony between the communi­
ties in the post-independence period, even though the socio­
economic divisions would be preserved also.
97. The result of the 1959 election to the Federal parliament is 
set out below:
PARTY PARLIAMENTARY SEATS, 1959
Number %
Alliance 74 71.2
Pan-Malayan Islamic Party 13 12.5
Socialist Front 8 7.7
Perak People's Party 4 3.8
Party Negara 1 1.0
Malayan Party 1 1.0
United Democratic Party* -
People's Action Party* - -
Independents y 2 .5
TOTAL 104 1-O6-.0
* did not contest election in 1959
Cont/..,
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97* Continued:
Source: Ratnam, K. J., and Milne, R. S., 19&7» The Malayan
Parliamentary Election of 1964* (University of Malaya, Singapore), 
Table XX,
99. Federation of Malaya, 19&1, Second Malaya Plan, 19^1 - 
(Government Press, Kuala Lumpur).
99* The reader is referred to the data presented in Table 4*3*
100. The result of the 19&4 election to the Federal parliament is
set out below:
PARTY PARLIAMENTARY SEATS, 19&4
Number %
Alliance 89 85 .6
Pan-Malayan Islamic Party 9 8.7
Socialist Front 2 1.9
Perak People's Party 2 1.9
Party Negara 0 -
Malayan Party* - -
United Democratic Party 1 1.0
People’s Action Party 1 1.0
Independents 0
TOTAL 104 100.0
* did not contest election in 19&4*
Source: Ratnam, K. J., and Milne, R. S., 19&7? op.cit.,
Table XX.
In point of fact, it is quite possible that the "massive 
victory" ( Goh Cheng Teik, 1971 » p.11 ) of 19&4 was occasioned 
not by a successful Alliance rural development policy, but by 
the "Confrontation" with Indonesia, which threatened the 
integrity of the new Federation of Malaysia. The Federation 
was created officially on 31st August, 1963* amid opposition 
from neighbouring countries, especially from Indonesia. The 
"Confrontation" with Indonesia lasted some three years ( from 
1963 to 1966 ), during which time trade, travel and communic­
ation between the two countries were halted. The Alliance 
success in 19&4 probably resulted from a patriotic desire on 
the part of the voters not to rock the ship of state at that 
difficult time, rather than from satisfaction with Alliance 
socio-economic planning policy. On "Confrontation" see 
Federation of Malaysia, 1979a* P*20, and Appendix I of this 
thesis.
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101. Federation of Malaysia, 1966, First Malaysia Plan, 1966 - 1970, 
(Government Press, Kuala Lumpur)
102. The General and State Elections of May 1969 - and the events 
which followed them - are considered in Chapter 5*
103* The Draft Development Plan was produced largely to support
British Malaya's claim upon part of these funds, by showing that 
money spent in Peninsular Malaysia would be directed to profit­
able, revenue-generating projects.
104. For example, Mr. Oscar Spenser (former colonial Minister of 
Economic Affairs) remained as head of a small Economic Secre­
tariat (Rudner, 1975a, p*27).
105. The "First FYP" or Five-Year Plan was the First Malaya Plan,
1956 - 1960.
106. As Rudner notes, the Alliance emphasised "fiscal propriety, 
'sound1 currency, and a strong external reserve position" 
(Rudner, 1975a, p.2 5). Even so, there was some preparedness 
to break with the past, and in 1956 N. S. Lee (the new Finance 
Minister) stated that the government would budget for a deficit 
in 1957 (Ness, 19 6 7a). As Ness has observed, "the new men of 
power were willing to mortgage the future in order to stimulate 
the development of the economy" (Ness, 1967b, p.2). However, 
the 1957 economic recession was to blunt enthusiasm for great 
changes in planning policy.
107. A fact which did not escape at least one observer. In the 
early 1960s Silcock noted that the First Malaya Plan and the 
Second Malaya Plan - and other aspects of economic policy also - 
were "instances of active promotion of economic growth along 
lines already begun under the colonial government" (Silcock,
1963b, p.2 5 1 ).
108. There was apprehension that foreign agency houses would repat­
riate capital if it should appear threatened (Silcock, 19633-, 
p.2 5). One way to forestall this flight was by maintaining 
large reserves, and the adjusted figure for Malayan reserves 
held by official organisations and monetary bodies at the end 
of 1960 was M$3»010 million (Corden, W. M., 1963> The Malayan 
Balance of Payments Problem, pp.112 - 130 in Silcock, T, H., 
and Fisk, E. K., eds., 19 6 3 , The Political Economy of Independ­
ent Malaya - A Case Study in Development, (Australian National 
University, Canberra"}^ The reference is on page 121).
109. The reader is referred again to the data presented in Table 
4.1, Table 4.2, Table 4-3 and. Table 4*4*
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CHAPTER 5
The 1969 General and State Elections 
and the Events of May, 19&9
5.1 INTRODUCTION
Towards the end of the 1960s, the Alliance government considered 
that its planning policies satisfied the development requirements of 
independent Peninsular Malaysia's socio-economic system. The manner 
In which the Alliance was "brought to this conclusion has been described 
in Chapter 4 above. The crisis of May, 1969 came as a tremendous 
shock to an Alliance government leadership convinced of the soundness 
of Its planning approach and of its political accommodation, The 
race-rioting precipitated by the 1969 General and State Elections was 
a violent symptom of dissatisfaction with the style of government and 
with development progress, a dissatisfaction rendered all the more 
traumatic to the Alliance because it was totally unexpected.
Greatest dissatisfaction was felt with the government's failure 
to alter after independence the status quo of socio-economic imbalance 
inherited from the colonial era. Disadvantaged Malaysians felt that 
little had been done to fulfil the aspirations for communal socio­
economic equality which they had cherished since Merdeka. There was 
resentment that independence had achieved little for the mass of the 
people, and appeared merely to have substituted a new elite for the 
colonial overlord. (-^0)
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The dissatisfaction with the lack of fulfilment of Merdekaf s 
promise found violent expression in the race-riots which hoiled over 
in the wake of the 1969 General Election. The race-riots served notice 
to the government of a potentially terminal cancer in the Peninsular 
Malaysian tody politic, and forced the reappraisal of national socio­
economic development planning policy which will he recounted in 
Chapter 6. It is the aim of Chapter 5 to relate briefly the events 
which led to this reappraisal.
5.2 THE COMMUNAL NATURE OF POLITICS
IN PENINSULAR MALAYSIA ^111^
The development of British Malaya led to the creation of the 
plural society and the dual economy described in Chapter 3* Each 
community became identified with certain socio-economic niches, and 
often there was neither real necessity - nor clear opportunity - for 
any but superficial contacts between Malays, Chinese and Indians.
Each community was more concerned about its relationship with the 
ruling British than about its relationship with the other two Asian 
communities (Silcock, 1963a). This pattern of separateness became 
established prior to the Second World War, and was not altered in the 
period between 19^5 and 1957*
It was a natural consequence that the forces produced by ethnic 
separatism on the socio-economic front should have great influence 
subsequently upon developments of a political nature. There was little 
legacy of ethnic socio-economic cooperation to indicate a contrary 
course, and each community considered that intra-communal cohesion in 
the face of potential threat from the other two communities was vital
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to success in the political arena. UMNO became the "symbol of Malay 
solidarity" (National Operations Council, 1969} P*6) in the struggle 
to maintain Malay political ascendancy. MCA was formed by Chinese 
businessmen wishing to demonstrate loyalty to Malaya by disassociating 
themselves from the Communist menace. Thus it was that the communalism 
which "has always been the salient feature of the Malaysian political 
system" (Gagliano, 1970, p.2) became established.
Despite intercommunal political differences, there were some 
areas of great interest to all Peninsular Malaysians, These common 
concerns provided the basis of an accommodation between the main 
parties - UMNO, MCA, and MIC - and the Alliance was established between 
them in order to facilitate the attainment of Merdeka and the prose­
cution of the struggle against militant Communism,
The extent to which communally-based political parties multiplied 
in Peninsular Malaysia is revealed in Figure 5.1 > which shows the 
political orientation of the parties in 1969. Malay political parties 
were the ultra-conservative Pan-Malayan Islamic Party (P-MIP), the 
more liberal - yet still conservative - United Malays National 
Organisation (UMNO), and the left-wing Party Rakyat (PR). Non-Malay 
choice ranged from the moderately conservative Malayan Chinese 
Association (MCA) and Malayan Indian Congress (MIG), through the 
People’s Progressive Party (PPP) and the United Malayan Chinese 
Organisation (UMCO), to Labour Party Malaysia (LPM). Only the 
Democratic Action Party (DAP) and Gerakan Ra’ayat Malaysia (Gerakan) 
had pretensions to moderate, intercommunal status.
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Fig 5.1 PENINSULAR MALAYSIA POLITICAL ORIENTATION OF 
PARTIES, 1969
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5.3 THE 1969 GENERAL ELECTION
5 .3a The Campaign
The 1969 General Election was the culmination of more than five 
weeks' heated politicking by the parties (Gagliano, 19?0), a most 
notable feature of which activity was the attempt by many candidates 
to generate support by provoking intercommunal hatred (National 
Operations Council, I9 6 9). The campaign polarised along communal 
lines mainly, but differences of policy towards the vexed question of 
intercommunal socio-economic imbalance caused splits between parties 
hoping to win support from within the same community. The campaign 
became a contest between UMNO and P-MIP for Malay support in the East 
Coast, and between MCA and DAP/Gerakan for Chinese support in the 
urban areas.
The Alliance recognised that the 19&9 General Election would
provide a severe test of its strategy of intercommunal political
accommodation, and of its socio-economic development policies. UMNO
appeared to be losing ground to P-MIP, and Chinese support seemed to
be slipping from MCA (Gagliano, 19?0, p.9). From the start of the
campaign the Alliance was on the defensive, and saw its principal task
(112)as consolidation of its established political position, / Conse­
quently, the Alliance showed a disposition to play upon the communities' 
fears in order to revitalise support for its modus operandi. In
furtherance of this objective, Tunku Abdul Razak stated that UMNO ^
(113)would accept only MCA as the Chinese partner in the Alliance.
By contrast, opposition parties viewed their main task as that 
of weakening Alliance power so as to establish a position of greater
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strength from which to fight future political contests. Unlike the 
Alliance, opposition parties were not hindered hy even an ostensible 
basis in intercommunal accommodation. Thus they were able to exploit 
to the full the potential of intercommunal hostility as a campaign 
weapon.
Malay opposition to the Alliance centred on P-MIP, which fielded 
some 60 Parliamentary candidates in the East Coast constituencies. 
P-MIP directed its campaign against UMNO's accommodation with MCA, 
and even went so far as to promise that it would create in Peninsular 
Malaysia a Malay-dominated Islamic theocracy. The only other Malay 
opposition to the Alliance was Party Rakyat, which ran on an "agrarian 
reform programme" (Rudner, 1970, p.^). Party Rakyat was foremost in 
accusing the Alliance of "deluding" the Malays with rural land 
development schemes (Enloe, 1970).
Non-Malay opposition to the Alliance was more organised and 
cohesive than the Malay opposition. The three main non-Malay oppo­
sition parties - DAP, Gerakan and PPP - had met in 1 966 to forge the 
bond of cooperation between them. The consequence of this meeting 
was that in 1969 they agreed to not compete against each other, so 
as to provide strong opposition to the Alliance,
The non-Malay opposition was not at all worried about upsetting 
Malay sensitivities. All attacked vehemently the Constitution, 
especially those Articles enshrining the Special Rights of the Malays 
(National Operations Council, 1969, p . i v ) . ^ ^  More specifically, 
the anti-MCA Chinese-controlled DAP attacked MCA for giving in to UMNO 
pressures, and called for a 'Malaysian Malaysia' in which no community
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would, "be able to claim special privilege. Gerakan represented itself 
as a middle-of-the-road multi-racial opposition to the Alliance. PPP
- the weakest link of the non-Malay opposition accord - limited 
itself to representing the old-established Chinese community of 
the Perak mining districts.
5.3b The Result
The result of the 1969 General Election furnished a weakening 
of Alliance power so severe that it constituted the most serious set­
back to the Alliance since its establishment in 1952. The Alliance's 
share of seats in the Dewan Rakyat plummeted from 89 before the 
election to 66 in the aftermath. The slump was rendered more serious 
by the fact that the Alliance alone contested all seats, 9 Alliance 
candidates being returned unopposed. The full extent of the damage 
sustained by the Alliance is revealed in Table 5*1 and Table 5*2.
Table 5*1 relates the story of the main parties' fortunes at 
General Elections since 1955> and reveals their changing popularity 
with the electorate in terms of percentages of the poll captured. The 
general decline in the popularity of the Alliance between 1955 and 
1969 - alleviated only by the success at the 1964' General Election - 
is apparent from Table 5.1. In I969 the Alliance obtained only k9A% 
of the total vote, the first time that the Alliance had not been 
supported by at least half those persons who had voted.
More serious than the mere fact of Alliance failure was the 
reason for that failure. The two non-Malay components of the Alliance
- especially MGA - had fared proportionately much worse than had UMNO.
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TABLE 5.1
Peninsular Malaysia
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL VOTE OBTAINED BY PARTY AT GENERAL 
_ELECTIONS OF 1955, 1959, 1964 AND 1969W ______________
PARTY Percentage of Total Vote Obtained
1955 1959 1964 1969
Alliance (b) 79.6 51 .8 58.3 49.1
P-MIP (c) 3.9 21.3 14.6 24.3
PAP/DAP (d) dnc* dnc 2.0 13.5
Gerakan (e) dnc dnc dnc 8.2
PPP (f) 0.1 6.2 3 > 3.4
SF (g) 0.4 12.9 16.1 dnc
Minor Parties 
and Independents 16.0 7.8 5 A 1.5
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
* dnc =* did not contest election
(a) contested seats only.
(b) the Alliance was not a party as such, but a coalition of 
three parties: United National Malays Organisation (UMNO),
Malayan Chinese Association (MCA), and Malayan Indian 
Congress (MIC).
(c) Pan-Malayan Islamic Party.
(d) People8s Action Party/Democratic Action Party. The party 
was known as PAP prior to the expulsion of Singapore from 
the Federation of Malaysia in 19^51 and as DAP thereafter,
(0) Gerakan Raya1 at.Malaysia, or Malaysian People's Movement.
(f) People's Progressive Party.
(g) Socialist Front. The party was known as Labour Party in
1955, and. as SF thereafter.
Source: adapted from Rudner, 1970, Table 4, Percentage of
Total Vote by Party.
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Table 5-2 shows that overall the Alliance's Parliamentary seats were 
reduced from 89 to 66 - or from 85.6% of Parliamentary seats to 6 3■5%
- with UMNO representation dropping from 59 to 51 seats. However, 
although UMNO's performance was bad, it was still good relative to 
those of MCA and MIG. In particular, Table 5.2 reveals that the 
Alliance's "Chinese pillar" (Goh Cheng Teik, 1971 > P*ll) had been 
half-demolished at the 1969 General Election: only 13 of the 33
Alliance candidates presented at the polls by MCA were returned, and 
the number of MCA seats in Parliament fell by just over half (from 
27 to 13).
The perpetrators of the 'demolition job* on the MCA were the 
Democratic Action Party and Gerakan Ra1ayat Malaysia, and the showings 
of these parties in 1969 contrast starkly with that of MCA. DAP had 
fielded 2^ candidates, of whom 13 had scored victories, and 8 of 
Gerakan's 1^ candidates had been successful (see Table 5>2).
The Alliance's comparative failure was due to a widening of 
the gap between the leaders of the Alliance, and certain socio-economic 
strata of the communities which they represented. Opposition leaders 
had told poor Chinese that MCA looked after only,businessmen's 
interests (Enloe, 1970, p.v), and many poor Chinese were unhappy with 
the way MCA represented in the Alliance the interests of the poorer 
members of the Chinese community.
Most serious was the implication which MCA failure had for 
future political stability. The obliteration of MCA's legitimacy 
as representative of Chinese interests "posed a severe challenge to 
the principle of Malay political predominance underlying the UMNO-MCA- 
MIG Alliance" (Rudner, 1970, p.16). Also in terms of Parliamentary
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TABLE 5.2 
Peninsular Malaysia
RESULTS OF GENERAL ELECTIONS TO FEDERAL PARLIAMENT 
______________BY PARTY, 1964 AND 1969_______________
PARTY FEDERAL SEATS OBTAINED
1964 1969
Number % Number %
Alliance 89 8 5.6 66 63.5
(UMNO) (59) (56,7) (51) (49.0)
(MCA) (27) (2 6.0) (13) (12.5)
(MIC) ( 3) ( 2.9) ( 2) ( 1.9)
PAS (a) 9 8.7 12 11.5
PAP/DAP (b) 1 1.0 13 12.5
Gerakan 0 0.0 8 7.7
PPP 2 1 .9 4 3.8
SF 2 1.9 0 0.0
UDP (c) 1 l.o 0 0.0
Vacant 0 0 .0 1 1.0
TOTAL 104 100.0 104 100.0
(a) The initials PAS stand for Parti Islam Sa-Tanah Melayu, the 
Malay for Pan-Malayan Islamic Party,
(h) People's Action Party (PAP) in 1964, Democratic Action Party 
(DAP) in 1969*
(c) United Democratic Party,
Source: adapted from Goh Gheng Teik, 1971-j Table 2, The Malayan
Federal Election Results by Party, (1964 and 1969).
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seats non-Malay DAP (13 seats) had replaced Malay P-MIP (12 seats) as 
the largest single opposition party, and by doing so at the expense 
of MCA had weakened even further the principle of Malay political 
ascendancy.
Table 5*3 makes clear this point. After 1969 DAP, Gerakan, and 
PPP together had 16 Chinese Members of Parliament. MCA could field 
only 13. Consequently, MCA could claim no longer to represent 
legitimately in Parliament the majority interests of Peninsular 
Malaysia's Chinese community. Similarly, MIC - with only two of the 
Indian community's 10 Parliamentary representatives - could no 
longer justify its position in respect of its own community.
As noted above, the DAP-Gerakan-PPP accord had regarded its 
main election objective as that of weakening the Alliance. Viewed 
in this light, the 1969 General Election furnished them with a 
clear-cut - if unexpected - victory. DAP, Gerakan and PPP had 
achieved their electoral objective of reducing Alliance legitimacy 
and power.
The disasters suffered by MCA and MIC were construed by the 
Malays to be the result of failure by Chinese and Indian voters 
- particularly by the former - to support the principle of Malay 
political dominance enshrined in the Alliance concept. For the first 
time since Merdeka. it seemed to the Malays that "political power was 
shifting (i) from the Alliance side to the Opposition parties and 
(ii) from the Malay race to the immigrant minorities" (Goh Cheng Teik,
1971, p .13).
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TABLE 5.3
Peninsular Malaysia
RESULT OF GENERAL ELECTION TO FEDERAL PARLIAMENT 
_________BY PARTY AND BY COMMUNITY,__1969_________
PARTY FEDERAL SEATS OBTAINED Party Seats
C 0 M M U N I T Y Total %
Malay Chinese Indian
Alliance 66 63.5
UMNO (51) - - (49.0)
MCA - (13) (12.5)
MIC - - ( 2) ( 1.9)
P-MIP 12 - - 12 11.5
DAP - 10 3 13 12.5
Gerakan 1 4 3 8 7.7
PPP - 2 2 4 3-8
Community Seats 
Total 64 29 10
i0^a) 100. (P^
(a) one seat vacant (see TaLle 5*2 aLove). The percentages in the 
final column are calculated against a total of 104 seats.
(b) The calculation of percentages against a total of 104 seats 
means that these percentage figures total 99%> not 100$. The 
difference (l$) is made up by the one vacant seat.
Source: adapted from Rudner, 1970, Table 3» Election Results by
Community and Party.
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5.4 THE RESULT OF THE ELECTION TO THE
SELANGOR STATE GOVERNMENT
The wound suffered by the Alliance at the 19&9 General Election 
was severe, but not fatal. Table 5*3 shows that the Alliance still 
held a majority in Parliament, and that UMNO remained the largest 
single party by far. The Alliance held 66 (63*5%) of the total 104 
Parliamentary seats, UMNO’s share alone being 49.0% of the total. 
Moreover, the combined total of Malay Members of Parliament was 64 
(see Table 5*3)» thus assuring the Malay community a majority on any 
intercommunal issues which would override mere political affiliations, 
Malay political ascendancy at Parliamentary level was diminished, but 
in no way eradicated.
However, at State level the shift of power from the Alliance was 
more marked. Prior to the 1969 elections, the Alliance had held all 
States except Kelantan. In the run-up to the 1969 elections, Alliance 
recognition of its declining fortunes had persuaded it that it was 
faced with the loss of Penang in addition to continued failure in 
Kelantan. Alliance defeat in Perak and Selangor was considered a 
possibility also, though defeats in these States >was not thought 
probable. Consequently, Alliance failure to gain majorities in Perak 
and Selangor in the face of combined opposition came as a great surprise, 
both to the Alliance and to their opponents.
The situation became particularly tense in Selangor, Table 5*4 
reveals that the Selangor State election was a debacle for the 
Alliance, The number of seats held by the Alliance in the Selangor
TABLE 5.4
State of Selangor
RESULTS OF ELECTION TO STATE ASSEMBLY BY 
____________PARTY, 1964 AND I969___________
PARTY STATE SEATS OBTAINED
1964 1969
Entered Lost Won Entered Lost Won
Alliance 28 4 24 28 14 14
(UMNO) (13) ( 0) (13) (13) ( 1) (12)
(MCA) (12) ( 4) ( 8) (12) (U)
(MIC) ( 3) ( 0) ( 3) ( 3) ( 2) ( 1)
PAP/DAP (a) 5 5 0 12 3 9
Gerakan dnc* - - 8 4 4
PPP 4 4 0 dnc - -
PAS (b) 7 7 0 12 12 0
SF 26 22 4 dnc - -
Independent dnc - - 1 0 1
State Seats 
Total 28 28
* dnc - did not contest election
(a) People's Action Party (PAP) in 1964, Democratic Action Party 
(DAP) in 1969.
(t>) PAS stands for Parti Islam Sa-Tanah Melayu, or Pan-Malayan 
Islamic Party (P-MIP).
Source: adapted from Goh Cheng Teik, 1971j Table 6, Selangor State
Election Results (1964 and 1969)•
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State legislature slumped from 24 to 14, and - as at 'the election to 
the Federal Parliament - the main collapse was in the Alliance's two 
non-Malay supports. Table 5-4 shows that UMNO support between 1964 
and 1969 remained virtually unchanged, UMNO gaining only one fewer 
seat in 1969 (12 seats in 1969 > as opposed to 13 seats in 1964). By 
contrast, MCA seats were slashed in number from 8 in 1964 to 1 in 1969i 
11 MGA Alliance candidates failing to be returned. MiG's reduction 
in strength from 3 seats to 1 seat mirrored MGA's downfall.
Again, the conclusion drawn by the Malay community was that 
Chinese and Indian voters - in Selangor now - were rejecting the 
principle of Malay-dominated political accommodation which was enshrined 
in the Alliance concept. Thus, the result of the Selangor State 
election was to add to the apprehensions felt by the Malays as a con­
sequence of the decline in Alliance power experienced at Federal level.
The immediate consequence of the Selangor result was that the 
Alliance - with exactly half the State's seats, 14 out of the total of 
28 - was incapable of continuing as State government. Unfortunately, 
the serious consequences which were to arise from this state of 
affairs were not obvious immediately. Only post facto did it become 
clear that the decline in Alliance power - coupled with the possibility 
of a Selangor State government ruled by a DAP-dominated opposition - 
were the two goads which roused intercommunal hostility from its slumber.
5.5 THE EVENTS OF MAI, 1969^ ^
The events subsequent to the result of the Selangor State election 
may be subdivided into two phases. First, there was a period of some
2^3
two days - May 11th and May 12th - during which resentment between 
the Malay and non-Malay communities rose to a head. This was followed 
by a period of approximately 24 hours - May 13th - during which the 
intercommunal tension exploded into overt racial violence.
5.5a May 11th and May 12th, 19&9
The sudden demise of the Alliance in Selangor came as a shock 
to all concerned, but opposition surprise turned quickly to joy 
when the full extent of their success in reducing Alliance power in 
that State became clear. Soon many non-Malay youths - party-workers 
and supporters of the opposition parties - were hailing the Selangor 
result as a non-Malay victory over entrenched Malay political power. 
Moreover, DAP and Gerakan leaders were prepared to exploit fully the 
situation in order to consolidate their unexpected political gains.
In the wake of the Selangor State result, the non-Malay opposi­
tion had a distinct psychological advantage over the discomfitted 
Malays, The 11th and 12th May saw that advantage pushed home. On 
those days DAP and Gerakan held noisy, intimidating and racially- 
provocative 'victory' processions on the streets of Kuala Lumpur, On 
many occasions Chinese and Indian youths went out of their way - often 
literally - to hurl obscenities at Malay passers-by and at the largely 
Malay Police lining the processions’ routes.
During this period, neither DAP nor Gerakan leaders attempted to 
restrain their supporters, who freely taunted the Malays over their 
loss of political face. Soon non-Malay opposition fervour had grown 
out of all proportion to the success which had been achieved: "what 
started as political activity was allowed to deteriorate into race- 
baiting” (National Operations Council, 1969» P»V),
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On May 12th a large, licensed Gerakan procession was led "by 
successful candidate Dr. Tan Ghee Khoon, and the pattern of racial 
provocation was repeated. Non-Malay youths even entered the Malay 
residential stronghold of Kampong Bahru and threatened that they would 
'evict' the Selangor Mentri Besar.
Malay reaction to these events was a mixture of alarm and anger. 
There was apprehension that opposition claims to have ousted Malay 
political power might be justified, concern over the willingness of 
the Police and government to protect Malay interests, lives, and pro­
perty, and anger at the insults directed against Malays as individuals, 
as a community, and as a viable political force.
On the evening of May 12th, UMNO youth workers from Kampong 
Bahru approached Alliance assembleyman Haji Razak bin Ali and demanded 
a 'victory' procession of their own. After all, the UMNO part of the 
Alliance had not fared badly at the Selangor State election. Accord­
ingly, an UMNO procession was arranged for the following day, May 13th,
5.5b May 13th, 1969
The UMNO procession was scheduled to leave the Mentri Besar's 
residence at 7.30 pro* but a large crowd of Malays had gathered outside 
the residence at least two hours before-hand. Many Malays feared that 
the procession would be attacked, and had taken the step of arming 
themselves with weapons such as knives, sticks and bottles.
At approximately 6 pm fighting broke out in the Setapak area of 
Kuala Lumpur between non-Malays, and Malays who were on their way to 
Kampong Bahru to join the procession. News of the fighting soon
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reached the throng gathered outside the residence of the Mentri Besar. 
Ignoring the Mentri Besar*s pleas for calm, a crowd of some 200 to 300 
armed Malay youths left Kampong Bahru for the Jalan Tuanku Abdul 
Rahman area of the capital. Federal Reserve Unit troops which arrived 
shortly after this mob had left were in time to stop more Malays from 
leaving the vicinity of the Mentri Besar*s residence.
The situation deteriorated rapidly in the tense atmosphere which 
prevailed. Emotions were fanned by rumour of intercommunal fighting, 
and there was little opportunity for reconciliation. Serious race- 
rioting erupted in Kampong Bahru and in the non-Malay Chow Kit and 
Jalan Raja Laut areas of Kuala Lumpur, and very soon "mob-madness had 
seized the city" (Gagliano, 1970, p.17).
Events moved so quickly that the Police and Federal Reserve Units 
were unable to cope. By 8 pm on May 13th the race-rioting was so 
serious that Deputy Prime Minister Tun Haji Abdul Razak bin Dato* 
Hussein declared a city-wide curfew, and ordered the Army to reinforce 
the civil and para-military security forces. During the night of the 
13th/l4th May the authorities were hard put to quell the frequent inter 
communal clashes, murders, and incidents of looting and arson. However 
Police reinforcements arrived from Ipoh during the small hours of May 
l^th, and by Wednesday morning a semblance of calm had been restored 
to the shattered city.
5.6 THE CONSEQUENCES OF MAY 13th, 1969
In the immediate aftermath of the Kuala Lumpur race-riots the 
government reacted swiftly to prevent similar out—bursts occurring in 
other parts of the country. On May 15th a State of Emergency was
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declared, and on the l6th the 2^-hour curfew effective in Kuala Lumpur 
was extended to the remainder of Selangor and to the States of Malacca, 
Negri Sembilan, Perak, Penang and Kedah. Measures taken to control 
the situation included the suspending of the Constitution, the 
indefinite postponement of the reconvening of Parliament, the gaoling 
of some new Members of Parliament, and the halting of the elections 
pending in East Malaysia. In addition to these measures the publishing 
of newspapers was suspended.
On May 20th an Emergency Cabinet was formed, This Cabinet 
appointed an 8-man National Operations Council to restore law and 
order, to ensure the smooth running of the administration, and to 
start the long process of restoring peace and confidence between the 
communities (National Operations Council, 1969f P .??)• The efforts 
of the National Operations Council notwithstanding, sporadic inter­
communal clashes occurred in Peninsular Malaysia during the remainder 
of May and during June.
Ihe physical cost of the May 13th race-riots was high. Official 
figures put the total number of deaths in Kuala Lumpur at 196, with 
many wounded (National Operations Council, I969, p.88). Rioting,
looting and arson had caused great damage to property. There was also 
the financial cost of the Police and Army operation necessary to curtail 
the riots.
Severe though the physical damage was, of much greater conse­
quence was the damage inflicted on intercommunal relations. The 
apparant harmony between Malays and non-Malays had been e^sploded into 
a myth at the first major upset of the "delicately balanced communal
Bk7
equation" (Snider, 1969* P*l) whereby the Malays maintained political 
power as insurance against non-Malay economic strength being trans­
formed into total dominance of Peninsular Malaysia's socio-economic 
system. Whatever the proximate causes of the unrest, closer scrutiny 
revealed that the fundamental reasons were buried deep in Peninsular 
Malaysia's social and economic framework:
"On that day we were jolted into a sharp realisation 
that the racial problem in this country is a serious 
one and measures taken in the past to cope with it 
have not proved adequate"
(National Operations Council, 19^9j p.iii).
The deep-seated imbalances between Peninsular Malaysia's communi­
ties, socio-economic groups and geographical regions - a legacy of 
the colonial development policies which had been transferred intact to 
the independent- Federation - were identified as the real culprits.
In particular, Malay feelings of socio-economic inferiority relative 
to the non-Malays were seen as the root cause, and it was recognised 
that national unity could not be expected to grow in a country whose 
socio-economic system was characterised by social plurality and 
economic dualism exhibiting such a marked ethnic component. It was 
imperative that a new approach to national socio-economic development 
be discovered if Peninsular Malaysia were to stand a real chance of 
achieving genuine nationhood in the future. The New Development 
Strategy was promulgated in an attempt to forge the national unity 
whose absence had been disclosed so tragically in May, 1969.
The present Chapter has recounted the events of May, I969,
Chapter 6 will show the effect which these events had upon national 
socio-economic development planning In Peninsular Malaysia in the post-
1969 period.
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 5
110. Rudner states that AMul Aziz bin Ishak - ex-Minister of 
Agriculture, who had joined the Opposition bench - had denounced 
the Alliance, saying that beneath the surface of apparent 
prosperity "lay a sullen but ignored mass whose mood reflected 
'the quiet anger of a people who feel that they have been 
defrauded of the fruits of Merdeka, and the price of freedom has 
turned to sand in their mouths. Our people are watching and 
they see that the entire colonial structure is intact excepting 
that a few brown faces have replaced the white faces in the air- 
conditioned offices and the big American cars'" (Rudner, 1975a-, 
p.58).
111. In addition to works listed in the Bibliography, the reader 
interested in politics in Peninsular Malaysia will find the 
following books of use: Means, G. P., 1976, Malaysian Politics,
2nd edition, (Hodder and Stoughton, London); Mills, L. A., 1958, 
Malaya: A Political and Economic Appraisal, (University of
Minnesota Press, Minneapolis); Milne, R. S., and Mauzy, D. K,, 
1978, Politics and Government in Malaysia (Federal Publications, 
Singapore); Ratnam, K. J., 19^5, Communalism and the Political 
Process in Malaya, (University of Malaya Press, Kuala Lumpur); 
Ratnam, K. J., and Milne, R. S., 19^7, The Malayan Parliamentary 
Election of 196^ -, (University of Malaya Press, Singapore); Reid,
A., 1969, The Kuala Lumpur Riots and the Malaysian Political 
System, Australian Outlook, Vol. 23, No. 3, pp.258 - 279; Scott,
J. G ., 1968, Political Ideology in Malaysia: Reality and the
Beliefs of an Elite^ ("Yale University Press, Yale); Vasil, R. K., 
1972, The Malaysian General Election of 1969 and 1972, (Oxford 
University Press, Kuala Lumpur); Yong Meung Chong (ed.), 197^, 
Trends in Malaysia II: Proceedings and Background Paper,
(Singapore University Press, Singapore).
112. By means fair or foul. Snider notes that UMNO attempted to sway 
voters in Kelantan away from P-MIP by offering a 'bribe' of 
M$5^8 million for development if the Alliance were victorious in 
that State (Snider, 1969, P«^).
113. Snider refers to this as the "threat-and-fear" approach (Snider,
1969, p.3 )■
114. "During the campaign a number of Opposition candidates attacked
the Constitution in racialist terms. They twisted and misrepre­
sented certain provisions in the Constitution, principally Articles 
152 and 153* They agitated for the removal of Article 153 which 
provides safeguards for the special provision of the Malays" 
(National Operations Council, I969, p.iv).
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115. "The voter revolt of May 10 represented a revolt not only against 
a Malay-dominated government, hut also against the patronising 
style of government prevalent during almost 15 years of Alliance 
rule - a style that can perhaps hest he summed up as 'papa knows 
hest'" (Snider, 1969, P*6).
116. For a detailed account of the events subsequent to the Selangor 
State election in May, 1969, see the official, ac.oo.unt of the 
riots:. . National Operations Council, 1969? The May 13 Tragedy
- A Report, (Government Press, Kuala Lumpur). As indicated 
helow, some douht has heen expressed ahout the accuracy of the 
official account in regard to such items as the number of deaths 
which occurred during the Kuala Lumpur riots. However, the 
official account's reporting of the order in which certain events 
occurred does not appear to he disputed. Consequently, unless 
stated otherwise, Section 5«5 is based on the official account.
A brief, alternative account is that of Edmonds, 1973i Chapter 12.
117. This was the figure put out officially in the immediate after- 
math of the riots, hut it has heen disputed from more than one 
quarter. For example, Edmonds claims that Tun Razak and Tunku 
Abdul Rahman tried to "maintain the fiction" that the riots were 
not as serious as indicated (Edmonds, 19731 p.H9)» and states 
that foreign estimates put the number of those killed as high
as 1,000 (Edmonds, 1973, p.118). More significant, in a recent 
interview with the Far Eastern Economic Review the then Prime 
Minister - Datuk Hussein Onn - mentioned that "hundred^’of 
people died in the race.v»riots of May 13, 1969 (Far Eastern 
Economic Review, 1979, Volume 103, Number 4, January 26, pp.18 - 
23). Whatever the exact figure, it would appear that the I969 
race-riots were much more serious in terms of deaths, numbers 
injured and damage to property than government sources have been 
wont to admit.
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CHAPTER 6
The Consequences of the Events of May, 1969 for 
National Socio-Economic Development Planning in 
Peninsular Malaysia
6.1 INTRODUCTION
Chapter 4 showed how the limited socio-economic development 
policies practised by the British in the colonial era were passed on 
to the Alliance in 1957» and became accepted subsequently as the 
correct policies for developing Peninsular Malaysia's socio-economic 
system after independence. Chapter 5 revealed that there was great 
dissatisfaction with the nature of national planning among ordinary 
Peninsular Malaysians, and that the disadvantaged of all communities 
felt that nothing had been done to alter the socio-economic imbalance 
inherited from British Malaya.
The general dissatisfaction at the persistence after 1957 of 
socio-economic imbalance - especially with ethnic socio-economic 
imbalance - which had originated during the British period, found 
expression in the violence which exploded after the 19&9 elections. 
The deep-seated ethnic imbalances inherited from the pre-independence 
period were identified officially as the greatest obstacles to 
national unity, and the government set about seeking ways and means to 
remove these barriers to the development of a Peninsular Malaysian 
nation/118^
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The most important consequence which this national soul-searching 
had was the promulgation of the New Development Strategy, with its 
components the Rukun Negara and the New Economic Policy. It is the 
aim of Chapter 6 to reveal the course which this reappraisal of 
national socio-economic development planning took, and to detail the 
consequences which the New Development Strategy has had for national 
planning in Peninsular Malaysia today.
(119)
6.2 THE NEW DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY
The New Development Strategy which resulted from the race-riots 
of May, 1969 had its origin in the imperative of avoiding a repetition 
of such an occurrence. The inter-ethnic imbalances ingrained in 
Peninsular Malaysia*s socio-economic system were identified as the 
root-causes of the disturbances, and the New Development Strategy has 
been adopted in order to eradicate the social and economic problems at 
the heart of Peninsular Malaysia's predicament. It is the New 
Development Strategy which supplies the basic ethos of national 
planning in Peninsular Malaysia today.
The New Development Strategy has been modified and developed
somewhat since its inception, in order to provide'a general foundation
for national planning in Peninsular Malaysia. The New Development
Strategy was born in 1971* having its genesis with the series of
national five-year Plans which commenced with the publication of the
Second Malaysia Plan (1971 - 1975) in that year. So far, two Plans
in the series have been produced: the Second Malaysia Han (1971 -
1975)» and the Third Malaysia Plan (1976 - 1980). An assessment of
these two Plans will reveal the main characteristics of the New
(120)Development Strategy, J
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The New Development Strategy is a direct consequence of the May, 
I969 race-riots, which events happened to coincide closely with the 
end of the First Malaysia Plan. Thus, the way was clear for the 
vital new development principles to be incorporated into national 
planning strategy by way of -the imminent Second Malaysia Plan. 
Accordingly, the Second Malaysia Plan:
"added a new dimension to the nation's developmental 
efforts by proclaiming the laudable objective of 
initiating steps to correct economic imbalances. The 
planners had mainly two imbalances in view: regional
and racial"
(Bhanoji Rao, 197^> P-23).
The Second Malaysia Plan was conceived hurriedly in the immediate
aftermath of the 1969 disturbances. Consequently it did not go into
very great detail concerning the New Development Strategy, The Second
Malaysia Plan stated merely the skeleton of the strategy of which it
formed the first stage. It was left to the next Plan - the Third
Malaysia H a n  - to flesh out the bones of the New Development Strategy
with a more considered statement of the ways in which its objectives
(121)were to be achieved. J
The Second Malaysia Plan and the Third Malaysia Plan were guided 
by an overall Outline Perspective Plan (1970 - 1990). This is not a 
development Plan as such. Rather, the Outline Perspective Plan is 
intended to be an indication of the ultimate goal towards the attain­
ment of which individual Plans are directed.
The long-term future considered in the Outline Perspective Plan 
received only passing treatment in the Second Malaysia Plan. However, 
the Second Malaysia Plan did indicate that the solution to Peninsular
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Malaysia's social and economic problems would not be quick in coming:
"The specific policies and programmes described 
in later Chapters are concerned primarily with 
development over the five years. However, what 
comes after 1975 Is equally of great importance"
(Federation of Malaysia, 19?1} P»9)«
The Outline Perspective Plan took on more concrete form in the Mid-Term 
Review of the Second Malaysia Plan:
"To provide us with a clear perspective of the 
efforts which must be made and to enable us to 
measure and monitor our efforts meaningfully, as 
we move from one Plan to the next, an Outline 
Perspective Plan covering the period up to 1990 
has been prepared"
(Federation of Malaysia, 1973» p.v).^22'*
The Third Malaysia Plan went into even greater detail devoting an 
entire chapter (Chapter IV) of forty pages to the Outline Perspective 
Plan.
The New Development Strategy may be considered to have two aims, 
the one long-term, the other short-term. The long-term aim is a deli­
berate attempt to create national symbols and institutions as a 
foundation for the national unity to be created in Peninsular Malaysia, 
and is embodied in the Rukun Negara, or National Ideology. The short­
term aim is the immediate amelioration of the socio-economic status of the 
Malays vis-a-vis that of the non-Malays. The short-term ai.m is 
encapsulated in the New Economic Policy,
Malay political dominance, and the Malays’ status as the indi­
genous community, dictate that the symbols and institutions of Rukun 
Negara reflect Malay rather than non-Malay values. However, care must 
be taken that non-Malays do not feel unnecessary antipathy to the very 
symbols which are intended to foster national unity by breaking down
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the harriers between the communities. Thus, traditional Malay
loyalties - loyalty to the country, loyalty to the Sultans, and
acceptance of Malay as the national language and of Islam as the
national religion - are augmented where practicable by non-Malay 
(123)values. ' Even so, Malay traditions and culture permeate those
symbols and institutions intended to have national appeal. J
The short-term objectives of the New Economic PblLcy are the more 
pressing component of the New Development Strategy. There are several 
reasons for the emphasis upon the New Economic Policy. First, the 
Malays - as indigenes - feel that their aspirations should take 
precedence over those of the non-Malay communities, Second, the 
politically-powerful Malays have the necessary leverage to force this 
priority on the Malay-dominated government. Third, the race-riots of 
May, 1969 were seen primarily as a Malay back-lash in the face of 
perceived non-Malay gains in political strength, the
immediate priority of the New Development Strategy is the rapid 
improvement of Malay socio-economic status via the short-term object­
ives of the New Economic Policy.
6 ,2a Rukun Negara
The desire to provide a basis of beliefs and loyalties on which 
to build a united Peninsular Malaysian nation is expressed as the 
National Ideology, or Rukun Negara. The Rukun Negara was proclaimed 
officially on 31st August, 1970, and is said to provides
"the ideological foundations for a common value system 
among Malaysians which transcends ethnic, cultural 
and socio-economic differences within the nation"
(Federation of Malaysia, 1976, p.91)*
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Rukun Negara was mentioned first in the Second Malaysia Plan, 
in Chapter i of which it was emphasised that future strategy for 
development was to he guided by the National Ideology. In fact, Rukun 
Negara supplies the ideological basis of all the development Plans 
spanning the period 19?0 to 1990
Rukun Negara aims not only at providing common ground on which . 
Peninsular Malaysia's communities can meet: it also specifies how this
common ground is to be achieved. Rukun Negara acknowledges that it is 
the many divisions within Peninsular Malaysia's socio-economic system 
which are the source of the national malady, and identifies those ills 
which require immediate attention. The National Ideology takes as its 
rationale:
"the fundamental premise that unemployment and poverty, 
especially in a relatively affluent society like that 
of Malaysia, is an affront to human dignity and that 
racial imbalances in the opportunities to participate 
in the economic life of the country have the seeds for 
social and political tension"
(Federation of Malaysia, 1973j p.6l).
Two areas of particular concern are singled out for special 
consideration. The first is the eradication of poverty by raising 
incomes and by providing employment. The second is the restructuring 
of Peninsular Malaysia's socio-economic system. The manner in which 
these two areas are to be tackled is more specifically the province of 
the New Economic Policy.
6 .2b The New Economic Policy
The New Economic Policy pervades all that is official in 
Peninsular Malaysia today. Scrutiny of the main features of the 
Second Malaysia Plan and of the Third Malaysia Plan enables the
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fundamental components of the New Economic Policy to be identified, 
By bringing together the available information, it is possible to 
summarise the principles guiding development planning in Peninsular 
Malaysia today.
(i) The Second Malaysia Plan, 1971 - 1975^ * ^
As envisaged in 1971> the Second Malaysia Plan incorporated a 
"two-pronged New Economic Policy for development" (Federation of 
Malaysia, 1971) P«l)« The New Economic Policy has two main policy 
platforms, or ‘prongs'. The first prong is the redressal of poverty 
by policies aimed at raising income levels and at increasing oppor­
tunities for employment. The second prong is the restructuring of 
Peninsular Malaysia's socio-economic system so that race should be 
associated no longer with socio-economic status.
More specifically, the first prong of poverty eradication is to 
be achieved by:
"( i) Increasing the productivity and income of those 
in low productivity occupations through the 
adoption of modem techniques and better use of 
facilities. Measures for this purpose include 
programmes for double-cropping, off-season and 
inter-cropping, drainage and irrigation, improved 
marketing and credit, and financial and technical 
assistance to small-scale businesses and industries.
(ii) Increasing opportunities for inter-sectoral move­
ments from low productivity to higher productivity 
activities in new land development schemes, modern 
fishing and forestry projects and in commerce, 
industry and modem services; also the provision 
of financial and technical assistance, education 
and training opportunities and the necessary organ­
isational arrangements to facilitate movements 
into these modem sectors,
(iii) Providing a wide range of free or subsidised social 
services especially designed to raise the living 
standards of the low-income groups. Such services 
include public housing projects, subsidised rates
(Continued)
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(Continued)
for electricity, water and transportation, 
health and medical services, improved 
educational opportunities and increased 
recreational and community facilities"
(Federation of Malaysia, 1971* P*^)»
The restructuring of the socio-economic system so as to correct 
inter-ethnic socio-economic imbalance is to he attained by policies 
and programmes designed tot
"modernise rural life, encourage a rapid and balanced 
growth of urban activities, provide improved education 
and training programmes at- all levels, and above all, 
ensure the creation of a Malay commercial and indust­
rial community in all categories and at all levels of 
operation, in order that within one generation 
Malays and other indigenous people can be full part­
ners in the economic life of the nation"
(Federation of Malaysia, 1971» P*6).
Mid-Term Review of the Second Malaysia Plan reiterated the
information presented above, and added that "new growth centres" 
(Federation of Malaysia, 1973» p.20) would be established as part of 
the effort to restructure the socio-economic framework. The Mid-Term
Review said also that the most important parts of the New Economic 
Policy were:
"( i) generation of employment opportunities to bring 
about full employment of the labour force;
(ii) growth and redistribution of ownership of economi­
cally productive assets so that within a generation 
the Malays and other indigenous people will own and 
operate at least J0% of the total"
(Federation of Malaysia, 1973> p.62).
The main features of the Second Malaysia Plan are summarised in 
Table 6,1. Table 6,1 shows that the original expenditure planned for 
the public sector over the period 1971 - 1975 was M$5»868.12 million,
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Notes to Table 6.1
(a) The figures given in Table 6.1 are the unrevised expenditures 
presented originally in the Second Malaysia Plan.
(b) Estimated.
(c) The sum of the Second Malaysia Plan's expenditures on Agriculture; 
Rubber Replanting; Land Development; Drainage and Irrigation; 
Forestry; Animal Husbandry; Fisheries; Agricultural Credit and 
Marketing; Agricultural Research; other associated activities,
(d) The Second Malaysia Plan's expenditures on Public Works 
Department Plant and Equipment was contained within the category 
Transport.
(e) Allocated expenditure was to Geological Survey Department 
(M$0.50 millions) and Feasibility Studies (M$23-26 millions). 
Actual expenditure was Geological Survey Department (M$0.44 
millions) and Feasibility Studies (M$28.94 millions).
(f) Expenditure on Sewerage; Culture, Youth and Sports; Community 
Services; Welfare, Aborigines (Qrang Asli); Land.
(g) Expenditure on General Administration.
(h) The Security Expenditure of the Second Malaysia Plan included 
Defence and Police. The break-down of the Security expenditure 
was as follows:
DEFENCE
POLICE
TOTAL
PLANNED 
EXPENDITURE 
M$ MILLIONS
813.07
181.00
ACTUAL 
EXPENDITURE 
M$ MILLIONS
764.89
179.05
994.07 943.94
Sources: adapted and compiled from data presented in Federation of
Malaysia, 1971» Table 5-1t Public Development Expenditure 
1966 - 75J- and Federation of Malaysia, 1976, Table 12-3» 
Public Development Expenditure, 1971 - 80.
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with actual expenditure totalling M$8,075*83 million. The Second 
Malaysia Plan revealed the traditional Peninsular Malaysian emphasis 
on 'economic' as opposed to 'social' development. This is shown in 
hoth planned expenditure (66.4% to'economic', 14,2% to 'social') and 
in actual expenditure (71.5% to 'economic', 14.0% to 'social') on 
these two sectors.
Table 6.1 shows also that the attainment of ''economic' expendi­
ture was rather better than that of 'social* expenditure. 'Economic* 
development was 148,0% attained overall, with the Commerce and Industry 
category receiving expenditure (M$l,542.3^ millions) nearly three times 
the Plan allocation (M$564.53 millions). Overall 'social* development 
targets (135*5% fulfilled) were not attained quite so well as the 
overall 'economic' development targets (148.0% fulfilled) and it must 
be remembered that the allocations to 'social' development were much 
lower than those to 'economic' development. It must be noted also that 
one 'social' category - Health and Family Planning - was under-attained 
quite noticeably, receiving only 84.4% of planned expenditure.
(ii) The Third Malaysia Plan, 1976 - 1980^129^
The Second Malaysia Plan was a "blueprint for the New Economic 
Policy" (Federation of Malaysia, 1971» P*v). The Third Malaysia Plan 
expanded upon its predecessor, and emphasised further the two main 
prongs of the New Economic Policy. The New Economic Policy continued 
to be:
"a socio-economic policy designed to achieve national 
unity through the two-pronged objectives of eradicating 
poverty irrespective of race and restructuring society to 
eliminate the identification of race with economic 
function"
(Federation of Malaysia, 1976, p.2).
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In this respect the Third Malaysia Plan is merely the Second 
Malaysia Plan writ large. However, taking its lead from the Second 
Malaysia Plan, the Third Malaysia Plan lists more fully the objectives 
of the New Economic Policy. According to the Third Malaysia Plan,
"the overall goals of the NEP comprise the following objectives:
( i) employment creation at a rate sufficient to
reduce current levels of unemployment and event” 
ually bring about full employment of the labour 
force;
( ii) expansion cf the incomes and productivity of all
those engaged in low productivity rural and urban 
occupations by increasing their access to oppor­
tunities to acquire skills, land, capital and 
other necessary inputs and by eliminating 
underemployment;
(iii) enlargement of opportunities for those engaged 
in low productivity occupations to move to more 
productive endeavours in agriculture, forestry, 
fisheries, mining, construction, transportation, 
manufacturing, commerce and services industries;
( iv) reduction of existing inequalities in the distri­
bution of income between income and racial groups;
( v) modernization of rural life and improvement of 
living conditions among the urban poor through 
the provision of a wide range of social services * 
including public housing, electricity, water 
supply, sanitation, transportation, health and - 
medical services and recreational and community 
facilities;
( vi) creation of a commercial and industrial community 
among the Malays and other indigenous people in 
order that, within one generation, they will own 
and manage at least 30$ of the total commercial 
and industrial activities of the country in all 
categories and scales of operation;
(vii) restructuring of sectoral and occupational employ­
ment patterns in the various sectors of the economy 
so that they reflect the racial composition of the 
country by 1990; and
(viii) expansion of education and training facilities, 
other social services and the physical infra­
structure of the country to effectively support 
the attainment of the above objectives"
(Federation of Malaysia, 1976, p.5l)■
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The Third Malaysia Plan departs from the two main prongs of the 
New Economic Policy stated already - the eradication of poverty and 
the restructuring of society - by adding a third objective. This 
third prong is the provision of security in Peninsular Malaysia.
Since the end of the Second World War, Peninsular Malaysia has 
been plagued by a Communist guerilla 'problem'. The sporadic recrude­
scence of militant Communism over the years since the end of the 
Emergency - especially since the events of May, 1969 - has forced the 
government to consider the Communist guerilla 'problem* as a growing 
menace to the attainment of national unity by way of the New Economic 
P o l i c y , g 0VernlIien^  has stated its apprehension that 
Communist guerilla activity might hinder the progress of socio­
economic development (Federation of Malaysia, 19?6, p.101). Thus, 
although eradication of poverty and restructuring of the socio­
economic system remain the primary means by which national unity is 
to be achieved,
"it is now recognised that this must be achieved not 
only through eradication of poverty and restructuring 
society, but also through the maintenance and improve­
ment of the security of the nation"
(Federation of Malaysia, 1976, p.9l)»
The Second Malaysia Plan and the Third Malaysia Plan both state 
that the objectives of the New Economic Policy are to be achieved 
within the time-span of one generation, and a period of twenty years 
has been set aside as the time-scale over which the New Economic 
Policy will be implemented. This time-scale applies particularly to 
the attainment of the two original, and most important prongs of the 
New Economic Policy. Thus, the main aim of the New Economic Policy may
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be summarised as the fulfilment of the two main prongs - eradication 
of poverty and restructuring of the socio-economic system - in the 
period 1970 - 1990.^131')
Table 6.2 summarises the main features of the Third Malaysia
Plan’s allocations to public expenditure. Table 6.2 reveals that a
much greater amount of public development expenditure was allocated to
'economic' rather than 'social' development. 'Economic' development
was allocated 67*9% of the total Plan allocation, with 'social1
development awarded 16,2% of the total. Thus, in terms of planned
expenditure the Third Malaysia Plan shows the traditional Peninsular
(132)Malaysian bias for 'economic' rather than 'social' development. J
6.2c Growth of the Economy
An important feature of development planning in Peninsular
Malaysia today is that the New Economic Policy is to be implemented in
an atmosphere of sustained economic growth. Rapid economic growth is
seen as a "necessary condition" (Federation of Malaysia, 1973j P*&3)
for the achievement of the New Economic Policy's two main prongs,
poverty eradication and the restructuring of the socio-economic system.
The government appreciates that the New Economic Policy cannot bring
about its objective of national unity simply by redistributing the
present national cake. Redistribution of present wealth without
economic growth will serve to alienate the wealthy non-Malay communities,
Consequently, rapid economic growth is vital to the attainment of the
objectives of the New Economic Policy, so that no section of Peninsular
Malaysia's socio-economic system experiences any loss or feels any
(133)sense of deprivation.
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Notes to Table 6.2
(a) The figures given in Table 6.2 are the unrevised planned 
expenditures presented originally in the Third Malaysia Plan.
(b) The sum of the Third Malaysia Plan's expenditures on Agriculture; 
Rubber Replanting; Land Development; Drainage and Irrigation; 
Forestry; Animal Husbandry; Fisheries; Agricultural Credit and 
Marketing; Agricultural Research; other associated activities,
(c) The Third Malaysia Plan's expenditures on Public Works Depart­
ment Plant and Equipment was contained within the category 
Transport.
(d) Allocated expenditure was to Mines Department (M$0,560 millions); 
Geological Survey Department (M$1.^79 millions); Feasibility 
Studies (M$25«000 millions).
(e) Expenditure on Sewerage; Culture, Youth and Sports; Community 
Services; Welfare; Aborigines (prang Aslj); Land.
(f) Expenditure on General Administration.
(g) The Security expenditure of the Third Malaysia Plan included 
Defence and Police. The break-down of the Security expenditure 
was as follows:
PLANNED 
EXPENDITURE 
M$ Millions
POLICE
DEFENCE 1,^70.000
570,000
TOTAL 2,0^ 0.000
Source: adapted and compiled from data presented In Federation of
Malaysia, 19?6, pp.2^0 - 2^1, Table 12-3, Malaysia: Public
Development Expenditure, 1971 - 1980.
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The government has heen at pains to make this point very clear.
In the Foreword to the Second Malaysia Plan the late Tun Abdul Razak 
bin Dato1 Hussein stated that the government
"will spare no efforts to promote national unity and 
develop a just and progressive Malaysian society in 
a rapidly expanding economy so that no one will 
experience any loss or feel any sense of deprivation 
of his rights, privileges, income, job or opportunity"
(Federation of Malaysia, 1971j P*v).
The Third Malaysia Plan also emphasised the point that economic growth 
was vital to the successful implementation of the Hew Economic Policy's 
objectives: "What is sought is redistribution in a context of dynamic
growth so that no particular group experiences’ any loss or feels any 
sense of deprivation in the process" (Federation of Malaysia, 1976, p.8).
6.3 THE FEDERAL LAND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY AMD THE NEW 
ECONOMIC POLICY
In Section 1,2c of Chapter I above it was noted that the 
Federal Land Development Authority has been vested by the Malaysian 
government with much responsibility for achieving the objectives of 
the New Economic Policy, especially in the Malay-dominated rural 
areas. It was pointed out that not only is FELDA the pre-eminent 
agency in the field of Agriculture and Rural Development, but that 
the Authority was raised to this position in the wake of the 1969 
race-riots. The salient features of Section 1.2c above are 
reiterated below.
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First, Table 1.6 above showed that after 1969 land development 
as a whole achieved much greater prominence among development 
planning policies, being elevated from around one-tenth/one-ninth of 
public expenditure on economic and social development under the 
First Malaysia Plan ( 1966 - 1970 ) to around one-seventh/one-sixth 
of equivalent expenditure under the Second Malaysia Plan ( 1971 - 
1975 )* Second, Table I.7 and Table 1.8 above showed that in the 
Agriculture and Rural Development sector of the economy, land 
development by FELDA was elevated dramatically to premier status, that 
land development as an approach became much more important than 
alternative strategies of rural development ( for example, Drainage 
and Irrigation ), and that FELDA was given the lion's share of the 
monies allocated to/expended on land development.
Table 6 .3 builds upon and confirms the position explained in 
Section I.2c, especially the data presented in Table 1.7 and Table 
1.8. Table 6 .3 shows the importance of the Federal Land Development 
Authority and of Other Land Development within the Agriculture and 
Rural Development sector for the First Malaysia Plan ( 1966 - 1970 )
- that is, pre-1969 - and Tor the Second Malaysia Plan ( 1971 - 1975 )
and the Third Malaysia Plan ( 1976 - 1980 )—that is, post-1969. It is
quite clear from Table 6 .3 that not only did the Second Malaysia Plan 
( 1971 - 1975 ) see a sudden and marked swing to land development - 
particularly by FELDA - but that the Third Malaysia Plan ( 1976 - 1980 ) 
consolidated and even accentuated that swing.
As explained in Section I.2c above, in terms of actual expendi­
ture on Agriculture and Rural Development in the First Malaysia Flan
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Table 6*3
Sources and Notes:
(a), (b.), (c.) Estimated,
(d) In, the source Table from which the figures for actual
expenditure for the Third Malaysia Plan (1976-1980)
were obtained, Land Development and Regional Develop­
ment were linked together* Thus, Other Land Develop­
ment for the Third Malaysia Plan (1976-1980) includes 
not only spending on FELCRA and State schemes, but also 
money expended by the various regional development 
authorities, notably Pahang Tenggara, Johore Tenggara, 
and Trengganu Tengah.
(e) Includes expenditure on items such as crop protection
services,' crop production services, soil and agricultural 
services, agricultural extension, agricultural education, 
coconut replanting and rehabilitation, pineapple replanting, 
farm crop subsidies, construction of agricultural buildings, 
and spending by authorities such as Muda Agricultural Devel­
opment Authority ( MADA ),
(f) Includes expenditure on items such as Bank Pertanian
( Agricultural Bank ), Federal Agricultural Marketing 
Authority ( FAMA ), Cooperatives, and Farmers Organisation 
Authority*
(g) Includes expenditure on Malaysian Agricultural Research 
and Development Institute ( MARDI ), Division of Food 
Technology, and Palm Oil Institute Malaysia ( PORIM ).
(h) The source Table from which the figures for actual 
expenditure for the Third Malaysia Plan (1976-1980) were 
obtained did not contain the category "Others".
Sources; the data for First Malaysia Plan (1966-1970) 
and Second Malaysia Plan (1971-1975) actual 
expenditures were obtained from Table 1*7 and 
Table 1*8 above* The figures for Third Mal­
aysia Plan (1976-1980) actual expenditure were 
obtained from Federation of Malaysia, I98I,
Table 6-2, Malaysia: Public Development Expend­
iture* 1971-1980.
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( 1966 - 1970 ) Land Development was second string - though a close 
second - to Drainage and Irrigation, each category taking just over 
one-third ( 94*0% and 36.1% respectively ) of the total expenditure 
( see Table 6*9 ). The two categories together attracted nearly 
three-quarters ( 70.1% ) of total expenditure, with FELDA alone 
attracting just over one-quarter ( 2 7*3% ) of total expenditure on 
Agriculture and Rural Development under the First Malaysia Plan 
( 1966 - 1970 ).
The data for the Second Malaysia Plan ( 1971 “ 1975 ) actual 
expenditure on Agriculture and Rural Development record the sudden 
rise to favour of land development - especially by FELDA - in the 
years immediately post-1969* Second Malaysia Plan ( 1971 “ 1975 ) 
actual expenditure on Land Development was over half ( 56.8% ) of 
total expenditure on Agriculture and Rural Development, and FELDA 
alone now attracted over one-third of expenditure ( 36.9%  )•
In contrast, the leading spender of the First Malaysia Plan ( 1966 - 
1970 ) - Drainage and Irrigation - had ( with 13*7% °f actual 
expenditure ) fallen to the position of very poor second relative 
to all land development, and had spent even less under the Second 
Malaysia Plan ( 1971 - 1975 ) - M$240.Q7 millions - than under the 
First Malaysia Plan ( 1966 - 1970 ) - M$328.5 millions.
The data for the Third Malaysia Plan ( 1976 - 1980 ) actual 
expenditure accentuate the reliance placed on the Federal Land 
Development Authority and land development as a means of prosecuting 
Agriculture and Rural Development under the New Economic Policy,
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Luring the Third Malaysia Plan ( 1976 ~ 1980 ) actual expenditure 
on PELLA alone was 38*1% the total ( M$4*547*56 millions ) 
expended on Agriculture and Rural Levelopment, with Other Land 
Levelopment accounting for a further 20% of the total. The 
next category - Lrainage and Irrigation - attracted only 12.2% 
of Third Malaysia Plan ( 1976 - 19&0 ) actual expenditure on Agri­
culture and Rural Levelopment.
It has been made clear from the information presented in 
Section 1.2c above and confirmed in the present Section ( Section
6.3 ) that the Peninsular Malaysian government has consistently 
regarded land development by the Pederal Land Levelopment Authority 
as the main vehicle for carrying the New Economic Policy into the 
Malay-dominated rural areas, the elevation of PELLA and land devel­
opment to this premier status occuring as a direct consequence of 
the events of 1969* 'Thus, PELLA has been invested by the Malaysian 
government with main responsibility for implementing the New Economic 
Policy's objectives of poverty eradication and restructuring of 
society in the rural areas.
6.4 THE FELERAL LAND LEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY AND THE
RESTRUCTURING OP SOCIETY
As has been noted above, the New Economic Policy has as its 
main prongs the eradication of poverty and the restructuring of 
society. The first prong - poverty eradication - has always 
been a major theme of development plans implemented in Peninsular 
Malaysia. Clearly, no government in Peninsular Malaysia - whether
2?2
pre-independence or post-independence - would relish placing 
before the electorate of that country a development Plan which did 
not have income enhancement stated as a major objective. Thus, 
as noted above, the British-implemented Draft Development Plan 
stated that the "aim of development" was "to make the country more 
prosperous" ( Federation of Malaya, 1950, p.124 )» in the same 
vein the First Malaysia Plan ( 1966 - 1970 ) stated that the over­
riding goal of planning was a happier and more prosperous Malaysia 
( Federation of Malaysia, 19&5» P*1 )*
However, the Mew Economic Policy has a second prong - the 
restructuring of society - and it is the emphasis placed upon 
this second prong by the Second Malaysia Plan ( 1971 - 1975 ) 
and the Third Malaysia Plan ( 1976 - 1980 ) which most clearly 
marks these Plans as different to the pre-1969 Flans. True, pre- 
1969 Plans did pay lip-service to the need to restructure the socio­
economic system. For example, the Draft Development Plan noted 
that rural health and medical services had advanced more slowly 
than had similar urban services, and that the distribution of such 
services would have to be made more even before being extended 
further ( Federation of Malaya, 1950, p.6 ). Similarly, the First 
Malaysia Plan ( 1966 - 1970 ) stated that the fruits of economic 
growth had been distributed unevenly, and that economic growth 
would be needed if this situation were to be remedied without 
disruptive redistribution of wealth ( Federation of Malaysia, I966, 
p.6 ). Even so, in the pre-1969 Plans restructuring of the 
socio-economic system was counted much less important than the
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creation of wealth and the eradication of poverty.
By contrast, under the New Economic Policy enshrined in the 
Second Malaysia Plan ( 1971 ” 1975 ) and. the Third Malaysia Plan 
( 1976 - 1980 )j restructuring of the socio-economic system has 
been vested with an importance equal to that accorded traditionally 
to poverty eradication. In the Second Malaysia Plan ( 1971 - 1975 ) 
Chapter III is devoted to Economic Balance, and Poverty Eradication 
and Racial Economic Balance are dealt with in Chapter I*X of the 
Third Malaysia Plan ( 1976 - 1980 ). The emphasis placed upon the 
restructuring of society in the post-1969 Plans as compared with 
the pre-1969 Plans means that the Federal Land Development Auth­
ority’s role in respect of this second prong of the New Economic 
Policy merits closer scrutiny.
Exactly what is meant by the '*restructuring of society” in 
the Peninsular Malaysian context is best answered by the following 
quotation from the Second Malaysia Plan ( 1971 - 1975 ):
"The second prong of the New Economic Policy is 
aimed at restructuring the society so that the 
present identification of race with particular 
forms of economic activity will eventually be 
eliminated. The Plan outlines policies and 
programmes to modernise rural life, encourage a 
rapid and balanced growth of urban activities, 
provide improved education and training prog­
rammes at all levels, and above all, ensure 
the creation of a Malay commercial and indus­
trial community in all categories and at all 
levels of operation, in order that within one 
generation Malays and other indigenous people 
can be full partners in the economic life 
of the nation"
( Federation of Malaysia, 1971> P«6 ).
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This particular quotation is very apt, "because it embodies 
both the long-term and the short-term aims of the restructuring 
objective. The first sentence of the quotation suggests that a 
long-term aim is the eventual elimination of the identification of 
race with particular economic 'activity. However, the quotation 
indicates also that a short-term aim is more important, for the 
main thrust of policies and programmes is to "above all, ensure 
the creation of a Malay commercial and industrial community..."
( Federation of Malaysia, 1971 » P*6 )*
Thus, although there is some long-term commitment to create 
a socio-economic system in which racial employment in all categories 
and at all levels is in direct ratio to the proportions of Malays, 
Chinese, and Indians in the Peninsular Malaysian population, in 
practice it is the creation of a Malay commercial and industrial 
community which is the core of the New Economic Policy’s restruc­
turing objective. The eventual elimination of the identification 
of race with economic function and social status means in theory 
that non-Malays will in future share equally in those activities 
and occupations which at present they do not favour, or to which 
they are presently denied access. However, neither the Second 
Malaysia Plan ( 1971 - 1975 ) nor the Third Malaysia Plan ( 1976 - 
1980 ) pay much regard to the ways in which the intersectoral 
movement of non-Malays might be achieved. Instead, the two 
Plans concentrate almost entirely on restructuring the socio­
economic system from the Malay viewpoint. In other words, as 
regards restructuring of the socio-economic system the Plans
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accord priority to the elevation of Malays to those economic 
positions and categories which are traditionally the preserve of 
non-Malays’; The political strength of the Malays allows of no 
contrary course of action.
The Second Malaysia Plan ( 1971 - 1975 ) and the Third Malaysia 
Plan ( 1976 - 1980 ) are replete with strategems designed to ensure 
that such inter-sectoral movement of Malays occurs as quickly as 
possible. Por example, the Second Malaysia Plan ( 1971 “ 1975 ) 
states that
’’The Government has set a target that within a 
period of 20 years, Malays and other indig­
enous people will manage and own at least 30% 
of the total commercial and industrial activities 
in all categories and scales of operation.
The Government has also stipulated that the 
employment pattern at all levels and in all 
sectors, particularly the Modern Rural and 
Modern Urban Sectors, must reflect the racial 
composition of the population"
( Federation of Malaysia, 1971? p*41 )*
Similarly, the Third Malaysia Plan ( 1976 - 1980 ) states:
"The NEP has set as its target the ownership 
and management by Malays and other indigen­
ous people of at least 30% of commercial 
and industrial activities in the economy 
and an employment structure at all levels 
of operation and management that reflects 
the racial composition of the nation by 1990"
( Federation of Malaysia, 1976, p.30 ).
A close scrutiny of the Second Malaysia Plan ( 1971 - 1975 ) 
and of the Third Malaysia Plan ( 1976 - 1980 ) leaves no doubt that 
the creation of a Malay commercial and industrial community is the
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paramount objective of any socio-economic restructuring expected 
to occur under the New Economic Policy. The political realities of 
Peninsular Malaysia permit no alternative, certainly not in the 
short-term. The following paragraphs will first show how the 
Peninsular Malaysian government intends to create a Malay commerc­
ial and industrial community - principally by establishing or 
strengthening certain specialised agencies and authorities - and 
will then discuss the relationship between the Federal Land Devel­
opment Authority and the agencies and authorities charged with this 
special mission.
There are many agencies, authorities, and programmes which 
can be expected to have some impact upon the restructuring of the 
socio-economic system in general, and upon the creation of a Malay 
commercial and industrial community in particular. Given that 
Malays form the bulk of both the rural population and of the 
relatively poor population, then all strategems which aim to raise 
income - especially among rural dwellers - may be expected to have 
some effect in this regard. Thus the Malaysian Handicraft Board, 
the National Padi and Rice Authority ( NAPRA ), the Rubber Industry 
Smallholders Development Authority ( RISDA ), the Federal Agricul­
tural Marketing Authority ( FAMA ), Bank Pertanian ( Agricultural 
Bank ), the Federal Industrial Development Authority ( FIDA ), 
Malaysian Industrial Development Finance ( MIDF ), and a host of 
others can all be expected to contribute to the creation of a 
Malay commercial and industrial community. Even so, the activities 
of these organisations are not - or certainly should not be -
27?
limited to this objective, and they also provide assistance to 
the non-Malay population.
However, there are some agencies and programmes reserved to 
the Malays in order to help them become more commercialised and 
industrialised. The most important of these specialised agencies 
are Majlis Amanah Ra1ayat ( MARA, or Council for the Development of 
the Indigenous People ), Perbadanan Nasional Berhad ( National 
Committee Limited, or PERN AS ), Urban Development Authority ( UDA ), 
and the various State Economic Development Corporations ( SEDC’s ).
In addition, there is special financial assistance to Malays from 
bodies such as Bank Bumiputra, Bank Pembangunan Malaysia ( Develop­
ment Bank of Malaysia ), and the Bumiputra Investment Pund.
MARA was established in 1966 "to assist and promote the 
participation of Malays and other indigenous people in commerce 
and industry" ( Federation of Malaysia, 1971» P*15 )? its 
objective is
"to stimulate, guide, train and help the Bumi- 
puteras to participate actively and progress 
in trade and industrial activities by paying 
special attention to the rural population 
based on the New Economic Policy"
( Federation of Malaysia, 1979a, p.424 )
PERNAS, incorporated in 19&9> was
"created in order to give the Bumiputeras the 
organisational strength, management expert­
ise and the financial backing that would 
enable them to play a more active role in 
the industrial and commercial development 
of the nation"
( Federation of Malaysia, 1979&, P«424 )
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UDA was established "in line with the New Economic Policy"
( Federation of Malaysia, 1979a, p.428 ) in November, 1971> 
in order
"to assist Malays and other Bumiputeras 
( indigenous peoples ) to manage and own 
at least 30 per cent of the total comm­
ercial and industrial activities in the 
urban areas of the country within a span 
of 20 years"
( Federation of Malaysia, 1979a, p.428 ).
Last, the State Economic Development Corporations were var­
iously established between I964 ( Selangor ) and 1973 ( Perils ), 
and they
"constitute the principal arms of the State 
Governments in the promotion of economic 
development generally as well as greater 
participation by the Malays and other 
indigenous people in commerce and industry"
( Federation of Malaysia, 1976, p.196 ).
That MARA, PSRNAS, UDA, and the SEDC's are the main agencies
and authorities specifically designed to create a Malay commercial 
and industrial community is clear from the text and allocations of 
the Second Malaysia Plan ( 1971 - 1975 ) the Third Malaysia 
Plan ( 1976 - 1980 )• Therefore - given the status of the Federal 
Land Development Authority in socio-economic development planning
in Peninsular Malaysia - there is much to be gained from a compar­
ison between these agencies and authorities on the one hand, and 
FELDA on the other, especially in terms of monies allocated and 
monies expended. Table 6.4 offers such a comparison.
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Table 6.4 ( Comparison Between Federal Land Development 
Authority and Agencies/Programmes Designed to Create a Malay 
Commercial and Industrial Community ) shows that the land develop­
ment agencies have between them consistently been allocated greater 
sums ( and have consistently spent greater sums ) than MARA, PSRNAS, 
UDA, and the SEDC’s combined. For example, Second Malaysia Plan 
( 1971 “ 1975 ) allocation to land development was M$795*14 millions, 
whereas the total allocated to MARA, PSRNAS, UDA, and the SEDC1 s 
was M$403*68 millions. Similarly, Third Malaysia Plan ( 1976 - 
1980 ) actual expenditure on land development ( M$2 ,642 .94 millions ) 
was nearly double ( 179*2% ) actual expenditure by MARA, PERNAS,
UDA, and the SEDC's combined ( M$1,475*1C millions ). Indeed,
FELDA alone was allocated more under the Second Malaysia Plan 
( 1971 - 1975 ) ^8. spent more under the Third Malaysia Plan 
( 1976 - 1980 ) than these latter agencies together.
Table 6 .4  shows that in terms of actual expenditures there 
is an important contrast between the Second Malaysia Plan ( 1971 - 
1975 ) anh "the Third Malaysia Plan ( 1976 - 1980 ). Under the 
Second Malaysia Plan ( 1971 - 1975 ) land development targets were 
124.8% attained overall. Indeed, FELDA spent only slightly more 
( 110,8% ) than its allocation. In contrast, the agencies charged 
with creating a Malay commercial and industrial community exceeded 
their allocations markedly. For example, the SEDC’s spent over 
four times ( 417*7%  ) their ( admittedly small ) allocation, and 
overall MARA’s, PERNAS!s, UDA's and the SEDC’s allocations were 
227.3% attained.
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Table 6.if
Sources and Notes:
(a),(b) Estimated.
(c) Source: Table 1.8 above.
(d) Source: Federation of Malaysia, 1976, Table 16-3,
Malaysia: Public Development Expenditure 
for Agricultural Programmes. 1971-1980*
(e) Source: Table 6-3 above.
(f) Source: Table 1.7 above.
(g) The sources of the data for these agencies and programmes
are:
(i) Second Malaysia Plan (1971-1975) original allocation: 
Federation of Malaysia, 1971, Table 5-1, Public 
Development Expenditure. 1966-1973;
(ii) Second Malaysia Plan (1971-1975) actual expenditure 
and Third Malaysia Plan (1976-1980) original 
allocation: Federation of Malaysia, 1976, Table
12-3, Malaysia: Public Development Expenditure. 
1971-1980;
(iii) Third Malaysia Plan (1976-1980) actual expenditure: 
Federation of Malaysia, 1981, Table 6-2, Malaysia: 
Public Development Expenditure. 1971-1980.
(k) Ma.ilis Amanah. Pa1 a.yat. or Council for the Development
of the Indigenous People.
(i) Perbadanan Nasional Berhad. or National Committee Limited,
(j) Urban Development Authority.
(k) State Economic Development Corporations*
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However, under the Third Malaysia Plan ( 1976 - 1980 ) these 
positions were reversed. Overall, the land development agencies 
spent 164.8% of their allocations, with FELDA overspending by 
three-quarters ( 175*9% ) already large allocation ( M$985*020 
millions ), Conversely, the overspending by the agencies designed 
to create a Malay commercial and industrial community - 114*5% of 
allocated expenditure - was much lower than that under the previous 
Plan. Only PEREAS appeared to hold its position; UDA and the 
SEDC’s overspent by much smaller proportions than they had under 
the Second Malaysia Plan ( 1971 - 1975 )» and MARA was able to 
spend only 82.9% of its Third Malaysia Plan ( 1976 - 1980 ) 
allocation.
The data in Table 6 .4 suggest that under the Second Malaysia 
Plan ( 1971 - 1975 ) some attempt was made to give equal status to
land development on the one hand, and to the creation of a Malay
commercial and industrial community on the other. This is attested 
to by the considerable overspending achieved by MARA, PEREAS, UDA, 
and the SEDC’s, and by the fact that total expenditure by these 
agencies (M$917*64 millions ) was not far removed from that on land 
development ( M$992.31 millions ). _ The total of these two expendi­
tures ( M$992.31 millions and M^9^*7*64 millions ) is MJ2> 1,909*95 
millions, of which they are 52.0% and 48.0% respectively. Indeed,
MARA, PEREAS, UDA, and the SEDC's together spent much more than did
FELDA ( $645*14 millions ).
However, the data in Table 6 .4 suggest also that this position 
of relative equality was not maintained during the Third Malaysia
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Plan ( 1976 - 1980 ), As noted above, under the Third Malaysia
Plan ( 1976 - 1980 ) MARA, PERNAS, IjDA, and the SEDC1 s were much
less successful in attaining allocated targets than they had been 
in the previous five-year period. Conversely, the land development 
agencies - especially the Federal Land Development Authority - were 
more successful in this respect than they had been under the Second 
Malaysia Plan ( 1971 - 1975 )• Also, if the total expenditure on 
land development ( M$2,642.94 millions ) and that by MARA, PEENAS,
UDA, and the SEDC’s ( $1,475*10 millions ) are added, then the former 
is 64-2%  and the latter 35*8% of the total M$4>118.04 millions, a 
noticeable shift from their nearly equivalent positions at the end 
of the Second Malaysia Plan ( 1971 - 1975 )* Indeed, Third Malaysia
Plan ( 1978 - 1980 ) expenditure by KARA, PERNAS, UDA, and the SEDC' s
( M$1,475*10 millions■) was only 85.1% of the expenditure ( M$1,732*71 
millions ) by FELDA alone, whereas under the Second Malaysia Plan 
( 1971 ~ 1975 ) these agencies had spent nearly half as much again 
( 142.1% ) as FELDA, M$917*64 millions as compared with M$645*14 
millions.
Table 6 .4 appears to show that - despite some near equivalence 
of status under the Second Malaysia Plan ( 1971 - 1975 ) ”* by the 
end of the Third Malaysia Plan ( 1978 - 1980 ) the Federal Land 
Development Authority was in a very strong position vis-a-vis 
those agencies charged specifically with the creation of a Malay 
commercial and industrial community. Not only did the Authority 
spend rather more than MARA, PERNAS, UDA, and the SEDC's combined 
( M$1 ,732.71 millions, compared with M$1,475*10 millions ) under
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the Third Malaysia Flan ( 1976 - 1980 ), hut the data for over­
spending suggest that the Federal Land Development Authority today 
has much greater momentum than the agencies intended to create a 
Malay commercial and industrial community. This point will he 
returned to in Chapter 8.
6.5 CONCLUSION
The nature of development planning in Peninsular Malaysia today 
is revealed in the Second Malaysia Plan and the Third Malaysia Plan. 
Modern development planning in Peninsular Malaysia is guided hy the 
New Development Strategy, which strategy has aims hoth long-term and 
short-term. The long-term aim is to evolve a National Ideology, or 
Rukun Negarat hased on traditions, loyalties and institutions common 
to all Malaysians, so as to establish "a true Malaysian identity 
hased on national pride and a sense of belonging” ( Federation of 
Malaysia, 1976, p.93 )• short-term aim is more prosaic, and
involves the implementation of the New Economic Policy.
For reasons noted above, the short-term objectives of the New 
Economic Policy are more pressing in their immediacy than the long­
term goal of Rukun Negara. Consequently, development planning in 
Peninsular Malaysia today revolves around the necessity to implement 
the New Economic Policy's two major prongs - the eradication of 
poverty and the restructuring of the socio-economic system - by 1990, 
so as to forestall a repetition of the race-riots of May, 1969* and in 
order to remove the inter-ethnic socio-economic imbalances identified 
as the main barrier to national unity in Feninsular Malaysia.
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The main features of the complex web that is socio-economic 
development planning in Peninsular Malaysia today are summarised 
below# The "triple thrusts of the Third Malaysia Plan"
( federation of Malaysia, 197&, P*v ) a**e 'the three prongs of the 
New Economic Policy:
I. Eradication of Poverty
This will involve programmes aimed at
( i) raising incomes and productivity of persons in 
poorly paid and unproductive occupations;
( ii) providing employment in order to alleviate 
unemployment and underemployment, so as to 
bring about eventually full employment of 
the labour force;
II. Restructuring of the Socio-Economic System
This will involve programmes aimed at
( i) improving the quality of life of the poor by 
providing physical infrastructure and social 
services;
( ii) providing an urban environment and regional 
growth centres;
(iii) creating a Malay commercial and industrial 
community owning at least 30%  of productive 
assets;
( i-v) facilitating intrasectoral and intersectoral 
movements so that race should cease to be 
identified with social status or economic 
function; and
III. Improvement of Security
These objectives - particularly the first two - necessitate 
that the New Economic Policy be implemented in the context of a 
rapidly expanding economy if they are to be achieved successfully.
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It has been emphasised in Chapter 6 that the main priorities 
of national socio-economic development planning in Peninsular 
Malaysia today are the first two prongs of the New Economic Policy, 
namely the eradication of poverty and the restructuring of the 
socio-economic system. It has also been emphasised - in Section 
1.2c, Chapter 2, and Section 6.3 - that since 1969 the Malaysian 
government has placed upon the Federal Land Development Authority 
the main responsibility for the implementation of its New Economic 
Policy in the Malay-dominated rural areas. The remainder of this 
thesis will assess the ability of the Federal Land Development 
Authority to meet the responsibility placed upon it by the Malaysian 
government, by paying particular attention to FELDA1s ability to 
contribute to the attainment in the rural areas of the two prongs 
of the New Economic Policy : the eradication of poverty and the
restructuring of the socio-economic system.
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 6
118. It has "been stated that "the trauma of racial riots led to a 
critical self-analysis of what went wrong and the formul­
ation of new approaches towards strengthening national unity"
( Federation of Malaysia, 1976, p.1 ). The extent to which 
the "critical self-analysis" arising from the race-
riots came up with the New Development Strategy, and the 
extent to which this new approach is motivated hy a laudable 
desire for "national unity" per se, is open to discussion.
What cannot be doubted is that the crisis of 19^9 was instru­
mental in bringing about the replacement of the 'old guard' 
of conservative UMNO politicians ( e.g. Tunku Abdul Razak 
and Tunku Abdul Rahman ) by younger, more radical men (e.g.
Dato' Hussein Onn and Dr. Mahathir Mohamad ), and that it is 
quite possible to view the New Economic Policy as a means of 
advancing the Malays at the expense of the non-Malays. True, 
the UMNO-dominated government of Peninsular Malaysia can say 
with justification that amelioration of the lot of the dis­
advantaged Malays is a pre-requisite for national unity, but 
the cynic ( or the non-Malay? ) might suggest that this worthy 
aim is merely a cover for nepotism, as the Malay-dominated 
government seeks to justify a New Economic Folicy which favours 
the Malay community. However, although the motives of the 
Malaysian government may be disputed, there is no doubting 
that the New Economic Policy now forms the core of national 
planning in Peninsular Malaysia, and that it has done so since 
the start of the Second Malaysia Plan ( 1971 - 1975 )• I am 
grateful to Dr. H. Demaine for advice on these points,
119. The New Development Strategy forms the burden of Chapter 1 of
the Second Malaysia Plan. See Federation of Malaysia, 1971 » PP*1”9*
120. The Fourth Malaysia Plan, 1981 - 19^5 had. not been published
when the body of this thesis was being written. However, the 
Plan is now available.
121. The Second Malaysia Plan was 267 pages long, whereas the Third 
Malaysia Plan was 430 pages long.
122. Federation of Malaysia, 1973* Mid-Term Review of the Second
Malaysia Plan, ( Government Press, Kuala Lumpur ).
123. Loyalty to the country and the status of Malay as the Bahasa
Kebangsaan (National Language) are particularly contentious 
issues. The Malays consider themselves bumiputera ('princes or 
sons of the soil'), and Peninsular Malaysia is to them Tanah 
Melayu, the 'Malay Land' . In the past, many non-Malays - 
especially Indians - have maintained close links with their 
countries of origin, and have either repatriated capital to those 
places or have indulged in extended visits 'home'. One way in 
which non-Malays can demonstrate to the Malays that they now 
consider Peninsular Malaysia to be 'home', and that they are
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loyal to their adopted homeland, is to sever - or at least to 
reduce - such links. The question of Malay as the national 
language has become very contentious in recent years, many non- 
Malays having feared that those unfamiliar with the Malay language 
would be disadvantaged. Today, facility in Malay is necessary 
for advancement in many fields - e.g. politics, education - 
although English remains the official and widely-used second 
language•
124. "The evolution of a Malaysian national identity will be based on 
an integration of all the virtues from the various cultures in 
Malaysia, with the Malay culture forming its core" (Federation 
of Malaysia, 1976, p.94)»
125. Coupled with Malay dissatisfaction with their own progress in 
the socio-economic field.
126. Referring to the Third Malaysia Plan, Datuk Hussein Onn said:
"The Plan is an action-oriented agenda of policies, programmes 
and projects to spearhead further progress towards the building 
of a united, secure, socially just and resilient nation as envis­
ioned in the Rukunegara within the time frame of the present 
generation" (Federation of Malaysia, 1976, p.v) .
127. The successful attainment of these two objectives is seen as a 
precondition for the achievement of national unity: "while 
there must be no delusion that national unity can be achieved 
by purely economic means, the eradication of poverty and the 
restructuring of the society and economy are necessary conditions 
for national unity" (Federation of Malaysia, 1971> P»4)*
128. Federation of Malaysia, 1971 » Second Malaysia Plan, 1971 - 1975? 
(Government Press, Kuala Lumpur)•
129• Federation of Malaysia, 1976, Third Malaysia Plan, 1976 - 1980, 
(Government Px*ess, Kuala Lumpur) •
130. Whilst the existence of communist guerillas in Peninsular 
Malaysia is undoubted, the threat posed by such subversive ele­
ments is not clear. The communist activists of Peninsular 
Malaysia are not the irresistible force that they have recently 
been proved to be in Vietnam, and it is possible that the govern­
ment sees in the communist 'problem* a potential excuse for 
shortcomings in the implementation of the New Economic Policy.
For instance, the government has warned that there will be necess­
ary "a substantial allocation of resources for the strengthening 
of the country's security forces" (Federation of Malaysia, 1976, 
p.42), and this will presumably take money which would otherwise 
be diverted to socio-economic development.
131, By contrast, the government has set no date by which the Communist 
guerilla problem of Peninsular Malaysia is expected to be exting­
uished. However, in recent years several sustained efforts have 
been made to attack the guerillas in their jungle lairs.
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132. At the time of writing of the body of this thesis
the Fourth Malaysia Plan. 1981-1983 was unavailable. 
This accounts for the omission of actual expend­
iture from Table 6.2. However, the Fourth Malaysia 
Plan has recently been published, and the actual 
expenditures of the Third Malaysia Plan are con­
tained within the Fourth Malaysia Plan document. 
These actual expenditures were 1 economic * develop­
ment M$I3,570*79 millions ( 64.0% ) 9. ’social' 
development M$3>635.99 millions ( 17.1% ), 'general 
government’ M$465.32 millions ( 2.2% ), and 
'security' M$3S529.80 millions ( 16.6% ), total 
M$2I,20I.90 millions ( 100.0% ), proportions not 
dissimilar to those presented in Table 6.2. See 
Federation of Malaysia, 1981, Table 6-2, Malaysia: 
Public Development Expenditure. 1971-1980.
133* It is imperative that the growth of the economy be 
sustained if the amelioration of the Malays' low 
socio-economic status is not to be attended by the 
inter-ethnic quarrels which will occur otherwise. 
Maintenance of the balance of power between the 
Malays and the non-Malays - especially the Chinese - 
remains the short-term imperative, whilst at the 
same time efforts are made to channel growth so that 
the long-term national unity objective might be 
achieved.
134. The subdivision of programmes into those aimed at 
eradication of poverty on the one hand, and those 
aimed at restructuring of the socio-economic system 
on the other, is partly for the sake of convenience. 
Clearly, the socio-economic system of Peninsular 
Malaysia is a complex web of interlinkages, and 
programmes aimed at the one objective will often 
have some effect upon the other. Indeed, it is a 
sensible use of limited resources if one programme 
can be made to contribute to the attainment of both 
the eradication of poverty and the restructuring of 
the socio-economic system.
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CHAPTER ?
The Contribution of the Federal Land Development 
Authority to the Attainment of the Objectives of 
the Hew Economic Policy
7.1 INTRODUCTION
It was revealed in Chapter 6 that modern development planning 
in Peninsular Malaysia is guided hy the New Development Strategy, of 
which the New Economic Policy is by far the more important component. 
The main objectives of the New Economic Policy were summarised at the
i
end of Chapter 6. The government of Peninsular Malaysia intends that 
these objectives be attained by 1990*
It is the aim of Chapter 7 to assess the contribution of the 
Federal Land Development Authority to the attainment of the two main 
prongs of the New Economic Policy! the eradication of poverty and the 
restructuring of the socio-economic system. The assessment of FELDAfs 
contribution to the attainment of these two objectives will be con­
ducted under the following headings:
7.2 ERADICATION OF POVERTY 
7.2a Raising of Incomes;
7.2b Provision of Employment;
7.3 RESTRUCTURING OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC SYSTEM
7.3a Improvement of Physical Infrastructure and 
Provision of Social Services;
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7.3b Provision of Urban Environment and of ■
Regional Growth Centres;
7.3c Creation of Malay Commercial and Industrial 
Community, and Facilitation of Intra­
sectoral and Intersectoral Movements;
7 A  CONCLUSION 
The Conclusion will summarise the main findings in respect of the 
contribution by FELDA to the eradication of poverty and to the 
restructuring of the socio-economic system in Peninsular Malaysia.
7.2 ERADICATION OF POVERTY
It has been claimed that the Federal Land Development Authority 
is contributing to the attainment of the objectives of the New 
Economic Policy by being "actively engaged in the eradication of rural 
poverty" (Addnan Din, 1978, p.87). The New Economic Policy intends 
that this worthy objective be achieved mainly by raising rural incomes 
and by providing employment in rural areas. The first part of Chapter 
7 will assess the extent of the Federal Land Development Authority's 
contribution to the attainment of these two vital goals: the raising
of incomes and the provision of employment.
7.2a Raising of Incomes
The extent to which the Federal Land Development Authority is able 
to raise incomes through its land development and settlement activities 
depends mainly on four factors. These are the age of the scheme, the 
type of main crop grown, FELDA*s particular mode of operation, and the 
world market prices for the commodities produced by the Authority.
These four factors affect the incomes of FELDA settlers for several
(136) reasons. '
£9£
First, a mature FELDA scheme - regardless of type of main crop
- yields incomes higher than those on a very new or on a very old 
scheme. Second, the two main crops grown on the Authority's schemes
- rubber and oil-palm - differ markedly in value. Third, FELDA's 
modus operand! involves the settler in considerable financial indebt­
edness to the Authority, Fourth, FELDA has no control over world 
market prices for its commodities, and fluctuations in world prices are 
"a major source of income instability among settlers" (Blair and Noor, 
1978, p.59)* Income differentials may be either inter-scheme or intra­
scheme in nature.
The first factor governing FELDA1s ability to raise incomes is 
the age of the scheme. This is mainly because the age of the scheme 
governs the stage of growth of the main crop, which in turn determines 
the yield obtained from that crop. A period of time must elapse 
before the crop comes into production, and yield will vary during the 
crop's productive life. Rubber starts to yield after five to seven 
years, reaches its peak of production when between fifteen and seven­
teen years old, and has a productive life of some JO years. Oil-palm 
starts to bear fruit some two to -three years after planting, reaches a
peak of production when about nine or ten years of age, and has a pro-
(117)ductive life of about twenty-five years. J
Apart from its affect upon the growth and yield of the main crop, 
the age of a scheme determines settler incomes in other ways, A 
settler on a new scheme is unable to avail himself easily of traditional‘ 
sources of supply. In the short-term he will not be able to obtain 
food-stuffs from his house-lot garden, fruit trees, or domestic fowl,^^^
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A scheme In a remote area is likely to he far distant from any neigh­
bouring kampungs, with their established shops and traders. In 
addition, it is likely that some time will elapse before settlers will
be able to subsidise their main income by undertaking ancillary
(139)activities, such as setting up small businesses. J
Consequently, on a new scheme a settler may well be restricted 
to satisfying his needs from the scheme FELDA shop. One author (Bahrin, 
1971) has noted that the Authority's scheme shops usually charge 
higher prices, and there is evidence to suggest that the cost of 
living on FELDA schemes is higher than in other rural areas (Syed 
Hussain Wafa, 197^)■
The second factor governing FELDA*s ability to raise incomes is
the type of main crop grown. A major reason for the Authority's
adoption of oil-palm during the 1960s was the decline in the world
market price of rubber. Fluctuations in the world price of rubber led
to a loss of revenue for the country, and to a drop in income for the
settlers. In recent years, prices for oil-palm products on the world
market have been higher than those for rubber. Consequently, the
settler growing oil-palm today can expect to earn an income generally
(140)greater than that of his counterpart growing the latter crop,v J
The third factor governing FELDA's ability to raise incomes is 
the Authority's mode of operation. The nature of FELDA development 
means that the settler is in debt to the Authority for many years.
The settler is supported on the scheme by allowances paid by FELDA for 
work done in crop maintenance. This allowance is reduced progressively 
after the main crop begins to yield. The settler receives income from
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the crop, hut FELDA deducts money from the settler in order to 
defray the expense of scheme development. A substantial proportion of 
the total cost of scheme emplacement must be paid back to the 
Authority before the settler receives title to the land.
In 1966 the rate of repayment of the costs incurred was fixed at 
6 ^ % interest over a 15-year period commencing with the start of pro­
duction of the main crop. One author concluded that the debt incurred 
may give settlers justifiable cause for feeling that the monetary 
rewards of scheme emplacement do not match the returns expected:
"The average level of indebtedness appears high even 
by comparison with the most depressed of rural 
communities in Malaya. The fact that the debts are 
owed to an impersonal organisation rather than to an 
individual entrepreneur may not be of much comfort 
to the FLDA settler"
(Ho, 1 9 6 5 ,  5 . 7 ) ^ ^
The fourth factor Is that of world market price, over which
FELDA has no control. Variations in world prices can cause great
fluctuations in settler incomes, as was demonstrated for oil-palm
settlers by the high prices for palm oil in 197/+. The highest average
(l l±2)net income ever recorded for oil-palm was attained in that year. J 
In respect of price stability, oil-palm prices seem to be more 
unstable than those for rubber (Blair and Noor, 1978).
The interplay of these several factors governing the earnings 
of FELDA settlers has influenced authors' opinions of the success of 
the Authority in raising incomes via its land development and settle­
ment activities. Authors' opinions are influenced by the ages of - 
and the crops grown on - the schemes which they studied.
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Ho studied rubber schemes in the early stages of development, 
and concluded that "most assessments of earnings by FLDA farmers .would 
seem optimistic” (Ho, 1965? p.11).^^^ The contention that rubber 
schemes at an early stage of development generate low incomes has 
received support from MacAndrews, who found that the original incomes 
of settlers on FELDA's first scheme at Bilut Valley were not as high 
as before scheme emplacement. Incomes became higher only after 
the start of rubber tapping (MacAndrews, 1977).^^^
Table 7.1 presents the FELDA Census's findings in respect of 
settler income prior to scheme entry, Table 7.1 shows that prior to 
scheme entry 44.2% of settlers had incomes of M^IOO.O per mensem or 
less. These settlers may be assumed to have benefitted immediately 
from scheme entry, However, the corollary is that 55*8% of settlers 
had incomes per mensem of M$101.0 or greater, and these settlers may 
be assumed to have experienced loss of income on entering the scheme.
In the case of those who enjoyed very good incomes prior to scheme 
entry it would be several years at least before their incomes regained 
their previous high level, and in the cases of the "significant minority 
amounting to over 10% of settlers" who had received an income of over 
M$200.0 per month "it may be surmised that they had moved to FELDA 
schemes with higher expectations" (Addnan Din, 1978, p.87).
More pertinent to our enquiry are the incomes of settlers in 
established schemes, and several authors have assessed the earnings of 
settlers on schemes at - or nearing - m a t u r i t y . I n  1970/1971 Lim 
Sow Ching undertook a study of six FELDA rubber schemes which had been
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TABLE 7.1
Federal Land Development Authority
INCOMES OF FELDA SETTLERS, n 
PRIOR TO SCHEME ENTRY W
MONTHLY INCOME 
CLASSIFICATION 
PRIOR TO SCHEME 
ENTRY (f$)
Number of 
Settlers
% Cumulative
%
No income' 463 1.3 1.3
100 and less 15,285 42.9 44.2
101 - 200 16,139 45-3 89.5
201 - 300 2,886 8.1 97.6
301 - 400 606 1.7 99-3
0 M- 1 La O O 178 0.5 99.8
501 and more 71 0.2 100.0
TOTAL 35,628 100.0 100.0
(a) Monthly income.
Source: adapted from Addnan Din, 1978, Table VI, Settler1s
Income Before Entering FELDA Schemes.
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(146)in existence for some ten years.' J Lim Sow Ching's studies led him 
to conclude that settlers on most FELDA schemes "may he deemed to have 
earned an income (M/200 - M/250 per month) sufficient to provide a 
reasonable standard of living" (Lim Sow Ching, 1976, p.233)*^^^
The figures obtained by Lim Sow Ching in 1970/1971 compared 
favourably with the mean monthly household income for Malays in 1970, 
which stood then at M$172 (Federation of Malaysia, 1976).
In 1975, MacAndrews made a detailed study of four FELDA schemes
chosen as representative of the wide range of the Authority's opera-
(1^8)tions, J MacAndrews found that the average net monthly income of 
settlers on rubber schemes was between M023^ and M$277, depending on 
the size of the rubber-lot, whereas the incomes of settlers on oil- 
palm schemes in the same period ranged from M$802 (for those with an 
8-acre holding) to M$l,218 (for those with a 10 acre holding) 
(MacAndrews, 1977)• The considerable earnings of oil-palm settlers 
about this time are explained by the fact that palm-oil prices were 
very high in 197^.
Bahrin and Perera - drawing on data provided by the Federal Land 
Development Authority - gave the settlers' average monthly net income 
in 1976 as M$338.0 for rubber settlers, and M$36l.O for oil-palm 
settlers (Bahrin and Perera, 1977) These figures are similar to
those supplied by FELDA elsewhere.
In 1976, FELDA undertook a "comprehensive census of all its 
settlers and their households" (Addnan Din, 1978, p.83) in order to 
acquire vital socio-economic data.^*^ Whilst acknowledging the 
problems of variations in income levels apparent in schemes, the FELDA
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TABLE 7.2
Federal Land Development Authority
NET AVERAGE INCOME OF FELDA SETTLERS 
______JANUARY TO NOVEMBER, 1976______
SIZE OF 
HOLDING 
(Acres)
NET AVERAGE INCOME PER MONTH (M$)
OIL-PALM SETTLERS RUBBER SETTLERS
6 - 327.55
7 - 293.35
8 351.07 355.06
10 343.03 -
14 342.51 -
Source: Federal Land Development Authority, 19771),
P.7.
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Census indicated a "considerable increase in average earnings experi­
enced by the majority of settlers since they entered FELDA schemes" 
(Addnan Din, 1978, p.91)* Table 7-3 reveals the average monthly net 
incomes of settlers on oil-palm and rubber schemes between 1973 and 
early 1977. The net monthly averages for 1976 - the latest full year 
for which data are presented - were M$526 for oil-palm settlers, and 
M$365 for rubber settlers (see Table 7*3),
It must be emphasised that average figures such as those just 
presented mask numerous income differentials. Income differentials 
arise from the several causes noted above, and also from variations in 
the levels at which individual settlers maintain their crops, and from 
the crops’ seasonal nature of production.
Wikkramatileke observed a very wide range of income levels on 
the Bilut Valley scheme in 1970* In June of that year one settler 
received an income of M$1,000, a second settler received M$200, and a 
third settler received M$20 (each settler had a ?-a,cre plot of rubber) 
(Wikkramatileke, 1972a),
MacAndrews noted that in 1975 settlers on the oil-palm scheme at 
Bukit Besar received an average of M$750 P©^ month from their holdings, 
ranging from a low of M$200 - M$500, to a high of M$l,500 (MacAndrews, 
1977).
The FELDA Census revealed marked income variations between phases, 
between crops, between seasons, between settlers in the same scheme, and 
through time for individual settlers, The fact that in recent years 
oil-palm settlers have enjoyed consistently net average monthly 
incomes much greater than those earned by rubber settlers is evident 
from the foregoing discussion, and from the data presented in Table 7*3*
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TABLE ?.3
Federal Land Development Authority
AVERAGE MONTHLY NET INCOME OF 
FELDA SETTLERS, 1973 - 1977(a)
Year Income Classi­
fication (b)
INCOME IN M$
Oil-Palm 
schemes
Rubber
schemes
1973 Highest 734 n .a.
Lowest 134 n .a.
Average 453 n.a.
1974 Highest 1,496 536
Lowest 281 156
Average 819 210
1975 Highest 1,021 384
Lowest 222 145
Average 422 229
1976 Highest 979 506
Lowest 292 143
Average 326 3 65
1977 Highest 956 858
(Until Lowest 396 105
March) j Average 640 423
(a) The data presented in Table 7.3 were collected during the 1976 
FELDA Survey, which was implemented between October and 
November of that year (see footnote 138). 'Net' income means 
the amount paid in cash to the settler after deductions for items 
such as settler's loan repayment; settler savings fund; expendi­
tures on agricultural materials or tools; shop credits given in 
advance; payments to settlers fund and organizations. The 
figures presented in Table 7*3 z'efer only to income derived from 
the main crop.
(b) The average income of settlers within a given phase of a scheme 
was calculated month by month for all settled phases, and the 
means of these averages were then determined for each month.
Thus, the highest and lowest figures presented in Table 7 .3 refer 
to the overall average and relate to the months of peak and 
trough income levels, whereas the^  average shown is the monthly 
average for the year, Data on settlers' incomes were obtained 
from the settlers' paysheets, which are processed by computer and 
then stored in the Settlers' Accounting Division at FELDA 
headquarters,
Source: adapted from Addnan Din, 1978, Table VII, Average Monthly
"Net" Income ($).
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The way In which an individual settler's income may vary through 
time is of particular concern to FELDA. Such variations cause diffi­
culties for settlers when planning their household budgets, "and the 
uncertainty over income levels must of necessity engender some degree 
of dissatisfaction" (Blair and Noor, 1978, p.66). Blair and Noor 
state that seasonal variations in yield may cause the lowest possible 
monthly production to be between one-third and one-half of the maximum 
in the case of rubber, and approximately one-half of the maximum for 
oil-palm. The same authorities conclude that such seasonal variations 
may cause income to vary by three times above and below the average.
(154)Another authority suggests that even greater variations are possible. '
Notwithstanding the variations in income on FELDA schemes, and 
the problems inherent in making an assessment, consideration of the 
data leads to the conclusion that the average settler on a mature 
scheme is rendered ultimately much better off as a result of the 
Federal Land Development Authority's activities. The majority of FELDA 
settlers are from the "rural poverty group" (Addnan Din, 1978, p.84), 
and prior to scheme entry the vast majority earned monthly incomes 
much less than they might e;jq?ect on a FELDA scheme (the reader is 
referred again to Table 7«l)* FELDA's stated intention is "to meet 
the national goal of giving the settlers the opportunity of earning a 
monthly income of between M03OO-00 and M$350.00" (Bahrin and Perera,
1977 > p.75)» and even ifthe higher of these figures is taken, FELDA 
has had a "very considerable degree of success in. achieving fulfilment 
of the stipulated target level of income" (Blair and Noor, 1978, p.66)^^^
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Therefore, one must conclude that FELDA5s activities succeed 
ultimately in raising considerably the incomes enjoyed by the vast 
majority of the settlers, and one must concur that
"In general, the present position represents a consid­
erable degree of success In achieving, and often 
surpassing, target income levels, and remedial action 
is generally in hand in cases where the average income 
level is lagging behind that targetted. FELDA has 
thus raised the majority of its established settlers 
from beneath the poverty line to a level substantially 
above it"
(Blair and Noor, 1978, p-5?)»
7.2b Provision of Employment
The government of Peninsular Malaysia states that a main justifi­
cation for land development is the ability of such an approach to 
create employment. Development Plans since 1970 have contended that 
land development is the means most suited to bringing jobs into rural 
areas. Thus the Second Malaysia Plan noted that new land development 
would be the most important factor governing the creation of agricul­
tural employment (Federation of Malaysia, 1971 > P*132) The Mid-
Term Review of the Second Malaysia Plan reiterated the contribution of 
land development to the creation of employment (Federation of Malaysia, 
19731 P«32)» an|l the Third Malaysia Plan has sustained the theme:
"Within the agricultural sector, land development 
will be the major vehicle for the Plan’s objective 
of eradicating poverty, increasing rural incomes 
and expanding job opportunities. The development 
of about one million acres of land is estimated to 
create about 105,000 jobs"
(Federation of Malaysia, 1976, p. 156).^'^
The Federal Land Development Authority acknowledges the great 
importance of land development as a creator of employment, and recognises
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that it has itself an important contribution to make in this respect:
"Land development provides employment not only to 
the settler-families but also to the many contract 
labourers engaged in jungle felling and planting 
operations.
By providing employment opportunities, FELDA con­
tributes to the uplifting of income and livelihood 
of the rural poor and in this way also subscribes 
to the Government's programme of eradicating poverty 
in the rural areas"
(FELDA, 197?b, p.11),
The ability of the Authority to provide employment will be 
assessed below, and the discussion will consider three main points: 
first, the ability of FELDA to provide employment to the settlers 
themselves; second, the ability of FELDA to provide employment to 
settler dependants, particularly the second generation; third, the 
Authority's ability to generate employment in areas near to its 
schemes.
First, the Federal Land Development Authority's ability to pro­
vide employment to the settler depends mainly upon the size of the 
main-crop holding which the settler is allocated, and the size of 
holding which furnishes enough employment to the settler -without 
overtaxing him - is governed by several f a c t o r s , T h e  appropriate 
dimensions depend on factors such as type of crop, season of the year, 
age of the scheme, and the nature of the terrain. For example, 
although oil-palm is a less labour-intensive crop than rubber (Gates, 
et al, 196?, p.14), yet oil-palm is physically very demanding to work. 
The seasonal nature of some tasks means that the settler is unlikely 
to be employed fully throughout the year. The tasks to be performed 
will vary in importance as the scheme matures, Schemes in very hilly 
areas might require a greater input of labour than those blessed with 
more gentle relief.
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The lower limit of holding size is set by the Authority's aim 
to provide certain minimum levels of income and employment, Maximum 
size is influenced by the government's desire that as many people as 
possible benefit from FELDA settlement. The actual size of holdings 
is a compromise between these constraints and requirements.
FELDA has experimented with different sizes of main crop holding 
(181 ^
over the years, ' Today, a FELDA settler is allocated a 'standard' 
holding of 10 acres. However, investigation suggests that the 
Authority's present holding size is not sufficient to provide even the 
settler - let alone others on the scheme - with full employment. Lim 
Sow Ching's 1970/1971 data for six FELDA rubber schemes showed that the 
estimated total labour requirement on these schemes was 6Q*k% of the 
estimated potential supply then employed as tappers on the schemes (Lim 
Sow Ghing, 1976* Table 10.9).^^^ Lim Sow Ching's findings suggested 
strongly that each settler was employed below his full potential, (^3) 
The consultants for the Jengka Triangle Project considered that a 
settler could work between 8 and 10 acres of rubber, and between 10 
and 12 acres of oil-palm (Tippetts and Co., et aL, 1967» p.20). In 
addition, many schemes lack alternative sources of employment, and 
often the settler must rely upon his main crop holding to keep him 
fully occupied.
The data available imply that the standard holding size of 10 
acres is not big enough to provide the settler with continual, full 
employment. The settler may be fully stretched at periods of peak 
yield (Bahrin and Perera, 1977)» But during off-peak periods, and in 
the years before and after the crop reaches maximum production, he is 
likely to be underemployed. This may be particularly the case with 
oil-palm, where the 10 acres allocated to the FELDA settler is much
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smaller than the 14 to 16 acres which private sector oil-palm estates 
consider one man capable of working (Harcharan Singh Khera, 1975)■ ln 
general, the level at which the settler is employed on the scheme may 
"be described at best as adequate,
Second, FELDA1s ability to provide employment for settler depen­
dants must be questioned. The Authority's schemes are designed around 
the requirements of the settler, and in the early days very little 
thought was given to the problems which would be encountered once the 
settlers' children had reached maturity. It was even stated in an 
official FELDA propaganda leaflet that problems of over-population and 
of unemployment on schemes would "solve themselves" (FELDA, 1956, p.l). 
Today, FELDA is aware that - far from having solved themselves - over­
population and under-employment among settler dependants pose serious 
problems,
High levels of unemployment among settler dependants arise from
several causes. First, FELDA selection procedure has always been
biased in favour of potential settlers with large families. The
Authority's schemes are reserved for married men, and a points system
(164)favours settlers with many children, J Second, the inability of 
the holdings to furnish the settlers with full employment means 
necessarily that there is little employment to be found on the holdings 
for settler dependants. Third, many FELDA schemes - especially the new 
schemes - are remote from established kampungs and small towns which 
might offer alternative employment opportunities. Fourth, FELDA 
schemes do not encompass sufficient reserve land to accommodate all 
the dependants who may wish to become FELDA farmers. Fifth, it is 
probable that the settler dependants have aspirations beyond agri­
culture, and the scheme and its environs may not be able to furnish the 
different - non-agricultural - jobs sought by the second generation.
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Lim Sow Ching stated that the average family size on the FELDA 
schemes which he studied in the period 1969 ” 1971 was 9-1 persons, 
and that in the average family children below the age of sixteen 
numbered 4.9 persons (Lim Sow Ghing, 1976).
It has been stated that there is a "progressive decline in the 
number of children per family in the newer schemes as compared with 
the older schemes" (Bahrin and Perera, 1977i P*59), ^ut even so the 
FELDA Census found that the average number of children per settler- 
family was 4.80 persons (Addnan Din, 1978).^^'^
FELDA prefers to settle relatively young farmers on its schemes. 
Thus the chances of a settler's son inheriting the holding from his 
father are very small. Few young men are likely to remain on the 
scheme long enough to inherit, and they cannot look forward realistically 
to this possibility of future employment.
The problem of providing employment for the second generation has 
been with the Federal Land Development Authority for many years.
However, the problem has grown as the settlers' families have matured.
In 1965i Wikkramatileke noted a "tendency towards internal population 
pressures" on schemes, and he described teenagers-as a "minor social 
nuisance" (Wikkramatileke, 1965, p.40l). Only a few years later, with 
reference to the Jengka Triangle, Wikkramatileke considered that 
"impending population pressure within the Jengka schemes is blatantly 
obvious" (Wikkramatileke, 1972b, P-500). Other workers have warned of 
the dangers of future high unemployment levels among settler dependants, 
and the matter has been summarised recently by MacAndrews and Yamamoto: 
"the FELDA mechanism of land development is now creating an appreciable 
pressure for second generation unemployment" (MacAndrews and Yamamoto, 
1975a, p.10).
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The magnitude of the problem of second generation unemploy­
ment may be gauged from the findings of the FELDA Census. Table 7*4 
reveals the occupations ( by occupational groups ) of settlers’ 
children who have completed schooling. The occupational groups 
presented in Table 7*4 preclude detailed analysis ( because the 
^Private Sector Staff” and "Others" categories embrace a wide range 
of occupations ), but one feature stands out from the Table : the 
great number ( 17*087 ) of settlers’children who had completed 
schooling who at the time of the survey declared themselves unemployed. 
These unemployed dependants numbered almost half ( 44*3% ) of the 
total number ( 38,584 ) of settlers' children who had completed 
schooling by 1976. In addition to these children, there must have 
been other dependants - particularly wives, but also elderly rela­
tives - who were resident on FELDA schemes but who were also without 
employment.
Table 7.4 shows also that a significant proportion of those 
who had found work ( 21,497* or 55*7% of the total 38*584 ) were 
employed by FELDA, by other statutory bodies, or by some department 
of government. The settlers’ children with these types of employ­
ment numbered 4*311 ( 1,210 4- 3*101 )» that is 11.1% of the total 
number of settlers’ children who had completed schooling ( 38*584 )» 
and 20.1% of the 21,497 settlers’ children who were reported as 
employed. It would appear that these children at least preferred 
the incomes, Job security and Job satisfaction more likely to be 
found by them in public employment than elsewhere.
The high level of unemployment ( 44*3% ) among settlers’ child-
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TABLE 7.4 
Federal Land Development Authority 
OCCUPATIONS OF SETTLERS' CHILDREN 
WHO HAVE COMPLETED SCHOOLING, 1976
SETTLERS' CHILDREN V/HO HAVE
FIELD OF OCCUPATION COMPLETED SCHOOLING
No. %
EMPLOYED: 21,497 55*7
FELDA STAFF 1,210 3.1
GOVERNMENT AND OTHER 
STATUTORY BODIES’ STAFF 3,101 8.0
PRIVATE SECTOR STAFF 2,082 5.4
OTHERS 15,104 39.1
UNEMPLOYED: 17,087 44.3
TOTAL 38,584 100,0
Source: FELDA, 1978, Table 8.4 ,
Settlers1 Children V/ho Have Completed Schooling by 
Occupational Groups.
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ren who had completed schooling by 1976 may be explained partly 
by a lack of jobs per se, but it is this author’s opinion that a 
further cause was a lack of suitable employment* This observation 
is supported by the PELLA Census of 1976, by personal observation in 
the Jengka Triangle between early-April and mid-June, 1977, and by 
empirical study ( namely that of MacAndrews, 1977 )•
The PELLA Census of 1976 leaves little doubt that the children 
of settlers are educated to a much higher standard than are their 
parents. Indeed, given the great importance which has been attached 
to education in Peninsular Malaysia since independence it would be 
surprising if this were not so. Table 7*5 makes this point 
abundantly clear.
Table 7*5 shows the level of educational attainment of settlers 
and their children at the 1976 survey. Several points can be made 
concerning the data in Table 7*5* First, a small but measurable 
percentage of settlers ( 5*8% ) professed to having no formal school­
ing, whereas all the settlers’ children had acquired at least some 
primary level education. Second, the vast majority of settlers 
( 87.6% ) had acquired primary education only, with a mere 5*8%
( 4*6% + 1.2% ) proceeding to secondary education, and very few 
( 0.7% ) going beyond the upper secondary level ( see note (b) to 
Table 7*5 )* This position contrasts with that for settlers’ 
children who had completed schooling ( of particular relevance here, 
for they will include any job-seekers ). Although the majority 
( 64*1% ) of settlers’ children who had completed schooling had only 
primary level education, over one-third ( 55*4%, i*e. 22.0%+ 13*4% )
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Table 7*3
Sources and Notes.
(a) In Peninsular Malaysia today a child should have at least 
nine years* schooling: six years1 Primary education 
(Standard I to Standard 6) from the ages of 6+ to II + , 
followed automatically by three years' Lower Secondary 
education (Form X to Form 3) from the ages of 12+ to 14+. 
At the end of Form 3 the children are examined, and the 
successful candidates proceed to Upper Secondary education 
(Form and Form 3)* Again there is an examination, and 
the successful candidates proceed to two years of Sixth 
Form education (ages 17+ and 18+), and thence possibly to 
Higher Education. For details of Peninsular Malaysia's 
education system, see Federation of Malaysia, 1979a, 
PP*3?0-420, especially pp.380-381.
(b) The source Table for the settlers' educational attainment 
recorded "Secondary 6 and above", leaving doubt as to 
whether any settlers had reached Higher Education. The 
present author considers that few settlers will have 
attained a college or university education, and has 
chosen to list this figure under Sixth Form Education in 
Table 7 .5 .
(c) In addition to this total, a further 994 settlers were 
recorded under "missing information".
(d) In addition to this total, a further 2,408 settlers' 
children who had completed schooling were recorded 
under "Other" education. This "Other" education may well 
have been religious education in an Islamic religious 
school.
Source: adapted and compiled from data presented in
FELDA, 1978, Table 4*1, Husbands' Academic 
Education by States. Table 8.2, Level of 
Settlers' Children1s Education Who Are Still 
Schooling, and Table 8.3* Level of Education 
Achieved Settlers1 Children Who Have 
Completed Schooling, and in Federation of 
Malaysia, 1979a, pp.380-381.
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had gone on to secondary level education, and a small proportion 
( 0,5% ) had proceeded to college or university.
Similarly, nearly one-third ( 51*6% ) of settlers’ children 
who were still schooling were in secondary level education, with 
some 485 ( 0,7% ) having gone on to tertiary education. Presumably, 
most of those recorded still at primary level will move automatically 
to lower secondary level at the age of 12+ years, and lower secondary 
level education at least should be the norm for all the settlers' 
children in future ( see note (a) to Table 7*5 )•
MacAndrews found in his sample study of Bilut Valley - FELDAfs 
oldest scheme, which settlers first entered in 1975 “ that the over­
all number of years schooling for dependants was 5*8 years, compared 
with 4*2 years for the settlers sampled ( MacAndrews, 1977  ^P*203 ).
In addition to formal education, the children of settlers 
probably make much greater use of media such as radio, television, 
magazines and cinema. There is good indication that the relatively 
high levels of schooling attained by the settlers' children, coupled 
with their knowledge of - and desire to experience - life beyond the 
FELDA schemes, means that in many cases they aspire to employment 
which generally cannot be provided by the schemes or by their close 
environs. Therefore, high unemployment among settlers' children 
results not just from lack of jobs per se, but also from a lack of 
employment deemed suitable by children whose levels of education and 
knowledge - and hence, aspirations - are generally much higher than 
those of their parents.
As indicated above, support for this viewpoint was acquired in 
the Jengka Triangle between early-April and mid-June, 1977* During
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this period, the present author attempted to implement a question­
naire designed to ascertain the opinions of settlers and their sons 
regarding the sons' education and proposed future employment. This 
questionnaire was not implemented fully, hut nevertheless it allowed 
this author much opportunity to talk to settlers and their sons and 
to canvass their opinions on these matters. Consequently, this 
field-work experience supplies a basis for the subjective comments 
recorded below.
The scheme with which this author was primarily concerned was 
Anggerik or Jengka I ( in the Jengka Triangle, Pahang ), an oil- 
palm scheme of some 5»208 acres ( Bahrin and Perera, 1977> Appendix 
I ), with a total population in 1976 of 2,859 persons, comprising 
455 settlers, their wives and dependants ( FELDA, 1978» Appendix I ), 
as well as FELDA staff and occasional visitors. Settlers and their 
sons were inteviewed through the medium of an interpreter, the inter­
views taking place either at home, at the scheme manager's office, 
or wherever proved to be most convenient, e.g. at a kedai kopi, 
bearing in mind that the settlers had to find an opportunity to break 
off from their work. All the respondents appeared quite willing to 
answer the questions put to them, and did not appear to be influenced 
by the fact that the interpreters used were junior FELDA staff. 
Questions were put separately to the settlers and their sons, and 
the main findings are set out below.
The settlers themselves seemed quite happy with their lot as 
FELDA settlers. Table 7*6 shows that few ( only 14*1%) of Jengka 
I's settlers were natives of Pahang State, most having migrated some
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TABLE 7.6 
Federal Land Development Authority 
STATES OF ORIGIN OF SETTLERS ON JENGKA 
I (ANGGERIK), 1976
STATE OF ORIGIN
SETTLERS
No. %
Penang 17 3 .7
Perak 78 17.1
Selangor 17 _ > 7
CENTRAL WEST COAST 112 24.5
Negri Sembilan 13 2.9
Malacca 38 8 .4
Johore 89 19.6
SOUTH-WEST COAST 140 30.9
Kedah 71 15.6
Perils -2
0
•
C\)
NORTH-WEST COAST 80 17.6
Pahang • 64 14.1
Kelantan 38 8 .4
Trengganu 21 4*6
EAST COAST m 27.1
TOTAL 455 100.0
Source: FELLA, 1978, Table 3.1.5,
Migration by States of Origin for Pahang State.
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considerable distance in 1970 - 1971 from States such as Johore 
( 19.6% ), Perak ( 17.1% ), and Kedah ( 15.6% ). Whilst they 
acknowledged that the first years of settlement had been hard, they 
were now beginning to reap the rewards of a maturing oil-palm scheme, 
and as most of them had a background in -unprofitable padi-farming, 
rubber small-holding, fishing or labouring, they were appreciative 
of their enhanced incomes and improved living conditions. As might 
be expected from the information in Table 7*5» vast majority of
the settlers consulted had only primary level education, and they 
realised that the incomes they received through the good offices of 
FELDA were far beyond those which men of their social and educational 
background might have expected normally. Although there was some 
griping at having to pay back the cost of resettlement and at the 
fluctuations in income which occurred over the year, in general the 
settlers thought themselves fortunate to be FELDA settlers, and 
considered that settlement by the Authority represented a good deal 
for men of their age and social and educational background.
MacAndrews noted similar responses in his studies. MacAndrews 
noted, for example, that
"the Bilut Valley settler surveyed saw FELDA as a 
better occupation providing land, income and 
security and that they saw it as a good means of 
livelihood for their own generation"
( MacAndrews, 1977* p.220 ).
When the present author asked about their aspirations for 
their sons future employment, most of the Jengka I settlers hoped 
that their sons would find employment outside agriculture. Despite 
their own experience with FELDA, they generally looked upon agricul-
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tural occupations as low-income employment involving hard manual 
work in the open air, and desired that their sons make full use of 
their better education by acquiring secure, well-paid jobs in non- 
agricultural employment. Most were uncertain about the precise 
nature of the work to which they aspired for their sons, but "office 
work" or "working for the government" were cited frequently as 
possibilities. "Business" occupations were also regarded with 
favour.
The settlers seemed to consider agriculture - as manual work - 
to be of low status, and that to enter agriculture would be a waste 
of their sons* good education. The only agriculture which in 
general was deemed suitable for their sons was that of following in 
their fathers* footsteps as FELDA settlers, and this only because of 
the high incomes which FELDA-based agriculture can provide. Some 
settlers expressed a desire that their sons proceed to higher educa­
tion if possible, although generally it was considered that secondary 
education would be sufficient to ensure a satisfactory future for 
their sons.
The empirical studies of MacAndrews reached similar conclusions. 
MacAndrews found that government jobs had a very prestigious status as 
being secure and privileged ( MacAndrews, 1977» p* 151 )> education 
was seen by the settlers as a very desirable commodity. The settlers 
at Bilut Valley had high educational goals for their children, and 
desired "to see their children educated and to move upwards in the 
Malaysian society" ( MacAndrews, 1977j P-205 ). They did not look 
to agriculture as a future for their offspring:
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"Generally the Bilut Valley settlers had high 
hopes of a good career for their children, with 
a strong preference for a government job. This 
was particularly strong in the case of the Malay 
respondent ( 79*4% )• A business occupation 
seemed a second alternative to all three groups'5* "
(MacAndrews, 1977* p.221 ).
Similarly, in Ulu Jempol ( which settlers entered in 19&5 ) 'th® 
settlers were appreciative of what the Authority had done for them,
"but if the settlers were happy with their own 
experiences with PELDA and would recommend their 
own generation of friends to join FELDA they 
clearly had higher aspirations for their children"
( MacAndrews, 1977? p*298 ).
When MacAndrews posed the question what kind of job would you 
hope your children to do when they leave school?, 22 ( 51*2% ) of 
his 43 settler respondents on Ulu Jempol preferred a "government job" 
for their children, 15 ( 34*9% ) preferred "business", and only I ( 2.3% ) 
preferred the occupation of "farmer". The remainder either wished to 
leave the decision to their children, or did not state a preference.
The present author found that the attitudes of the settlers' sons 
mirrored those of their fathers, with desire for a secure, non-agricul- 
tural job figuring highly in their aspirations. In common with many 
youths in their mid-teens ( and some, in fact, were well into their 
twenties ), the majority had no definite future occupation in mind, 
but the desire to avoid agriculture was evidently a priority. Again, 
"office work" and "working for the government" figured high on the 
list of desirable future employment, and - although these categories
* i.e. Malay, Chinese and Indian,
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are vague - they suggest strongly that the aspirations were for non- 
manual, relatively well-paid, secure, and relatively easy jobs in 
terms of physical labour such as agriculture in Peninsular Malaysia 
can hardly provide. Some respondents also had notipns of taking 
part in "business", although the actual desired occupation went 
largely unspecified.
Most of the settlers' sons did not see emplacement on a FELDA 
scheme as a desirable future, although it was generally acknowledged 
that if one had to enter an agricultural occupation then FELDA settle­
ment was the best option available. Only one or two of the settlers' 
sons consulted by the present author had actually joined the ranks 
of FELDA settlers.
Whilst desire to put their education to good use and to avoid
agricultural jobs which were thought rather menial was some explana­
tion for the aspirations of settlers' sons, investigation revealed 
that there was certainly another reason : a desire to "see the
world". This author knows from personal experience that life on a 
FELDA scheme such as Jengka I is tranquil, to say the least. The 
scheme is situated several miles from even small towns such as
Temerloh and Jerantut, and transport links between the Jengka Triangle
and such towns are poor. Although the following statement may not 
be true of older FELDA schemes on the West Coast, new - and remote - 
schemes such as Jengka I have little to offer youths in the way of 
their own perceptions of entertainment and interests : a rather
poorly equipped Community Centre, a rough and stony football field, 
a weekly film-show and a mobile library, none of these could be
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expected to compensate the youth of Jengka I for the lack of such 
delights as television, cinema, night-clubs and bright lights, 
especially when their own education - and radio and magazines - 
informed them that such desiderata were obtainable in the larger 
cities of their own country.
It was clear that many of the settlers' sons found life on 
Jengka I boring. If transport could be found, then they would take 
themselves off to nearby towns such as Temerloh, Mentekab, and 
Jerantut, and - if they were lucky - as far as Kuantan or even Kuala 
Lumpur. Understandably, Kuala Lumpur and Singapore were the cities 
to which they aspired when the time came for them to leave home and 
seek employment - or higher education - and there was a general 
feeling that although life on a FELDA scheme was fine for their 
parents, they were loth to make this their own future.
The preceding discussion suggests strongly that FELDA would do 
well to turn its attention to the problem of second generation unemploy­
ment on its schemes. This said, there is very good ground for suggest­
ing that the onus for providing suitable employment opportunities for 
the educated and ambitious children of settlers should fall not on 
the Federal Land Development Authority, but on other authorities better 
placed than FELDA to furnish such employment opportunities, and ultim­
ately squarely upon the government itself. As a land development 
agency, FELDA has only limited powers and terms of reference. This 
point will be elaborated in Chapter 8 below.
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Third, from the foregoing it must he inferred that the ability 
of the Federal Land Development Authority to provide direct employment 
in areas near to schemes is virtually nil at present. The overall 
rate ■ of unemployment in rural areas in the period 1957 to 1970 was 
16.4% (MacAndrews, 1977) - despite FELDA5s swift rise to pre-eminence 
among land development agencies in this period - and in 19^9 it was 
considered officially that the estimated growth rate of all Peninsular 
Malaysia's land development agencies in the period 1969 to 1985t
"would do nothing to reduce the very sizeable under­
employment already existing in the agricultural 
sector, nor would it reduce existing rates of 
unemployment"
(Economic Planning Unit, 1969> P«2).^^^
Thus the Federal Land Development Authority's schemes seem not 
to satisfy entirely the needs of the settler for employment, not to pay 
much regard to the employment of the settler dependants, and to furnish 
little direct employment to nearby rural areas. Given the magnitude 
of the problem of rural unemployment and underemployment in Peninsular 
Malaysia, the activities of FELDA have done little to alter the socio- 
economic status quo with respect to overall imbalance in the provision 
of employment in rural areas.
7.3 RESTRUCTURING OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC SYSTEM
In addition to the claim noted above that the Federal Land 
Development Authority is "actively engaged in the eradication of rural 
poverty" (Addnan Din, 1978, p.87), it has been stated that "FELDA also 
contributes to the 'restructuring of the Malaysian Society' through its 
development activities" (FELDA, 1977b, p.11). Such restructuring is 
to be achieved by giving all Peninsular Malaysians equal opportunity to
participate in - and reap the benefit of - socio-economic development. 
The second part of Chapter 7 will assess the extent to which FELDA 
contributes to the restructuring of Peninsular Malaysia’s socio­
economic framework.
The discussion will deal in turn with the extent to which the 
Authority has improved physical infrastructure and provided social 
services; the extent to which FELDA has introduced to rural areas an 
urban environment and atmosphere; and the extent to which FELDA has 
helped to create a Malay commercial and industrial community owning 
30% of productive assets and has facilitated intra-sectoral and inter­
sectoral movement,
7 *3a Improvement of Physical Infrastructure
and Provision of Social Services
The physical infrastructure associated with Federal Land 
Development Authority schemes consists of housing, transport and 
communications facilities, and utilities such as piped water and 
electricity supply. The main social services are educational and health 
services. Some of these facilities, utilities and services are provided 
by the Authority, but most are the responsibility'of other Agencies and 
Departments.
The Federal Land Development Authority furnishes its settlers 
with a standard timber house measuring some 450 square feet, comprising 
bedroom, lounge, dining room, kitchen, bathroom and toilet. Such 
accommodation is reckoned superior to typical kampung housing 
(Federation of Malaysia, 1975). Every group of 6 houses is served by
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one stand-pipe, although piped water may he extended to individual 
houses when the crops start to yield.
The settlers’ houses which this author had the opportunity 
of visiting on FELDA schemes in the Jengka Triangle and elsewhere 
varied in opulence. At first hearing a floor area of 450 square 
feet sounds large, hut in practice it means a fairly simple wooden 
building with dimensions of approximately 30 feet hy 15 feet, the 
interior consisting of one large room with a ’’master” bed-room 
sectioned off by means of a partition or curtain - not large when 
one considers that it has to house a settler, his wife, his family 
( averaging 4.8 children ), and his belongings and furniture. The 
standard FELDA house is raised up on stilts within the -J-acre house- 
lot/garden, and has a verandah at the front. The kitchen consists 
of a cooking-area at the back of the house, and the bath-room and 
toilet are a screened—off washing area, and a latrine.
Understandably, such conditions do not allow of much privacy, 
and comfort is somewhat constrained. Consequently, many settlers 
expend time and effort on improving their houses, usually by build­
ing extensions to the sides and back of the house so as to add to 
the living/sleeping area. Some settlers make considerable efforts 
in this regard, and replace part or all of the house with brick 
construction. Indeed, the houses are designed with such extension 
in mind, and the enlarging or re-building of houses is encouraged 
by PELDA ( Bahrin and Perera, 1977 )•
Overall, the settlers' houses remain largely unmodified.
Table 7.7 shows the PELDA Census's findings in respect of expend-
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TABLE 7-7 
Federal Land Development Authority 
EXPENDITURE ON THE MODIFICATION OF 
SETTLERS’ HOUSES
EXPENDITURE
SETTLERS' HOUSES
No. %
Cumulative
%
NO EXPENDITURE 21,965 CT
\ f 
I
CD 61.8
M$500 AND LESS 5,449 15.3 77.1
M$501 1,000 5,535 9.4 86.5
M$1,001 - M$1 ,500 1,504 4.2 90.7
M$1,501 AND MORE 3,270 9.2 100.0
MISSING INFORMATION 8 0.0 100.0
TOTAL 35,531 100.0 100.0
Source : FELDA, 1978, Table 7-2, Expenditure on the Modification
of Settlers' Houses.
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iture on modification of settler houses : nearly two-thirds of the
houses ( 61.8% ) were the original structures, and a further 15*3% 
had had M$500 or less spent on them. However, on some schemes much 
improvement of houses has taken place, and Bahrin and Perera make 
special mention of the Taib Andak complex schemes ( Johore ) :
TIIn '1976 of the 404 original settler houses in the Taib Andak 
project 372 have been modified or rebuilt" ( Bahrin and Perera,
1977, p.73 )* In respect of Jengka I, 207 ( 45*5% ) the 455 
houses had received some modification by 1976 ( PELDA, 1978> Table 
7.1.5 ), an impressive number when the relative newness of the scheme 
at that date is remembered, and testimony to the high incomes 
enjoyed by oil-palm settlers.
Construction of transport facilities has been a necessary part 
of PELDA's activities. The building of roads has been imperative 
for all stages of scheme development, from forest clearance to the 
evacuation of rubber and oil-palm products to the main ports. 
Consequently, the Authority's activities have led to considerable 
road-building in areas which were previously little-served by such 
infrastructure. However, the impact of the road-building programme 
associated with PELDA must not be overemphasised. The total 
mileage constructed by 1975 was 1,076 miles, of which 388 miles 
were access roads and 688 miles were village roads (MacAndrews,
1977, Table 3.8)/168^
Although road-building by PELDA in rural areas has been merit­
orious, the construction of roads is not a sufficient condition for 
improving the physical mobility of the local population, whether
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settler or not. Again, from experience in the Jengka Triangle, 
this author can confirm that lack of personal transport is a serious 
handicap to mobility : public ’bus and taxi services between schemes
and nearby towns are fairly limited, and a motor-car, motor-cycle, 
or even pedal-cycle is a very useful possession. Many rural people 
do not have adequate personal transport, and are constrained in 
their mobility by the distances they are prepared to walk. In 
addition, the elements may play havoc with even FELLA’s efforts to 
improve transport and communication links : on at least one scheme
( in Trengganu ) visited by this author, small boats are kept at 
the scheme office for use when floods caused by monsoon rains should 
render impassable the river-ford via which the scheme is entered.
With respect to communications, all FELLA schemes are planned 
to have a public telephone, and a telephone at the FELDA office.
The original Jengka Triangle plan was designed to incorporate one 
telephone in each scheme office, one public call-box on each scheme 
and a further 350 telephones distributed between the various towns 
and factories within the project area ( Tippetts and Co., et al,
1967 )• However - as with shortfalls in road construction - the 
implementation of the planned provision of telephone facilities, 
especially in the more remote areas of the East Coast States, has 
not been as rapid as envisaged by FELLA. In addition, FELLA schemes 
usually have a post office-cum-general store*
The Authority provides basic utilities on its schemes. Mention 
has been made above of the piped water, and FELLA schemes have usually 
some provision for electricity supply. However, few FELLA schemes are
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linked, to the national electricity grid, and most settlers make use 
of small diesel generators, each generator serving a small number of 
households ( Federation of Malaysia, 1975 Rubber and oil-
palm processing installations are served by their own generating 
equipment.
The social services found on FELDA schemes are mainly of an 
educational and medical nature. All the Authority's schemes have a 
primary school and a health clinic, and some schemes are endowed also 
with a secondary school and more advanced medical facilities,^
In addition to the FELDA post office-cum-general store, on Jengka I 
there were settler-run shops, a mosque, a primary school, a mid-wife/ 
health clinic, a police station, and a Community Centre, which last 
contained a kindergarten and had a football pitch of sorts alongside 
it. There were also, of course, a scheme management office and a 
fertiliser store. All of these facilities - excepting some of the 
shops - were grouped fairly close to one another at the village 
centre.
The foregoing implies that fully-developed schemes of the 
Federal Land Development Authority might be expected to furnish the 
settlers and their families with a fair standard of basic facilities, 
utilities and services. Table 7*8 summarises the physical and 
social infrastructure on Federal Land Development Authority schemes 
at the end of 1974* The level of physical infrastructure and the 
provision of social services will be referred to again in the Con­
clusion to this Chapter.
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TABLE 7.8
Federal Land Development Authority
PHYSICAL AND SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
ON FELDA SCHEMES, 1974(a)
ITEM TOTAL AT 
END 1974
SCHEME PARTICULARS
i) Number of Schemes 100
ii) Acreage developed (b) 659,714
iii) Number of settler-families (c) 30,100
PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
iv) Access Roads (miles) 388
v) Village Roads (miles) 688
vi) Bus Services 41
vii) Public Telephones 46
viii) Postal Agencies 60
ix) Mobile Post Offices 54
SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE
x) Schools (Primary/Secondary) 100
xi) Clinics 88
xii) Mobile Library Units 3
xiii) Community Centres 84
xiv) Playgrounds 30
xv) Places of Worship 70
xvi) Police Posts 38
(a) The mere listing of physical and social infrastructure says 
nothing about the state of repair or the efficiency of the 
items listed, nor - in the case of items (vi), (ix) and (xii)
- about the frequency of service.
(b) Refers to acreage developed for settlements on rubber and oil- 
palm schemes only.
(c) The total population of the schemes was estimated at over 
200,000 persons.
Source: adapted from MacAndrews, 1977» Table 3*8 , Public Amenities
in FELDA Schemes. MacAndrews derived the data from FELDA 
sources ""(1975).
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7*Jb Provision of Urban Environment and.
of Regional Growth Centres
A further claim made for the Federal Land Development Authority 
is that its land development and settlement activities have helped to 
'urbanise' rural areas. The extent to which FELLA has contributed to 
restructuring Peninsular Malaysia's socio-economic system by providing 
an urban environment in rural areas will be discussed with reference 
to three main points : the extent to which the Authority's schemes
accord with the definition of 'urban' accepted in Peninsular Malaysia 
today; the extent to which FELLA has brought urban-type physical 
and social infrastructure, goods, services and functions to rural 
areas; and the extent to which the Authority has transformed the 
'quality of life' of rural dwellers by furnishing them with an 
'urban' rather than a 'rural' atmosphere.
In respect of this first point, official opinion as to what
constitutes an 'urban' area in Peninsular Malaysia has changed over
the years. At the 1931 Census, any gazetted area with a population
of 1,000 persons or greater was considered 'urban'. At the 1947
and 1957 Censuses this definition of urban was used again. For the
1970 Census the definition of 'urban' was fixed at a gazetted area
(171)with population 10,000 persons or greater. J This is the present 
definition of 'urban' in Peninsular Malaysia, and is therefore the 
population size criterion against which FELDA's schemes must be 
measured.
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None of the Federal Land Development Authority's present 
schemes measures up to the definition of 'urban' accepted in Penin­
sular Malaysia today. Table 7*9 shows that the estimated average
population of all FELDA schemes with settlers in 1976/1977 was
(172)1.842.9 persons. This estimated average figure concealed a
wide variation between schemes at different stages of development. 
There were variations also between rubber schemes and oil-palm 
schemes. In 1976, the estimated average population of rubber 
schemes was 1,813*5 persons, ranging from a minimum of 82 persons 
to a maximum of 3>256 persons. The equivalent figures for oil- 
palm schemes were 1,876.9 persons, ranging from 257 bo 4*076 
persons (see Table 7*9)*
Even if one accepts the maximum figures presented in Table
7.9 it can be seen that the Authority's schemes fall far short of 
the 10,000 persons or greater minimum population size criterion 
deemed necessary for the achievement of 'urban' status in Peninsular 
Malaysia today.^  ^ ^
The second way in which the Federal Land Development Author­
ity' s 'urbanising' activities may be assessed is with respect to 
the provision of urban-type physical and social infrastructure, 
goods, services and functions in rural areas. The physical and 
social infrastructure, goods, services and functions to be found 
on FELDA schemes have been discussed in Section 7*3a above. The 
following paragraphs will compare the infrastructure, services and
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TABLE ?.9 
Federal Land Development Authority 
POPULATION SIZES OF SCHEMES, 1976
Type of Scheme Average 
population/ v 
per Scheme
Range of /, 
Population
minimum maximum
Rubber 1,813*5 82 3,256
Oil-Palm 1,876.9 257 4,076
All Schemes 1,842.9 -
(a) Only schemes with a settler population at the time of
the FELDA Census (October-November, 1976) are included:
61 rubber schemes and 53 oil-palm schemes, totalling
114 schemes. The 61 rubber schemes had a total popul­
ation (settlers + dependants) of 110,622, and the 53 
oil-palm schemes a total population (settlers + dep­
endants) of 99,474* Therefore, this author calculates 
the grand total population in 1976 to be 210,096 
settlers and dependants. Note that this figure is 
slightly lower than the grand total of 211,826 settlers 
and dependants presented in the source Appendix.
(b ) The actual schemes were: rubber (highest) Lembah
Bilut (Pahang), 4,645 acres; (lowest) Parit Haji 
Idris (Johore), 253 acres; oil-palm (highest) Ulu 
Tebrau (Johore), 6,450 acres; (lowest) Tementi (Pahang), 
3 * 9 2 0  acres.
Sources: adapted and compiled from FELDA, 1978,
Appendix I, List of Number of Settlers, 
Husbands. Wives, and Settlers1 Population 
Included in the Settler Census 1976, and 
Bahrin and Perera, 1977> Appendix I, FELDA 
Land Development Schemes. 1977*
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functions to tie found on a typical FELDA scheme with those which 
might be expected in an established small rural town.
In 1974 this author participated in a socio-economic survey 
of three towns within the Muda Agricultural Development Authority's 
project in north-west Peninsular M a l a y s i a . ^ T h e  three towns 
were Kangar (capital of the State of Perlis), Jitra (Kedah), and 
Simpang Empat (Perlis), the population sizes of which in 1970 were 
8*757 persons, 4*223 persons, and 1?724 persons respectively 
( SOAS, 1974 )• The survey collected data in respect of economic 
functions, urban morphology, land use and infrastructure, and 
population dynamics.
The two smaller towns - Jitra and Simpang Empat - are of 
•population sizes which allow comparison between themselves and the 
typical FELDA scheme. Jitra (population 4*223) may be
compared with the largest of the Authority's schemes, whereas 
Simpang Empat (population 1,724) provides a useful comparison
with the 'ideal' FELDA scheme (population approximately 2,000
 ^ (176) persons). 7
33S
With respect to physical and social infrastructure, in 197^
Jitra was served well by electricity and street-lighting, water 
supplies, telephone lines, lined and covered drains and metalled roads 
within the town boundary, Simpang Empat had good electricity supplies 
within its boundaries, street-lighting, covered and lined drains and 
metalled roads serving the town centreZ1??) p^e typical FELDA 
scheme is served adequately with basic physical and social infra­
structure, yet the comparison with Jitra and Simpang Empat suggests 
that the typical FELDA scheme is less well served than an established 
small, rural town in this respect (see Section 7.3a above).
More pertinent is the comparison between the established small, 
rural towns and their FELDA counterparts with regard to the provision 
of urban goods, services and functions. Although the typical FELDA 
scheme has infrastructure such as mosque, clinic, primary school, piped 
water supplies, roads, and low-order retail establishments, there is 
much less in the way of urban goods, services and functions such as 
libraries, hospitals, banks, entertainment facilities and higher-order 
retail establishments. Comparison between the two established small, 
rural towns of Jitra and Simpang Empat and the four FELDA schemes 
studied by MacAndrews shows that the former are much better served than 
the latter with urban goods, services and functions (confer Table 7.10 
with Table 7.11).
The comparison between Jitra and the Authority's Bilut Valley 
scheme is worthy of closer scrutiny. The Bilut Valley scheme was 
established in 1957» and has therefore had longer than virtually any 
other FELDA scheme to acquire urban goods, services, and functions.
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Notes to Table 7.10 (Continued)
(c) (Continued)
Hitam. More than half these trips (52.5%) were between Jitra 
and the State capital of Kedah, Alor Star (population 66,000 
in 1970). The April 197^ survey noted also that 'buses made 
a total of 126 journeys between Simpang Empat and the State 
capital of Perlis, Kangar (population 8,757 in 1970 ) .
Thus, in 197*1 Jitra and Simpang Empat - the former especially - 
were well connected by 'bus services to neighbouring settle­
ments capable of providing additional physical and social 
infrastructure, goods, services and functions (see SOAS, 197*1» 
Table 11:2).
(d) The small hospital listed for Jitra specialized in maternity
cases and vaccinations (SOAS, 197*0*
(e) The total number of retail establishments in Jitra has had to
be estimated from the source which presented data in regard of 
selected categories only. The figure for Simpang Empat is the 
actual total.
Source: adapted dnd compiled from data presented in School of
Oriental and African Studies, 197*1, Map III:^ and 111:5,
Jitra - Urban Morphology; Map 111:6 and 111:7, Simpang Empat 
- Urban Morphology, Map IV:6, Jitra - Infrastructural Areas; 
Map IV:8, Simpang Empat - Infrastructural Areas; Table V:6, 
Jitra - Functional Mix of Retail Establishments at Three 
Periods: Selected Categories; and Table V:8, Simpang Empat:
Functional Mix of Retail Establishments at Three Periods.
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Notes to Table 7- II
(a) Settlers may enter a scheme over a period of several weeks or 
months after the opening of a scheme.
(b) Nearest town to Bilut Valley is Bentong, 14 miles away.
(c) In 1975, an additional 3 j063 acres was listed as Reservation 
or Unutilized.
(d) MARA: Ma.jlis Amanah Ra' ayat, or Council for the Indigenous
People. See Glossary.
(e) At the time of MacAndrews1 survey, Jengka 12 had no electricity, 
no telephone, no direct 'bus service (MacAndrews, 1977j Table 
4.18). MacAndrews notes that Jengka 12's inhabitants made use 
of a secondary school on a "nearby scheme - Jengka 2 - seven 
miles away" (MacAndrews, 1977, Table 4.18), and lists this 
secondary school among Jengka 12's facilities. The present 
author has chosen to not list this secondary school among the 
physical and social infrastructure of Jengka 12 as presented
in Table 7®.II* Nearest town to Jengka 12 is the Jengka Triangle's 
'new' town, Bandar Pusat, 6 miles distant.
(f) Nearest town to Bukit Besar is Kulai, 14 miles away.
(g) MacAndrews lists the secondary school at Jengka 2 (five miles 
distant) and the Police Station at Tongkiat among the facilities 
of Ulu Jempol. These have not been included among the physical 
and social infrastructure of Ulu Jempol as presented in Table
7. II. MacAndrews notes that electricity is supplied to FELDA 
Staff/Staff Quarters only (MacAndrews, 1977» Table 5»l)>
Source: adapted and compiled from data presented in MacAndrews, 1977i
Table 4,1, Summary of Facilities: Bilut Valley; Table 4.18,
Summary Table: Jengka 12; Table 5*lj Ulu Jempol: Summary;
and Table 5-9» Summary of Facilities: Bukit Besar; and from
data presented in Bahrin and Perera, 1977> Appendix I, FELDA 
Land Development Schemes, 1977■
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What is more, with a 1975 estimated total population of 5>000 persons 
(MacAndrews, 1977) Bilut Valley is of a size comparable to that of 
Jitra. MacAndrews described Bilut Valley in 1975 as "well-endowed 
with facilities. It has two secondary schools, a primary school, 
a health clinic, a community hall, a police station and a large 
number of shops" (MacAndrews, 1977i p.182).
Comparison between the physical and social infrastructure found 
in Bilut Valley as revealed in Table 7*11 and that enjoyed by Jitra 
(summarised in Table 7*10) shows that the former - despite being "well- 
endowed with facilities" - is much less favoured than the latter in 
this respect.
This point is brought out further by a comparison of the numbers 
and types of retail establishments to be found in Bilut Valley and 
Jitra. Table7* 12 lists the retail establishments to be found in 
Bilut Valley in 1975- Table 7.13reveals similar data for Jitra (and 
Simpang Empat) in 197^«
Comparison of Table ?• 12-with Table 7 • 13suggests two main con­
clusions . First, there was a great discrepancy in the number of retail 
establishments between Bilut Valley in 1975 and. Jitra in 197^ (52 
compared with 143).^^^ Second, the majority - 67.3$ (30*8% +
36.5%) of the retail establishments in Bilut Valley were low-order 
kedai kopi (coffee shops) and sundries shops, whereas a much greater 
proportion of the retail establishments in Jitra were relatively high- 
order establishments such as photographic supplies, chemists, and 
electrical goods. Kedai kopi were only 17*5% of the total. Comparison 
between Table 7,12 and Table 7 .13 shows that in 197^ even the smaller
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Notes to Table 7.13
(a) It is to be assumed that the Muda River Irrigation Project may 
have had a stimulating effect upon the type and number of 
retail establishments in Jitra and Simpang Empat in i97^» 
Therefore data for 1970 and 1957 are included in order to provide 
a comparison with the 197^ data. The 1957 data is particularly 
useful in this respect, for it .indicates the position prior to 
the impact of the Muda project, ,
(b) The data presented in the sources listed below has been adapted 
slightly by fhe amalgamation of categories.
(c) Includes both General Stores selling perishable goods and 
General Stores selling non-perishable goods, which appear as 
separate items in the sources.
(d) The total number of retail establishments in Jitra has had to 
be estimated from the data presented in the source noted below. 
The total figures for Simpang Empat are actual figures.
Source: adapted and compiled from data presented in School of
Oriental and African Studies, 197^» Table V:6, Jitra: 
Functional Mix of Retail Establishments at Three Periods - 
Selected Categories; and Table V:8, Simpang Empat: Functional 
Mix of Retail Establishments at Three Periods.
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established rural town of Simpang Empat had more shops than Bilut 
Valley had in 1975 (87 compared with 52).
The data presented above suggest that the land development 
schemes of the Federal Land Development Authority do not provide the 
same level of urban physical and social infrastructure, goods, services 
and functions which one might expect in an established small, rural 
town in Peninsular Malaysia. The Authority does provide adequate 
levels of basic physical and social infrastructure - piped water 
supplies, housing, village roads, schools, mosques, and clinics - but 
higher levels of infrastructure, goods, services and functions appear 
generally absent. (-^9)
The third point to be considered when assessing the extent to 
which the Federal Land Development Authority has helped to ’urbanise1 
rural areas is the extent to which the Authority has brought an 'urban 
atmosphere' into rural districts. The assessment of a factor as sub­
jective as 'urban atmosphere* is constrained necessarily by lack of 
parameters accepted as indicators of such a factor. Indeed, in the 
absence of criteria accepted universally, the following brief assessment 
must needs be very subjective. However some conclusions may be drawn.
The Federal Land Development Authority states officially that
"the settlers must not be settled in an area which 
exhibits the unknown or the unfamiliar, FELDA 
therefore attempts, as far as possible, to create 
a settlement type which the settlers are familiar 
with"
(Bahrin and Perera, 1977» p.6^).
The vast majority of the Authority's settlers are poor, rural Malays 
taken from a traditional, rural, Malay kampung environment,(-^0)
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is well aware of the problems involved in resettlement, and the 
'culture-shock' which may occur when rural Malays are 'uprooted' from 
their traditional, close-knit village socio-economic system and trans­
planted elsewhere. Consequently, FELDA's mode of operation consists 
of moving poor rural Malays and their families into a new kammmg 
environment, in which the process of modernisation - both social and
* / H Q 'N
economic - may be undertaken with limited trauma. '
Clearly, the extent to which any one FELDA scheme presents an 
"urban atmosphere" to the observer will depend upon many factors, 
primarily the background - social, economic and educational - of 
the observer, and the characteristics of the particular scheme ( for 
example, the scheme's location, age, and size ). With these points 
in mind, the following subjective impressions formed by MacAndrews 
are worth recording. First is MacAndrews* impression of Jengka 12 
( or Melor ) in Pahang, a rubber scheme of 4,217 acres ( Bahrin and 
Perera, 1977» Appendix I ), at the time of the new settlers' arrival 
( Spring 1975 ) :
"...one reaches Jengka 12 only after an initial 
five mile drive on a potholed tarmac road 
going eastwards a further twelve miles on a red 
mud road driven into the sparse and isolated 
landscape...It is a land with few signs of life 
except the odd and seemingly very distant 
village centre in another scheme or the odd 
small timber factory. Generally it is 
extremely isolated and lonely country to the 
outsider"
( MacAndrews, 1977* P.227 ).
However, MacAndrews' impression of Ulu Jempol was more 
favourable. Ulu Jempol - also in Pahang - contrasted with Jengka 12
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in being an old-established, scheme at the time of MacAndrews1 visit 
( the first settlers arrived in 19^5 ) based around 5»93& acres of 
oil-palm ( Bahrin and Perera, 1977? Appendix I ), located adjacent 
to the main road between Jerantut and Maran* Ulu Jempol had
,fthe air of being part of the established and 
developed countryside unlike the raw planned 
impact of the other Jengka area schemes1’
( MacAndrews, 1977? P*259 )•
The present author has visited Peninsular Malaysia twice, once 
as part of an undergraduate field-trip ( for some five weeks, June - 
August, 1974 ) and later for six months ( mid-January - mid-July, 
1977 ) as part of the research for the present study. During these 
two field-trips nearly all the major towns of Peninsular Malaysia 
were visited ( e.g. Kuala Lumpur, Penang, Kuantan, Kota Bahru, Alor 
Setar ), some for periods of several days or even weeks, and some 
more than once, and every effort was made to travel around and 
experience Peninsular Malaysia. In this regard, the 1974 field- 
studies of the small towns of Kangar, Jitra, and Simpang Empat ( in 
north-west Peninsular Malaysia ), in which this author participated, 
and visits to East Coast townssuch as Kuantan, Kuala Trengganu and 
Kota Bahru were particularly valuable, as they furnished experience 
of the "small-town" atmosphere in Peninsular Malaysia. Clearly, a 
major capital city such as Kuala Lumpur is of little use as the sole 
Peninsular Malaysian standard by which to judge the "urban atmos­
phere" of FELDA schemes.
As regards FELDA schemes visited, these were several, although
3 ^
it must "be acknowledged that all those visited were in East Coast 
States ( that is, in Pahang and Trengganu ) and were relatively new 
schemes ( exceptions being schemes such as Ulu Jempol, noted above ). 
Also, it must be acknowledged that at no time did this author reside 
on a FELDA scheme : the FELDA guest-house at the Tunku Abdul Razak
Research Centre at Sungai Tekam proved to be the most convenient 
residence in the Jengka Triangle area. This said, much time was 
spent travelling into, out of, and within the Jengka Triangle, 
especially between the town of Temerloh, the Tunku Abdul Razak 
Research Centre at Sungai Tekam, and Jengka I. This latter was 
covered very comprehensively, either by motor-cycle or on foot, 
these proving to be the most convenient modes of transport. With 
these points borne in mind, the following paragraphs record the 
present author’s own subjective impressions of FELDA schemes in the 
Jengka Triangle area, with particular reference paid to Jengka I.
The Jengka Triangle as a whole represented something of a 
paradox to this observer. On the one hand there was the isolation 
of the Jengka Triangle vis-a-vis the small yet bustling towns of 
Temerloh, Mentekab and Maran, and the busy National Route 2 which 
links them along the Jengka Triangle's southern frontier. Once 
these outposts are left behind, the traveller striking northwards 
into the Jengka Triangle on the new roads encounters comparatively 
little traffic other than occasional Landrovers, timber-lorries, 
palm-oil tankers and motor-cycles, and there is at first sight 
little very obvious sign of human activity. Often the only clear
indication of human presence is a distant view of the roof-tops 
which indicate yet another FELDA scheme.
On the other hand, there are the trees. Notwithstanding the 
absence of human faces, the most lasting impression of the Jengka 
Triangle which remains with this author is that of standing on a 
hill-side, and gazing downwards on the evidence furnished by a green 
ocean of oil-palm and rubber trees, whose arrangement into ordered, 
curving rows across the far slopes testifies through the clear fact 
of their cultivation that the hand of man has been at work in a 
remarkable way. At first sight isolated and empty, nonetheless 
the Jengka Triangle must impress the visitor with the hard \'/ork and 
fine organisation which have transformed the former forest into 
settled plantations in such a short space of time. True, forest 
does remain along stream-courses, in marshy hollows, on certain hill­
sides for soil conservation, and in areas reserved for logging, but 
neither these remnants - nor the FELDA villages themselves - can 
detract from the overall impression of cultivation on the massive 
scale : the Jengka Triangle does not have the brisk activity of a 
Temerloh nor the bustle of a national highway, yet man is just as 
active there, albeit his activity is slower and quieter.
Within this pacific ocean of oil-palm and rubber trees stand 
islands of greater bustle. These are the new roads, the rubber 
latex and palm-oil mills, the timber-processing factories, and the 
FELDA villages. Hoad-building has been vital to the Jengka Triangle's 
development, and - despite delays and difficulties in their
construction - throughout the region roads have been carved through 
the forest. Such roads impress by their bold execution, but often 
delay in providing them with a black—top has meant deterioration of 
the lateritic surface thus exposed. The heavy lorries abet the 
afternoon downpours to create cloying mud, and in dry weather 
passing vehicles stir up billows of orange-red dust. In addition 
to the rumble of lorries, in the vicinity of the mills and factories 
there is the noise of machinery, and here of course there is greater 
movement of lorries and tractors bearing timber, rubber latex, and 
oil-palm fresh fruit bunches ( FFB ) - these last especially - for 
processing.
None of the foregoing has paid much regard to the settlements 
which are in many ways the rationale of the Jengka Triangle, the 
FELDA villages. To what extent do these settlements furnish an 
"urban atmosphere"? The answer must be that they do not, an 
opinion supported both by objective fact and by subjective impression.
On the first point - that of objective fact - the earlier 
discussions of the average sizes of FELDA schemes ( as compared 
with the Peninsular Malaysian urban standard of 10,000 population ), 
and of the level of urban-type physical and social infrastructure, 
goods, services and functions on the schemes, showed that on neither 
criterion can FELDA schemes be considered "urban" in the Peninsular 
Malaysia context : the schemes are too small, and their infrastruc­
ture, goods, services and functions are well below the "urban" 
standard. True, the youthfulness of even the oldest FELDA scheme 
vis-a-vis most established towns is not conducive to the acquisition
3k 7
of a wide range of infrastructure, goods, services and functions, "but 
clearly FELDA settlements are designed to be villages, not towns. 
FELDA settlements are invariably referred to as kampung or village 
( see, for example, Bahrin and Perera, 1977 )» and'no attempt is 
made by the Authority to elevate their settlements beyond this basic 
role.
This is not to say that there is no urban development associ­
ated with FELDA’s activity. For example, the Jengka Triangle plan 
contains one central town - Bandar Pusat ( planned population, 12,000 
persons ) - and two smaller towns of 4*000 persons each, and other 
regional development plans have considerable provision for urban 
settlement. However, these planned urban places are not FELDA 
schemes, nor are they the responsibility of the Authority. More­
over, the tardy growth of these places is often in marked contrast 
to the rapid rise of the FELDA schemes themselves, clear tribute 
to that Authority's expertise. Also, although it is true that 
several FELDA settlements may be established adjacent to one another, 
yet again this juxtaposition does not create per se an urban area.
( Bahrin and Perera discuss FELDA's efforts to comply with the govern­
ment's urbanization policies. See Bahrin and Perera, 1977> PP»70 - 
71 ).
Apart from the established towns of Temerloh, Eentekab, Maran, 
and Jerantut - at the apexes of the Jengka Triangle - the region 
does possess one new settlement which appears to merit the descrip­
tion "urban", at least in terms of infrastructure, goods, services, 
and functions, if not in terms of size. This is Tongkiat, a small
3k&
yet vigorous settlementcomposedlargely of Chinese, which has dev­
eloped spontaneously and rapidly astride the Jerantut-Maran road. 
This author has not studies Tongkiat in depth, but a visit to this 
settlement imbues the visitor with the feeling that here is a town, 
albeit small, haphazard, and decidedly "frontier" in character.
Tongkiat has arisen unplanned as a source of at least some of 
the goods, services, and functions which the FELDA schemes do not 
offer, e.g. motor-veh'icle repair workshops, electrical goods' 
retailers, goldsmiths. MacAndrews has noted the following with 
reference to the Ulu Jempol FELDA scheme :
"The nearby town of Tongkiat was extensively used 
by the settlers for shopping though socialising 
seemed to be carried on in the scheme or with 
other nearby schemes"
( MacAndrews, 1977* P*297 )•
On the second point noted above - that of subjective impress­
ion - the following impressions of the present author regarding 
Jengka I may prove of value. As has been recorded earlier, the 
present writer spent long periods on Jengka I interviewing settlers 
and their dependants, and travelled extensively around the scheme, 
either on foot or by motor-cycle. The following brief paragraphs 
will mention first the physical impression of the scheme, followed 
by impressions of the scheme population,
Jengka I may be entered from more than one direction, either 
on a tarmacadamed road ( showing signs of deterioration ), or by 
way of newly-cut dirt roads. In either case, one passes first 
through glades of oil-palm trees. The trees are well grown and
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tall, and their heavy fronds sweep downwards to leave tunnels through 
the dark foliage. If one pauses and enters a glade on foot, there 
is a surprising amount of undergrowth and tree-litter to contend 
with : weeds and cut fronds are left to protect the soil. Beneath
the trees there are deep shadows and profound silences. Pew birds 
sing, and to come across a group of settlers harvesting fruit, 
cutting fronds, or performing some other task of maintenance is 
welcome. As a stranger, one senses strongly the quiet presence of 
the millions of trees which form this man-made forest.
The FELDA village - Jengka I - v/hich lies at the end cf the 
road or track used for access appears a jumble of roofs and veget­
ation. The houses are built right up to the oi1-palm glades, 
and - although the houses are spaced thirty or forty yards apart - 
much of the intervening space is occupied by palm and fruit trees, 
vegetable gardens and weeds. The exceptions to this luxuriance 
are the spaces immediately around the houses, which the settlers 
generally keep clean-weeded to discourage rodents, insects and 
snakes, and to allow for ventilation beneath their dwellings. The 
houses are raised up on stilts, and are approached by short flights 
of wooden steps.
The density of housing is low, up to about 4 houses per acre. 
The roads which thread their way between the houses are either dirt 
roads, or black-top roads which now have a rutted surface. V/ith 
the settlers at work and the children at school, the residential 
areas are quiet. The main centres of activity are the scheme 
office, the small, central complex of kedai kopi, food stalls, and
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sundries shops, and the scheme primary school. The police station, 
the health clinic and the mosque stand apart within their own compounds. 
Wherever one goes within the kampung, the atmosphere is that of a 
village, albeit a large and populous one.
The residents of this village are nearly all Malay. The FELLA 
Census of 1976 recorded 2,547 ( 99*0% ) of the total population 
( settlers and dependants ) of Jengka I ( 2,574 persons ) in the category 
’Malay', the remainder ( 27 persons, or 1.0% ) being listed as 'Indian'
( FELLA, 1978j Table 2.6.5 )• A most noteworthy feature of the scheme 
population was its youth. A staggering 1,545 ( 59«9% ) of Jengka I's 
residents were children fifteen years old or younger; a further 965 
( 57• 4% ) of the residents were adults between the ages of sixteen and 
forty years; only 68 residents ( 2.6% ) were over the age of forty 
( FELLA, 1978, Table 2.5.5 )• Overall the residents of the village 
seemed well off, well fed, and well clothed. In particular, the younger 
children were smartly turned but in neat school uniforms, and appeared 
healthy, alert, and inquisitive.
In terms of community and age structure Jengka I can be considered 
typical of a FELLA scheme. Table 7*14 presents the age structures and 
community composition of settled FELLA schemes by State, as well as 
the overall position. It may be seen from Table 7*14 that all FELLA 
schemes have populations which are youthful, and composed largely - 
usually almost entirely - of Malays. The schemes with the most aged 
average populations are those of Kedah, but even on Kedah schemes 
only 18.0% of the FELLA settlers and dependants exceed forty years of 
age, and nearly half ( 48*1% ) children fifteen years old or
younger. Similarly, the State with ethnically the most heterogeneous 
populations on its schemes ( Malacca ) has a FELLA population which is
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Table 7.1^
Sources and Notes:
(*) Indicates that the number of settlers recorded was too 
small to figure in the Table as a percentage after 
rounding; otherwise (-) indicates that no settler was 
recorded*
Sources: adapted and compiled from data presented in
FSLDA, 1978, Table 2*5, Settlers1 Population 
by Age and Sex* and FELDA, 1978, Table 2.6, 
Number of Settlers * Population by Race.
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83*4% Malay on average. If the figures for Jengka I are compared with 
the data for Pahang FELDA schemes as revealed in Table 7•14» and. with 
the data for all schemes, then it will be seen that Jengka I's popula­
tion is slightly younger and slightly more Malay than the average. 
However, the differences are small - especially in respect of the 
average scheme in Pahang - and Jengka I may be considered typical as 
regards the criteria of age structure and community composition of 
FELDA schemes.
Therefore, given the information and data presented above and 
FELDA's ability to generate high incomes, it is not surprising that the 
atmosphere to be found on a mature FELDA scheme is that of a prosperous 
Malay village community. 'Malayness' pervades a FELDA scheme : the
settlers are Malay, and consequently culture is Malay, socio-economic 
institutions are Malay. Even the standard FELDA house mimics typical 
Malay kampung housing.
The absence of non-Malay population, culture and institutions from 
a FELLA scheme, the generally slow pace of life compared with even a 
small town worthy of the name, and the low level of urban physical and 
social infrastructure, goods, services and functions - all lead to 
the conclusion that the atmosphere on a FELDA scheme is not 'urban'. 
Rather, the atmosphere is that of a relatively modern and progressive 
rural Malay kampung.
7.3c The Creation of a Malay Commercial and Industrial
Community and the Facilitation of Intrasectoral and
Intersectoral Movement
The extent to which the Federal Land Development Authority has 
helped to restructure Peninsular Malaysia's socio-economic system by
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creating a Malay commercial and industrial community and "by facili­
tating intrasectoral and intersectoral movement will "be discussed 
below. Lack of precise data - particularly on the first point - pre­
clude detailed analysis, and conclusions drawn are tentative at best.
It is difficult to assess the extent to which FELDA has helped 
In the creation of a Malay commercial and industrial community owning 
at least 30% of economic assets by 1990* However, a number of points 
may be raised.
Up to the end of March 1977? FELDA had placed a total of 41,288 
settlers on schemes growing rubber and oil-palm (Bahrin and Perera, 
1977, Appendix i). At that date the Authority's schemes numbered 210, 
and totalled some 918,843 acres (Bahrin and Perera, 1977, Appendix I), 
However, at that time only 65 of the 86 rubber schemes and 58 of the 
120 oil-palm schemes actually had settlers on them (Bahrin and Perera, 
1977, Appendix I). The 65 settled rubber schemes totalled 217,242 
acres, the 58 settled oil-palm schemes totalled 277,823 acres (Bahrin 
and Perera, 1977, Appendix l). By this reckoning, at the beginning of 
1977, 41,288 FELDA settlers were emplaced on 495,085 acres of rubber 
and oil-palm.
Tree crops such as rubber and oil-palm require several years of 
maturation before they start to yield. Therefore more relevant to this 
assessment than the planted acreage of rubber and oil-palm is the 
acreage of these crops actually in production. In 1978 the productive 
acreage of rubber was 113,397 acres, that of oil-palm 242,040 acres. 
These two figures together gave a grand total of 355,437 acres (Bahrin 
and Perera, 1977, Table 2.8).
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Thus we may conclude tentatively that the major productive 
assets owned "by 41,288 Federal Land Development Authority settlers 
at about the beginning of 1977 were approximately 355,437 acres of 
commercially-productive tree-crops, comprising 113,397 acres of
/ 82 'N
rubber and 242,040 acres of oil-palm. This situation cannot
be expected to have any significant effect upon Malay ownership 
within the Peninsular Malaysian economy. Indeed, even within the 
commercial crop sector the effect is minimal, and the Second Malaysia 
Plan stated that
"about 308,000 acres of FELDA land cultivated with 
rubber and oil palm and settled predominantly by 
Malays do not significantly affect the overall 
disparity in the ownership in the rubber, oil palm 
and coconut industries"
( Federation of Malaysia, 1971, P * 40  ) .
Settlers on FELDA schemes are encouraged to undertake subsid­
iary occupations, and some settlers have undoubtedly used their new­
found wealth to branch out into non-agricultural endeavours. No 
doubt a few have been very successful, and have contributed in their 
small way to the creation of a Malay commercial and industrial 
community. However, the overall effect has been minimal. The 
majority of settlers have been prevented from using subsidiary occu­
pations as a means of effecting inter-sectoral movements by factors 
such as the remoteness of schemes ( especially of those in the East 
Coast States ), lack of capital ( especially on newer schemes, not­
withstanding FELDA!s ability to furnish loans ), and - probably 
most important - the settlers' own relatively poor educational 
attainment and their lack of training and expertise in non-agricul- 
tural occupations.
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Table 7*15 presents data concerning the subsidiary occupations 
of FELDA settlers and their wives ( all settled FELDA schemes ), and 
Table 7*16 presents equivalent data for Jengka I only. The salient 
features of Table 7*15 arid Table 7*16 are discussed below.
Table 7*15 shows that overall 57*6% of FELDA settlers and 
80.1% of settlers’ wives had no subsidiary occupation, and that the 
majority of those who did have subsidiary occupations were engaged 
either in "subsidiary agriculture" ( 9*5% and 4*4% respectively ) or 
as "part-time plantation workers" ( 15*2% and 8.1% respectively ), 
Thus, 82.7% of the settlers ( 92.5% of their wives ) had only their 
FELDA work or similar agricultural work to occupy them, and only the 
balance of 17*3% ( 7*5% of their wives ) could claim an additional, 
non-agricultural occupation, and that - in the settlers’ case - sub­
sidiary to their main work as a FELDA settler.
Table 7*16 reveals that the position was very similar on 
Jengka I, although Jengka I was slightly better than the overall 
position presented in Table 7*15* On Jengka I over half the settlers 
( 51.0% ) and their wives ( 64.8% ) claimed no subsidiary occupation, 
and where there was a subsidiary occupation it was usually as "part- 
time plantation workers" ( 18.9% a^d 27.1% respectively ). However, 
24*6% (100.0% minus 75*4% ) of settlers ( 6.2% of their wives ) 
claimed a non-agricultural subsidiary occupation. This figure is 
somewhat higher than the 17*3% average recorded in Table 7*1 5> and 
the generally better position regarding subsidiary occupation on 
Jengka I vis-a-vis the average probably reflects the fact that the
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TABLE 7.15 
Federal Land Development Authority 
SUBSIDIARY OCCUPATIONS OF SETTLERS AND THEIR WIVES
HUSBANDS WIVES
SUBSIDIARY OCCUPATION
No. % No. 0L /°
None 20,132 57.6 28,066 80.1
Subsidiary Agriculture 3,469 9.9 1,540 4.4
Part-Time Plantation 
Workers 5,297 15.2 2 ,829 8.1
SUB-TOTAL 28,898 82.7 32,435 92.5
Traders 2,649 7.6 1 ,001 2.9
Tailors 40 0.1 887 2.5
Teachers 96 0.3 59 0 .2
Drivers 655 1.9 - -
Watchmen 228 0.7 4 0 .0
Others 2,370 6 .8 674 1.9
TOTAL 34,936 100.0 35,060^ 100.0
(a) Note that the total calculated by this author differs slightly 
from that presented in the source Table i 35>073*
Source : FELDA, 1 9 7 8 ,  Table 5.3 , Husbands1 Subsidiary Occupation,
and Table 5*4, Wives * Subsidiary Occupation.
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TABLE 7.16 
Federal Land Development Authority 
SUBSIDIARY OCCUPATIONS OF SETTLERS ADD THEIR WIVES
ON JENGKA 1
SUBSIDIARY OCCUPATION
HUSBANDS WIVES
No. % No. %
None 232 51.0 294 64 .8
Subsidiary Agriculture 25 5.5 9 2.0
Part-Time Plantation 
Workers 86 18.9 123 • 27.1
SUB-TOTAL 343 75.4 426 93.8
Traders 34 7.5 3 0.7
Tailors - 1 0.2
Teachers 3 0.7 4 0 .9
Drivers 15 3*3 - -
Watchmen 5 1.1 - -
Others 55 12.1 20 4.4
TOTAL 455 100.0 454 100.0
Source : FELDA, 1978* Table 5-3•5» Husbandsf Subsidiary Occupation
for Pahang State, and Table 5* 4*5» Wives1 Subsidiary 
Occupation for Pahang State.
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location of Jengka I allows opportunity for part-time plantation 
work on FELDA schemes being developed nearby in the Jengka Triangle, 
and that the scheme's distance from established towns - coupled with 
the high incomes enjoyed by settlers - has prompted the more enter­
prising settlers to establish small businesses to serve their fellows' 
needs.
The foregoing indicates that - even allowing for subsidiary 
occupations - FELDA settlers are still restricted largely to agricul­
tural occupations of one kind or another. Non-agricultural subsid­
iary occupations are mainly those of trader, driver,- watchman or 
teacher. There is no mention of the higher levels of commerce 
( e.g. banking, insurance ), of large-scale industry, or of the 
higher-paid and more prestigious professions ( e.g. doctor, solici­
tor ). Although the lack of data preclude certainty, from the 
foregoing it must be concluded that FELDA’s direct contribution to
the creation of.a Malay commercial and industrial community owning
 ^ ^  n (185)30% of productive assets by 1990 is more apparent than real.
In respect of intrasectoral and intersectoral movement of 
population, it must be remembered that the vast majority of the 
Federal Land Development Authority's settlers are Malays. KacAndrews - 
quoting the Authority's records - gave the ethnicity of FELDA settlers 
as 96%  Malay, 2.7% Chinese, and 1.3% Indian in 1975 (KacAndrews, 1977% 
Bearing in mind FELDA's great bias towards Malay settlers, several 
points may be made with reference to intrasectoral and intersectoral 
movements of population.
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With regard to intrasectoral movements, the activities of the 
Federal Land Development Authority have resulted in a proportion of 
the rural Malay population "being moved from the poor subsistence 
sectors - such as padi-farming and traditional fishing activities - 
into the wealthy commercial agriculture sector, concerned mainly with 
tree crop cultivation. In terms of spatial movements, FELDA has 
moved people short distances and intra-State, and from contiguous 
States ( MacAndrews and Yamamoto, 1975b, p.79 )*
Given that a major prong of the Few Economic Folicy is the 
restructuring of the socio-economic system, more pertinent than intra­
sectoral movement is FELDA1s effect on intersectoral movement. The 
Federal Land Development Authority has made little or no direct 
contribution to the intersectoral movement of population. The 
Authority's activities are directed at the movement of Malays from 
poor rural occupations - especially unproductive agriculture - into 
wealth-generating, rural agricultural projects (FELDA schemes).
The settler remains essentially a rural farmer, albeit with his 
income and standard of living enhanced. The settler has not been 
moved out of the agricultural sector into manufacturing or tertiary 
sector industries, nor has he been moved from a rural to an urban 
environment. Indeed, it is claimed that the Authority's activities 
have helped to reduce rural-urban migration ( MacAndrews, 1977> p.142 ).
The Federal Land Development Authority has an understanding 
with State governments that at least 50% °f places on a scheme be 
reserved for nationals of the State in which the scheme is located.
In those States with greater population densities - Fegri Sembilan,
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Malacca, Kedah, Perak and Selangor - nearly all settlers are State 
nationals ( Bahrin, 1972, p.18 ). This is shown clearly in Table 
7.17» which reveals that in 1976 by far the highest proportion of 
FELDA settlers in any State were nationals of that State. For 
example, Table 7*17 reveals that 94*9% of FELDA settlers in Johore 
hailed from that State. All the other States - bar one - showed 
a marked concentration of State nationals in the FELDA schemes 
located within their borders.
The only state which exhibited non-conformity to the rule 
that the majority of FELDA settlers within its borders are nationals 
of that State was Pahang. Table 7*17 shows that Pahang nationals 
were only 33*0% of that State’s FELDA population, a figure which 
reflects the fact that Pahang's small population can not fill all 
the FELLA places available in the State.
Consequently, although the Federal Land Development Authority 
has achieved limited intrasectoral movement of the Malay population, 
it has not effected intersectoral movements, nor touched in any 
meaningful way on the movements of the non-Malay population. The 
FELDA settler - despite enhanced income and living conditions - 
remains a Malay agriculturalist.
7.4 CONCLUSION
The foregoing has presented data pertinent to an assess­
ment of FELLA's ability to contribute to an attainment of the 
objectives of the New Economic Policy, the discussion centring
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Notes to Table 7.17
(a) data were derived from the FELDA Settler Census, 1976.
(b) Penang and Perils are excluded since these States do not have 
FELDA schemes, Kelantan is excluded because there were no 
settlers in the FELDA schemes in Kelantan at the time of the 
Census in 1976.
(c) Settlers not born in Peninsular Malaysia.
Source: adapted from Federation of Malaysia, 1979L, Table 5-6,
Malaysia: States with Settled FELDA Schemes.
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around the New Economic Policy1s two main prongs - the eradication of 
poverty and the restructuring of the socio-economic system. The main 
conclusions will he summarised below.
In respect of the eradication of poverty, Section ?,2 above 
examined FELDA1s contribution to the raising of incomes and the pro­
vision of employment. The discussion made three points. First, it 
was noted that there are wide imbalances in income, both between 
schemes growing different crops and at different stages of development, 
and between settlers. It was noted also that a settler's income might 
vary greatly over time. Second, it was revealed that factors such as 
the different ages of schemes, the different main crops grown., FELDA®s 
modus operand!, and fluctuations in the world market prices for the 
Authority's products are responsible for these income differentials.
It was shown how such factors hinder an assessment of FELDA's contri­
bution to an enhancement of income. Third, it was concluded that - 
income differentials and fluctuations notwithstanding - the average 
settler on a mature Federal Land Development Authority scheme has had 
his income raised considerably, both in terms of his previous income 
and in terms of the 'poverty line1. In 197& the average settler 
growing oil-palm earned M$526 per month, the average rubber settler 
M$365 per month.
Section 7.2 discussed also the contribution of the Federal Land 
Development Authority to the provision of employment. It was noted 
that land development by FELDA and other agencies is considered a 
major vehicle for the generation of employment in rural areas. Section
7.2 showed that the employment level of the settler may fluctuate over 
time, that the provision of employment to the settler is adequate at
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best, that there is a problem of unemployment among settler dep­
endants which FELDA cannot alleviate unaided, and that little 
employment is generated by FELDA in rural areas near to schemes.
With regard to the restructuring of the socio-economic system, 
Section 7-3 above examined FELDA's contribution to the provision of
physical and social infrastructure in rural areas, to the provision of
an urban environment and regional growth centres in rural areas, and to 
the provision of a Malay commercial and industrial sector and to 
intrasectoral and intersectoral movement.
Taking the first two points together, it was found that the
Federal Land Development Authority provides on its schemes the level of
physical and social infrastructure reminiscent of a progressive Malay 
kampung, and that higher level urban physical and social infrastructure, 
goods, services and functions do not feature in FELDA's plans for a 
typical scheme. The contrast between four FELDA schemes and two 
established small, rural towns - Jitra and Simpang Empat - supported 
this view. Similarly, consideration of the population sizes of the 
Authority's schemes, and of the very un-urban atmosphere to be found 
on them, tend to refute the Contention that FELDA has brought urbani­
sation to rural areas.
Consideration of the third point was more difficult, for lack of 
precise data precluded any but a superficial assessment. The main 
productive asset 'owned' by Federal Land Development Authority settlers 
was the productive acreage of rubber and oil-palm (totalling 355*^3? 
acres in early 197?)• It was not possible to assess accurately the 
contribution of the Authority to the creation of a Malay commercial
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and industrial community owning 30 %  of productive assets by 1990, 
merely to suggest that FELDA's activities have had little direct 
impact in this respect.
The assessment of the Authority's contribution to intrasectoral 
and intersectoral movement was easier. The constraints laid upon the 
Authority in terms of the State nationality of its settlers, and 
FELDA's own .objective of moving poor rural dwellers out of 'subsistence 
agriculture' into 'market agriculture', lead to the conclusion that 
the Federal Land Development Authority has brought about limited intra­
sectoral movement only. FELDA has not brought about intersectoral 
movement of its settlers,
Thus, the Authority's ability to contribute to 
the attainment of the objectives of the New Economic Policy - the 
eradication of poverty and the restructuring of the socio-economic 
system - appears confined to the limited intrasectoral movement of 
part of the poor, rural Malay population. Those poor, rural Malays 
- mainly agriculturalists of some kind - who have been lucky enough 
to have become FELDA settlers have had their incomes enhanced and have 
been given adequate employment levels. They have, been moved from a 
traditional, rural Malay kampung environment to a modem, rural Malay 
kampung environment. In FELDA's own words, "those who were 'subsis­
tence farmers' before have now become 'commercial farmers'" (FELDA, 
1976, p.10). This is not surprising, for
"FELDA's approach for the development of new areas is 
to finance groups of owner-farmers, to create a stable 
and prosperous land-owning peasantry enjoying through 
cooperative institutions the advantage of large-scale 
estate agriculture"
(Bahrin and Perera, 1977, P»25)
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In other words, the Federal Land Development Authority's mode 
of operation is to enhance rural Malay incomes in situ, that is "by 
maintaining the Malays as rural dwellers engaged in agricultural 
occupations. FELDA's approach is aimed at eradicating poverty among 
those lucky enough to benefit from FELDA settlement, and not aimed 
particularly at moving Malays out of the rural/agricultural sector 
into the urban/non-agricultural sector. Therefore, restructuring of 
the socio-economic system does not fall to the Authority.
Chapter ? has dealt with the contribution of the Federal Land 
Development Authority to the attainment of the two main objectives of 
the New Economic Policy - eradication of poverty and the restructuring 
of the socio-economic system. Chapter 8 will draw upon the informa­
tion presented in Chapter 7 - and in previous Chapters - to complete 
this assessment of the extent to which land development by the 
Federal Land Development Authority is a satisfactory method 
for eradicating poverty and restructuring society in the Malay- 
dominated rural areas, and thus the ability of FELDA to face up
to the responsibilities placed upon it by the Malaysian govern­
ment since 1969*
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 7
135. "Within the context of the earning power of the settler the 
measurement of income is highly problematic. Certainly, income 
is measured in terms of money and wealth. But it must he 
emphasised that not all settlers are motivated in a similar way 
and degree by cash income. Closer observations indicate that 
not all the settlers place a high value on cash. A basic 
income, however, is a necessity" (Bahrin and Perera, 1977> P*75)»
13 6 . Blair and Noor list several causes of variation in income, 
including type of crop planted, size of holding, yield achieved, 
and market price (Blair and Noor, 1978), and they discuss the 
variations in income which arise from these causes (see Blair 
and Noor, 1978, pp.57 - 66). Section 7*2a does not consider 
variation in holding size as an influence upon income, on the
assumption that holding size remains standard.
137. The techniques required for the successful cultivation of rubber 
and of oil-palm are summarised in Ooi Jin Bee, 1976, pp.221 - 
2^8 (rubber) and pp . 268 - 277 (oil-palm).
138. Perhaps most important, he is unlikely to be able to find much
suitable land for the construction of padi-fields, even if he 
has enough spare time in which to undertake rice-cultivation 
(which is itself unlikely), Consequently, the great bulk - if
not all - of his staple food-stuff will have to be bought.
139* In 1976 FELDA undertook a detailed survey of its settler popu­
lation. This FELDA settler Census 1976 will be referred to
further below. It suffices here to note that at that time 57*6% 
of settlers said that they had no subsidiary occupation, and 
there "is still considerable scope for encouraging settlers to 
undertake subsidiary occupations, a policy supported by FELDA" 
(Addnan Din, 1978, p.92).
140. As Blair and Noor have observed, the differential between the
earnings of oil-palm settlers vis-a-vis those of rubber settlers 
may not be as great as it sometimes appears to be when all the 
various costs of production are taken into account (Blair and 
Noor, 1978, p.59).
1^1. "The FELDA settler has to repay over a period of 15 years an 
average sum of M$l46 a month, which is ^5% of his total gross 
income" (Lim Sow Ching, 1976, p.215). At the beginning of 1977 
the cost of settling one family on a FELDA scheme was broken 
down in the following manner:
(Continued)
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Item Cost in M$
( i) Infrastructure 5,900
( ii) Administration 5,700
(iii) Agricultural Holding 15,200
( iv) House and Houselot 2,200
Total 29,000
Items(iii) and (iv) are paid tack "by the settler before he 
receives title to the land (FELDA, 1977b, p.6).
142. In 1974 there were many instancesof oil-palm settlers earning 
net monthly incomes in excess of M$1,000 (Bahrin and Perera,
1977» p.78). The highest average net incomes ever recorded on 
FELDA schemes were: M$l,881 for rubber (March, 1977)» and
M$2,782 for oil-palm (November, 1974) (Addnan Din, 1978, p.9l).
143. It must be remembered that FELDA was relatively inexperienced as 
a land developer at the time Ho made his assessment, and that no 
scheme would have reached full production.
144. FELDA acknowledges that settlers newly-arrived on a scheme will 
remain poor until the main-crop begins to yield (Bahrin and 
Perera, 1977, PP.76 - 78). Blair and Noor state that prior to 
production starting ’settlers can be assumed to have an income 
of the order of M$100 per month" (Blair and Noor, 1978, p.54), a 
figure which compares poorly with the 'poverty level'. The 
'poverty level' is an approximation of average household incomes, 
and in 1976 was estimated at M$150 per mensem (Blair and Noor, 
1978, p.69).
145. In order that data presented by different authors might be 
comparable, presentation here of figures for income levels is 
restricted to incomes 'net' of costs deducted by FELDA.
146. Lim Sow Ching, 1976, Land Development Schemes in Peninsular 
Malaysia: A Study of Benefits and Costs, (Rubber Research
Institute of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur}"]
147. Lim Sow Ching computed three measures of income (gross income; 
labour income; profit), and he defined 'labour income' as "the 
total cash income finally available to the settler for meeting 
his daily expenses and other requirements (the return after 
deducting all material and other costs except unpaid family 
labour)". He considered'labour income'to be a "most realistic 
measure of settlers' earnings" (Lim Sow Ching, 1976, p.211).
In his study, Lim Sow Ching found that the total labour income 
per month on FELDA rubber schemes (average size 7.8 acres) was 
M$246,5 per holding (Lim Sow Ching, 1976, Table 9*19).
148. MacAndrews, B. C,, 1977* Mobility and Modernisation: A Study of
the Malaysian Federal Land Development Authority and its Role in 
Modernising the Rural Malay" (Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, Cambridge).
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1^9• "Average monthly net income after deductions of their loan repay­
ments, land rents and operating costs" (Bahrin and Perera, 1977> 
p.78).
150. Table 7*2 lists the net average incomes per month for oil-palm 
and rubber holdings of various sizes, See Table 7*2.
151* The FELDA Settler Census 1976 was conducted between October and
November of that year, and "information was successfully collected" 
on 35,628 of the 37>158 settler households eligible for inclusion 
in the Census (Addnan Din, 1978, p.83). Collection of data was 
at phase - not scheme - level, and was confined to those rubber 
schemes which had been in production for at least four years, and 
to those oil-palm schemes with a 'block' system in operation 
(Blair and Noor, 1978, p.5^0*
152. Table 7»3 reveals that the equivalent figures for the early part 
of 1977 were even higher, at M$640 and M^23 respectively.
153* Blair and Noor note that in Peninsular Malaysia rubber trees 
'winter1 during March, at which time the yield of latex is at 
its lowest (Blair and Noor, 1978, p,62). In respect of oil-palm, 
there is a close relationship between rainfall and yield, dry 
weather being followed usually by low yields. Maximum yields 
of oil-palm fruits occur in April, May and June in Johore, and 
during November and December elsewhere in Peninsular Malaysia 
(Ooi Jin Bee, 1976, p.276).
I5 4, "The average figures discussed tend to conceal the even wider
range in income variation experienced by settlers. For an indi­
vidual settler may earn less than M$200 in a month or on 
occasion more than M$3,000 in a month" (Addnan Din, 1978, p.9l)»
155* Lim Sow Ching's comparative study of FELDA, State and Fringe
schemes reaches a similar conclusion about land development in 
general: "despite the limitations discussed, land development
programmes have certainly succeeded in raising the income of 
the settlers, and hence their living standards" (Lim Sow Ching, 
1976, p.229).
156. "Land development, as envisaged in the Plan, is synonymous with 
the creation of ’employment opportunity1" (Bahrin and Perera,
. 1977, p.20).
157* Most recently, the Mid-Term Review of the Third Malaysia Plan 
has stated categorically that "land development by the Federal 
Land Development Authority (FELDA) is the most important source 
for the expansion of agricultural employment" (Federation of 
Malaysia, 1979L, p.67).
158. This last point is particularly important when one recalls that 
FELDA is the corner-stone of Peninsular Malaysia's regional 
development plans. If such plans are to succeed, then as many 
opportunities as possible for providing employment must be seized.
37*
159* For a brief discussion of the factors influencing holding-size, 
see Bahrin and Perera, 1977* PP-27 - 28.
160. For example, harvesting may he subject to seasonal troughs and 
peaks of labour requirement, and in the early days of scheme 
development less labour will be needed than when the scheme 
reaches maturity. The hilly nature of the terrain usually 
chosen for land development can necessitate greater inputs of 
labour for the many tasks - applying fertiliser, harvesting 
and the like - which are usually performed manually. In the 
Jengka Triangle, aircraft have been used to spread fertiliser, 
especially on the more inaccessible and hilly parts of schemes 
(which may have been covered inadequately by settlers on the 
ground),
161. See Chapter 2 above, and Bahrin and Perera, 1977, P>28 and p.15^*
162. It must be noted that Lim Sow Ching found an average of 1.6 
persons working as tappers on the FELDA rubber holdings which he 
studied, although "in almost all cases the head of family was 
the main tapper most of the time and was assisted by his wife
or one other member of the family" (Lim Sow Ching, 1976, p.237)■
16 3. • See in particular Lim Sow Ching, 1976, Chapter 10 (Family Size,
Resource Use and Farm Size), pp.235 - 259, especially Section
10.2 Supply and Utilisation of Labour.
16^. The points system by which FELDA settlers are selected is sum­
marised in Appendix III. This modus operandi can be justified 
by genuine desire to help the most needy -"the applicant’s 
family size indicates his need" (Bahrin and Perera, 1977, P*59)
- but it has the obvious disadvantage of exacerbating future 
problems caused by large numbers of settler dependants,
165■ The remarkable similarity between this figure (4.80) and that 
obtained by Lim Sow Ching (4.90) would seem to give the lie to 
the claim that numbers of children are fewer on new schemes as 
compared to old.
166. Today FELDA settlers are likely to be between approximately 
twenty-five and about forty years of age when they enter the 
scheme. However, in the early days, FELDA was less discriminating 
and places were allocated to older farmers in their fifties and 
early sixties. These older men often found the many tasks of 
scheme development to be beyond their capabilities, especially in 
the days when the settler was regarded as a true pioneer and was 
expected to undertake arduous operations such as tree-felling
and terracing.
16 7. Lim Sow Ching is in no doubt of the inability of land development 
schemes generally to furnish employment opportunities: "It would 
thus appear that the problem of surplus labour on holdings in the 
scheme is no less acute than that faced by many individual small 
growers on holdings outside the schemes. This is true even on the 
FELDA schemes where the size of holding is considered big enough 
to provide reasonable earnings at a high level of employment.
(Continued)
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While a full utilisation of available farm labour can perhaps 
never be achieved, the fact that half of this labour is unem­
ployed on the scheme should be of serious concern to the 
Government and the planners. The evidence just presented does 
not support the widely accepted belief that land development 
schemes have successfully eliminated rural unemployment among 
settler-families" (Lim Sow Ching, 1976, p.246). With reference 
to FELDA, Lim Sow Ching opines in a footnote that the Authority's 
belief "that a 10-acre holding is sufficient to provide 'full' 
employment to a settler-family" is not true (Lim Sow Ching, 1976, 
p.246, footnote 6).
168. The actual construction of access roads is the responsibility of 
the Jabatan Ker.ja Raya (Public Works Department), which has not 
always been able to keep to its planned schedules (Alias, 1975» 
p.18). Two points need to be made briefly. First, roads being 
constructed in the new schemes of the East Coast States - for 
example, in the Jengka Triangle - may experience delays in sur­
facing with tarmacadam. Such roads deteriorate quickly if they 
remain unsurfaced, and heavy traffic such as timber-lorries and 
palm-oil tankers render them rutted and dusty in dry weather, or 
muddy quagmires in wet. Also, only the main routes are planned 
as 'black-top', the more usual laterite ('dirt') roads experi­
encing the deterioration noted above (although the unsurfaced 
roads within oil-palm holdings - protected as they are by the 
trees - seem to bear up to the relatively small loads imposed 
upon them), Second, much of the road mileage leads only to 
FELDA schemes, and this fact will limit its ability to stimulate 
much traffic additional to FELDA-related traffic.
16 9. Indeed, the original plan for the Jengka Triangle made no pro­
vision for the supply of electricity to the rural areas: "in 
the rural areas electric power is not recommended in the initial 
stages of development. As incomes increase and demand for 
domestic power becomes greater, consideration shodld be given to 
providing local power supply for each settlement" (Tippetts and 
Co., et al, 1967» p ,26).
170. It is claimed that "the village centre in all schemes has 
reserves for most or all of the following:
FELDA Office 
Community Centre 
Post Office 
Police Station 
Market 
Shops
Petrol Kiosk and Bus Station
Fire Station
Cinema
Health Centre 
Public Library 
Women's Institute 
Co-op.Shop 
Government Reserves 
Youth Club 
Young Farmers' Club 
Place of Worship 
Public Playground"
(Bahrin and Perera, 1977» p.68).
This list is somewhat idealised,in that not all schemes have all 
the facilities listed, and those facilities which are present 
may not be of a very high standard. For example, an information
(Continued)
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broadsheet issued by the Jengka Triangle's FELDA Regional Office 
at Sungei Tekam (Pahang) listed the 1 social development benefits' 
on the 16 schemes which had acquired settlers by early 1977 as 
schools, clinics, FELDA co-operative shops, water supply, com­
munity centres and mosques, Four of the mosques and one school 
were still under construction, and one mosque had yet to be 
started (although the tender was being called) (FELDA, 1977a,
Table VII).
171. As one author has put it, the 1,000 persons or greater defini­
tion of 'urban* "appears unduly low and does not allow us to
distinguish between urban centres and overgrown villages" 
(Narayanan, S ., Patterns and Implications of Urban Change in 
Peninsular Malaysia, pp.55 - 71> in Malayan Economic Review,
Volume XX, Number 2, October 1975* The reference is on p.55)*
172. It was noted above (Chapter 2, Section 2.3a) that the 'ideal'
FELDA scheme has a population of approximately 2,000 persons 
(settlers + dependants),
173. FELDA has a policy of increasing settlement size wherever cond­
itions allow (Bahrin and Perera, 19771 P*29), yet it is very 
unlikely that FELDA settlements can ever achieve the 'magic' 
figure of 10,000 persons which will transform them into 'urban' 
places. The reason lies in the inability of FELDA settlers to 
travel more than a relatively short distance to and from work: 
"FELDA is quite aware that the settlers must not travel more 
than three to four miles to their respective agricultural lots
as their efficiency will be affected by longer commuting distance. 
These considerations govern the maximum size of a single scheme 
to be limited to about 6,500 acres for 600 families" (Bahrin and 
Perera, 1977» p.28). (Even postulating a highly-inflated figure 
of 10 persons per family, a scheme of 600 families would fall 
far short of official 'urban' status).
17^. School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), 197^> Nest
Malaysia Field Eap>edition Survey Report on Urban Encroachment 
on Padi Land in the Muda Project Area,(School of Oriental and 
African Studies, London). Referred to hereunder as SOAS, 197^).
175* Note that even Kangar - population 8,757 in 1970 - was not 
'urban' in the strict sense used above.
176. The Report described Jitra as a "commercial and administrative 
centre of fairly high rank within the settlement hierarchy of 
the Muda irrigation project area" (SOAS, 197^» P-13). Simpang 
Empat functioned as a "minor service and marketing centre"
(SOAS, 197^> P*24) serving the nearby agricultural area.
177. The Report does not suggest that all physical and social infra­
structure was spread fully throughout the area covered by each 
town. However, the supply of electricity seemed to be ubiquitous 
within both Jitra and Simpang Empat, and the main commercial core 
of each town was well served with infrastructure: "the main
(Continued)
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commercial (and residential) area of Jitra is well served "by 
electricity and street-lighting, piped water supplies and 
covered, lined drains" (SOAS, 197^» P-30)j and in respect of 
Simpang Empat, "the main commercial area between the old road 
and the by-pass possesses all modern facilities" (SOAS, 197^> P»3i)*
178, Estimated. See note (d) to Table 7*13*
179* On the basis of the data presented here, this author finds it
difficult to concur that FELDA schemes - especially the newer
schemes of the East Coast - have "the basic facilities of schools, 
clinics, telephones and other modern structures that provide the 
usual social service for a town centre" (MacAndrews, 1977> p.1^8). 
Whilst some of the more basic facilities - piped water, schools, 
clinics- are present, even a small town worthy of the name (e.g. 
Simpang Empat) has much better provision of urban goods, services 
and functions such as electricity supply, shops and entertainment 
facilities. Even Lim Sow Ching fights shy of describing FELDA 
schemes as urban, though he does acknowledge that the "FELDA 
approach, however, has the great concomitant advantage of improving 
the 'quality of rural life' through the provision of public amen­
ities, including houses, water supplies and roads" (Lim Sow Ghing, 
1976, p.280), themselves facilities that the urban dweller would 
normally take for granted.
180. The nature of the physical and socio-economic environment from 
which the vast majority of FELDA settlers are drawn is dealt with 
by Bahrin and Perera under the heading Malaysian Traditional Farmer 
(Bahrin and Perera, 1977> PP*23 ~ 25)* Although not stated spec­
ifically, the 'Malaysian traditional farmer' referred to is 
clearly a Malay village dweller, and the comments made should not 
be considered equally applicable to farmers of non-Malay stock.
181. Indeed, the situation can hardly be otherwise when the Authority 
itself admits that "FELDA is dealing with settlers who have been 
conditioned in an environment, where attachment to the land and 
the kampung is such that living away from them is considered with 
abhorrence" (Bahrin and Perera, 1977* P»2^).
182. Of course, the majority of settlers do not yet 'own' their crops, 
as most are still paying off some part of the cost of development 
incurred by FELDA.
18 3. This author has been unable to acquire data pertaining to the 
numbers and types of small businesses owned by settlers, although 
undoubtedly the more able and more enterprising of their number 
have branched out into enterprises such as raising chickens for 
the sale of eggs, and into coffee shops, barber shops, and 
other endeavours.
18^. The government has indicated some dissatisfaction with ihe Malay
dominance of FELDA schemes, and has stated that "efforts will 
continue to be made to increase the number of Chinese and Indian 
settlers in land schemes such as FELDA and youth schemes. In 
addition, it is the intention of the Government to intensify and
(Continued)
375
18^. (Continued)
promote land development to effectively increase the participa­
tion of other Malaysians in land schemes as envisaged in the 
Opp" (Federation of Malaysia, 19791b P*5^)* However, it is very 
difficult to see how the government can effect substantial 
changes in the ethnicity of FELDA settlers without inciting pro­
test from the Malays, who see FELDATs activities very much as 
a 'pet' programme for enhancing their own socio-economic position 
relative to that of the non-Malays.
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CHAPTER 8
The Ability of the Federal Land Development 
Authority to Contribute to the Attainment 
of the Objectives of the Hew Development 
Strategy
8.1 INTRODUCTION
The foregoing Chapters have presented data concerning national 
socio-economic development planning, land development, and nation- 
building in Peninsular Malaysia. The study has concentrated on the 
activities of the Federal Land Development Authority - the country's 
premier development agency - and the contribution of the Authority to 
the attainment of Peninsular Malaysia's socio-economic priority, national 
unity. Concentration on the activities of FELDA was deemed imperative 
because the Authority is the leading spender on socio-economic devel­
opment in Peninsular Malaysia. Thus the Federal Land Development 
Authority is the most vital weapon in the government's armoury for 
correcting the imbalance in Peninsular Malaysia's socio-economic system.
Chapter 8 concludes this study, and has the purpose of summaris­
ing the main findings in respect of the Federal Land Development 
Authority's ability to meet the national socio-economic responsibili­
ties placed upon it. The first aim of Chapter 8 is to assess the 
ability of FELDA to contribute to the attainment of the Malaysian 
government's New Economic Policy up to the present. The second aim 
is to offer suggestions concerning the Authority's future role.
However, a synopsis of previous Chapters will first be presented.
37?
Chapter 2 described the Federal Land Development Authority's 
activities and gave a short history of the Authority's development.
The status of FELDA as a public agency undertaking the opening-up and 
settlement of new land, and as the leading agency within the land deve­
lopment programme, were both revealed. Chapter 2 showed that FELDA had 
become an experienced and able land developer by the end of the 1960s, 
and indicated that this was a main reason why the government chose the 
Authority as a vital component of its New Development Strategy after
1971.
Chapter 3 covered the development of British Malaya, A brief 
history of European and British contacts with the Malay Peninsula was 
presented, but the focus was upon the way development of British Malaya 
was attended by the creation of gross imbalance within the socio­
economic system. It was pointed out that a socio-economic system 
evolves in space over time, that the fundamental social and economic 
structure of Peninsular Malaysia had been created by about 191^ -, and 
that development up to 1957 reinforced this socio-economic pattern. 
Chapter 3 stressed that at Merdeka Peninsular Malaysia inherited from 
British Malaya a plural society and a dual economy, of which the most 
significant features were the imbalances in socio-economic status and 
regional distribution of the main communities.
Chapter ^ detailed the several national socio-economic develop­
ment Plans implemented in Peninsular Malaysia between 1950 an(l 1969*
The main features of the Plans were described, and it was shown that 
the Plans were very similar in their important characteristics.
Chapter ^ revealed that the planning ethos of the colonial era was 
carried through intact to the post-independence period: colonial-style
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national socio-economic development planning was still being implemented 
more than a decade after Merdeka. Chapter ^ showed also that the 
government had reacted to electoral dissatisfaction - especially that 
manifested at the 1959 General Election - by accelerating existing 
programmes, not by changing fundamentally the planning approach.
Chapter 5 described the communal nature of politics in 
Peninsular Malaysia, and showed how dissatisfaction with the course of 
national development planning exploded into race-rioting at the May,
1969 elections. Chapter 5 emphasised that political considerations 
have a stranglehold over socio-economic development in Peninsular 
Malaysia, Finally, Chapter 5 revealed that scrutiny of the reasons 
for the May, 1969 race-riots led to the identification of the deep- 
rooted ethnic socio-econaiic.imbalances as the causes, and that this 
resulted in the New Development Strategy as the means of eradicating 
the problem.
Chapter 6 described the New Development Strategy and its two 
components, Rukun Negara and the New Economic Policy. The main features 
of the two Plans implemented to achieve the New Development Strategy's 
objectives - the Second Malaysia Plan and the Third Malaysia Plan - 
were discussed, Chapter 6 noted that Rukun Negara is a long-term 
concept intended to change perceptions in Peninsular Malaysia, and 
stressed that it is the short-term New Economic Policy’s objectives which 
are paramount today. Indeed, the New Development Strategy and the New 
Economic Policy in Peninsular Malaysia may be treated as synonyms.
Chapter 7 dealt with the contribution of the Federal Land 
Development Authority to the attainment of the New Economic Policy’s 
two main prongs - the eradication of poverty and the restructuring of
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the socio-economic system. Chapter 7 discussed FELDA's contribution 
to achieving these two main objectives and concluded that the Authority 
achieves the intra-sectoral movement of a limited number of Malays 
from 'subsistence agriculture' to ’commercial agriculture'. Chapter 
7 noted that - enhancement of income notwithstanding - the settlers 
remain rural, Malay agriculturalists.
As stated in Chapter 1, it is the purpose of Chapter 8 to 
bring together the many threads of the complex web of national socio­
economic development planning in Peninsular Malaysia, in order to 
assess the ability of FELDA to contribute to the attainment of the 
Malaysian government’s Mew Economic Policy. Chapter 1 suggested 
that the most pertinent question to ask today is whether or not 
individual development programmes in Peninsular Malaysia are directed 
fully at national policy objectives?
The methodology to achieve the assessment of FELDA1s role in 
attaining national objectives was stated as a comparison of planning 
pre-1969 with planning post-1969* The principle invoked was that 
repetition of pre-1969 planning in the post-1969 environment will 
produce ultimately the same failure of national unity as was revealed 
by the May, 1969 race-riots, and that an assessment of FELDA’s 
present role must include an appreciation of past mistakes* That 
methodology will be implemented below.
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8.2 COMPARISON BETWEEN NATIONAL SOCIO-ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT PLANNING PRE-I969 AND NATIONAL 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PLANNING POST-I969
8.2a Main Features of National Socio-Economic 
Development Planning, 1950 - 1969
Chapter 4- gave a detailed account of national socio-economic 
development planning in Peninsular Malaysia between 1950 and 1969* 
Chapter presented also a critique of the Plans implemented in that 
period, and the main features of socio-economic development planning 
1957 - 1969 were summarised. The main characteristics of these several 
Plans were a two-fold emphasis on 'economic* aspects of development, 
and on rural development.
National planning pre-1969 was characterised by construction of 
physical infrastructure in rural areas. The main factor controlling the 
structure of the Plans in this period was the political necessity of 
finding a compromise national socio-economic policy acceptable to all 
Peninsular Malaysia's communities, It was especially vital to find a 
compromise accepted by both the politically powerful Malays and the 
economically powerful Chinese. The construction of physical infra­
structure in rural areas was considered to be the solution.
The emphasis placed upon 'economic' development in rural areas 
was clear in the allocations and attainments of the Plans of this 
period. Table 8.1 shows that the First Malaya Plan, the Second Malaya 
Plan, and the First Malaysia Plan all allocated the greatest proportion 
of their expenditure (6 9.2%, 68.8$ and 60.1$ respectively) to 'economic' 
development. Reference to Table ty.2, Table ^ .3 and Table above will
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show that the priority allocation was always to Transport, Communications 
and Public Utilities, with Agriculture and Rural Development claiming 
next place, Table 8,1 shows also that ’economic1 targets were always 
attained more fully than 'social' targets.
Most 'economic' development took place in rural areas, where 
stress was placed on construction of irrigation and drainage schemes, 
roads, bridges, hospitals, schools, and mosques, Ness has stated that 
during the 1950s development emphasis narrowed "to an almost exclusive 
concern with building up the physical items of social overhead capital 
for the rural areas" (Ness, 1964, p.-4 0 3 ) . ^ ^  The great 'economic' 
emphasis of the First Malaya Plan - revealed in Table 8,1 - supports 
this contention. Table 8.1 does appear to show that the First
Malaysia Plan was less concerned with 'economic' development - this 
category receiving 'only* 60.X% of planned expenditure - but the Plan 
document tends to refute this. The First Malaysia Plan stated that 
emphasis would be on projects which would provide firmer infrastructure 
for the economy, and on rural development (Federation of Malaysia, 1965)•
The emphasis on the construction of physical infrastructure in 
rural areas was regarded as a workable economic and political compro­
mise, Planners in the pre-1969 era could discover sound economic and 
political motives for this approach to national socio-economic deve­
lopment planning.
Economically, planning in the post-independence pre-1969 period 
still put greatest emphasis on preserving an investment climate attrac­
tive to the foreign capital deemed vital to development, and upon the 
necessity that development should pay for itself through revenue- 
generating projects. Thus the government stated in the First
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Malaysia Plan that it would concentrate upon the -maintenance of a 
favourable investment climate (Federation of Malaysia, 1965)» anh 
stressed the 'economic' nature of planning by stating that progress in 
the "sphere of social and community services, however, necessarily has 
to be subordinated to the economic objectives of the Plan" (Federation 
of Malaysia, 1965> p.68).^^^
This approach was considered sound economically because it main­
tained the ethos of 'economic' stringency which had originated in the 
British colonial era, an ethos which was preserved long after indepen­
dence. Also, Peninsular Malaysia's dependence on the export of primary 
products - rubber and tin especially - continued to lend further 
rationale to this prudence.
In terms of political soundness, the development of physical 
infrastructure in rural areas was a socio-economic policy acceptable to 
all communities. Such an approach was imperative to help convince 
rural Malays that the government was concerned for their progress, 
and it had the concomitant advantage of assuaging Chinese fears concer­
ning private - that is, Chinese - capital. Indeed, the Alliance 
philosophy was that private enterprise went hand-in-hand with political 
democracy (Rudner, 1975a), and Alliance leaders were at pains to stress 
this fact:
"It is our firm policy to maintain an environment in 
which opportunities increase and private owners are 
encouraged to produce, to prosper, and to expand 
their enterprises, for the benefit and prosperity of 
the whole country"
(Federation of Malaysia, 196^, p.50)*
Thus in the period 1956 - 1969 the emphasis on agricultural development 
and public sector activity was directed at supporting and/or subsidising 
the private sector (Thillainathan, 1975) •
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The result of the 1959 General Election was a set-hack for the 
Alliance government. The Alliance responded to the electorate's 
dissatisfaction with the course of national socio-economic development 
planning by stepping-up the pace of implementation, not by altering the 
basic structure of its approach. This lack of basic change is revealed 
in Table 8.1, which shows that Second Malaya Plan allocations were very 
similar to those of the First Malaya Plan in terms of the proportional 
allocation to either 'economic'or 'social' development. The pace of 
development was accelerated by the quasi-military methods described 
in Chapter 4 . ^ ' ^
The main features of national socio-economic development planning 
in the pre-1969 period are summarised below. First, emphasis was 
placed upon 'economic' rather than 'social' development, and upon rural 
rather than urban areas. Second, the rationale underlying these 
emphases was that they satisfied the political requirement for Malay 
economic progress, at the same time letting Chinese private economic 
interests alone. Thus, the development of physical infrastructure in 
rural areas was a politically-motivated socio-economic compromise.
Third, when these policies were challenged by electoral dissatisfaction 
- in 1959 - the government response was not to change the policies, but 
to speed up their implementation by allocating more funds, and by red­
ucing bureaucratic impediments to development. This last point is 
important, for it indicates the government's response to electoral 
challenge of its policies.
8,2b Main Features of National Socio-Economic
Development Planning, 1969 - 1980
National socio-economic development planning in the post-1969
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period, is embodied in the Second Malaysia Plan and the Third Malaysia 
Plan, which Plans enshrine the government's New Development Strategy, 
The main features of national planning in the post-1969 period can 
be discovered by a scrutiny of these Plans, and are revealed in the 
Plans' allocations and achievements.
Chapter 6 summarised the main features of the New Development 
Strategy, of the Rukun Negara, and of the New Economic Policy. The 
allocations and achievements of the Second Malaysia Plan and the 
Third Malaysia Plan were presented in Table 6.1 and Table 6.2 respect­
ively, and data-relevant to this section is reproduced in Table 8.1,
Table 8.1 shows that the Second Malaysia Plan and the Third 
Malaysia Plan both allotted over half of their expenditure (66.4% 
and 67.9% respectively) to 'economic' development. 'Social' develop­
ment received a much smaller allocation (14.2% and 16.2% respectively). 
Reference to Table 6.1 and Table 6.2 above will show that the priority 
allocation in both Plans was to Transport, Communications and Public 
Utilities, with Agriculture and Rural Development running a close 
second. Table 8.1 shows also that on the whole 'economic' develop­
ment was achieved rather better than 'social' development in the
(192)Second Malaysia Plan, } although in the Third Malaysia Plan 
'social' development was more successfully achieved than 'economic' 
development. However, this fact does not alter the situation that - 
in terms of allocation - 'economic' development was much the favoured 
sector.
The data presented in Table 8.1 suggest that the post-1969  
Plans show a remarkable similarity to the pre-1969 Plans in terms
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of allocations and attainments. The percentage of total expendi­
ture allocated to ’economic' rather than ’social’ development 
throughout the period 1956 - 1980 shows noticeable congruity, a
congruity particularly remarkable when it is remembered that the
(193)latter two Plans embody a 'new development strategy’.
Scrutiny of the more detailed Tables - Tables 4*2, 4«3» 4«4j 6.1 
and 6.2 above - will reveal that all the Plans emphasise first 
Transport, Communications and Public Utilities and, second, Agricul­
ture and Rural Development. In each Plan, the allocation to Agricul' 
ture and Rural Development alone is rather larger than the entire 
Plan allocation to ’social’ development, and all the Plans give 
emphasis to Education and Training within this latter category.
Thus in terms of allocated expenditure all the Plans - pre-1969 
and post-1969 - show a great similarity of sectoral emphasis.
The position is similar with respect to the attainment of 
Plan objectives. Actual expend!tures in the Plans for which data 
are available show that within sectors greatest expenditure was 
always to Transport, Communications and Public Utilities, with 
Agriculture and Rural Development occupying next place. Excluding 
the Second Malaya Plan, in all the Plans the actual expenditure on 
Agriculture and Rural Development alone was greater than the actual 
expenditure on the entire ’social’ development sector. Even in 
the Second Malaya Plan, ’social' development expenditure only just 
exceeded that spent on Agriculture and Rural Development, and may 
be explained by the greater emphasis that the Alliance placed on 
wooing the rural Malays in the wake of the 1959 General Election 
defeat.
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Table 8.1 demonstrates the remarkable congruity between all 
Peninsular Malaysia's national socio-economic development Plans 
between 1958 and 1980. In terms of sectoral allocations and attain­
ments, the Plans are very similar, and it is clear that national 
planning in the post-19^9 period possesses the same basic structure 
as planning pre-1969* Differences between the three earlier Plans 
and the two later Plans lie not in their structure, but solely in 
the amounts of funds allocated and expended. This similarity 
between the pre-1969 and the post-1969 Plans is emphasised by scrutiny 
of the Second Malaysia Plan and the Third Malaysia Plan documents.
The Second Malaysia Plan and the Third Malaysia Plan expressed 
a predilection - now familiar from our knowledge of pre-1969 national 
planning in Peninsular Malaysia - for a sound investment climate 
attractive to foreign capital, for revenue-generating projects, and 
for economic advancement of the Malays whilst still maintaining a 
climate favourable to local - that is, Chinese - private capital.
These emphases were reiterated throughout the Second and Third 
Malaysia Plans.
The Second Malaysia Plan stated that foreign loans and grants 
would be expected to finance approximately 15% of total public 
development expenditure in the Plan period, and stressed that the 
country had a light debt burden and a "substantial holding of foreign 
assets" ( Federation of Malaysia, 1971? p*80 ). These would make 
the country attractive to foreign investors. The attractiveness of
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the country to foreign investment was reiterated in the Third 
Malaysia Plan,^1^  and it was emphasised that the need for external 
capital assistance remained high:
"Despite the success of past development efforts and 
the rapid build-up of domestic resources, the nation 
continues to experience financial and skilled man­
power limitations which could affect the successful 
implementation of the large public sector programme 
of the TMP. Efforts to secure the required level of 
development assistance on concessionary terms from 
all possible sources will therefore be sustained"
( Federation of Malaysia, 1976, p.26l)
The Second and Third Malaysia Plans both stressed that 
allocations of money would be 'prudent', that is to revenue-genera­
ting projects capable of financing themselves. After noting that 
the country was attractive to foreign capital, the Second Malaysia 
Plan pointed out that this should not be considered an excuse for 
profligacy:
"Although the country's capacity to absorb 
additional loans is large and the debt burden 
still light, there is a cost to be paid on all 
borrowed funds. It is justifiable and indeed 
advantageous to borrow as long as there are pro­
jects which are economically viable and productive 
enough to repay the cost. In the Second Malaysia 
Plan, the priorities and needs of the public 
sector programme have been carefully considered 
to ensure that all projects are justified in terms 
of the financial costs involved and the alternative 
uses of resources"
( Federation of Malaysia, 1971, p.80 )
The Third Malaysia Plan restated that public development must be 
'prudent' in the financial sense: "the operations of public corpora­
tions and the commercial enterprises must be based on financial 
viability and social and management accountability" ( Federation of 
Malaysia, 1976, p.280 ),
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The post-1969 Plans reveal also the political necessity of 
bringing about Malay economic advancement without harming the vested
interests of Chinese private capital. The major stated theme of the
New Development Strategy is the augmentation of the economic status 
of the Malays, but - although Chinese private capital is not mentioned 
specifically - the reassurances are there for those who require them:
"Thus an essential ingredient of policy to reach the 
investment targets is the maintenance of a favour­
able economic and political climate in Malaysia.
The surge of investment in 1970 suggests that, as 
the Plan gets underway, there does exist a general 
atmosphere congenial to a strong upward trend in
private investment. The Government is committed to
the continuation and maintenance of this favourable 
atmosphere"
( Federation of Malaysia, 1971» P«92 )
The theme of reassuring private capital was sufficiently important 
for it to be re-iterated in the Foreword to the Third Malaysia Plan:
"The private sector has a crucial role to play in the 
attainment of the nation’s socio-economic goals. The 
active participation of the Malaysian business com­
munity, in combination with foreign private enterprise 
in the history of Malaysia's economic development, is 
indicative of the invaluable contributions that the 
private sector, in partnership with the Government, 
can make to the nation’s progress. The Government is 
fully appreciative of the need to maintain a sound and 
favourable investment climate as an essential pre­
requisite to the existence of dynamic entrepreneurship.
The Government will ensure that the design and implemen­
tation of its policies and programmes conduce towards 
the fuller utilization of the great potential that exists 
in private initiative and enterprise for the socio­
economic development of the country"
( Federation of Malaysia, 1976, p.vi ).
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The present government's faith in private enterprise does not 
extend simply to assuaging Chinese fears over their interests.
Trust in private enterprise is central to present government strategy. 
The activities of the Federal Land Development Authority itself 
are essentially public-financing of Malay private ownership of land. 
Thus can Thillainathan say with reference to the present agricultural 
sector, "generally the role of the public sector in this area 
continues to be one of supporting and/or subsidising activities 
which are based on private ownership"- ( Thillainathan, 1975» P«311 )*
It can be seen from the foregoing that the Second Malaysia 
Plan and the Third Malaysia Plan contain the same basic structure 
as the pre-1969 national Plans. All the Plans - pre-1969 
post-1969 - show a much greater emphasis on 'economic' development 
rather than 'social' development, direct that 'economic' develop­
ment to rural areas rather than urban, stress the need for foreign 
financing and an investment climate attractive to private capital, 
and put the emphasis on financial accountability and revenue-genera­
ting programmes.
The rationale underlying all the Plans is the same. First, 
that socio-economic development must be economically sound. Second, 
that socio-economic development must increase the economic status of 
the politically-powerful Malay community - especially of those in 
rural areas - without stepping on the toes of established Chinese 
economic interest. The overriding political constraint - that of 
choosing a policy of national socio-economic development accepted
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as a compromise by both Malay and Chinese - has not changed since 
Merdeka. Hence, national socio-economic development Plans remain 
the same in their essential characteristics.^ ^
/
The Second Malaysia Plan and the Third Malaysia Plan appear 
to differ from the pre-1969 Plans in two ways only. First, they 
each reveal a willingness on the part of government to increase 
the rate of socio-economic development. Table 6.1 above shows that 
the Second Malaysia Plan contains allocations rather greater than 
those of the First Malaysia Plan, and the increased allocations of
the Third Malaysia Plan over those of the Second Malaysia Plan -
revealed in Table 6.2 above - are particularly noteworthy. The 
two Plans stress also that a guiding concern of the government is 
-to speed up Plan implementation. The Second Malaysia Plan states 
that "major improvements will be undertaken in the planning and 
implementation capacity of the Government" ( Federation of Malaysia, 
1971, p.8 ), and notes that
"the main attention of the Government during the five 
years will therefore be one of expediting implemen­
tation, particularly of the major economic programmes.
Emphasis will be given to breaking bottlenecks which 
hinder the smooth implementation of the Plan"
( Federation of Malaysia, 1971» P*75 )• 
Similarly, the Third Malaysia Plan states that "the Government will 
continue to be watchful of bottlenecks which inhibit the projected 
growth of the economy" ( Federation of Malaysia, 1976, p.35 )•
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However, this is not a real break with the past. It has been 
noted elsewhere that the government reacted to the crisis posed by the 
result of the 1959 General Election by increasing the pace of socio­
economic development. The Alliance government of the day did this by 
raising allocations and by employing quasi-military techniques to bring 
about a rapid, visible impact in rural areas, the purpose being to 
mollify Malay disenchantment with the course of national planning. The 
result was the Second Malaya Plan, which differed from the First Malaya 
Plan, not in structure, but in the increased funds allocated and in the 
more successful implementation of projects.
Viewed in this light, the stress on greater funds and on speedier 
implementation contained in the Second Malaysia Plan and the Third 
Malaysia Plan is not new. It is the standard government response to 
electoral disenchantment with the course and nature of national socio­
economic development planning.
The implication is that the post-1969 Plans differ from the pre- 
1969 Plans in only one real way: the stated objectives of the New 
Development Strategy. This is the only difference between the
Second and Third Malaysia Plans and the pre-1969 Plans. . Present nati­
onal socio-economic development Plans in Peninsular Malaysia state that 
the greatest weight is not on economic growth per se, but on the objec­
tive of restructuring the socio-economic system so as to correct 
historical inter-ethnic imbalance.(-^8) jn particular, the short-term 
socio-economic objectives of the New Economic Policy are stressed because 
of the need to bring about quickly the visible socio-economic advance­
ment of the politically-powerful Malays, if a repetition of the 1969 
crisis is to be averted.
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In 1969 the government of Peninsular Malaysia was faced with the 
same problem as that of 1959s how to tackle the problem of electoral 
dissatisfaction with national socio-economic development planning, 
especially the dissatisfaction exhibited by the Malay community? In 
19591 the government had chosen a development compromise acceptable to 
all, namely the construction of physical infrastructure in the Malay- 
dominated rural areas. In 1969, the problem lay not so much in the 
fact of Malay backlash in the face of lack of socio-economic progress, 
but in the severity of that backlash and in the prospect of more 
serious repercussions. Clearly, a new, more powerful medicine was 
required to calm Malay anger and frustrations. Yet the government's 
hands remained tied by the continuing political necessity that economic 
advancement of the Malays be acceptable to the Chinese also. What was 
needed was a new socio-economic development compromise acceptable to all.
In the wake of the 1959 electoral dissatisfaction the compromise 
had been the construction of physical infrastructure in the Malay- 
dominated rural areas. The 19&9 zuce-riots had shown that this parti­
cular compromise was inadequate. A more vigorous approach was required, 
and in the wake of the 19&9 race-riots the choice fell upon a rapid and 
visible land development programme.
8.3 ■ LAND DEVELOPMENT AND THE FEDERAL LAND DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY - AN ACCEPTABLE SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVEL­
OPMENT COMPROMISE
In May, 19&9 ^he government of Peninsular Malaysia was faced 
with calamity at the polls, The race-riots which followed the Selangor 
State Elections on May 13, 19&9 indicated great electoral dissatis­
faction with the style of national development planning since Merdeka.
39k
Proximate causes of the disturbances were numerous, but the underlying 
reason was seen to be the inter-ethnic imbalance prevalent in the 
socio-economic system. The government's dilemma lay in choosing a 
response suited to the challenge thrown down by the electorate, especi­
ally that expressed by the Malay community.
The response to the May, 1969 crisis had to be selected with care,
for it had to satisfy certain criteria peiculiar to socio-economic
development in Peninsular Malaysia. The crisis was mainly political,
and was seen to consist primarily of Malay dissatisfaction with the fact
that economic growth seemed to have passed by them. Thus, the first
imperative of the new approach was that it had to embody an element of
redistribution of economic power favourable to the Malay community. Yet
the May 196 9 race-riots had not altered the fact that in the short term
(199)the Chinese still enjoyed economic paramountcy. ' Consequently, in 
order that Chinese private capital should not take fright, the second 
imperative of the new approach was that it had also to leave Chinese 
economic interests well alone. In addition, the 1969 Malay political 
backlash had been much more severe than that of 1959» so a third impera­
tive was that the new approach achieve a rapid and visible effect in the 
Malay-dominated rural areas.
To these political imperatives could be added the government's 
traditional liking for economic rigour, attraction of foreign capital 
and revenue-generating projects, a liking which dictated that - if at all 
possible - the new approach be sound economically as well as acceptable 
politically.
Land development answered all the political requirements of the 
situation. Bahrin has pointed out that in Southeast Asia land development
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is a convenient instrument for maintaining the political status quo 
(Bahrin, 1972, p.l), and this point is particularly apposite in the 
context of Peninsular Malaysia's politics. First, public development 
of State land leading to private ownership was very acceptable to the 
Malays, the bumiputra for whom land-ownership has a very high status. 
Second, to the Chinese, development of State or Federal land did not 
impinge on vested Chinese interest, and thus was to them an acceptable 
mechanism for directing some economic advantage to the Malays. Third, 
development of previously little-used forest regions necessarily had 
a major impact on the landscape of rural areas, and thus satisfied the 
imperative for visible and speedy socio-economic development of the 
Malays. (^0) Thus land development was in all respects a politically 
sound investment.
Land development had an additional attraction in the government's 
eyes, in that it was also a sound investment economically. If under­
taken properly, public sector land development could prove a rich fount 
of revenue for the country, What is more, land development made use of 
two resources which Peninsular Malaysia had in abundance - underused 
public land and underutilized rural labour - and it had been proven 
that the capital costs of developing these resources - though great - 
could be recouped eventually, with considerable profit.
Land development, in Peninsular Malaysia was not new in 1969 > but 
its potential - especially political potential - had not been exploited 
fully. In the aftermath of the May, 1969 race-riots the government cast 
around for new approaches, and the very success of the Federal Land 
Development Authority during the 1960s was sufficient cause to adopt 
land development by FELDA as a main vehicle for putting the New 
Development Strategy into practice.
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The premier position of the Federal Land Development Authority 
on the socio-economic development scene in Peninsular Malaysia stems 
from its ability to implement the politico-economic compromise, land 
development. Chapter 2 revealed that there are other land development 
agencies in Peninsular Malaysia, but only FELDA can satisfy all the 
requirements placed upon land development by the government. The 
Authority has been selected as Peninsular Malaysia’s main socio-economic 
development agency for several reasons.
First, as was noted in Chapter 2, the Federal Land Development 
Authority had ironed out the difficulties inherent in the practical 
implementation of land development prior to 1969* Indeed, FELDA had 
featured once before as part of a government response to electoral 
dissatifaction. It is no coincidence that the start of FELDA's 
Development Stage coincided with the Second Malaya Plan, which Plan 
required increased rural development in the aftermath of the 1959 elec­
toral dissatisfaction:
"The- main strategy of the Plan was rural development 
with an allocation of about 50 pe^ : cent of the total 
investment, in order of priority, for land develop­
ment and settlement, agriculture, rural roads, water 
supply, clinics, schools and other utility services.
The execution of such a programme requires * experience 
and expertise. FELDA, therefore, with its wide exper­
ience and competence gained over the years, became the 
logical choice of the Government as its agency for the 
planning and implementation of all the schemes in the 
country"
(Bahrin and Perera, 1977» p.17)*
The Second Malaysia Plan noted that the Authority had enjoyed in 
the 1960s success not always achieved by other agencies (for example, by 
fringe alienation schemes), and it was logical that the government should 
look to FELDA again as its most experienced and capable agency for accel­
erating rural development post-1969.
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Second, FELDA was the only agency capable of tackling successfully 
the development of remote regions. The development of the ’backwoods’ 
was forced partly by the lack of large areas of suitable, unalienated 
land in the West Coast States, and partly by the political imperative 
of being seen to do something for the rural Malays. Economies of scale 
and political requirements both pointed to the Malay-dominated, rural 
and backward East Coast States. Such areas necessitated the 'package- 
deal’ approach if land development were to be successful, and only FELDA 
was capable of implementing such land development on the required scale.
Third, the Federal Land Development Authority’s mode of operation 
fitted the many pressing political requirements. The Authority takes 
State land in trust, develops it with the use of Federal funds, then 
passes it to the settler, who retains title. The settler becomes ulti­
mately the owner-ocoupler of a small-holding growing commercially 
valuable tree-crops at a level of efficiency akin to that of a planta­
tion, and so his desire for land and his demand for a higher income 
are satisfied in one operation. The severity of the May, 19&9 backlash 
meant that this latter factor - enhancement of rural Malay income as a 
means of redirecting economic wealth - had to take priority.
Lim Sow Ching's 1976 analysis has shown that public investment 
in FELDA-type land development is the most profitable commercially, and 
that FELDA is more capable than other agencies of enhancing the incomes 
of rural Malays via land development. Thus, in the wake of the 19&9
electoral dissatisfaction the Authority was seen by the government to 
satisfy the many political requirements forced upon it, particularly 
that of being seen to raise Malay incomes as part of the correction of 
imbalance in the socio-economic system.
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In addition, FELDA development had the attraction of "being 
economically viable for the country. Rudner notes that "FELDA was 
originally expected to yield an accounting ’profit' in the finest tradi­
tion of colonial enterprise" (Rudner, 1975c, p.326). The Authority may 
have political rationale, but economic viability remains imperative if 
the enhancement of Malay incomes is not to involve wasteful government 
subsidy. However, there is no fear on that score, for the Authority 
plays to Peninsular Malaysia's strengths! vast experience in cultivation 
of valuable tree-crops, primarily rubber and oil-palm, for which the 
country has cornered a large slice of the world market.
Several authorities have shown that land development by the 
Federal Land Development Authority is economically very profitable.
Singh found that FELDA development was economically advantageous on 
cost-benefit analysis (Singh, 1968), and more recently Bahrin and Perera 
have noted that the high cost of FELDA development is more than offset 
by the economic and social returns (Bahrin and Perera, 1977). The 
economic returns are particularly high when advantage can be taken of 
large-scale operations, as on the regional development projects of the 
Jengka Triangle model. Quoting the FELDA Annual Report for 1967» Bahrin 
notes that:
"Development of the Triangle represents an objective 
investment of Federal funds that can generate ample 
repayment capacity and earn foreign exchange"
(Bahrin, 1971* p.32)/202^
The Federal Land Development Authority is Peninsular Malaysia's 
main socio-economic development agency because it is that agency best 
fitted to implement land development, the socio-economic development 
compromise selected in the wake of the 1969 race-riots. The severity
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of the 1969 electoral dissatisfaction necessitated that the government 
he seen to correct inter-ethnic socio-economic imbalance. The mere 
construction of physical infrastructure - roads, bridges, mosques, 
playing fields - was not the solution that it had been in 1959: the
visible economic advancement of the Malays - particularly the raising 
of rural Malay incomes - was imperative after May 13> 19^9* The promul­
gation of the New Development Strategy -with the New Economic Policy as 
its core - satisfied Malay demands on paper. However, the difficulty 
was the perennial problem of conversion of words into deeds without 
harming Chinese economic interests,
The foregoing has shown that land development was selected as
the acceptable compromise, and that the Federal Land Development
Authority stood out as the only agency capable of putting the compromise 
into practice. Thus, the status of FELDA arises from the fact that the 
Authority embodies the compromise solution acceptable in the socio­
economic/political climate of Peninsular Malaysia today,
8.4 THE ABILITY OF THE FEDERAL LAND DEVELOPMENT 
AUTHORITY TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE ATTAINMENT OF 
THE OBJECTIVES OF THE NEW DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY
8,4a The Present Role of the Federal Land
Development Authority
It is well to remind ourselves here of the exact stated aim of 
national socio-economic development planning in modern Peninsular 
Malaysia. National planning is guided by the New Development Strategy, 
which has the long-term aim of welding Peninsular Malaysia's plural 
society into a nation. This nation-building is to be achieved partly by
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the long-term aims of Rukun Negara, hut mainly by the short-term 
objectives of the New Economic Policy. The severity of the 1969 race- 
riots indicated great electoral dissatisfaction with the style of 
national development planning, and forced the government to state 
publicly the methods it would adopt to correct the inter-ethnic imbal­
ance in the socio-economic system. There can be little doubt that 
national unity will arise only from the correction of socio-economic 
imbalance, and that failure to correct such imbalance presages disaster.
Development planning before 1969 failed to create national unity 
because it persisted with policies which maintained inter-ethnic 
imbalance. Planning put the emphasis on economic growth, whilst per­
petuating the basic socio-economic framework. This approach worked 
well in the pre-Merdeka period, when the British had acted as buffer 
and mediator between Malay and non-Malay. However, it should not have 
been allowed to persist into the post-independence years. Chapter 4 
has shown the manner in which colonial planning policies were carried 
virtually intact into the late 1960s.
The first General Election in independent Peninsular Malaysia was 
that of 1959, at which the dissatisfaction of certain sections of the 
population with the nature of national planning was manifested by 
partial Alliance failure at the polls. The greatest dissatisfaction 
was felt by rural Malays, and the government had to seek a way of 
answering the electoral challenge.
The course chosen was a rapid increase in the pace of rural 
development. Implementation was speeded up by allocating more funds 
and by reducing bureaucratic controls. However, the structure of 
national development planning was not altered fundamentally. Nor could
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it be, for the economic power of the Chinese dictated, that economic 
advancement of the Malays must not impinge upon Chinese vested 
interests, Thus the construction of physical infrastructure in the 
Malay-dominated rural areas was a politically-inspired socio-economic 
compromise which in the short-term satisfied Malay demands for economic 
development whilst being accepted by the Chinese. The government had 
apparently withstood electoral dissatisfaction simply by stepping up 
the pace of existing programmes.
The 1969 General Election brought a second manifestation of 
electoral discontent with national socio-economic planning, but this 
time the reaction was much more severe. The May, 1969 race-riots showed 
that Malay demands for socio-economic equality could not be disregarded. 
It was imperative that the government put forward policies which would 
actually go some way towards correction of the socio-economic imbalance 
at the heart of the predicament. Thus the government promulgated its 
New Development Strategy, with the New Economic Policy as its major 
theme, and stated explicitly that future national development planning 
policy would be to correct inter-ethnic imbalance in the socio­
economic system so as to create national unity.
The main contrast between the electoral dissatisfaction of 1959 
and that of 1969 was that the latter was expressed much more force­
fully, Consequently* • the requirement for remedial policies was much 
more pressing than it had been ten years before. However, other than 
that, conditions had not changed! any socio-economic advancement of 
the Malays would have to meet with Chinese acceptance if it were to be 
implemented without further political ruction.
kQ2
The government of 1969 one "bis advantage over that of 1959 
- the knowledge gained from the 1959 experience. The response to the 
1959 dissatisfaction had "been to step up the implementation of policies 
the structure of which had been pronounced sound. This accelerated 
pace of development was enshrined in the Second Malaya Plan, which 
embodied the political compromise accepted at that time, namely con­
struction of infrastructure in Malay-dominated rural areas,
In the light of the apparent success of the 1959 response to 
electoral dissatisfaction, viz. acceleration of the rate of development 
without fundamental restructuring, the government seemed to have an 
efficient model. Consequently, the 1969 response mirrored that of 
1959'* "to implement a socio-economic compromise capable of satisfying 
Malay demands whilst leaving Chinese interests alone. However, the 
construction of rural physical infrastructure clearly did not go far 
enough: a more vigorous attempt to redirect some wealth at least to
the Malays was vital, Land development by the Federal Land Development 
Authority was known to be able to raise considerably the incomes of 
poor Malays, and so FELDA became the favoured son of national socio­
economic development planning in Peninsular Malaysia.
The government response in 1969 differed from that of 1959 only 
in the fact that emphasis was shifted away from the construction of 
rural physical infrastructure per se towards an emphasis upon land 
development, with its promise of land-ownership and higher incomes for 
rural Malays. Otherwise, the response to electoral dissatisfaction 
remained one of attempting to bring about socio-economic development 
of the Malays in situ, that is by concentrating upon rural economic 
development of the Malays,
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The shift in emphasis from infrastructure construction per se to 
land development by FELDA is an intra-sectoral shift only. It does 
not alter the fact that present policy hangs still upon socio-economic 
advancement of the Malays by speeding up development of rural areas, so 
as not to harm Chinese economic interests. The switch to land develop­
ment by FELDA as the major vehicle for achieving Malay socio-economic 
advancement is necessitated by the more urgent political environment 
in the post-1969 period.
It was stated in Chapter 1 (see above, p.67) that
"public or stated goals are often different from actual 
or operative goals. The former can be identified in 
public policy statements, the latter in allocations of 
personnel and financial resources"
(Ness, 1967a, p.88).
Chapter 1 noted that in Peninsular Malaysia today the "public or 
stated goals" are those of the New Development Strategy, with its 
emphasis upon the correction of inter-ethnic socio-economic imbalance 
so as to create national unity. Also, Chapter 1 suggested that the 
"actual or operative goals" (identified in allocations of personnel 
and of financial resources) must coincide with the "public or stated 
goals" if these latter are to be achieved. Chapter 1 emphasised that 
any repetition of pre-1969 national planning policies and programmes - 
which failed to create national unity - would itself fail ultimately.
The Second Malaysia Plan and the Third Malaysia Plan contain 
both the "public or stated goals" and the "actual or operative goals" 
of the New Development Strategy. The former are contained in the writ­
ten assurances of the Plan documents, the latter in the actual alloca­
tions and attainments of the Plans, Comparison between the pre-1969 
national development Plans and the Second and Third Malaysia Plans
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showed, great congruity between them. Table 8.1 shows that all the 
Plans gave approximately equal emphasis to 'economic1 development, 
with 'social' development gathering the crumbs. All the Plans showed 
a preference first for Transport, Communications and Public Utilities, 
with Agriculture and Rural Development taking second place. All the 
Plans accorded great emphasis to the maintenance of a sound invest­
ment climate, the attraction of foreign capital, the concentration upon 
revenie-gen era ting projects, and the continued welcome extended to 
private capital. In all basics these Plans are congruous.
It follows from the foregoing that the Second and Third Malaysia 
Plans do not embody a 'new development strategy' at all, at least as 
regards'short-term "actual or operative goals". These remain synon­
ymous with those of the .pre-1969 Plans. This is potentially disastrous, 
for investigation has shown that continuation of these particular 
"actual or operative goals" maintains the inter-ethnic socio-economic 
imbalance that the New Development Strategy sets out to eradicate as 
the pre-requisite for the creation of national unity in Peninsular 
Malaysia.
Government response to the 1969 electoral crisis was distinguished 
only by the intrasectoral shift to land development, primarily by the 
Federal Land Development Authority, noted above. Otherwise, the 
government response to Malay demands for socio-economic progress mani­
fested in the New Development Strategy remains the same as that imple­
mented in the Second Malaya Plan: accelerating the pace of development
of the Malays whilst keeping them in their rural environment.■ The only 
change is that the switch to land development as the means of achieving 
this in situ socio-economic progress of the Malays acknowledges the more 
pressing requirement for Malay economic progress in the post-1969 period,
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The government's liking for in situ development of the Malays as 
the preferred course of action - at least in the short-term - is "borne 
out by the realities of land development, both by FELDA and by other 
agencies. As regards the Authority, the data presented in Chapter 7 
show that FELDA's activities may be summarised as moving a relatively 
small number of rural Malays from one rural, Malay environment to a 
second, similar environment. The FELDA settler receives benefits in 
terms of better physical and social infrastructure and greatly 
enhanced income, but all in all he remains a rural, Malay agricultural­
ist, albeit wealthier.
Thus, the activities of the Federal Land Development Authority 
of themselves do little to alter inter-ethnic imbalance in Peninsular 
Malaysia's socio-economic system. The Authority's mode of operation 
does not move Malays from a rural environment to an urban, nor from 
primary agricultural activity to activities within secondary and 
tertiary industries. The significant advantage that FELDA's land 
development activity does have over the construction df ‘physical infra­
structure pure and simple - the 1959 response to electoral dissatis­
faction - is that the FELDA settler has actually had his income 
enhanced. Thus, the Authority can be pointed to as a manifestation 
of government preparedness to advance the socio-economic position of 
the Malays in the more hostile political climate of the post-1969 era.
The Federal Land Development Authority does enhance a minority 
of rural incomes, but otherwise does not alter inter-ethnic socio­
economic imbalance significantly through its activities. Indeed, there 
is a danger that FELDA*s activities may compound the socio-economic 
complexity prevalent in Peninsular Malaysia. As long ago as 1965» Ho 
noted that the Authority provided for only a minority of rural peoples,
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and that thus the gap between the Malay primary producers and the 
commercially-oriented immigrant peoples was perpetuated. Ho noted also 
that this fact would lead to the preservation of Malay cultural values 
(Ho, 1965)» Hot long after, the consultants for the Jengka Triangle 
Project warned of the danger of settler incomes being allowed to 
become too high, "leading to a wasteful distribution of income and to 
the creation of a rural elite on FELDA schemes" (Tippetts and Co., et
al, 1967, p.154). More recently, the empirical study of MacAndrews
stressed that FELDA's success
"has led to the creation of a growingly powerful 
privileged class of FELDA settlers, one that 
particularly with the high incomes being received 
is developing into a powerful and perhaps destabi­
lising force on the Malaysian political scene"
(MacAndrews, 1977, p . 366 ) , ^ ^
The ability of FELDA to contribute to attaining the
government's New Development Strategy is of itself limited.
Within the New Development Strategy, FELDA is aimed only at the New 
Economic Policy, and then at only the first of the New Economic 
Policy's two main prongs: the eradication of poverty. The great
bias which FELDA has for ogi situ socio-economic development of Malays 
alone means that it is unable to contribute to the restructuring of 
Peninsular Malaysia's socio-economic system. Even within the field of 
poverty eradication, the Authority's benefits are limited to the 
"fortunate few chosen to be FELDA settlers, in having a permanent job, 
good income, a home, and land of their own" (New Straits Times, 1977b, 
P-7) •
The real role of the Federal Land Development Authority today is 
to act as a short-term compromise between the politically-powerful 
Malays and the economically-powerful Chinese. The present concentration
w
upon land development by FELDA and other agencies gives the Malays 
some of the socio-economic advancement which they crave - in terms of 
income enhancement - without infringing upon established Chinese 
fields of interest.
The political rationale underlying FELDA's activities is nothing 
(20^ 0new. y The main reason behind the Authority's establishment was to 
give assistance to Malays desiring new land for development. Stated 
simply, the Federal Land Development Authority was set up in 1956 
"principally to help the bumiputras" (Barr, 1973> P«590).
The political motive underlying FELDA was noted in 1965 ^y 
Wikkramatileke, Wikkramatileke stated that the Authority's first 
objective was to satisfy the needs of "segments of Malaya's rural folk", 
and stressed that the Authority's programme needed to be interpreted 
in that context (Wikkramatileke, 1965* P*379)*^°^ The political 
status of FELDA has been summarised by MacAndrews*.
"FELDA is and has always been a political organisation 
created to meet a clear political demand for land and 
employment from the predominantly rural Malay that to 
the Malay dominated Government represents its basis of 
voting power"
(MacAndrews, 1977* P*350)*
The I969 race-riots forced the government to reconsider its 
socio-economic development policies, and the severity of Malay voter 
backlash necessitated that rural Malays be shown unequivocally that 
something was being done to redirect economic growth to them. Land 
development of the FELDA model is highly visible, and lends itself 
easily to propaganda purposes, having the great advantage over the 
construction of physical infrastructure pure and simple that it does 
enhance income.
^ 08
In the immediate aftermath of the 19&9 race-riots, new develop­
ment of land hy the Federal Land Development Authority bought valuable 
political breathing-space. However, Chapter 7 has shown that the 
FELDA-style of land development does not of itself help to restructure 
the socio-economic system in any meaningful way. The Authority’s 
settlers may be a "new breed of 'commercial farmers'" (Alladin Hashim, 
1978i p.,3l), but they remain essentially rural agriculturalists in a 
Malay-dominated environment. The New Development Strategy is a forward- 
looking strategem intended to run well beyond the termination of the 
New Economic Policy in I99O. What, then, of the long-term 
ability of the Authority to contribute to attaining the 
government's New Development Strategy?
8 .h-b The Future Role of the Federal Land
Development Authority
The emphasis placed upon the Federal Land Development Authority 
in the years subsequent to the May, 1969 race-riots was a logical 
result of the political climate of the time. There was a short-term 
imperative that Malays - particularly rural Malays - be handed firm 
proof of the government's willingness to bring about the restructuring 
of the socio-economic system which would give Malays a greater share 
of economic power. As one author has noted, land settlement is gener­
ally a useful vehicle for propaganda purposes and is pre-eminent as a 
means of achieving political support in Southeast Asia (Bahrin, 1971)* 
The Federal Land Development Authority has fulfilled this short-term 
role admirably in Peninsular Malaysia.
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However, the race-riots of May, 19&9 “ serious though they were 
- occurred over a decade ago. Ten years is a relatively long time in 
the context of socio-economic development planning in a country such 
as Peninsular Malaysia, for the reason that a new generation of young 
people is coming through to political maturity. It is these new 
voters for whom the New Development Strategy must he aimed in future. 
Consequently, the government must ask itself whether the politically 
expedient socio-economic compromise of the 1970s - land development, 
primarily by FELDA - is valid as the main vehicle for implementing 
the New Economic Policy in the 1980*s and beyond?
The usefulness of land development in Peninsular Malaysia is 
constrained necessarily by the nature of land development. The 
limitations of land development in the context of Southeast Asian 
countries have been expressed by Professor Bahrin (Bahrin, 1971), 
MacAndrews noted that FELDA has a limited time span (MacAndrews, 1977)» 
and as long ago as 196 9 Professor Ungku Aziz observed that
"even if it can considerably increase the rate of its 
ability to settle landless rural population, the FLDA 
is still unlikely to be able to deal with more than 
one fifth of the problem of Malay landlessness"
(Ungku Aziz, 1969, P-^3)*
The Federal Land Development Authority itself recognises the 
limitations upon land development. The Official History of FELDA 
notes that administrative and financial constraints will curb the 
Authority in future (Bahrin and Perera, 1977)> and makes a heartfelt 
plea that land development policy be integrated fully with the over­
all rural development programme (Bahrin and Perera, 1977).
These comments refer primarily to the pace at which land develop­
ment by FELDA is implemented, the implication being that land development
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cannot be undertaken rapidly enough to have a significant long-term 
effect. This study has shown that the long-term future is limited 
not only by an inability to implement land development sufficiently 
rapidly, but also by the reality that land development per se is not a 
suitable vehicle for the creation of national unity under the New 
Development Strategy, Land development does not of itself alter 
significantly the inter-ethnic socio-economic imbalance between Malay 
and non-Malay which prevents national unity.
It is apparent from the history of national planning in 
Peninsular Malaysia that the politically-powerful Malays will not be 
deflected from their goal by palliatives, Since Merdeka, the Malays 
have demanded consistently that the socio-economic imbalance inherited 
from the colonial past be corrected, so that they might gain more 
economic power. Chapter 7 bas shown that the activities of FELDA do 
not themselves bring about restructuring of the socio-economic system 
in any meaningful way. Ergo, the limitations of the Federal Land 
Development Authority within the New Development Strategy stem from 
the inherent inability of land development to bring about the correc­
tion of inter-ethnic socio-economic imbalance which national unity in 
Peninsular Malaysia demands,
It is this fundamental factor - that FELDA's land development 
activities cannot of themselves contribute to significant socio­
economic restructuring - which limits the Authority's future role. The 
history of socio-economic development in Peninsular Malaysia is a cata­
logue of economically sound projects which - although acceptable as 
political compromises in the short-term - were not socially sound, in 
that they did not undertake the socio-economic restructuring which 
necessitated the implementation of the political compromise in the 
first place.
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The government must recognise that land development "by the 
Federal Land Development Authority - politically and economically 
attractive in the short-term - does not offer a long-term solution 
to the socio-economic problems of the country. It maintains the 
basic socio-economic subdivision between rural/Malay and urban/ 
Chinese and the politically powerful Malay electorate will not be 
duped for ever into believing that the income enhancement of the 
"fortunate few" FELDA settlers compensates for maintenance of overall 
socio-economic imbalance. Consequently, the role of the Federal 
Land Development Authority in the development of future national 
unity in Feninsular Malaysia must lie firmly in the present. In 
this respect, FELDA still has a vital role - perhaps the most vital 
role - to play. However, it is imperative that the government 
recognise FELDA1s limitations now, and that the government does not 
continue to burden the Authority with responsibilities which - in 
the final analysis - it cannot meet, and which it was not designed 
to meet. The Federal Land Development Authority cannot be expected 
by the government to implement unaided in rural areas the govern­
ment's Hew Development Strategy - particularly the Hew Economic 
Policy - and attention must be turned to those mechanisms which 
must support - and ultimately replace - the Authority. Otherwise, 
at the end of the day the strenuous efforts of FELDA will count 
for nought.
The government can still avail itself of FELDA's short-term 
political and economic strengths. The highly visible land develop­
ment undertaken by the Authority in the Malay-dominated, rural
if 12
East Coast States - coupled with the fact that the Authority does 
actually enhance settler incomes - may he used legitimately to 
calm Malay resentment while other restructuring aspects of the New 
Development Strategy are implemented. Similarly, FELDA*s proven 
ability to earn foreign exchange can be used to generate funds for 
those mechanisms which are needed to support and replace the Author­
ity. However, the palliative nature of land development must be 
acknowledged: short-term political calmness induced by land
development (and other programmes) should not be assumed mistakenly 
to indicate long-term national unity, and the funds generated by 
FELDA must be used well and wisely to build firm foundations for 
the nation.
The large-scale regional development projects of the Jengka 
Triangle model hold one key to nation-building in Peninsular 
Malaysia, but only if they are implemented with an eye-firmly to 
the future. These projects have many political dnd economic 
strengths in the short-term : political ’visibility1 in Malay-
dominated rural areas; political acceptance among Chinese entre­
preneurs; economically sound use of abundant land and labour 
resources; and a firm economic foundation in revenue-generating 
Federal Land Development Authority projects.
However, it must be recognised that the Federal Land Develop­
ment Authority is only the foundation of these regional projects; 
FELDA cannot guarantee their long-term viability, nor is this the 
Authority's role. Wikkramatileke has noted that "vibrant patterns 
of urban living and industrial growth must be dove-tailed with the
k 13
agricultural sector", and has observed that - in the regional
context - the developments ancillary to the FELDA development are
more important ( Wikkramatileke, 1972b, p.500 ). This cannot be
doubted. It is imperative that the new towns and secondary and
tertiary industries planned for these new regions be considered not
merely ancillary to FELDA, but as the reason for the Authority’s
present activities. There is little point in FELDA providing a
(207)
firm foundation if nothing is placed on that foundation.
There is evidence to suggest that the support mechanisms 
which are imperative to the future of Peninsular Malaysia’s regional 
development projects are not being implemented to schedule. The 
government must turn its attention to this urgent task, and must 
strive to construct the socio-economic superstructure for which the 
Authority's activity is the basis, before the basis itself crumbles. 
Otherwise, the long-term result will be a new, educated and articu­
late - but disenchanted - rural Malay electorate which will not 
be blinded by a few highly visible FELDA schemes into thinking that 
the fundamental socio-economic imbalance has been eradicated.
The development of the support mechanisms is the government's
responsibility, not that of the Federal Land Development Authority.
It is imperative that the government make good use of its chosen
weapon of politico-economic compromise - land development by
FELDA - to bring about socio-economic reform before that weapon's
( 209)
keen edge is blunted by time.v
8.5 CONCLUSION
The foregoing has been a critique of national socio-economic 
development planning, land development, and nation-building in 
Peninsular Malaysia. The study has focussed on the ability of 
Peninsular Malaysia's premier development agency - the Federal 
Land Development Authority - to implement the government's New 
Development Strategy in the Malay-dominated rural areas, paying 
particular attention to the two goals of the New Economic Policy: 
poverty eradication and the restructuring of society. The assess­
ment was deemed imperative due to the great reliance placed upon 
FELDA by the government as the main vehicle for achieving these 
objectives of government policy in the post-1969 period.
The main conclusion reached in this study was that the 
utility of the Federal Land Development Authority in this respect 
is limited. FELDA has a short-term role to play as a politico- 
economic compromise between the main communities. The limitations 
inherent in the land development approach constrain the Authority's 
ability to cause itself the restructuring of the socio-economic 
system necessary for the achievement of the government's ends. 
However, FELDA may be able to buy valuable time for the vigorous 
implementation of the New Economic Policy's restructuring object­
ives.
The comparison between the pre-1969 Plans and the post-1969 
Plans has revealed the continuation of the basic planning ethos 
which has permeated national socio-economic development in Peninsular
M 5
Malaysia since the colonial era. Planning in the British period 
( the Draft Development Plan ) and immediately after independence 
( the First Malaya Plan ) followed policies cast firmly in the 
colonial mould, policies which maintained necessarily the status 
quo of inter-ethnic socio-economic imbalance which itself is at . 
the root of Peninsular Malaysia's predicament.
The fine balance within Peninsular Malaysia's plural society 
has been the main factor determining planning policy. Malay polit­
ical power - especially in rural areas - has been nearly matched by 
Chinese economic power, in such a way that the main aim of planning 
has always been the selection of a political compromise which would 
give economic advancement to the Malays without harming Chinese 
private economic interests. However, policies which have led to 
economic growth have not resulted in social restructuring, the 
absence of which caused the necessity for political compromise in 
the first instance.
The vigorous rural Malay electorate has shown itself unwilling 
to accept short-term palliatives in place of true long-term correction 
of imbalance in the socio-economic system. The Alliance responded 
to the 1959 rural Malay voter dissatisfaction simply by stepping up 
development of rural physical infrastructure, the long-term unsuita­
bility of which as a satisfier of Malay economic desires was proven 
by the race-riots of May, 19&9* Clearly, the rural Malays will not 
accept jLn situ development which ultimately does not cure their 
feelings of inferiority vis-a-vis non-Malay - primarily Chinese - 
economic power.
JfI6
The government responded to the Malay voter disenchantment of 
May, 1969 by promulgating the New Development Strategy, which has as 
its core a New Economic Policy aimed at eradicating poverty and at 
restructuring the socio-economic system so as to eliminate the identi­
fication of race with socio-economic function. The comparison between 
the pre-1969 Plans on the one hand, and the Second and Third Malaysia 
Plans on the other, suggests that planning has not changed very much 
in the aftermath of the May, 1969 race-riots. The government’s 1969 
response mirrored that of 1959 • bo step up the pace of rural 
development #  ^10)
The only difference has been the switch from the construction 
of physical infrastructure to an emphasis on land development by
the Federal Land Development Authority as the means of accelerating
(?11 . . .  rural development. This particular modification was necessi­
tated by the greater savagery of the 1969 Malay voter reaction, and 
by the imperative that efforts to improve Malay economic status be 
made visible to rural voters. FELDA - with its ability to enhance 
rural income - was the agency most suited to the fulfilment of the 
short-term need.
However, the real lesson of May, 1969 w a s  that the 1959 short­
term response - accelerating the pace of rural development - had 
been merely a palliative : its long-term ineffectuality had been
proven in short order. The danger is that the lesson may not have 
been learnt, and that too heavy reliance might continue to be 
placed upon land development by the Federal Land Development 
Authority in the belief that this intra-sectoral switch transcends
k I?
the palliative nature of rural development and renders it a panacea; 
The Official History of the Federal Land Development Authority has 
stated :
"Acreages developed and acreages planted are the measures 
that indicate FELDA's achievement and success. With its 
highly impressive developed acreage, FELDA had convinc­
ingly established itself as the most appropriate means 
for the upliftment of the rural sector through land 
development"
( Bahrin and Perera, 1977? P*47 )• 
This statement may well be true in terms of establishing the 
Authority's premier status among land development agencies, but 
"acreages developed and acreages planted" do not establish land 
development itself as the "most appropriate means for the upliftment 
of the rural sector" in Peninsular Malaysia.
There is evidence to suggest that the support mechanisms which 
are imperative to the future of Peninsular Malaysia1s regional 
development projects are not as vigorous - nor as favoured - as 
FELDA. Table 8.2 ( Comparison Between Federal Land Development 
Authority and Regional Development Authorities, Second Malaysia 
Plan ( 1971 - 1975 ) ) shows that FELDA was allocated much more 
money ( M$679.27 millions ) than the combined allocations to 
the four main regional development authorities ( M^249*35 millions ) 
under the Second Malaysia Plan. Moreover, FELDA was able to spend 
nearly all ( 95*0% ) of its large allocation ( see Note (a) to 
Table 8.2 ), whereas the majority of the regional development 
authorities recorded a noticeable shortfall, despite the relatively 
small funds of which they had to dispose. The government must turn 
its attention to remedying this situation, and must strive to con­
struct the socio-economic superstructure which is the responsibility
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Sources and Notes:
(a) Note that these are the revised allocations, not the 
original allocations presented in the Second Malaysia 
Plan (1971-1975)* Therefore, the revised allocation 
to FELDA under the Second Malaysia Plan (1971-1975) 
is rather greater than the original allocation of 
M#582.42 millions, and if the Authority’s actual 
expenditure under the Second Malaysia Plan (1971-1975) 
is compared with the original allocation, then FELDA’s 
Second Malaysia Plan (1971-1975) expenditure was 110.8% 
of the original allocation.
(b) Estimated.
Source: Federation of Malaysia, 1976, Table 16-3*
Malaysia: Public Development Expenditure 
for Agricultural Programmes. 1971-1980.
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of the regional development authorities, and for which FELDA's 
activity is the "basis, before the basis itself crumbles/
Otherwise, the long-term result will be a new, educated and articu­
late - but disenchanted - rural Malay electorate which will not be 
blinded by a few highly visible FELDA schemes into thinking that 
the fundamental socio-economic imbalance has been eradicated.
It cannot be over-emphasised that for the Malaysian government 
to continue to rely upon land development by FELDA as by far the 
major means of achieving government objectives in the Malay-dominated 
rural areas is a dangerous course indeed. The Authority was 
created in 1956, long before the promulgation of the New Development 
Strategy and the New Economic Policy, with limited objectives and 
terms of reference. In the immediate post-1969 years, as the 
government cast around for more vigorous ways of implementing rural 
development, it was understandable that FELDA's very expertise 
should recommend land development by the Authority as a short-term, 
palliative measure. Nevertheless, the Authority cannot be expected 
in the long-term to meet responsibilities for which it was not 
designed, responsibilities placed upon FELDA from above by the 
Malaysian government.
FELDA has borne these additional burdens with a good grace, 
but cannot be expected to carry alone their ever-increasing weight. 
The government chose FELDA as the main plank of rural development 
policy after 1969 because of the Authority's strengths, but these 
same strengths are highly limited in their applicability to the 
government's present purpose. Moreover, land development by FELDA
421
is only one plank of rural development policy, and the many alter­
native approaches - for example, other types of agriculture, hut 
especially the regional development of true urban areas integrated 
with a wide range of secondary and tertiary industries - must be 
tried and tested without delay for their ability to relieve the 
Federal Land Development Authority of the burden which it has 
already carried for far too long.
Section 6.4 above suggested strongly that FELDA is more 
vigorous and more favoured than those agencies and authorities — 
MARA, PEREAS, UDA, and the SEDC’s - which are specifically charged 
with the creation of a Malay commercial and industrial community. 
Similarly, Table 8.2 indicated that FELDA is more favoured and 
more vigorous than those regional development authorities which 
have the specific task of bringing urbanisation and secondary and 
tertiary industries to the Malay—dominated rural areas* True,
Table 8*3 ( Comparison Between Federal Land Development Authority 
and Regional Development Authorities, Third Malaysia Plan ( 1976 - 
1980 ) does suggest that under the Third Malaysia Plan the regional 
development authorities received a boost : whereas under the
previous Plan they had recorded shortfalls, under the Third Malaysia 
Plan they all overspent ( by 175-2% overall ). However, so did 
FELDA ( by 175*9% ), and both the combined original allocation and 
the combined actual expenditure of the regional development 
authorities was rather less than half of the equivalent for the 
Federal Land Development Authority ( 39-7% and 40.2% respectively ).
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T a b le  8 .3
Sources and Notes:
(a) Estimated.
(b) The source Table for the actual expenditure data did 
not list a figure for the Jengka Triangle Regional 
Authority as regards Third Malaysia Plan (1976-1980) 
actual expenditure.
Sources: Original allocations derived from Federation
of Malaysia, 1976, Table 16-3, Malaysia: 
Public Development Expenditure for Agri­
cultural Programmes. 1971-1980; actual 
expenditures derived from Federation of 
Malaysia, 1981, Table 6-2, Malaysia: Public 
Development Expenditure. 1971-1980.
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The apparent reliance placed upon the Federal Land Develop­
ment Authority by the government of Malaysia gives cause for 
concern. FELDA is a first-class land development authority, but 
should not be relied upon to bring about large-scale, integrated 
rural development ( a task for which the Authority is not designed ), 
nor to achieve the restructuring objectives of the New Economic 
Policy. Agencies such as MARA, PEPNAS, UDA, the SEDC’s, and the 
regional development authorities, are much better suited than 
FELDA to these tasks, and must be allowed to take the weight off 
FELDA as soon as possible if satisfactory long-term results are to 
be achieved.
This study is an extended caveat directed at those concerned 
with national socio-economic development planning in Peninsular 
Malaysia. As David Lim has noted, "the provision of a better rural 
infrastructure is only a necessary but not a sufficient condition for 
eliminating rural poverty" ( Lim, D., 1975» P*6 )• Land develop­
ment by the Federal Land Development Authority - for all its enhance­
ment of income and ability to cause intrasectoral movement of a 
minority of rural Malays - is merely another form of rural infrastruc­
ture construction. The government must beware of being blinded by 
FELDA1s abilities and expertise into 'thinking that land development offers 
a long-term solution to the problem of socio-economic imbalance. FELDA 
was (established long before the New Development Strategy, with certain 
limited objectives, and to imbue the Authority with responsibility for achieving 
new national objectives far beyond its scope is not only unfair on FELDA,
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it is extremely unwise in the Peninsular Malaysian context, Replica­
tion of archaic, colonially-derived planning policy - which maintains 
the imbalance within the socio-economic system - is doomed to ultimate 
failure.
The statement of the New Development Strategy, with the New
Economic Policy as its core, goes a long way towards solving Peninsular
Malaysia's socio-economic problems. On paper at least, the "politics
of ambiguity" (Enloe, 1970, p.7l) no longer operate: long-term goals
(213)have been stated. However, as the 1969 race-riots fade into
memory there may arise the temptation to procrastinate, and put off the 
restructuring programme so as to maintain short-term intercommunal 
political concord. This will be the case especially if the land 
development activities of FELDA and other agencies appear themselves 
to be solving the problem.
The Federal Land Development Authority can be used to buy short­
term political breathing-space, and to generate funds for the imple­
mentation of other aspects of the New Development Strategy, However, 
the mechanisms to support the Authority must be forthcoming, and the
socio-economic restructuring demanded by the Malays must occur if
(214')national unity is to prevail,x J The task will be immensely diffi­
cult, for the socio-economic imbalanoeinherited from the colonial era 
is deep-seated, but the task must not be shirked. Dilatory planning 
and procrastination will put off only temporarily the recurrence of 
the May, 1969 c r i s i s . T h e  New Development Strategy has made a 
start. The government must have the courage and the vigour to see that 
policies are implemented - by those agencies capable of doing so, and 
designed for the task - if the looked-for national unity is to be forged.
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 8
185. Rudner notes that rural development was the "hard core" of the 
Second Malaya Plan (Rudner, 1975a, p.54).
186. The 'economic* emphasis underlying rural planning in Peninsular 
Malaysia at the end of the 1950s and the start of the 1960s was 
emphasised by Ness: "It is not too great an exaggeration to say
that modem Malaya's approach to rural development lies largely 
through road huilding" (Ness, 1964, p.405).
187. In the First Malaya Plan, the government had been concerned with 
evaluating projects "in accounting terms, that is, whether they 
could be afforded, instead of on the basis of their impact on 
development" (Rudner, 1975, P*47).
188. This emphasis upon economic objectives was contrary to the opinion 
of the Mission of the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, which was "mindful that economic planning involves 
the need to maintain an appropriate balance between expenditures 
for production and for social services", and which stated that 
"beyond a point, we cannot propose to substitute future economic 
advantage for present human need" (international Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, 1955, p.137).
189. Lai Chow Pheng notes that the set-backs to the Alliance at the
1959 General Election made it necessary to adopt a policy which
"would provide visible signs of progress in all parts of the 
country, especially in the rural areas" (Lai Chow Pheng, 1977, 
Regional Development and Planning in Pahang, Peninsular Malaysia, 
(M.A. Thesis, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur), p.4).
1'90, "Industrial policy is primarily devoted to the creation of a
suitable investment climate for private enterprise industry"
(Wheelwright, E. L., 1963, Reflections on Some Problems of 
Industrial Development in Malaya, pp.66 - 80 in Malayan Economic 
Review, Volume VIII, Number i, April I963. The reference is on 
p.66).
191. Despite the lack of change in the basic structure of the planning 
approach, the acceleration'-of the pace of development led to annual 
development expenditure by the public sector more than trebling 
between i960 and 1965, and Lo total public development expenditure 
between 1961 and 1965 being more than double that of the previous 
five years (Federation of Malaysia, 1971, p.lO).
192, It has to be admitted that both 'economic' and 'social' develop­
ment targets of the Second Malaysia Plan were overachieved, the 
former by almost half, the latter by just over a third (see Table 
8.1) .
k&?
193■ Table 8.1 reveals that the allocation to 1 economic* development 
ranges from 60.1% of the total (First Malaysia Plan) to 69.2% 
of the total (First Malaya Plan), the average figure for all 
five Plans being 66,5% of total expenditure. The allocation to 
'social* development ranged from 1^.2% of the total (Second 
Malaysia Plan) to 22.8% of the total (Second Malaya Plan), the 
average figure for all five Plans being 18.6% of total expendi­
ture. Note particularly that there is only the merest differ­
ence between the three pre-1969 Plans and the two post-1969 
Plans in terms of allocation to ffeconomic1 development: the
three pre-1969 Plans average 66.0% of total expenditure allocated 
to 'economic* development, whereas the equivalent figure for the 
two post-1969 Plans is 6?.2%. There is greater difference 
between the three pre-1969 Plans and the two post-1969 Plans in 
terms of proportional allocation to 'social' development: the
former average 20.9%, the latter 15.2%. Although data for 
actual expenditures of the Third Malaysia Plan were not available 
at the time of writing, the Mid-Term Review of the Third 
Malaysia Plan, 1976 - 1980 indicated that the Third Malaysia 
Plan was 'right on course* in terms of the traditional sectoral 
biases of development planning in Peninsular Malaysia, The Mid- 
Term Review gave the total estimated expenditure between 1976 
and 1978 as M$ll,819.67 million, of which 73*2% was to 'economic* 
development, 12.6% to 'social' development, and the remainder to 
General Administration and Security (Federation of Malaysia, 
1979"b, Table 18-2, Malaysia: Public Development Expenditure,
1976 - 80).
19^. "The country has substantial capacity to undertake the proposed
levels of borrowing for the TMP ... Factors including the growing 
diversity of Malaysia's export structure, the prospects of growth 
of the national economy, the level of its international reserves 
and its debt service record are equally important considerations 
in determining the country's credit worthiness" (Federation of 
Malaysia, 1976, p.2^6).
195. Chapter VI of the Second Malaysia Plan (Federation of Malaysia, 
1971, PP.82 - 9*0 discusses the role of the private sector, 
pointing out the important part it has played - and must continue
to play - in the development of Peninsular Malaysia.
196. In I963 Fisk noted that "it is a political necessity that any
programme of development should manifestly be to the advantage of
the population in the backward sector" (Fisk, 1963a, p.163), and 
stated that "the result is that all current economic planning is 
coloured by the necessity for a clear and rapid improvement in 
the lot of the rural Malays" (Fisk, 1963a, p.165). Fisk's words 
are as true today as they were almost twenty years ago.
197. Referring to the Second Malaysia Plan, David Lim states: "From
the tone and presentation of the Plan and from its new policies
and its allocation of public development expenditure, it would 
appear that the reduction of inequality in the distribution of 
income and wealth has become the most important objective" (Lim, 
D., 1975, P.8).
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198. By way of contrast, David Lim also observes that the four Plans 
prior to 1970 had the primary aim of economic growth, and that 
"the creation of greater employment opportunities and a more 
equitable distribution of income and wealth was assumed either to 
be compatible with the objective of greater economic growth or to 
be totally unimportant" (Lim, D,f 1975» p.185).
199* Not only that, but that - in the absence of massive expropriation 
of Chinese economic assets in favour of the Malays - the Chinese 
would in actuality continue to control the economy for the 
foreseeable future.
200. MacAndrews has noted FELDA*s"highly visible character", and 
states that "nearly every kampong has one person or knows of 
people in FELDA schemes" (MacAndrews, 1977» p.388).
201. Lim Sow Ching has observed that "it has been widely accepted that 
public-sector investment in land development schemes (particu­
larly the high-cost ones) is uneconomic from the commercial view­
point, its justification being primarily political. The 
estimates of the commercial IRR and B/C ratio do not provide 
support for this belief" (Lim Sow Ching, 1976, p.279)- Lim Sow 
Ching then stated that the expected mean IRRs averaged 8.9%, 7*1% 
and 6.0% respectively on FELDA, State and Fringe schemes (Lim 
Sow Ching, 1976, p.279)* The present author considers that the 
political appeal of FELDA probably outweighs the economic appeal 
slightly, but that FELDAfs commercial profitability is a decided 
bonus for the government as it seeks to find the funds with which 
to satisfy the political constraints under which it labours.
202. In effect, this summarises the views of the consultants for the 
Jengka Triangle: "In conclusion, the development of the Triangle
appears sound as an object of investment of Federal funds in that 
it generates ample repayment capacity. It would require a combi­
nation of very adverse factors to render it financially unsound. 
Given expected prices and revenues from timber taxes, Jengka 
should be able to release funds in addition to repayment commit­
ments, for public investment elsewhere in Malaysia" (Tippetts 
and Co., et al, 1967> P*53)» and, "With the small foreign 
exchange requirements and the large surpluses earned in later 
years, Jengka becomes a very profitable development on foreign 
exchange criteria" (Tippets and Co., et al, 1967, p.5*0*
203. "He is in fact a different species of person that calls for a 
classification of its own, for he is no longer a farmer nor can 
he be said in income, living conditions, or attitude to belong 
to, in any narrow sense, an agricultural occupation, but now 
belongs to a new group of persons or class - the FELDA settler" 
(MacAndrews, 1977 > p.!7l)* The present thesis argues that the 
FELDA settler does remain a rural agriculturalist, and this 
author considers that the quotation cited above exaggerates 
greatly the changes wrought upon the farmer through becoming a 
FELDA settler. However, leaving this criticism aside, the 
present author accepts that the FELDA settler exhibits many 
characteristics which distinguish him from other, less fortunate 
Malay agriculturalists.
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204. "FELDA's own origin and development has teen closely intertwined 
with the special position of the Malay community in Malaysia and 
the political power of that section of the Malaysian population" 
(MacAndrews, 1977, p.368).
205. Wikkramatileke does not mention the Malays specifically, tut that 
the Malays are teing referred to is implied.
206. Professor Bahrin identified shortage of money as the main con­
straint upon implementation of land development: "land-
settlement is a costly undertaking and can be effective only if 
the governments are prepared to provide the necessary funds.
This is the crux of the problem ..." (Bahrin, 1971» P*33)»
Further afield, with reference to Ethiopia Simpson has observed 
that "while settlement can be a useful interim strategy ... it 
does not provide a long-run solution to the country's development 
needs" (Simpson, G., 1976, Socio- Political Aspects of Settlement 
Schemes in Ethiopia and their Contribution to Development, pp.22 
- 40 in Land Reform, Land Settlement and Cooperatives, Number 2, 
The reference is on p.39)*
207. It has been stated that rural location of major industry "can 
prepare the way for and facilitate the permanent migration out 
of agriculture of labour not required for farm production. This 
migration is the ultimate solution to rural underemployment"
(Food and Agricultural Organization, 19&3* Report of the FAQ/
ECAFE Expert Group on Selected Aspects of Agricultural Planning 
in Asia and the Far East, Agricultural Planning Studies, Number 2, 
XUNFAO, RomeX," p .54) . If such additional developments are not 
forthcoming in the regional development projects of the Jengka 
model, then the result of these projects will be ultimate failure. 
With the resources at its disposal, FELDA cannot itself furnish 
the permanency which regional development projects are intended
to have.
208. "Design of regional programmes and the scope of regional planning 
must be coordinated with a national concept of development" 
(Lefeber, L,, and Datta-Chaudhuri, M., i9?li Regional Development 
Experiences and" Prospects in South and Southeast Asia, (Mouton 
and Co., The Hague), p.6).
209. The following quotation seems apt in respect of socio-economic 
development in Peninsular Malaysia since independence: "the 
economic development processes of the fifties and sixties have 
not led to the intended result - massive improvements in the wel­
fare of the poor - but have, if anything, increased inequity" 
(Adelman, I., 1974, On the State of Development Economics,pp.3 - 5 
in Journal of Development Economics, Volume I, Number 1, (p.3))»
If full use is to be made of FELDA's undoubted expertise as a land 
developer in order to redress these imbalances, then the govern­
ment of Peninsular Malaysia must use the Authority to good effect 
during the remainder of the present century.
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210. In 1964 Ness stated that the Ministry of Rural Development's 
programme "required simply that the bureaucracy produce more of 
what it was already capable of producing" (Ness, 1964, p.4li), 
which could be achieved by increasing allocations and cutting red 
tape.
211. Ghee points out that the Malay leadership has been reluctant to 
disrupt rural social systems, so as not to create a radical 
peasantry: "Hence the emphasis on macro-planning in national 
economic policy with a preference for an infrastructural approach 
to rural development. While the later development Plans have 
shifted emphasis from one instrument or method to another, the 
basic policy of Malaysian rural development has changed little 
over the past 20 years" (Chee, 1974, P*13) •
212. Viewed in this light, the following quotations from the Mid-Term 
Review of the Third Malaysia Plan, 1976 - 1980 must be considered 
disturbing, for they indicate that past lessons are still being 
disregarded: "The public sector development programmes represent
direct Government efforts at increasing employment opportunities 
and incomes of the poor and accelerating the pace of restructuring 
Malaysian society. Towards this end, the allocation for public 
development expenditure during the 1976 - 80 period has been 
revised to M$32 .1 billion, representing an increase of 73% over 
the original allocation of M$18.6 billion"; and: "Of the total
revised allocation for public development expenditure, about 67% 
is for the economic sector, 17.4% for social services, 11.8% for 
defence and internal security, and 3-8$ for general administration. 
Agriculture and rural development, including new land development, 
continues to receive the highest priority in order to accelerate 
further the implementation of anti-poverty programmes, especially 
for the less developed states" (Federation of Malaysia, 19791b 
p.24l). Again, such has been the lack of real change in national 
planning in Peninsular Malaysia that words written almost twenty 
years ago - far from appearing dated - remain peculiarly apposite: 
"the present policy is a palliative measure rather than a cure for 
the basic imbalance in the Malayan economic structure" (Fisk,
1963t, P.175).
213. On the debit side, at least one author disagrees that there has
been fundamental change in Peninsular Malaysia's politics: "in
spite of its new links and new leaders, the Barisan Nasional has 
merely succeeded in perpetuating the pattern of politics that has 
existed for the last nineteen years" (Pillay, C., 1974, The 1974 
General Elections in Malaysia - A Post-Mortem, Occasional Paper
No. 25, (institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore). The
reference is on p.19).
214. "'Neutral' government, i.e. one that is not congruent with the
aspirations of the strategic Malay community, could never possess 
political viability in Malaysia. This is the predicament of 
Malaysian multi-racial development" (Chee, 1975* P*3)*
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215. conclusion, it should be emphasised that the development of
a progressive and dynamic rural community is not achieved through 
the establishment of more land development schemes along the 
plantation system, or the establishment of public sector estates 
or the co-operative estates. Nor could such an objective be 
realized by patterning development along the line of least 
resistance or perpetuating the policy of pacification of and 
compromise with the colonial past" (Syed Hussain Wafa, 1975*
P.193).
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APPENDIX I
MAJOR POLITICAL EVENTS CONCERNING 
________PENINSULAR MALAYSIA________
Penang (then Prince of Wales Island) occupied hy British 
East India Company.
Singapore founded hy Sir Stamford Raffles.
Malacca ceded to British by Dutch under terms of Anglo-Dutch 
Treaty.
Penang (and Province Wellesley), Malacca and Singapore com­
bined to form the Colony of the Straits Settlements,
Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Pahang combined to form 
Federated Malay States (F, M, S.).
British control replaced Siam's (Thailand's) suzerainty over 
Kelantan, Trengganu, Kedah and Perlis,
Johore came under British control.
Japanese Occupation.
All States of Peninsular Malaysia (then British Malaya) amal­
gamated to form Malayan Union. Singapore remained a seperate 
Crown Colony.
Malayan Union dissolved, and Federation of Malaya formed from 
the States of Peninsular Malaysia, Singapore remained a 
separate Crown Colony.
19*^ 8 Start of Emergency, an attempted Communist insurrection.
1955 First General Election in Peninsular Malaysia.
1957 Federation of Malaya achieved full independence within the
Commonwealth.
1959 Second General Election in Peninsular Malaysia.
1959 Singapore achieved full independence within the Commonwealth,
1960 End of Emergency,
I963 Federation of Malaya (Peninsular Malaysia), Singapore,
Sarawak and Sabah merge to form Federation of Malaysia.
1963 Start of confrontation with Indonesia, Indonesia objected
to the Federation of Malaysia, and there was a period of 
political, social and economic hostility - though little 
military activity - between the two countries.
1964 Third General Election in Peninsular Malaysia,
1965 Singapore withdraws from Federation.
1966 End of confrontation with Indonesia.
I969 Fourth General Election in Peninsular Malaysia, culminating
in Kuala Lumpur race-riots of May, 1969*
1971 Statement of New Economic Policy (N. E. P.) and of Rukunegara.
197/4, Fifth General Election In Peninsular Malaysia.
1976 Death of Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak, Succeeded by
Deputy Prime Minister, Hussein Onn.
1978 Sixth General Election in Peninsular Malaysia, 21st
Anniversary of Independence.
4 4 2
APPENDIX II
FEDERAL LAND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY 
STATISTICAL SUMMARY, 1977_______
CROP Number of 
Schemes
Area
(Acres)
Number of 
Settlers(a)
Schemes with 
Settlers:
RUBBER 86 311,049 20,347
OIL-PALM 120 589,464 20,941
Sub-total 206 900,513 41,288
Schemes without 
Settlers:
SUGAR CANE 2 12,671
COCOA 1 5,164 -
COFFEE 1 495 -
Sub-total 4 18,330 -
TOTAL 210 918,843 : 41,288
(a) as at 31 March, 1977.
Source: Bahrin and Perera, 1977, Appendix I, Federal Land Development
Schemes, 1977 *
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APPENDIX I I I
POINTS SELECTION SYSTEM FOR 
FELDA SETTLERS - 1974 TO 1977
ELIGIBILITY
FACTOR
HUSBAND TOTAL
POINTS
WIFE
1
TOTAL
POINTS
Health
Factor
Excellent health 
Moderate health 
Poor health 
Physically disabled 
(application will be 
rejected)
(Full points 6)
6
5
2
0
6
Excellent health 
Moderate health 
Poor health 
Physically disabled
(Full points 6)
6
5
2
0
6
Education Secondary school 
(Form 1 and above) 
Primary school 
(Std. 4 to 6)
Other schooling 
standards with ability 
to read and write 
(Full points 4)
■4
2
1
4
Secondary School 
(Form 1 and above) 
Primary school 
(Std. 4 to 6)
Other schooling 
standards with ability 
to read and write 
(Full points 4)
4
2
1
4
Skill Business skill 
Barbering skill 
Tailoring skill
Skill in handicraft 
Carpentry skill 
Mechanical trades skill 
Working skill in rubber 
estates
Working skill in oil- 
palm estates 
(Full points 6)
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
6
Business skill 
Tailoring skill 
Embroi dery/kni tting 
skill
Weaving skill 
Skill in handicraft
(Full points 3)
1
i
1
1
i
3
Background Farmers, Fishermen, 
Ex-servicemen 
Mining Workers, 
Lumbermen 
Labourers, drivers, 
office workers and 
others
(Full points 8)
8
5
3
8
No points
Number of 
Children
3 children and above 
2 children 
1 child
(Full points 3)
3
2
1
3
No points
TOTAL FOR HUSBAND 27 TOTAL FOR WIFE 13
Source: B ahrin  and P e re ra ,  1977» Appendix I I I .
M iles 10
kTRENGGANU
SOEHARTOj
CHENERAll
TEMERtOH'
SEBERfAK
Location of FELDA Schemes
RUBBER SCHEMES  
OIL PALM SCHEMES  
SUGAR-CANE PROJECT 
COCOA PROJECT 
COFFEE PROJECT
PROPOSED PROJECTS 
RESEARCH CENTRE 
REGIONAL OFFICE  
BULKING INSTALLATION  
HEAOQUARTERS  
TRAINING CENTRE  
TRAINING SCHOOL 
RUBBER FACTORY 
PALM OIL MILL
SUGAR CANE MILL
